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ARISTOTLE's

ETHICS AND POLITICS,

15567

COMPRISING HIS

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK.

ILLUSTRATED BY INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES;

THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF HIS LIFE;

AND A NEW ANALYSIS OF HIS SPECULATIVE WORKS;

BY JOHN GILLIES, LL.D.

F. R. S. and S. A. LONDON; F. R. S. EDINBURGH; and
Hiſtoriographer to his Majeſty for SCOTLAND.

Magna animi contentio adhibenda eſt in explicando Ariſtotele.

CICERO FRAGMENT. PHILOSOPH.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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PREFACE.

ARISTOTLE is the moſt voluminous, and generally deemed the moſt obſcure, of all the Greek writers of claſſic antiquity. His imperfect yet copious remains, which are now rather admired than read *, and which were formerly much read and little underſtood, ſtill naturally arrange themſelves in the minds of thoſe capable of digeſting them, under their original form of an encyclopedy of ſcience; in many parts of which, the author's labours are, doubtleſs, excelled by thoſe of modern philoſophers; while in other parts, and thoſe of the moſt important nature, his intellectual exertions remain hitherto unrivalled. It ſeemed high time, therefore, to draw the line between thoſe writings of the Stagirite which

* I except the ſmall but incomparable Treatiſe on Poetry, excellently tranſlated and commented in two recent publications in Engliſh; the books on Rhetoric and the Hiſtory of Animals, to which Mr. Caſſandre and Mr. Camus have reſpectively done juſtice in French; and the Organum, or Logic, ſtill ſtudied in ſome Univerſities.

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which ſtill merit the moſt ſerious attention of the modern reader, and thoſe of which the peruſal is ſuperſeded by more accurate and more complete information. This line I have preſumed to draw in the preſent work, by endeavouring to the beſt of my abilities to tranſlate the former perſpicuouſly and impreſſively, while I contented myſelf with giving a diſtinct and comprehenſive analyſis of the latter.

The "Ethics to Nicomachus and the Politics" ought never to have been disjoined, ſince they are conſidered by Ariſtotle himſelf as forming eſſential parts of one and the ſame work[b]; which, as it was the laſt[c] and principal object of his ſtudies, is of all his performances the longeſt, the beſt connected, and incomparably the moſt intereſting. The two treatiſes combined, conſtitute what he calls his *practical* philoſophy[d]; an epithet to which, in compariſon with other works of the ſame kind, they will be found peculiarly entitled. In the Ethics, the reader will ſee a full and ſatisfactory delineation of the moral

[b] See vol. i. p. 150, and p. 408, & ſeq.

[c] Compare vol. i. p. 408, & ſeqq. and vol. ii. pp. 338, 369. The Magna Moralia and Ethics to Eudemus are chiefly to be conſidered as the firſt imperfect ſketch of this great work.

[d] See vol. i. p. 176. He elſewhere calls it "His Philoſophy concerning Human Affairs." Ibid. p. 408.

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moral nature of man, and of the diſcipline and exerciſe beſt adapted to its improvement. The Philoſopher ſpeaks with commanding authority to the heart and affections, through the irreſiſtible conviction of the underſtanding. His morality is neither on the one hand too indulgent, nor on the other impracticable. His leſſons are not cramped by the narrow, nor perverted by the wild, ſpirit of ſyſtem; they are clear inductions, flowing naturally and ſpontaneouſly from a copious and pure ſource of well-digeſted experience.

According to the Stagirite, men are and always have been not only moral and ſocial, but alſo *political* animals; in a great meaſure dependent for their happineſs and perfection on the public inſtitutions of their reſpective countries. The grand inquiry, therefore, is, what are the different arrangements that have been found under given circumſtances, practically moſt conducive to theſe main and ultimate purpoſes? This queſtion the Author endeavoured to anſwer in his "Politics," by a careful examination of two hundred ſyſtems of legiſlation, many of which are not any where elſe deſcribed; and by proving how uniformly, even in political matters, the reſults of obſervation and experiment

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periment conſpire with and confirm the deductions of an accurate and full theory. In this incomparable work, the reader will perceive "the genuine ſpirit of laws" deduced from the ſpecific and unalterable diſtinctions of governments; and with a ſmall effort of attention, may diſcern not only thoſe diſcoveries in ſcience, unjuſtly claimed by the vanity of modern writers [e], but many of thoſe improvements in practice [f], erroneouſly aſcribed to the fortunate events of time and chance in theſe latter and more enlightened ages. The ſame invaluable treatiſe diſcloſes the pure and perennial ſpring of all legitimate authority; for in Ariſtotle's "Politics," and HIS *only*, government is placed on ſuch a natural and ſolid foundation,

[e] Compare, for example, the works of the modern œconomiſts, not excepting thoſe of Hume and Smith, with the Fifth Book of the Ethics, p. 270, and the Firſt Book of the Politics, p. 38, & ſeq. Compare Monteſquieu's Spirit of Laws with Books iii, vi, and viii, of the Politics throughout: and judge whether the admirable French work be, as the Author's motto boaſts, "Proles ſine matre creata." Compare likewiſe Machiavel's "Prince," with the laſt chapters of Book vii. of the Politics, p. 374, & ſeqq. from which the Italian treatiſe is entirely copied. Yet none of all thoſe Authors acknowledge their obligations to Ariſtotle.

[f] For the doctrine of repreſentative government, (with which the ancients are ſaid to have been totally unacquainted,) ſee the following tranſlation, vol. ii. pp. 64, & ſeqq. 304, & ſeqq. and 408, & ſeqq. For that of governments of reciprocal controul, ſee p. 293, & ſeqq.

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tion, as leaves neither its origin incomprehenſible, nor its ſtability precarious: and his concluſions, had they been well weighed, muſt have ſurmounted or ſuppreſſed thoſe erroneous and abſurd doctrines which long upheld deſpotiſm on the one hand, and thoſe equally erroneous and ſtill wilder ſuppoſitions of conventions and compacts, which have more recently armed popular fury on the other.

But our Author's principles and doctrines will ſpeak convincingly for themſelves. The intention of this Preface is merely to explain the plan and object of the preſent performance; which, beſides giving a tranſlation of Ariſtotle's practical philoſophy, contains a new analyſis of his ſpeculative works. This addition appeared the more neceſſary, becauſe the Stagirite's intellectual ſyſtem is ſo compactly built, and ſo ſolidly united, that its ſeparate parts cannot be completely underſtood, unleſs the whole be clearly comprehended. The writings indeed here tranſlated, ſtand more detached and more independent than almoſt any other; yet, without the aid of the prefixed "Analyſis," even the Ethics and Politics would require frequent, almoſt perpetual elucidation. The reader, I feared, would be ſoon tired with the

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unconnected prolixity of notes[s]; he will, I hope, be entertained by the Analyſis even of thoſe treatiſes to which, independently of any ſubſtantial utility, his attention may be ſtill allured by a liberal and commendable curioſity.

In my work throughout, I am ambitious of exhibiting fully, yet within a narrow compaſs, the diſcoveries and attainments of a man deemed the wiſeſt of antiquity; and to whom, even in modern times, it will be eaſier to name many ſuperiors in particular branches of knowledge, than to find any one rival in univerſal ſcience. Conſidered under this general aſpect, my "Engliſh Ariſtotle" is the natural companion and fit counterpart to my "Hiſtory of Ancient Greece;" ſince the learning of that country properly terminates in the Stagirite, by whom it was finally embodied into one great work; a work rather impaired than improved by the labours of ſucceeding ages. My time, I acknowledge, was miſerably miſ-

ſpent

[s] I have alſo avoided to ſwell my work with hiſtorical notes; a thing as eaſy as it is uſeleſs. Ariſtotle relates with the utmoſt preciſion, the particulars neceſſary for juſtifying his concluſions; and to introduce other events and circumſtances, altogether unconnected with the ſubject, appears to me to be better calculated for diſplaying an author's erudition, than for informing the mind of his reader.

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ſpent in examining his numerous commentators[h]; Greek, Arabic, and Latin; but the attention with which I have many times peruſed the whole of his invaluable remains, with a view of rendering him a perpetual commentary on himſelf, and thereby expreſſing his genuine ſenſe clearly and forcibly, will not, I hope, prove uſeleſs to thoſe who ſtudy Greek literature on an enlarged and liberal plan; not merely as grammarians and philologiſts, but as philoſophers, moraliſts, and ſtateſmen. To this claſs of readers, many pages of the preſent work are peculiarly addreſſed; but the far greater part of it, bearing an immediate reference to the people at large, will not, it is hoped, by the public, be either unregarded or unapplied; eſpecially in an age when, through the ardent activity of the preſs, ſalutary information, whatever be its *original* form, ſpeedily circulates to all claſſes of the community in *new* and fit channels.

PORTMAN-STREET,
September 1797.

J. G.

[h] I am diſpenſed from the neceſſity of ſpeaking of former tranſlations of the Ethics and Politics, becauſe I have not borrowed a ſingle ſentence, nor derived the ſmalleſt aſſiſtance, from any of them. The Ethics, which is incomparably the more difficult work of the two, has never, as far as I know, been tranſlated into any modern language.

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ERRATA in VOL. I.

Page 98. line 18. *for* acceſſaries *read* acceſſories
108. — 7 of the note, *for* εναντωσις *read* εναντιωσεις
109. — 4 of the note, *for* ἰνατοι *read* ἰαυτοι
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216. — *antepenult. for* Scyonians *read* Sicyonians

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THE

WORKS

OF

ARISTOTLE.

CHAP. I.

LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.

ARGUMENT.

Ariſtotle's birth-place—His education at Atarneus—at Athens—His reſidence with Hermeias—Singular fortune of that Prince—Ariſtotle's reſidence in Leſbos—in Macedon—Plan purſued in the education of Alexander—Ariſtotle's reſidence in Athens—Employment there—Calumnies againſt him—His retreat to Chalcis, and death—His teſtament—Sayings—Extraordinary fate of his Works—Publiſhed at Rome by Andronicus of Rhodes—Their number and magnitude.

CHAP. I. Introduction.

IT is my deſign in the preſent work to give a more diſtinct, and, I flatter myſelf, a juſter view, than has yet been exhibited, of the learning of an age, the moſt illuſtrious in hiſtory for great events and extraordinary revolutions, yet ſtill more pre-eminent in ſpeculation than it is renowned in action. A century before the reign of Alexander the Great, there ſprang

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CHAP. I.

up and flouriſhed in Greece a ſpecies of learning, or ſcience, totally unlike to any thing before known in the world. This ſcience was carried to its higheſt perfection by Ariſtotle: it decayed with the loſs of his writings, and revived with their recovery. But the imperfect and corrupt ſtate of thoſe writings rendered them peculiarly liable to be miſinterpreted by ignorance, and miſrepreſented by envy; his philoſophy, therefore, has been leſs frequently inculcated or explained, than diſguiſed, perverted, and calumniated. It has not certainly, ſince his own time, received any material improvement. To the philoſophical works of Cicero, though that illuſtrious Roman profeſſes to follow other guides, the world at large is more indebted for a familiar notion of ſeveral of Ariſtotle's moſt important doctrines, than to the labours of all his commentators* collectively. But how looſe and feeble (and often how

* All theſe commentators lived many centuries after Ariſtotle. They are Greek, Arabic, and Latin. The firſt began in the age of the Antonines, in Alexander Aphrodiſienſis at Rome, and Ammonius Sacchus in Alexandria; they continued to flouriſh through the whole ſucceſſion of Roman emperors, under the once revered names of Aſpaſius, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, the ſecond Ammonius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. Ariſtotle was ardently ſtudied, or rather ſuperſtitiouſly adored, by the Saracens, during upwards of four centuries of their proud domination, till the taking of Bagdat by the Tartars in 1258. The names of the Arabian commentators, Alfarabius, Avicenna, and Averroes, long reſounded even in the ſchools of Europe. But the Ariſtotelian philoſophy, or rather logic, had early aſſumed a Latin dreſs in the tranſlation of Boethius Severinus, the laſt illuſtrious conſul of Rome, in the beginning of the ſixth century. After a long interval of more than ſix hundred years, Latin tranſlations and commentaries began to abound, through the induſtry of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and the ſucceeding ſcholaſtics; and multiplied to ſuch a pitch that, towards the cloſe of the ſixteenth century, Patricius reckons twelve thouſand commentators on different works of the Stagirite. (Diſcuſſ. Peripatet.) This vaſt and cold maſs of Gothic and Saracenic dulneſs is now conſigned to juſt oblivion. But even to the beſt of Ariſtotle's commentators there are two unanſwerable objections:

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CHAP. I.

how erroneous?) is the Roman tranſcript, when compared with the energetic preciſion of the Greek original! Yet the works of Cicero are known univerſally to the whole literary world, while thoſe of Ariſtotle (with the exception of a few ſhort and popular treatiſes) are allowed to moulder away in the duſt of our libraries, and condemned to a treatment little leſs ignominious than that which, as we ſhall have occaſion to relate, befel them ſoon after their compoſition, when they were immured in a dungeon, and remained for near two centuries a prey to dampneſs and to worms. It is time once more to releaſe them from their *ſecond* unmerited captivity; to revive, and, if poſſible, to brighten, the well-earned fame of an author, ſometimes as prepoſterouſly admired, as at others unaccountably neglected; and whoſe fate with poſterity is moſt ſingular in this, not that his authority ſhould have been moſt reſpected in the ages leaſt qualified to appreciate his merit, but that philoſophers ſhould have deſpiſed his name almoſt exactly in proportion as they adopted his opinions. The multiplied proofs of this aſſertion, which I ſhall have occaſion to produce in examining his works, will not, it is preſumed, appear unintereſting to men of letters. Thoſe who know ſomething of Ariſtotle, muſt naturally be deſirous of knowing all that can be told; and of ſeeing, compriſed within a narrow compaſs, the life and writings of a man, whoſe intellectual magnitude ought to have preſerved and ſhewn him in his proper ſhape to the impartial eye

tions: firſt, they univerſally confound his ſolid ſenſe with the fanciful viſions of Plato, thus endeavouring to reconcile things totally incongruous: ſecondly, they aſcribe to their great maſter innumerable opinions which he did not hold, by making him continually dogmatiſe, where he only means to diſcuſs. To the ſame objections thoſe more modern writers are liable, who have drawn their knowledge of Ariſtotle's philoſophy from any other than the original fountain.

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CHAP. I.

eye of hiſtory, but whoſe picture, beyond that of all other great characters, has been moſt miſerably mangled.

Ariſtotle's birth-place, Stagira.

Ariſtotle, who flouriſhed in Athens when Athens was the ornament of Greece, and Greece, under Alexander, the firſt country on earth, was born at Stagira towards the beginning of the ninety-ninth olympiad, eighty-five years after the birth of Socrates [b], and three hundred and eighty-four before the birth of Chriſt. The city of Stagira [c] ſtood on the coaſt of Thrace, in a diſtrict called the Chalcidic region, and near to the innermoſt receſs of the Strymonic gulf [d]. It was originally built by the Andrians [e], afterwards enlarged by a colony from Eubœan Chalcis [f], and long numbered among the Greek cities of Thrace, until the conqueſts of Philip of Macedon extended the name of his country far beyond the river Strymon, to the confines of mount Rhodope [g]. Stagira, as well as the neighbouring

Its hiſtory,

[b] Socrates drank the hemlock, according to moſt authors, the firſt year of the ninety-fifth olympiad; and, according to Diodorus Siculus, the firſt year of the ninety-ſeventh. Socrates therefore died at leaſt eight years before Ariſtotle was born. The latter was one year older than Philip, and three years older than Demoſthenes. Vid. Dionyſ. Halicarn. Epiſt. ad Ammæum. This chronology is clearly aſcertained by various critics. See Bayle's Dictionary, article "Ariſtotle." I know not therefore why Lord Monboddo and the late Mr. Harris (two modern writers who have paid great attention to Ariſtotle's works) ſhould ſay, and frequently repeat, on no better authority than that of the Life of Ariſtotle aſcribed to Ammonius, or Johannes Philoponus, that the Stagirite was three years a ſcholar of Socrates.

[c] Strabo Excerpt. ex lib. vii. p. 331. He calls the place Stageirus.

[d] Ptolemei Geograph. According to his diviſion, Stagira was in the Amphaxetide diſtrict of Macedon.

[e] Herodot. l. vii. c. 115.; & Thucydid. l. iv. p. 311. [f] Juſtin. l. viii. c. 13.

[g] Thence the frivolous diſpute among modern biographers, whether Ariſtotle, who was really a Greek, ought to be deemed a Macedonian or a Thracian. See Stanley and Brucker's Lives of Ariſtotle.

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bouring Greek cities, enjoyed the precarious dignity of independent government: it was the ally of Athens in the Peloponneſian war, and, like other nominal allies, experienced the ſtern dominion of that tyrannical republic. It afterwards became ſubject to the city and commonwealth of Olynthus; which, having ſubdued Stagira and the whole region of Chalcidicé, was itſelf beſieged by Philip of Macedon; and, with all its dependencies, reduced by the arms or arts of that politic prince, in the firſt year of the 108th olympiad, and 348 years before the Chriſtian æra [h]. That the reſiſtance of Stagira was obſtinate, may be inferred from the ſeverity of its puniſhment; the conqueror raſed it to the ground [i]. Ariſtotle, who was then in his thirty-ſeventh year, had been removed from Stagira almoſt in his childhood; and he appears not, in that long interval, to have ever reſided in, and even rarely to have viſited, it [k]. But the misfortunes which fell on that city gave him an opportunity of ſhewing ſuch ardent affection for his birthplace, as is the indubitable proof of a feeling heart. Through his influence with Alexander the Great, Stagira was rebuilt [l]; both its uſeful defences and its ornamental edifices were reſtored; its wandering citizens were collected, and reinſtated in their poſſeſſions; Ariſtotle himſelf regulated their government by wiſe laws;

[h] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. xxxv.

[i] Plutarch. adverſus Colot. p. 1126.; & de Exil. p. 605.

[k] Dionyſ. Halicarn. Epiſt. ad Ammæum. Ammonius & Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot.

[l] Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. vii. c. 29.; & Valer. Maxim. l. v. c. 6. Plutarch prefers to all the pleaſures of the Epicurean, the delights which Ariſtotle muſt have felt when he rebuilt his native city, and placed in their hereditary ſeats his expatriated countrymen. Plutarch. adverſ. Epicur. p. 1097. He aſcribes the rebuilding of Stagira to Ariſtotle's influence with Philip.

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laws; and the Stagirites inſtituted a feſtival, to commemorate the generoſity of Alexander, their admired ſovereign, and the patriotiſm of Ariſtotle, their illuſtrious townſman [m].

connected with that of Ariſtotle and his family.

The city of Stagira indeed owes its celebrity wholly to Ariſtotle and his family; and, if its name is ſtill familiar to modern ears, this proceeds merely from its having communicated to our philoſopher the appellation of Stagirite [n]. His father Nicomachus, who was the phyſician and friend [o] of Amyntas, king of Macedon, derived his deſcent, through a long line of medical anceſtors, from Æſculapius, the companion of the Argonauts, whoſe ſkill in the healing art had raiſed him to a ſeat among the gods [p]. Nicomachus improved a branch of knowledge, which was the inheritance of his family, by writing ſix books on natural philoſophy and medicine [q]. To the ſame illuſtrious origin which diſtinguiſhed Nicomachus, the teſtimony of one ancient biographer [r] (but his only) traces up the blood of Pheſtis, Ariſtotle's mother; who, whatever was her parentage, certainly acknowledged for her country [s] the middle diſtrict of Eubœa, which lies within twelve miles of the Attic coaſt. Ariſtotle was deprived of his parents in early youth [t]; yet it is an agreeable, and not altogether an unwarranted conjecture, that by his father Nicomachus he was inſpired with that ardent love for the ſtudy of nature, which made him long be regarded as her beſt

[m] Plutarch. adverſ. Colot. p. 1126.; & Ammonius in Vit. Ariſtot.

[n] Strabo Excerp. ex lib. vii. p. 331.

[o] He was held by Amyntas, ὡ φιλῷ χρωμᾳ. Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot.

[p] Lucian. Jupiter Tragœdus; & Suidas in Nicomach. [q] Idem ibid.

[r] Ammon. Vit. Ariſtot. [s] Dionyſ. Halic. Epiſt. ad Ammæum.

[t] Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot.

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beſt and choſen interpreter [u]; while from his mother Pheſtis he firſt imbibed that pure and ſweet Atticiſm which every where pervades his writings.

Ariſtotle's education at Atarneus,

Ariſtotle alſo inherited from his parents a large fortune; and their early loſs was ſupplied and compenſated by the kind attentions of Proxenus, a citizen of Atarneus in Myſia, who received the young Stagirite into his family, and ſkilfully directed his education [x]. Theſe important obligations our philoſopher, in whoſe character gratitude appears to have been a prominent feature, amply repaid to Nicanor the ſon of Proxenus, whom he adopted, educated, and enriched [y]. At the age of ſeventeen [z], the young Stagirite was attracted by the love of learning to Athens, and particularly by the deſire of hearing Plato in the Academy, the beſt ſchool of ſcience as well as of morals then exiſting in the world; and where the moſt aſſiduous ſtudent might find competitors worthy of exciting his emulation and ſharpening his diligence. Plato early obſerved of him, that he required the rein rather than the ſpur [a]. His induſtry in peruſing and copying manuſcripts was unexampled, and almoſt incredible; he was named, by way of excellence, "the ſtudent or reader [b]." Plato often called him the "ſoul of his ſchool [c];" and, when Ariſtotle happened to be abſent from his prelections, often complained that he ſpoke to a *deaf audience* [d]. As the ſtudent

and at Athens.

His literary induſtry.

[u] Αριστοτελης της φυσιως γραμματευς ην. Anonym. apud Suid. in Ariſtot. Literally, "Nature's ſecretary."

[x] Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot. [y] Idem ibid.

[z] Dionyſ. Epiſt. ad Ammæum. Diogen. Laert. ibid. [a] Idem ibid.

[b] Diogen. Laert. ibid.

[c] Or rather the mind or intellect, ως της διανοιας. Idem ibid.

[d] Philoponus de Eternit. Mund. adverſ. Proclum, vi. 27.

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ſtudent advanced in years, his acuteneſs was as extraordinary in canvaſſing opinions, as his induſtry had been unrivalled in collecting them [e]: his capacious mind embraced the whole circle of ſcience; and, notwithſtanding his pertinacity in rejecting every principle or tenet which he could not on reflection approve, his very ſingular merit failed not to recommend him to the diſcerning admiration of Plato, with whom he continued to reſide twenty years, even to his maſter's death; alike careleſs of the honours of a court, to which the rank and connections of his family might have opened to him the road in Macedon; and indifferent to the glory of a name, which his great abilities might early have attained, by eſtabliſhing a ſeparate ſchool, and founding a new ſect in philoſophy [f].

His perſon, and ſuppoſed foibles.

At the ſame time that Ariſtotle applied ſo aſſiduouſly to the embelliſhment of his mind, he was not neglectful, we are told, of whatever might adorn his perſon. His figure was not advantageous; he was of a ſhort ſtature, his eyes were remarkably ſmall, his limbs were diſproportionably ſlender, and he liſped or ſtammered in his ſpeech [g]. For his ungracious perſon Ariſtotle is ſaid to have been anxious to compenſate by the finery and elegance of his dreſs: his mantle was ſplendid; he wore rings of great value; and he was foppiſh enough (ſuch is the language of antiquity) to ſhave both his head and his face, while the other ſcholars of Plato kept their long hair and beards.

Reflections thereon.

To ſome learned men, the omiſſion of ſuch particulars might appear

[e] Diogen. Laert. ubi ſupra.

[f] ὅτε σχολὴν ἤγαμεν, ὅτε ἰδίαν πεποιήκως αἵρεσιν. Dionyſ. Epiſt. ad Ammæum.

[g] Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot. Plutarch. de Diſcrim. Adulat. & Amic. p. 53. ſays, "that many imitated Ariſtotle's ſtuttering, as they did Alexander's wry neck."

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appear unpardonable; yet, in a life of Ariſtotle, ſuch particulars are totally unworthy of being told, ſince his love for oſtentatious finery (probably much exaggerated by his enemies) was in him merely an acceſſory, which neither altered his character, nor weakened that ardent paſſion for knowledge which reigned ſole miſtreſs of his ſoul. In men born for great intellectual atchievements, this paſſion muſt, at ſome period of their lives, ſuppreſs and ſtifle every other; and, while it continues to do ſo, their real happineſs is probably at its higheſt pitch. The purſuit of ſcience indeed, not having any natural limitations, might be ſuppoſed to invigorate with manhood, to confirm itſelf through cuſtom, and to operate through life with unceaſing or increaſing energy. But this delightful progreſs is liable to be interrupted by other cauſes than the decline of health and the decay of curioſity; for great exertions are not more certainly rewarded by celebrity, than celebrity is puniſhed with envy, which will ſometimes rankle in ſecret malice, and ſometimes vent itſelf in open reproach: wrongs will provoke reſentment; injuries will be offered and retorted; and, a ſtate of hoſtility commencing, the philoſopher, in defending his opinions and his fame, becomes a prey to the wretched anxieties incident to the vulgar ſcrambles of ſordid intereſt and ſenſeleſs ambition. Of this melancholy remark, both the life and the death of Ariſtotle will afford, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, very forcible illuſtrations.

Ariſtotle's gratitude to Plato.

Plato died in the firſt year of the 108th olympiad, and 338 years before the Chriſtian æra. He was ſucceeded in the academy by Speuſippus, the ſon of his ſiſter Potona; a man far inferior to the Stagirite in abilities; and however well he might be acquainted with the theory, not ſtrongly confirmed in

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the practice, of moral virtue, ſince he was too often and too eaſily vanquiſhed both by anger and pleaſure [h]. Ariſtotle appears not to have taken offence that, in the ſucceſſion to his admired maſter, the ſtrong claim of merit ſhould have been ſacrificed to the partialities of blood. In ſome of the lateſt of his writings, he ſpeaks of Plato with a degree of reſpect approaching to reverence. Soon after that philoſopher's deceaſe, Ariſtotle wrote verſes in his praiſe, and erected altars to his honour [i]: and the connections which he himſelf had already formed with ſome of the moſt illuſtrious as well as the moſt extraordinary perſonages of his own or any age, might naturally inſpire him with the deſign of leaving Athens, after he had loſt the philoſopher and friend whoſe fame had firſt drawn him thither, and whoſe inſtructive ſociety had ſo long retained him in that celebrated city.

His reſidence with Hermeias. The ſingular hiſtory of that prince.

One of the memorable characters with whom Ariſtotle maintained a cloſe and uninterrupted correſpondence was Hermeias, ſtiled, in the language of thoſe days, tyrant of Aſſus and Atarneus; a man whoſe life forcibly illuſtrates the ſtrange viciſſitudes of fortune. Hermeias is called a ſlave and a eunuch [k]; but he was a ſlave whoſe ſpirit was not to be broken, and a eunuch whoſe mind was not to be emaſculated. Through the bounty of a wealthy patron, he had been enabled early to gratify his natural taſte for philoſophy; and having become a fellow-ſtudent with Ariſtotle at Athens, ſoon united with him in the bands of affectionate eſteem, which finally cemented into firm

[h] Diogen. Laert. in Speuſipp.

[i] Idem; & Ammonius in Ariſtot.

[k] Ευνουχος ων και δουλος ηρχεν Ερμειας. His maſter's name was Eubulus, a prince and philoſopher of Bithynia. Suidas.

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firm and unalterable friendſhip. Ariſtotle through life purſued the calm and ſecure paths of ſcience, but Hermeias ventured to climb the dangerous heights of ambition. His enterpriſing ſpirit, ſeconded by good fortune, raiſed him to the ſovereignty of Aſſus and Atarneus, Greek cities of Myſia, the former ſituate in the diſtrict of Troas, the latter in that of Æolis, and both of them, like moſt Grecian colonies on the Aſiatic coaſt, but looſely dependant on the Perſian empire. Hermeias availed himſelf of the weakneſs or diſtance of the armies of Artaxerxes, and of the reſources with which his own ambition was ſupplied by a wealthy banker, to gain poſſeſſion of thoſe ſtrong-holds, with all their dependencies; and endeavoured to juſtify this bold uſurpation of the ſceptre, by the manly firmneſs with which he held it [l]. Upon the invitation of his royal friend, Ariſtotle, almoſt immediately after Plato's death, reviſited Atarneus [m], the ſame city in which he had ſpent the happy years of his youth under the kind protection of Proxenus; and might we indulge the conjecture that this worthy Atarnean ſtill lived, our philoſopher's voyage to Æolis muſt have been ſtrongly recommended by his deſire of repaying the favours of a man whom his gratitude always regarded as a ſecond father, and of thus propping, by his friendly aid, the declining age of his early guardian.

Deſtroyed by Mentor the Rhodian.

Ariſtotle found at Atarneus the wiſh of Plato realiſed; he beheld, in his friend Hermeias, philoſophy ſeated on a throne. In that city he reſided near three years, enjoying the inexpreſſible happineſs of ſeeing his enlightened political maxims illuſtrated in the virtuous reign of his fellow-ſtudent and ſovereign.

[l] Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. ſect. 122.

[m] Dionyſ. Epiſt. ad Ammæum.

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reign. But, to render his condition enviable, an eſſential requiſite was wanting, namely, that of ſecurity. Artaxerxes, whoſe ſucceſs againſt the rebels in Egypt had exceeded his moſt ſanguine hopes, could no longer brook the diſmemberment of the fair coaſt of Myſia, through the uſurpation of a ſlave and a eunuch. Mentor [n], a Greek, and kinſman of Memnon the Rhodian, a general ſo famous in the Perſian annals, had ſignaliſed his zeal and valour in the Egyptian war. He was one of thoſe crafty and unprincipled Greeks, whom the ambitious hopes of raiſing a ſplendid fortune often drew to a ſtandard naturally hoſtile to their country; and his recent merit with Artaxerxes recommended him as the fitteſt inſtrument to be employed in chaſtiſing the Myſian uſurper. This employment he did not decline, although the man whom he was commiſſioned to deſtroy had formerly been numbered among his friends [o]. Mentor marched with a powerful army to the weſtern coaſt. He might have effected his purpoſe by open force; but to accompliſh it by ſtratagem, was both more eaſy in itſelf, and more ſuitable to his character. He had been connected with Hermeias by the ſacred ties of hoſpitality; the ſanctity of this connection was revered by the greateſt profligates of antiquity; but the impious Mentor knew no religion but obedience to his maſter's commands. He employed his former intimacy with Hermeias as the means of decoying that unwary prince to an interview:

[n] Ariſtotle himſelf brands with infamy this ſucceſsful knave, by contraſting his profligate dexterity with the real virtue of prudence. Αλλα δεινος μεν και ὁ φαυλος λεγεται, &c. "A ſcoundrel may be clever; for example, Mentor, who ſeemed to be very clever, but ſurely was not prudent; for it belongs to prudence to deſire and prefer only the beſt ends, and to carry ſuch only into execution: but cleverneſs implies barely that fertility in reſource, and dexterity in execution, by which any purpoſes, whether good or bad, may be fitly and ſpeedily accompliſhed." *Magn. Moral.* l. i. c. 25. p. 171.

[o] Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. ſect. 122.

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His ſingular and cruel artifices.

view: Mentor ſeized his perſon, and ſent him privately to Upper Aſia, where, by order of Artaxerxes, he was hanged as a traitor [p]. The cruel artifices of Mentor ended not with this tragedy. Having poſſeſſed himſelf of the ring which the unfortunate Hermeias uſually employed as his ſignet, he ſealed with it his own diſpatches, and immediately ſent them to the cities that acknowledged the ſovereignty of a man, whoſe mild exerciſe of power tended, in the minds of his ſubjects, to juſtify the irregular means by which he had acquired it. In theſe diſpatches Mentor ſignified that, through his own interceſſion, Hermeias had obtained peace and pardon from the great king. The magiſtrates of the revolted cities eaſily gave credit to intelligence moſt agreeable to their wiſhes; they opened their gates without ſuſpicion to Mentor's ſoldiers, who inſtantly made themſelves maſters both of thoſe Myſian ſtrong-holds, which might have made a long and vigorous reſiſtance to the Perſian arms, and of the powerful garriſons by which they were defended [q]. One further deception crowned the ſucceſsful perfidy of Mentor. He affected to treat the conquered places with unexampled moderation. He was particularly careful to keep in their offices the ſame collectors of revenues and intendants who had been employed by Hermeias. Thoſe officers, when they were firſt appriſed of the danger which threatened their maſter, concealed their treaſures under ground, or depoſited them with their friends; but when they found themſelves treated with ſo much unexpected generoſity by the invader, they reſumed their wonted confidence, and conveyed back into their own coffers their long-accumulated wealth; of which circumſtance Mentor was no

[p] Diodor. ubi ſupra. Helladius apud Phot. Biblioth. p. 866. Polyaen. Stratag. vi. 48.

[q] Diodor. ubi ſupra.

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no ſooner informed by his emiſſaries, than he ſeized both the effects and the perſons of thoſe too credulous collectors [r].

Ariſtotle eſcapes to Leſbos.

The veil of moderation which Mentor's policy had aſſumed in his firſt tranſactions at Atarneus, enabled Ariſtotle to avoid the puniſhment which too naturally fell on the ambition of his friend. By a ſeaſonable flight he eſcaped to Mitylene in the iſle of Leſbos, in company with Pythias, the kinſwoman and adopted heireſs of the king of Aſſus and Atarneus, but now miſerably fallen from the lofty expectations in which her youth had been educated. But this ſad reverſe of fortune only endeared her the more to Ariſtotle, who married the fair companion of his flight in his thirty-ſeventh year [s]; which is preciſely that age pointed out by himſelf as the fitteſt, on the male ſide, for entering into wedlock [t]. Pythias died ſhortly afterwards, leaving an infant daughter, whom Ariſtotle named after a wife tenderly beloved, and who repaid his affection with the moſt tender ſenſibility. It was her laſt requeſt that, when Ariſtotle (which might the Fates long avert!) ſhould die, her own bones might be diſinterred, and carefully incloſed within the monument of her admired huſband [u].

His marriage with Pythias.

Is invited to Macedon.

The Stagirite paſſed but a ſhort time in the ſoft iſland of Leſbos, in the tender indulgence either of love or of melancholy. During his reſidence in Athens, he had ſtrengthened his hereditary friendſhip with Philip of Macedon, a prince one year younger than himſelf, who, having lived from the age of fifteen

[r] We learn this particular, which is neceſſary to explain what follows in the text, from Ariſtotle himſelf, in his curious treatiſe De Cura Rei familiaris, p. 508.

[s] Comp. Dionyſ. Epiſt. ad Ammæum; & Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot.

[t] Politic. l. vii. ſect. 16. [u] Diogen. Laert. ubi ſupra.

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fifteen to that of two-and-twenty in Thebes and the neighbouring cities, aſcended the throne of his anceſtors in the twenty-third year of his age. The buſy ſcenes of war and negociation in which Philip was immediately after his acceſſion engaged by neceſſity, and in which he continued to be involved during his whole reign by ambition, ſeem never to have interrupted his correſpondence with the friends of his youth; with thoſe who either poſſeſſed his affection, or who merited his admiration [u]. In the fifth year of his reign his ſon Alexander was born; an event which he notified to Ariſtotle in terms implying much previous communication between them: "Know that a ſon is born to us. We thank the gods for their gift, but eſpecially for beſtowing it at the time when Ariſtotle lives; aſſuring ourſelves that, educated by you, he will be worthy of us, and worthy of inheriting our kingdom [x]." If this letter was written at the æra of Alexander's birth, it muſt have found Ariſtotle at Athens in his twenty-ninth year, ſtill a diligent ſtudent in the ſchool of Plato. But it is certain that the Stagirite did not aſſume the office of preceptor to the ſon of Philip till fourteen years afterwards, when the opening character of this young prince ſeemed as greatly to merit, as peculiarly to require, the aſſiſtance of ſo able an inſtructor [y]. In the ſecond year of the 109th

Philip's letter to him.

[u] Hiſtory of ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 33. [x] Aulus Gellius, l. ix. c. 3.

[y] The chronology is clearly aſcertained by Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus's letter to Ammæus; yet the accurate Quintilian, becauſe it ſerved to enforce his argument, ſays, "An Philippus, Macedonum rex," &c. "Would Philip, king of the Macedonians, have thought fit that Ariſtotle, the greateſt philoſopher of the age, ſhould have been employed in teaching his ſon Alexander the firſt rudiments of learning, or would Ariſtotle himſelf have accepted of ſuch an office, had he not believed it of the utmoſt importance to the ſucceſs of our future ſtudies, that their firſt foundation ſhould be laid by a teacher of conſummate ſkill?" QUINTIL. *Inſtit.* l. i. c. 1.

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109th olympiad, Ariſtotle, probably in conſequence of a new invitation from Philip, ſailed from the iſle of Leſbos, in which he had reſided near two years, eſcaped the dangers of the Athenian fleet, which then carried on war againſt Macedon, and arrived at the court of Pella [z], to undertake one of the few employments not unworthy of an author qualified to inſtruct and benefit the lateſt ages of the world.

His merit and ſucceſs in the education of Alexander.

In the education of Alexander, the Stagirite ſpent near eight years; during which long period, in an office of much delicacy, he enjoyed the rare advantage of giving the higheſt ſatisfaction to his employers, while he excited the warmeſt gratitude in his pupil [a]. The temper of Alexander, prone to every generous affection, loved and eſteemed many; but Ariſtotle is the only one of his friends whoſe ſuperior genius he appears unceaſingly to have viewed with undiminiſhed admiration, and whom he ſeems to have treated through life with uniform and unalterable reſpect. By Philip and his proud queen Olympias, our philoſopher was honoured with every mark of diſtinction which greatneſs can beſtow on illuſtrious merit. Philip placed his ſtatue near to his own: he was admitted to the councils of his ſovereign, where his advice was often uſeful, always honourable; and where his kind interceſſion benefited many individuals, and many communities [b]. On one occaſion the Athenians rewarded his good ſervices, by erecting his ſtatue in the citadel [c]: and his letters, both to Philip and to Alexander, atteſted his unremitting exertions in the cauſe of his friends and of the publick, as well as his manly freedom in admoniſhing kings of their

Honours beſtowed on him by Philip.

[z] Dionyſ. Halicarn. ubi ſupra.

[a] Plutarch. in Alexand. tom. i. p. 668.; & adverſ. Colot. t. ii. p. 1126.

[b] Ammonius Vit. Ariſtot.

[c] Pauſanias Eliac.

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their duty [d]. But the ruling paſſions of Philip and Alexander, the intereſted policy of the one, and the lofty ambition of the other, were too ſtrong and too ungovernable to be reſtrained by the power of reaſon, ſpeaking through the voice of their admired philoſopher. The ambition of Alexander had early taken root; and the peculiarities of his character had diſplayed themſelves, in a very public and very important tranſaction, which happened ſeveral months before the Stagirite arrived at the court of Pella. During Philip's Illyrian expedition, Macedon was honoured with an embaſſy from the Great King. In the abſence of his father, Alexander, ſcarcely fourteen years old, received the ambaſſadors; and his converſation with thoſe illuſtrious ſtrangers, at a period in hiſtory when the public conferences of great perſonages conſiſted not merely in words of ceremony, afforded a juſt ſubject of praiſe and wonder. Inſtead of admiring their external appearance, or aſking them ſuch ſuperficial queſtions as correſponded with the unripeneſs of his years, he inquired into the nature of the Perſian government; the character of Ochus, who then reigned; the ſtrength and compoſition of his armies; the diſtance of his place of reſidence from the weſtern coaſt; the ſtate of the intermediate country, and particularly of the high roads leading to the great capitals of Suſa and Babylon [e]. To his premature love of aggrandizement, Alexander already added ſingular dexterity and unexampled boldneſs in his exerciſes, particularly in horſemanſhip; the moſt fervid affections, invincible courage, and unbending dignity [f].

Peculiarities of Alexander's character.

In

[d] Ammonius, ibid. See alſo the fragments ſtill remaining in Du Valle's edition, p. 1102. & ſeq. [e] Plutarch. in Alexand. [f] Idem ibid.

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The plan followed by Ariſtotle in his education.

In training ſuch a youth, the Stagirite had a rich field to cultivate; but he could only hope to give a new direction to paſſions, which it was too late to moderate or control. In his treatiſe on Politics, he has carefully delineated the plan of education beſt adapted to perſons of the higheſt rank in ſociety; and, in performing the taſk aſſigned to him by Philip, this plan was to be ſkilfully modified, by adjuſting it to the peculiar circumſtances and extraordinary character of his pupil. Alexander's loftineſs could not be conquered, but it might be made to combat on the ſide of virtue: if he was angry, it was proved to him that anger was the effect of inſult, and the mark of inferiority [s]. His love for military glory, which, while it is the idol of the multitude, will always be the paſſion of the great, could neither be reſtrained nor moderated; but, to rival this tyrant of his breaſt, ſtill more exalted affections were inſpired, which rendered Alexander as much ſuperior to conquerors, as conquerors deem themſelves ſuperior to the loweſt of the vulgar. Agreeably to a maxim inculcated in that book of Ariſtotle's Politics which relates to education, the two years immediately following puberty conſtitute that important period of life, which is peculiarly adapted for improving and ſtrengthening the bodily frame, and for acquiring that corporeal vigour which is one main ſpring of mental energy. During this intereſting period of youth, with the proper management of which the future happineſs of the whole of life is ſo intimately connected, Ariſtotle obſerves that the intellectual powers ought indeed to be kept in play, but not too ſtrenuouſly exerciſed, ſince powerful exertions of the mind and body cannot be made at once, nor

[s] Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. xii. c. 54.

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nor the habits of making them be ſimultaneouſly acquired. In conformity with this principle, Alexander was encouraged to proceed with alacrity in his exerciſes, till he acquired in them unrivalled proficiency; after which, the whole bent of his mind was directed to the moſt profound principles of ſcience.

Ariſtotle's acroatic philoſophy.

It is the opinion of many, that a ſlight tincture of learning is ſufficient for accompliſhing a prince. Both Philip and Ariſtotle thought otherwiſe; and the ardent curioſity of Alexander himſelf was not to be ſatisfied with ſuch ſuperficial and meagre inſtructions as have been ſometimes triumphantly publiſhed for the uſe of perſons deſtined to reign. The young Macedonian's mind was therefore to be ſharpened by whatever is moſt nice in diſtinction, and to be exalted by whatever is moſt lofty in ſpeculation [h]; that his faculties, by expanding and invigorating amidſt objects of the higheſt intellection, might thereby be rendered capable of comprehending ordinary matters the more readily and the more perfectly [i]. This recondite philoſophy, which was delivered by the Stagirite, firſt to his royal pupil, and afterwards to his hearers in the Lyceum, received the epithet of *acroatic* [k], to diſtinguiſh thoſe parts of his lectures which

[h] Plutarch. in Alexand.

[i] Ariſtot. de Anima, l. iii. c. 5 & 6. & Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. 7 & 8.

[k] This diviſion of Ariſtotle's works into *acroatic* and *exoteric*, has given riſe to a variety of opinions and diſputes; which all have their ſource in the different accounts given by Plutarch and Aulus Gellius, on one hand; and by Strabo, Cicero, and Ammonius, on the other. The former writers (Plutarch. in Alexand.; & Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 4.) maintain that the acroatic, or, as they call them, the acroamatic works, differed from the exoteric in the nature of their ſubjects, which conſiſted in natural philoſophy and logic; whereas the ſubjects of the exoteric were rhetoric, ethics, and politics.

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which were confined to a ſelect audience, from other parts called exoteric, becauſe delivered to the public at large. It has been ſuppoſed that, in thoſe two kinds of lectures, the Stagirite maintained contradictory doctrines on the ſubjects of religion and morality. But the fact is far otherwiſe: his practical tenets were uniformly the ſame in both; but his exoteric or popular treatiſes nearly reſembled the philoſophical dialogues of Plato or Cicero; whereas his acroatic writings (which will be explained in the following chapter) contained, in a conciſe energetic ſtyle peculiar to himſelf, thoſe deep and broad principles on which all ſolid ſcience is built, and, independently of which, the moſt operoſe reaſonings, and the moſt intricate combinations, are but matters of coarſe mechanical practice[1]. The ſublimity of this abſtract and recondite philoſophy admirably accorded with the loftineſs of Alexander's mind; and how highly he continued to prize it, amidſt the tumultuary occupations of war and government,

Highly prized by Alexander.

politics. But the opinions of both Plutarch and Gellius (for they do not entirely coincide) are refuted by Ariſtotle's references, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, from his *Ethic* to his exoteric works. The latter claſs of writers (Strabo, l. xiii. p. 608.; Cicero ad Attic. xiii. 19.; & Ammonius Herm. ad Catægor. Ariſtot.) maintain, that the acroatic works were diſtinguiſhed from the exoteric, not by the difference of the ſubjects, but by the different manner of treating them; the former being diſcourſes, the latter dialogues.

[1] Simplicius and Philoponus allow other writings beſides the dialogues to have been exoteric, as hiſtorical diſquiſitions, and whatever elſe did not require for underſtanding them intenſe thought in the reader. Simplicius ſays that Ariſtotle was purpoſely obſcure in his acroatic writings: "ut ſegniores ab eorum ſtudio repelleret & dehortaretur." Simplic. ad Auſcult. Phyſic. fol. ii. This would have been a very unworthy motive in the Stagirite: but the truth is, that the obſcurity of Ariſtotle's works proceeds from a corrupt text. When the text is pure, his writings are as eaſily intelligible, as a mere ſyllabus of lectures on moſt abſtruſe ſubjects can well be rendered.

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vernment, appears from the following letter, written ſoon after the battle of Gaugamela, and while he was yet in purſuit of Darius: "Alexander wiſhing all happineſs to Ariſtotle. You have not done right in publiſhing your acroatic works. Wherein ſhall we be diſtinguiſhed above others, if the learning, in which we were inſtructed, be communicated to the public. I would rather ſurpaſs other men in knowledge than in power. Farewell [a]." Ariſtotle, not conſidering this letter as merely complimental, anſwered it as follows: "You wrote to me concerning my acroatic works, that they ought not to have been publiſhed. Know that in one ſenſe this ſtill is the caſe, ſince they can be fully underſtood by thoſe only who have heard my lectures [b]." Of thoſe much-valued writings, the theological part, if at all publiſhed, was probably moſt involved in a ſublime obſcurity. To have maintained, in plain and popular language, the unity and perfections of the Deity, muſt have excited againſt the Stagirite an earlier religious perſecution than that which really overtook him. Yet in this pure theology Alexander was carefully inſtructed; as his preceptor reminded him in the midſt of his unexampled victories and unbounded conqueſts, concluding a letter with this memorable admonition; that "thoſe who entertain juſt notions of the Deity are better entitled to be high-minded, than thoſe who ſubdue kingdoms [c]."

Ariſtotle's genius for poetry.

Ariſtotle's love of philoſophy did not, like that of Plato, ſet him at variance with poetry. He frequently cites the poets, particularly

[a] Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 5.

[b] Idem ibid. If theſe letters be aſcribed to their right authors, they prove in what light Ariſtotle regarded his acroatic works; he conſidered them merely as text-books.

[c] Plutarch. in Alexand.

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particularly Homer; and he prepared for his pupil a correct copy of the Iliad, which that admirer of kindred heroes always carried with him in a caſket, whence this tranſcript was called "the Iliad of the Caſket[p]." The Stagirite was not only the beſt critic in poetry, but himſelf a poet of the firſt eminence. Few of his verſes indeed have reached modern times; but the few which remain prove him worthy of ſounding the lyre of Pindar[q]; and it is not the leaſt ſingularity attending this extraordinary man, that with the niceſt and moſt ſubtile powers of diſcrimination and analyſis, he united a vigorous and rich vein of poetic fancy.

The nature of his inſtructions to Alexander in ethics and politics.

Ariſtotle carefully inſtructed his pupil in ethics and politics. He wrote to him, long afterwards, a treatiſe on government; and exhorted him to adjuſt the meaſure of his authority to the various character of his ſubjects; agreeably to a doctrine which he frequently maintains in his political works, that different nations require different modes of government, reſpectively adapted to their various turns of mind, and different habits of thinking[r]. From the ethic writings of Ariſtotle which ſtill remain, and which are the moſt practically uſeful of any that pagan antiquity can boaſt, it is eaſy to detect that wicked calumny of his enemies, "that, for ſordid and ſelfiſh purpoſes, he accommodated the tenets of his philoſophy to the baſe morals of courts[s]." It may be ſafely affirmed that, if Alexander is

[p] Plutarch. in Alexand. vol. i. p. 688.

[q] Menag. Obſervat. in Diogen. Laert. l. v. p. 189.

[r] Plutarch. in Alexand.

[s] This abſurdity is brought forward and inſiſted on by Brucker, Hiſtor. Philoſoph. vol. i. p. 797. Nothing can be more erroneous or more unintelligible than Brucker's account of Ariſtotle's philoſophy. I have heard it ſaid in his own country, that this laborious German did not underſtand Greek!

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is distinguished above other princes for the love of knowledge and virtue, he was chiefly indebted for this advantage to his preceptor: the seeds of his haughtiness and ambition were sown before Aristotle was called to direct his education; his excellencies therefore may be ascribed to our philosopher[u]; his imperfections to himself, to Philip, above all to the intoxicating effects of unbounded prosperity. This is the language of antiquity, and even of those writers who are the least partial to the fame of the Stagirite.

Aristotle recommends Callisthenes to Alexander. His character and behaviour.

After the most intimate communication during the space of eight years[x], the pupil and the preceptor separated for ever, to pursue, in a career of almost equal length, the most opposite paths to the same immortal renown; the one by arms, the other by philosophy; the one by gratifying the most immoderate lust of power, the other by teaching to despise this and all similar gratifications. During his eastern triumphs, terminated in the course of ten years by his premature death, Alexander (as we shall have occasion to relate) gave many illustrious proofs of gratitude to the virtuous director of his youth. One incident, and one only, seems to have occasioned some disgust between them. At leaving the Court of Pella, Aristotle recommended, as worthy of accompanying Alexander in his Persian expedition, his own kinsman Callisthenes, an Olynthian; a learned

[t] See the proofs of this in Plutarch, p. 668. Alexander spared the house of Pindar, in the sack of Thebes; and the town of Eressus in Lesbos, in his war with the Persians, because it was the birth-place of Theophrastus and Phanias, Aristotle's disciples. In the midst of his expedition, he wrote to Athens for the works of the tragic poets, with the dithyrambics of Telestus and Philoxenus, and the history of Philistus.

[u] Αριστοτελης τα δικαια συμβουλευων Αλεξανδρῳ πολλοις ωφελιμος ην. Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xii. c. 54.

[x] Dionys. Halicarn.; & Diogen. Laert. ubi supra.

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learned and certainly an honeſt man, but of a moroſe unaccommodating temper, pertinaciouſly attached to the old ſyſtem of republicaniſm, which the father of Alexander had overturned in Greece; equally daring and inflexible in his purpoſes, and unſeaſonably bold in his ſpeech [y]. Ariſtotle himſelf perceived and lamented his faults, and admoniſhed him in a line of Homer, "that his unbridled tongue might occaſion his early death [z]." The prophecy was fulfilled. Calliſthenes, not reflecting that "he who has once condeſcended" (in the words of Arrian) "to be the attendant of a king, ought never to be wanting in due deference to his will," rudely and outrageouſly oppoſed Alexander's reſolution of exacting the ſame marks of homage from the Greeks which were cheerfully paid to him by the Perſians [a]. The manner of Calliſthenes's puniſhment and death is related more variouſly [b] than almoſt any hiſtorical event of ſuch public notoriety; but moſt writers concur in opinion, that he met with the juſt reward of his raſhneſs and arrogance. This tranſaction, it is aſſerted, much eſtranged Alexander from his ancient preceptor. The aſſertion however is not accompanied with any ſolid proof [c]; and the abſurd calumny, that Ariſtotle not only regarded this pretended diſpleaſure

Suppoſed rupture between Ariſtotle and Alexander.

[y] Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. iv. c. 8.

[z] Ωκυμορος δη μοι τεκος; εσσεται ὐι ἀγορευεις. Il. xviii. 95.

[a] Arrian. ubi ſupra.

[b] By Arrian, Curtius, Juſtin, Diogenes Laertius, Philoſtratus, and Suidas.

[c] Alexander's reſentment is inferred from a vague and haſty expreſſion in a letter to Antipater; "Τον δι σοφιστην εγω κολασω, και τους επεμψαντας αυτον—I will puniſh the Sophiſt (meaning Calliſthenes) and thoſe who ſent him." Plutarch. in Alexand. p. 696. Alexander, it is true, ſent preſents to Xenocrates; but ſo did Antipater, who always remained Ariſtotle's ſincere and confidential friend.

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pleaſure as an injury, but even proceeded to the wickedneſs of joining in a conſpiracy againſt Alexander's life, is warranted by nothing in hiſtory, but a hearſay preſerved in Plutarch [d], and the affected credit given to the monſtrous report by the monſter Caracalla, for the unworthy purpoſe of juſtifying his own violence in deſtroying the ſchools of the Ariſtotelian philoſophers in Alexandria, the burning their books, and depriving them of all thoſe privileges and revenues which they enjoyed through the munificence of the Ptolemies, Alexander's Egyptian ſucceſſors [e].

Plan of Ariſtotle's life in Athens.

Having taken leave of the Macedonian capital, Ariſtotle returned to his beloved Athens; where he ſpent thirteen [f] years, almoſt the whole remainder of his life, inſtructing his diſciples, and improving the various branches of his philoſophy. His *acroatic* lectures were given in the morning to thoſe who were his regular pupils [g]. A conſiderable part of them is ſtill preſerved in his works, which form an abſtract or ſyllabus of treatiſes on the moſt important branches of philoſophy. His *exoteric* diſcourſes were held after ſupper with occaſional viſitors, and formed the amuſement of his evening walks [h]; for he thought "exerciſe peculiarly uſeful after table for animating and invigorating the natural heat and ſtrength, which the too rapid ſucceſſion of ſleep to food ſeemed fitted to relax and encumber [i]." Before his arrival at Athens, Sheuſippus was dead; and

[d] "Thoſe who ſay that Ariſtotle adviſed Antipater to deſtroy Alexander by poiſon, cite for their authority a certain Agnothemis, who heard it from king Antigonus." Plut. in Alexand. p. 707.

[e] Dion in Caracall. [f] Dionyſ. Epiſt. ad Ammæum.

[g] Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 5. [h] Idem ibid.

[i] Plutarch, Conjug. Præcept. p. 133.

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and Xenocrates, whoſe dull gravity and rigid auſterity a man of Ariſtotle's character could not much admire, had taken poſſeſſion of the academy [k]. The Stagirite, therefore, ſettled in a *gymnaſium* in the ſuburbs, well ſhaded with trees, near to which the ſoldiers uſed to exerciſe, and adorned by the temple of Lycian Apollo, from whoſe *peripaton*, or walk, Ariſtotle and his followers were called Peripatetics [l]. It is reported that he opened his ſchool, obſerving, "That it would be ſhameful for himſelf to be ſilent while Xenocrates publicly taught [m]." Ariſtotle is not likely to have uttered ſuch a preſumptuous boaſt; but if it was really made, even this arrogant ſpeech was certainly very fully juſtified by the fame which the Lyceum ſpeedily acquired, which the Stagirite himſelf maintained unimpaired through life, and which was ably ſupported by his diſciple and ſucceſſor Theophraſtus.

Such is the genuine hiſtory of Ariſtotle's life, in the moſt important paſſages of which all the ancient writers [n], who have expreſsly treated his biography, unitedly concur. By arranging the ſubject, therefore, according to our preſent method, both my

[k] Diogen. Laert. in Xenocrat.

[l] Menagius ad Diogen. Laert. l. v. ſect. 2.

[m] Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot. But Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionyſius Halicarn. read "Iſocrates" inſtead of "Xenocrates." The reading in the text is the more probable, for Iſocrates and Ariſtotle, following very different purſuits, were not naturally rivals; beſides, the former is ſaid to have died ſoon after the battle of Chæronæa in extreme old age, and Ariſtotle did not return to Athens till three years after that deciſive engagement. Compare my Life of Iſocrates, and the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 33.

[n] Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, Diogenes Laertius, and Ammonius: the ancient Latin tranſlation of this laſt, firſt publiſhed by Nunneſius (Helmeſtadij 1767), contains ſome additional circumſtances, but thoſe of little value, and of doubtful authority.

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my own labour will be abridged, and the reader's time will be ſaved; for the calumnies againſt Ariſtotle will be no ſooner mentioned than they will refute themſelves, and they could not paſs unnoticed, becauſe they are perpetuated in the ſarcaſms of Lucian [o], and the lying whiſpers of Athenæus [p], which have been too often miſtaken, even by the learned, for true hiſtory.

Calumnies againſt Ariſtotle.

The abſurd reports that Ariſtotle firſt ſerved in the army, that he there diſſipated his fortune by low profligacy, and then followed for bread the trade of an apothecary [q], may be confidently rejected by thoſe who know, on unqueſtionable authority, that he became, at the early age of ſeventeen, a diligent ſtudent in the academy at Athens, where he remained during the long period of twenty years. The reader who has ſeen the teſtimonies of his gratitude to Plato, will not eaſily be perſuaded that he could treat this revered maſter with the groſſeſt brutality [r]; and let him who reads the Ethics to Nicomachus aſk his own heart, whether it is likely that the author of ſuch a treatiſe ſhould, inſtead of reſtraining and correcting, have flattered

[o] Lucian treats both Ariſtotle and his pupil with equal injuſtice. Vid. Dialog. Diogen. & Alexand. et Alexand. & Philip.

[p] Athenæus Deipnos. l. viii. p. 354.

[q] Athenæus ubi ſupra, and Ariſtocles apud Euſebium. Their report reſts on a ſuppoſititious letter of Epicurus on Study, and the aſſertion of Timæus of Tauromenon in Sicily; an author nicknamed Epitimæus, the Detractor. Diodorus Siculus, l. v. c. 1. Athenæus, l. vi. p. 272.

[r] Αριστοτελης ημας απιλακτισι—"Ariſtotle has kicked at us;" a ſtrong metaphor. Diogenes Laert. l. v. ſect. 2. Ælian Var. Hiſtor. l. iii. c. 19. aſcribes both to Plato and to Ariſtotle a behaviour totally inconſiſtent with every thing that we know of their characters. Comp. Ælian, Var. Hiſt. l. iv. c. 19. Photius, Biblioth. c. 279. Auguſtin. de Civitate Dei, l. viii. c. 12. Such contradictory reports mutually deſtroy each other.

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flattered[s] and fomented the vices of Alexander. Inſtead of farther examining theſe wild fictions, which ſtand in direct contradiction to the matters of fact above related, it is of more importance to inquire whence ſuch improbable tales could have originated; eſpecially as this inquiry will bring us to the events which immediately preceded our philoſopher's death.

Wherein they originated.

From innumerable paſſages in the moral and political works of which we have preſumed to offer the tranſlation to the public, it will appear that Ariſtotle regarded with equal contempt vain pretenders to real ſcience, and real profeſſors of ſciences which he deemed vain and frivolous. His theological opinions, alſo, were far too refined for the groſſneſs of paganiſm. He ſought only for truth, and was careleſs of the obſtacles which ſtood in his way to attaining it, whether they were found in the errors of philoſophers, or in the prejudices of the vulgar. Such a man, in ſuch a city as Athens, where, ſince the days of Socrates, the learned taught publicly and converſed freely with all deſcriptions of perſons, could not fail to have many rivals and many enemies. Sophiſts and ſcioliſts, ſoothſayers and ſatiriſts, and that worſt of banes, ſatirical hiſtorians[t], heaped obloquy on a character, the ornament of his own age, and deſtined to be the inſtructor of poſterity. But the name of Alexander, which then filled the world, was duly reſpected, even in the turbulent democracy of Athens; and it was not till the year following the

[s] Lucian, Dial. Diogen. & Alexand.

[t] Ariſtocles (apud Euſebium) ſays, that Ariſtotle was attacked by a hoſt of writers, "whoſe books and memories have periſhed more completely than their bodies." Even his fellow ſtudent, Ariſtoxenus, who had treated him moſt reſpectfully while he lived, heaped the moſt illiberal reproaches on his memory, becauſe he preferred to himſelf Theophraſtus for his ſucceſſor. Suidas in Ariſtoxen. & Ariſtocles apud Euſebium.

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the death of that incomparable prince, that the rancorous malignity, which had been long ſuppreſſed, burſt forth againſt Ariſtotle with irreſiſtible violence. He was accuſed of irreligion before the Areopagus by the hierophant Eurymedon, abetted by Demophilus, a man of weight in the republic; and both of them inſtigated to this cruel proſecution by our philoſopher's declared enemies [u]. The heads of the accuſation were, "that Ariſtotle had commemorated the virtues both of his wife Pythias and of his friend Hermeias, with ſuch ceremonies and honours as the piety of Athens juſtly reſerved for the majeſty of the gods." To Hermeias, indeed, he erected a ſtatue at Delphi; he alſo wrote an ode in his praiſe. Both the inſcription and the ode have come down to modern times; the former ſimply relating "the unworthy and treacherous death of Hermeias;" and the latter "extolling virtue above all earthly poſſeſſions; and eſpecially that generous patriotiſm, for the ſake of which the native of Atarneus, rivalling the merit of Hercules and Achilles, had willingly relinquiſhed the light of the ſun; whoſe fame therefore would never be forgotten by the Muſes, daughters of memory; and as often as it was ſung would redound to the glory of *Hoſpitable Jove* [x], and the honour of firm friendſhip [y]." From the frivolouſneſs of the accuſation reſpecting Hermeias, which was conſidered as the chief article of the impeachment, we may warrantably conjecture that the reproach of worſhipping Pythias with honours due to Eleuſinian Ceres, was altogether groundleſs: but in a philoſopher, whoſe intellectual rather than his moral virtues have been the object of panegyric, we may remark with pleaſure both the ſtrength of his friendſhip,

His accuſation at Athens.

[u] Diogen. Laert, l. v. ſect. 4 & 5.

[x] See above, p. 11. [y] Laertius in Ariſtot. Athenæus, xv. p. 697.

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ſhip, and the ſincere tenderneſs of his love, ſince both affections muſt have been expreſſed with an amiable enthuſiaſm, to enable even the malice of his enemies to interpret them into the crime of idolatry.

His tenets ignorantly calumniated.

It muſt not be diſſembled that the accuſation, and conſequent condemnation of Ariſtotle by the Areopagus, has been aſcribed to a different cauſe from that above aſſigned, and referred merely to the impiety of his tenets. He is ſaid by thoſe who have careleſsly examined his works, to have denied a Providence, and thence to have inferred the inefficacy of prayers and ſacrifices: doctrines, it is obſerved, which could not but enrage the prieſthood, as totally ſubverſive of its functions, eſtabliſhments, and revenues [y]. But never was any accuſation urged more falſely or more ignorantly. Ariſtotle, as it will be ſhewn hereafter, enumerates the prieſthood among the functions or offices eſſentially requiſite to the exiſtence of every community. In writing to Alexander he ſays, that thoſe are not entitled to be high-minded who conquer kingdoms, but rather thoſe who have learned to form juſt notions of the gods [z]; and in his life, as well as in his works, he uniformly ſhewed his veneration for religion in general, by treating, with great tenderneſs [a], even that diſtorted image of it reflected from the puerile ſuperſtitions of his country [b].

He

[y] Origines contra Celſum & Bruckeri, Hiſtor. Critic. vol. i. p. 790.

[z] Plutarch in Alexand.

[a] This tenderneſs, however, did not, probably, ſatisfy the Athenian prieſts, who, as it will appear from the following analyſis of his works, had more to apprehend from his real piety, than to fear from his pretended irreligion.

[b] Diogen. Laert. l. v. ſect. 16. But the beſt proof of this will appear hereafter, when we come to examine Ariſtotle's works.

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He is ſaid to have written his own defence, and to have inveighed, in a ſtrong metaphor, againſt the increaſing degeneracy of the Athenians [c]. His diſcourſe, of which the boldneſs would only have inflamed the blind zeal of his weak or wicked judges, was not delivered in court; ſince he eſcaped his trial by ſeaſonably quitting Athens for Chalcis in Eubœa, ſaying, in alluſion to the death of Socrates, that he was unwilling to afford to the Athenians a ſecond opportunity of ſinning againſt philoſophy [d]. He ſurvived his retreat to the ſhores of the Euripus, ſcarcely a twelvemonth; perſecution and baniſhment having probably ſhortened his days [e].

His retreat to Chalcis, and death.

His teſtament, preſerved in Diogenes Laertius, accords with the circumſtances related concerning his life, and practically illuſtrates the liberal maxims of his philoſophy. Antipater, the confidential miniſter of Philip, regent of Macedon both under Alexander and after his demiſe, is appointed the executor of this teſtament, with an authority paramount, as it ſhould ſeem, to

His teſtament.

[c] Laert. l. v. ſect. 16. Οχη επ οχη γηρασει. Homer's deſcription of the gardens of Alcinous. "The fig rotting on the fig," alludes to the Athenian ſycophants, ſo called originally from informing againſt the exporters of figs.

[d] Ælian, iii. 36.

[e] St. Juſtin (in admon. ad gentes) and Gregory of Naxianzen (contra Julian.) ſay that he died through the uneaſineſs of diſcontent at not being able to explain the cauſe of the tides of the Euripus; upon which authority the puerile ſtory is engraſted of his throwing himſelf into that arm of the ſea, ſaying, "You ſhall contain me, ſince I cannot comprehend you." Others ſay that he ended his life by poiſon to eſcape the vengeance of the Athenians (Rapin's Comparaiſon de Platon & d' Ariſtote). Such unwarranted reports would not be worthy of mention, did they not afford an opportunity of obſerving the extreme improbability that Ariſtotle ſhould have been guilty of ſuicide, ſince he always ſpeaks of it as of a ſhameful and cowardly crime.

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to that of the other perſons who are afterwards conjoined with him in the ſame truſt. To his wife Herpylis, (for he had married a ſecond time,) Ariſtotle, beſides other property in money and ſlaves, leaves the choice of two houſes, the one in Chalcis, the other his paternal manſion at Stagira; and deſires, that whichever of them ſhe might prefer, ſhould be properly furniſhed for her reception. He commends her domeſtic virtues; and requeſts his friends that, mindful of her behaviour towards him, they would diſtinguiſh her by the kindeſt attention; and ſhould ſhe again think of a huſband, that they would be careful to provide for her a ſuitable marriage. To Nicomachus, the ſon of this Herpylis, and to Pythias, the daughter of his firſt wife, he bequeathed the remainder of his fortune, with the exception of his library and writings, which he left to his favourite ſcholar Theophraſtus[f]. He deſires that his daughter, when ſhe attained a marriageable age, ſhould be given to Nicanor, the ſon of his ancient benefactor Proxenus; and failing Nicanor, that his eſteemed diſciple Theophraſtus ſhould accept her hand and fortune. The bones of his firſt wife Pythias, he ordered to be diſinterred, and again buried with his own, as ſhe herſelf had requeſted. None of his ſlaves are to be ſold; they are all of them either emancipated by his will, or ordered to be manumitted by his heirs, whenever they ſeem worthy of liberty; an injunction conformable to the maxims inculcated in his "Politics," that ſlaves of all deſcriptions ought to be ſet free, whenever they merited freedom, and are qualified for enjoying it. He concludes with a teſtimony of external deference at leaſt for the religion of his country, by ordering that the dedications which he had vowed for the ſafety of

[f] Strabo, xiii. 413.

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of Nicanor, ſhould be preſented at Stagira to Jupiter and Minerva, the ſaviours.

Thus lived and thus died, in his 63d year, Ariſtotle the Stagirite. His enlightened humanity was often ſeaſoned by pleaſantry. Many ſtrokes of genuine humour, little ſuſpected by his commentators, will be found in his political writings. His ſmart ſayings and quick repartees were long remembered and admired by thoſe incapable of appreciating his weightier merits. Some of theſe ſayings, though apparently not the moſt memorable, are preſerved in Diogenes Laertius; of which the following may ſerve for a ſpecimen. Being aſked, What, of all things, ſooneſt grows old?—Gratitude. What advantage have you reaped from ſtudy?—That of doing through choice what others do through fear. What is friendſhip?—One ſoul in two bodies. Why do we never tire of the company of the beautiful?—The queſtion of a blind man! Such apoththegms would be unworthy of mention, had they not, by their perpetual recurrence in our philoſopher's converſation, ſhewn a mind free and unincumbered amidſt the abſtruſeſt ſtudies; and, together with the moſt intenſe thought, a readineſs of wit, which never failed to repel ſneerers, and to abaſh arrogance[g]. He exhibited a character as a man, worthy of his pre-eminence as a philoſopher; inhabiting courts, without meanneſs and without ſelfiſhneſs; living in ſchools, without pride and without auſterity[h]; cultivating with ardent affection every domeſtic and every ſocial virtue, while with indefatigable induſtry he reared that wonderful edifice of ſcience, the plan of which we are ſtill enabled to delineate from his imperfect and mutilated writings. His ſayings.

The

[g] Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot. & Diogen.

[h] Plutarch. de Virtut. Moral. p. 448.

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The extraordinary fate of his writings.

The extraordinary and unmerited fate of theſe writings, while it excites the curioſity, muſt provoke the indignation of every friend to ſcience. Few of them were publiſhed in his lifetime; the greater part nearly periſhed through neglect; and the remainder has been ſo groſsly miſapplied, that doubts have ariſen whether its preſervation ought to be regarded as a benefit. Ariſtotle's manuſcripts and library were bequeathed to Theophraſtus, the moſt illuſtrious of his pupils. Theophraſtus again bequeathed them to his own ſcholar Neleus, who carrying them to Scepſis, a city of the ancient Troas, left them to his heirs in the undiſtinguiſhed maſs of his property. The heirs of Neleus, men ignorant of literature and careleſs of books [h], totally neglected the intellectual treaſure that had moſt unworthily devolved to them, until they heard that the king of Pergamus, under whoſe dominion they lived, was employing much attention and much reſearch in collecting a large library [i]. With the caution incident to the ſubjects of a deſpot, who often have recourſe to concealment in order to avoid robbery, they hid their books under ground; and the writings of Ariſtotle, as well as the vaſt collection of materials from which they had been compoſed, thus remained in a ſubterranean manſion for many generations, a prey to dampneſs and to worms [k].

At

[h] Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608 & 609. Bayle gives too ſtrong a meaning to ἰδιωταις ἀνθρωποις, when he calls them "gens idiots:" ἰδιωτης means one who confines his attention to the private affairs of life, in oppoſition to philoſophers and ſtateſmen.

[i] Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608.

[k] Athenæus, l. i. p. 3. ſays, that Neleus ſold Ariſtotle's books to Ptolemy Philadelphus; and Bayle (article Tyrannion) endeavours with Patricius (Diſcuſſ. Peripatet. t. i. p. 29.) to reconcile this account with that of Strabo, by ſuppoſing that Neleus indeed ſold Ariſtotle's library and works to king Ptolemy, but not before he had taken the precaution of having the whole carefully copied. According to thoſe writers, the books

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At length they were releaſed from their priſon, or rather raiſed from the grave, and ſold for a large ſum, together with the works of Theophraſtus, to Apellicon of Athens, a lover of books rather than a ſcholar [l]; through whoſe labour and expence the work of reſtoring Ariſtotle's manuſcripts, though performed in the ſame city in which they had been originally written, was very imperfectly executed. To this, not only the ignorance of the editors, but both the condition and the nature of the writings themſelves did not a little contribute. The moſt conſiderable part of his acroatic works, which are almoſt the whole of thoſe now remaining, conſiſt of little better than text books, containing the detached heads of his diſcourſes; and, through want of connexion in the matter, peculiarly liable to corruption from tranſcribers, and highly unſuſceptible of conjectural emendation.

Publiſhed at Rome by Andronycus of Rhodes.

What became of Ariſtotle's original manuſcript, we are not informed; but the copy made for Apellicon was, together with his whole library, ſeized by Sylla, the Roman conqueror of Athens, and by him tranſmitted to Rome [m]. Ariſtotle's works excited

books thus copied, and not the originals, ſuffered the unworthy treatment mentioned in the text. This ſuppoſition ſeems highly improbable; for not to mention the difficulty of copying, in a ſhort time, many thouſand volumes, it cannot be believed that Ptolemy, had he been in poſſeſſion of the genuine works of Ariſtotle, would have purchaſed at a high price thoſe counterfeits, which had no other connection with that philoſopher than bearing his forged name on their title-page. (Ammonius ad Categor ſub init.) Had a correct copy of the Stagirite's works adorned the library of Alexandria under the firſt Ptolemies, his genuine philoſophy would have ſtruck deeper root, and made farther progreſs than it ever did, in that Egyptian capital. Voſſius (de Sect. Philoſoph. c. xvi. p. 89.) endeavours to prove that Athenæus's words (which are certainly incorrect) imply that Neleus retained Ariſtotle's works when he ſold all the reſt.

[l] Strabo ſays, "rather than a philoſopher."

[m] Plutarch in Sylla.

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excited the attention of Tyrannion, a native of Amyſus in Pontus, who had been taken priſoner by Lucullus in the Mithridatic war, and inſolently manumitted [n], as Plutarch ſays, by Muraena, Lucullus's lieutenant. Tyrannion procured the manuſcript by paying court to Sylla's librarian; and communicated the uſe of it to Andronycus of Rhodes, who flouriſhed as a philoſopher at Rome, in the time of Cicero and Pompey; and who, having undertaken the taſk of arranging and correcting thoſe long injured writings, finally performed the duty of a ſkilful editor [o].

Their number and magnitude.

Though the works which formed the object of Andronycus's labours had ſuffered ſuch injuries as the utmoſt diligence and ſagacity could not completely repair [p], yet in conſequence of thoſe labours the Peripatetic philoſophy began to reſume the luſtre of which it had been deprived ſince the days of Theophraſtus; and the later adherents to that ſect, as they became acquainted with the real tenets of their maſter, far ſurpaſſed the

[n] Plutarch ſpeaks with the dignity becoming a man of letters, who feels himſelf ſuperior to the prejudices of his times: "That to give liberty by manumiſſion to a man of Tyrannion's education and merit, was to rob him of that liberty which he naturally and eſſentially poſſeſſed." Plutarch in Lucull. p. 504. I have melted into one ſentence οὐ γαρ ἐξιον (read ἀξιου) Λουκουλλος αυδρα δια παιδειαν ισπουδασμενον—and αφαιρεισις γαρ ην της ὑπαρχουσης ἡ της δεουσης ἐλευθεριας δοσις.

[o] Plutarch in Syll. Porphyr. in Vitâ Plotini. Boetius in Procemio libri de interpret. Strabo only ſays that Tyrannion, in the manner mentioned in the text, got poſſeſſion of the manuſcript; which was copied for the Roman bookſellers by careleſs tranſcribers, who did not even take the pains of comparing their copies with the original: a negligence, he obſerves, too common among the tranſcribers both in Rome and Alexandria.

[p] Even after this publication, Ariſtotle's followers were obliged τα πολλα ἐικοτως λεγειν δια το πληθος των ἁμαρτιων, "often to gueſs at his meaning, through the faultineſs of his text." Strabo, in the place above cited.

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the fame and merit of their ignorant and obſcure predeceſſors [q]. From the æra of Andronycus's publication to that of the invention of printing, a ſucceſſion of reſpectable writers on civil and ſacred ſubjects (not excepting the venerable fathers of the Chriſtian church) confirm, by their citations and criticiſms, the authenticity of moſt of the treatiſes ſtill bearing Ariſtotle's name; and of more than ten thouſand [r] commentators, who have endeavoured to illuſtrate different parts of his works, there are incomparably fewer than might have been expected, whoſe vanity has courted the praiſe of ſuperior diſcernment by rejecting any conſiderable portion of them as ſpurious [s]. According to the moſt credible accounts, therefore, he compoſed above four-hundred [t] different treatiſes, of which only forty-

[q] Strabo, l. xiii. p. 609. He obſerves, "that the Peripatetic philoſophers ſucceeding Theophraſtus had, till this time, but few of their maſter's works, and thoſe few chiefly of the exoteric kind; ſo that they were more converſant about words than things; and inſtead of reaſoning accurately and profoundly, were contented with diſplaying their ſkill in dialectic and rhetoric." I have thus paraphraſed the obſcurity of the original φιλοσοφειν πραγματικως and θεσεις ληκυθιζειν, becauſe Strabo, who had himſelf diligently ſtudied Ariſtotle's philoſophy (Strabo, l. xvi. p. 757.), uſes the word πραγματικως, moſt probably, in the ſame ſenſe in which it occurs in Ariſtotle, as ſynonymous with ακριβως, κατα αληθειαν; and in oppoſition to διαλικτικως and το διαλεγεσθαι λογικως.

[r] Patricius Diſcuſſ. Peripatet.

[s] Compare Diogenes Laertius in Vit. Ariſtot. Patric. Diſcuſſ. Peripatetic. Fabricius Bibliothec. Græc. & Bruckerus Hiſtor. Philoſ. artic. Ariſtot.

[t] Diogenes Laertius (in Vit. Ariſtot.) makes Ariſtotle's volumes amount to four hundred; Patricius Venetus, a learned profeſſor of Padua in the ſixteenth century, endeavours to prove that they amounted to nearly double that number. (Patric. Diſcuſſ. Peripat.) The laborious Fabricius employs one hundred pages of his ſecond volume in enumerating and aſcertaining Ariſtotle's remains; which ſtill exceed four times the collective bulk of the Iliad and Odyſſey. The whole works of Ariſtotle, therefore, muſt have contained a quantity of proſe, equal to ſixteen times 28,088 verſes; a fact

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forty-eight [a] have been tranſmitted to the preſent age. But many of theſe laſt conſiſt of ſeveral books, and the whole of his remains together ſtill form a golden chain of Greek erudition, exceeding four times the collective bulk of the Iliad and Odyſſey.

a fact the more extraordinary, ſince the greater part of his writings are merely elegant and comprehenſive text books, containing the heads of his lectures; laborious, but clear reaſonings; and often original diſcoveries in the moſt difficult branches of ſcience. The following paſſage concerning him in the French Encyclopedie, article Ariſtoteliſme, muſt excite a ſmile of ſomething more than ſurpriſe. "Le nombre de ſes ouvrages eſt prodigieux; on en peut voir les titres en Diogene Laerce encore ne ſommes nous pas ſûrs de les avoir tous: il eſt même probable que nous en avons perdu pluſieurs," &c.

[a] The treatiſes de Plantis & de Mundo are rejected by moſt writers. The former is, indeed, of little value; the latter, of the greateſt; but I do not cite it as an authority, becauſe it is my ambition to place my account of his philoſophy beyond the reach of cavil.

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CHAP. II.

A NEW ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S SPECULATIVE WORKS.

ARGUMENT.

Senſation—Its nature explained—Imagination and memory—Aſſociation of perceptions—Reminiſcence—Intellect—Its power and dignity—Ariſtotle's organon—Origin of general terms—Categories—Diviſion and Definition—Propoſitions—Syllogiſms—Their nature and uſe—Second analytics—Topics—Ariſtotle's organon perverted and miſapplied—Demonſtration—Ariſtotle's metaphyſics—Proper arrangement thereof—Truth vindicated—Introduction to the firſt philoſophy—Its hiſtory—Refutation of the doctrine of ideas—Elements—Analyſis of the bodies ſo called—Their perpetual tranſmutations—Doctrine of atoms refuted—Motion or change—Its different kinds—Works of nature—How her operations are performed—Matter—Form—Privation—The ſpecific form or ſight—State of capacity and energy—Ariſtotle's aſtronomy—The earth and its productions—Hiſtory of animals—Philoſophy of natural hiſtory—His book on energy—The firſt energy eternally and ſubſtantially active—His attributes—Antiquity of the doctrine that Deity is the ſource of being—Inculcated in Ariſtotle's exoteric works—Objections to Ariſtotle's philoſophy—Anſwers thereto.

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The different branches into which it is divided.

THE Works of Ariſtotle derive their importance and ſplendour, neither from their number nor their magnitude, but from their variety and their aim. Diſdaining the conqueſt of particular provinces, he daringly invaded the whole empire

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of philoſophy; and his perſevering and generally ſucceſsful exertions in this bold enterpriſe excites the juſteſt admiration of his genius and induſtry. The heavens and the earth; things human and divine; God, man, and nature; under theſe comprehenſive diviſions of whatever is the object of human thought, the Stagirite diſtributes the different articles of his truly philoſophical Encyclopædia; of which time has yet ſpared to us the diſtinct outline, with many groups imperfectly ſketched, and others totally defaced, yet filled up in ſome of its moſt eſſential parts with exquiſite ſkill, and delineated throughout with unexampled boldneſs and inimitable preciſion.

In endeavouring to communicate to the reader, in few words, a clear and correct notion of the condition in which Ariſtotle found, and in which he left philoſophy, it will be impoſſible ſtrictly to adhere to the capricious order in which his Works have been arranged by his editors. Agreeably to his own maxim, I ſhall begin, not with what is abſolutely firſt either in time or in dignity, but with what is firſt in relation to man; that is, with what is firſt in the order of his thoughts or conceptions; endeavouring, in my diſcourſe throughout, to preſerve the modeſty and impartiality of an hiſtorian, and to be as faithful in explaining my author's opinions, as cautious in interpoſing my own judgment.

The ſources of human knowledge.

It is the doctrine of Ariſtotle, a doctrine long and obſtinately diſputed, but now very generally admitted, that all our direct knowledge originates in perceptions of ſenſe[a]. Of the five ſenſes,

[a] De Anima, l. iii. c. ix. p. 656. εν τοις ειδεσι τοις αισθητοις το νοητα εστι ... και δια τουτο ουτε αισθανομενος μηδεν οιδεν αν μαθοι, ουδε συνιοι. τα δε αφωτα νοηματα, τινι διοισει τα μη φαντασματα ειναι; η ουδε ταυτα φαντασματα, αλλ' ουκ ανευ φαντασματων; but I no where find in Ariſtotle the words univerſally aſcribed to him, "Nihil eſt in intellectu, quid non prius fuerit in ſenſu."

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ſenſes, that of touch, he obſerves, is generally diffuſed through the whole animal frame, and cannot therefore be deſtroyed without deſtroying the animal [b]. The ſenſe of taſte Ariſtotle regards as a particular kind of touch, requiſite for the purpoſe of nutrition, and therefore eſſential to life [c]. But the three other ſenſes, always reſiding in particular organs, are in ſome animals altogether wanting, in others extremely imperfect; and even in thoſe animals in whom they are moſt vigorous, are often, without deſtruction to the animal itſelf, overwhelmed, weakened, or totally deſtroyed, by the too powerful operation of their reſpective objects [d].

Senſation.

Colours and ſounds are perceived reſpectively by the eye and the ear, and by them only; motions and figures are conveyed to the mind through the inſtrumentality of more ſenſes than one; and a third claſs of perceptions are communicated and impreſſed through the united energy of all the ſenſes [e]. Thoſe of touch and of taſte ſeem to be nearly a-kin, becauſe external objects ſeem to operate on them by direct and immediate application. This, however, is not probably the caſe; becauſe, were it true, the analogy of nature would here be violated, ſince it is found by experiment, that external objects, directly and immediately applied to the organs of the three other ſenſes, totally obſtruct the motions on which their power of ſenſation depends, and

[b] Compar. Ariſtot. de Anima, l. ii. c. iii. p. 633. and c. xi. p. 624. & ſeq.

[c] ὁ δὲ χυμὸς ἐν τι τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστι. Comp. l. ii. de Anima, c. iii. p. 633, and c. 10, p. 643. & ſeq.

[d] De Anima, l. ii. c. 6, 7, 8, 9.

ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ; and again, ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 648.

[e] De Anima, l. ii. c. vi. p. 638.

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and render their reſpective objects, ſounds, colours, and odours, altogether imperceptible [f]. By a rapid and continuous agitation of the air, ſonorous bodies affect the ear; through the intervention of light, colours are diſtinguiſhed by the eye; and odours are communicated in a ſubtile vapour, which muſt in ſome animals, before perception can have place, be accompanied with the act of inſpiring by the noſtrils [g]. Agreeably to this analogy, it is probable that the fleſhy and tender part of our external frame, which ſeems to us to be endowed with ſuch a delicate ſenſe of touch, is nothing more than the medium through which the perceptions of hardneſs, ſoftneſs, and other qualities of that kind, are conveyed and communicated [h].

Its nature explained.

The real qualities of external objects are ſuppoſed to be made known to us by our ſenſes; but in fact thoſe qualities, ſuch as they are by us conceived and denominated, have not any actual exiſtence until they are perceived [i]. Previouſly to this, they exiſt only in power or capacity; which, in the language of Ariſtotle, here means that they exiſt only in their cauſes [k]; cauſes

[f] εαν γαρ τις θη το εχον χρωμα επ' αυτην την οψιν, ουκ οψεται . . . ὁ δε αυτος λογος και περι ψοφου και οσμης εστι, &c. De Anima, l. ii. c. vii. p. 639.

[g] De Anima, l. ii. c. ix. p. 643.

[h] De Anima, c. xi. p. 641. How far is this conjecture connected with the diſcovery of the nerves and their functions? And to how many diſcoveries might the ſhrewd gueſſes of Ariſtotle, attentively examined, ſtill give birth?

[i] ἡ δε του αισθητου ενεργεια και της αισθησεως ἡ αυτη μεν εστι και μια. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 638. And again, αναγκη αμα φθειρεσθαι και σωζεσθαι την ὑτω λεγομενην ακοην και ψοφον, χυμον και γευσιν, και τα αλλα ὁμοιως. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 649.

[k] Compare διχως γαρ λεγομενης της αισθησεως και του αισθητου, των μεν κατα δυναμιν, των δε κατ' ενεργειαν, &c. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 649. And το μεν ουν μητε τα αισθητα ειναι, μητε των αισθηματα, ισως αληθες. του γαρ αισθανομενου παθος τουτο εστι· το δε τα υποκειμενα μη ειναι ἁ ποιει την αισθησιν, και ανευ αισθησεως, αδυνατον. Metaphyſ. l. iv. c. v. p. 879.

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cauſes which, though themſelves imperceptible, have the power of moving and agitating our organs [l], and thereby of producing in them that variety of ſenſations, which relieves man from ſolitude, and connects him with the external world. To beings differently conſtituted, or to man himſelf, enjoying a direct and immediate intimacy with the cauſes of his perceptions, this world would probably aſſume an appearance altogether different from that which it now wears; for all ſenſation directly and immediately depends, not merely on the nature of its external cauſes, but on that alſo of the motions and changes produced in the organs of ſenſe. Ariſtotle, therefore, juſtly reproves Democritus for ſaying, that if no medium were interpoſed, a piſmire would be viſible in the heavens [m]; aſſerting, on the contrary, that if vacuity alone intervened, nothing poſſibly could be ſeen, becauſe all viſion is performed by changes or motions in the organ of ſight; and all ſuch changes or motions imply an interpoſed medium [n].

Between the perceptions of the eye and of the ear there is a ſtriking analogy. Bodies are only viſible by their colour; and colour is only perceptible in light; and unleſs different motions were excited by light in the eye, colour and the diſtinctions of colour would no more be viſible, than, independently of different vibrations communicated to the ear, ſound, and the diſtinctions of

[l] ἡ δὲ λεγομένη αἰσθησις, ὡς ἐνεργεια, κίνησις τις διὰ τοῦ σωματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι. De Somn. & Vigilia, c. i. p. 685. ἡ δὲ αἰσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεισθαι τι καὶ πασχειν συμβαινει. De Anima, l. ii. c. 5. p. 636.

[m] De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 639.

[n] De Senſu & Senſili, c. ii. p. 665.

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of ſound, would be audible [o]. When the vibrations in a given time are many, the ſenſation of ſharpneſs or ſhrillneſs follows; when the vibrations are, in the ſame time, comparatively few, the ſenſation of flatneſs is the reſult: but the firſt ſound does not excite many vibrations becauſe it is ſhrill or ſharp, but it is ſharp becauſe it excites many vibrations; and the ſecond ſound does not excite few vibrations becauſe it is flat or grave, but it is grave becauſe it excites few vibrations [p].

Imagination and memory.

The powers of imagination and memory owe their origin to the ſenſes, and are common to man with many other animals. As ſenſation is carried on by means of certain motions excited in our organs, ſo imagination and memory, which are the copies of ſenſation, exert their energy by means of ſimilar but fainter motions, repreſentatives of the former [q]. That independently of external cauſes ſuch motions are produced, is demonſtrable from what happens in ſleep [r]. In ſome kinds of madneſs too, the phantoms of the brain are miſtaken for realities [s]; and, in other kinds, realities are miſtaken for phantoms [t]. But when our

[o] De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 641. See alſo l. ii. c. vii. p. 638. The intrepid ignorance of Voltaire might maintain, that Ariſtotle conſidered light as a quality merely; and that luminous and coloured bodies had qualities exactly ſuch as they excited the ideas of in us. (Voltaire's Newtonian Philoſophy.) But how could the learned Warburton aſſent to this erroneous account of the Peripatetic philoſophy? See Divine Legation of Moſes, &c. b. iv. ſect. 6.

[p] De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 641.

[q] ἡ δὲ φαντασια ἐστι αἰσθησις τις αἰσθήσεως. Rhetor. l. i. c. xi. p. 536. The ſame doctrine is maintained De Anima, l. iii. c. 4. p. 652. and De Memor. & Reminiſcent. c. i. p. 680. c. ii. 682 & 683.

[r] De Anima, l. iii. c. iv. p. 651.

[s] Of this ſee an extraordinary example in Mirabil. Auſcult. p. 1152.

[t] De Anima, l. iii. c. iv. p. 652. and De Mem. & Reminiſc. c. i. p. 680.

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our ſenſes are ſound and awake, we can eaſily diſtinguiſh between perceptions ariſing from external cauſes, and thoſe called into being by the mere agency of our internal conſtitution; and in many caſes we can diſcover and explain the laws by which the energy of this conſtitution operates [u]. For the perceptions of imagination and memory, though not rigidly governed, like thoſe of ſenſe, by the power and preſence of external objects, do not, however, float at random, but are ſubjected to a certain order and progreſſion, conformably to eſtabliſhed laws of aſſociation, which Ariſtotle was the firſt philoſopher that attempted to inveſtigate, to enumerate, and to explain [v]. He inveſtigated them in analiſing the complex act of reminiſcence or recollection, in which the principles of aſſociation operate under the immediate direction of the human will. He enumerated them, as far as ſeemed requiſite to the ſubject which he was then treating, by ſaying that they might be reduced to the four following heads: proximity in time; contiguity in place; reſemblance or ſimilarity; contrariety or contraſt [x]: And he explains them by ſhewing, that in every

Aſſociation of ideas or perceptions.

[u] De Memor. & Reminiſcent. c. i. p. 680. [v] Ibid. c. 2. p. 681.

[x] Mr. Hume ſays, "I do not find that any philoſopher has attempted to enumerate or claſs all the principles of aſſociation; a ſubject, however, that ſeems very worthy of curioſity. To me there appears to be only three principles of connexion among ideas; reſemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cauſe or effect." Eſſays, ſect. iii. of the Aſſociation of Ideas, vol. ii. p. 24. Mr. Hume might be ignorant that Ariſtotle had attempted to enumerate the principles of aſſociation; but it is an unpardonable error in logic, to aſſign cauſe and effect as one of thoſe principles, ſince cauſe and effect, as far as aſſociation is concerned, reſolves itſelf into contiguity in time or place; and according to Mr. Hume's doctrine, the very idea of cauſe ariſes ſolely from theſe connexions. Eſſays, vol. ii. pp. 34, 35. 88. 107. It may be remarked that "the aſſociation of ideas" is a modern expreſſion. Ariſtotle did not need it, ſince the thing meant by it is referred by him to cuſtom. τῳ γαρ ἐθει ακολουθουσι αἱ κινησεις αλληλαις, ἡδε μετα τηνδε. De Memor. p. 682.

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every act of recollection we are conſcious of *hunting about, as it were, among our thoughts*, until we hit on ſome one which is intimately connected with that which we wiſh to recall; or, in other words, that we produce in ſucceſſion a multitude of vibrations or motions in our organs, until we hit on ſome one of them intimately connected with that of which we are in queſt; and which has the power of reviving this laſt, becauſe the one motion is either excited nearly at the ſame time with the other, or is entirely the ſame in kind with it, or ſo nearly the ſame, that the minute difference between them is ſpeedily overpowered and loſt, and from near agreement finally reduced to perfect coincidence. Thus far our author proceeds in unfolding the mechaniſm of ſenſation, fancy [y], memory, and recollection; or, in other words, in aſcertaining the laws which regulate the union of mind and matter, without attempting the fruitleſs taſk of explaining in what manner thoſe totally heterogeneous [z] ſubſtances are united.

Every exerciſe of recollection, he obſerves, is a ſpecies of inveſtigation, in which the mind may be conſcious of its own activity in directing the current of its thoughts, in turning them from one channel to another, in rejecting thoſe which hold by no tie to the perception or image of which it is in queſt, and in preferring, examining, and contemplating in all their relations

[y] Fancy is here *uſed* in its ſtrict and original meaning; not, as in books of rhetoric and criticiſm, for the power of combining ideas or images by creative genius, agreeably to the dictates of correct judgment and refined taſte.

[z] Ariſtotle carefully diſtinguiſhes the percipient power from the motions accompanying perception. αναγκη αρα ἐν τι ειναι της ψυχης, ᾧ ἁπαντα αισθανεται, καθαπερ εἰρηται προτερον, αλλο δὲ γενος δια αλλα. De Senſu, c. vii. p. 675. See alſo De Anima, l. iii. c. x. p. 656.

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tions thoſe which, by their connexion with this perception or image, have a natural tendency to rouſe the one or to revive the other [a].

Reminiſcence the firſt boundary between man and other animals.

It is the characteriſtic of animals, in contradiſtinction to the inanimate parts of nature, to be endowed with ſenſation; and whatever is endowed with ſenſation muſt have perceptions of pain and pleaſure; and whatever has ſuch perceptions muſt feel the impulſe of appetite; the great moving principle in all animated beings [b]. But in the exerciſe of reminiſcence, which is the immoveable boundary between man and other animals, he, and he alone, recogniſes the divine principle of reaſon or intellect co-operating with the coarſer powers of fancy or memory; ſince every act of reminiſcence, as above explained [c], implies compariſon; and every the ſlighteſt compariſon, expreſſed in the ſimpleſt propoſition, indicates a ſubſtance different and ſeparable from matter, a ſubſtance totally inconceivable by man in his preſent ſtate, where the groſs perceptions of ſenſe are the only foundation and ſole materials of all others, how lofty ſoever and refined; but a ſubſtance, notwithſtanding, of whoſe exiſtence we are aſſured by our conſciouſneſs of its energies [d].

To

[a] τυτο δε γινεται κινηται πολλαι, ἑως αν τη αυτην κινησῃ κινησιν, ᾗ ακολουθησει το φαγμα. De Memor. & Reminiſcent. c. 2. p. 682. He adds, anticipating the philoſophy of Hobbes and Hartley, τω δε απο τυ αυτυ ενιοτε μεν μνησθηναι, ενιοτε δε μη, αιτιον, ὁτι επι πλειω ενδεχεται κινηθηναι απο της αυτης αρχης—ὡσπερ γαρ φυσις ηδη το ἐθος, &c. ibid. "But the cauſe that the ſame thing recalls ſometimes one perception, and ſometimes another, is, that different motions may ſpring from the ſame principle; for cuſtom is like nature," &c.

[b] De Anima, l. ii. c. iii. p. 633. & ſeq.

[c] De Memor. & Reminiſc. c. ii. p. 683.

[d] Com. De Anima, l. i. c. v. p. 625. and c. ix. p. 629.

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Proof of an intellectual principle in man.

To illuſtrate this further by an example, Ariſtotle ſays, let the compariſon or propoſition be one of the ſimpleſt imaginable, that whiteneſs is not ſweetneſs[e]. Theſe ſenſible qualities which the vulgar aſcribe to external objects, the philoſopher knows, as above explained, to depend on certain motions communicated to his internal organs, motions vivid and forcible when firſt produced by ſenſation, more faint and languid when afterwards revived by imagination or memory[f]. But the compariſon of any two objects neceſſarily implies, that they ſhould be both preſent in the ſame indiviſible point of time, to one and the ſame comparing power. Yet their preſence to the ſenſes, the fancy, or the memory, is known to conſiſt in nothing elſe but certain motions produced in our bodily organs. If the compariſon, therefore, could be made by any of them, it would follow that this organ was ſuſceptible of different and contrary motions,

[e] De Anima, l. iii. c. ii. p. 649.

[f] De Memor. & Reminiſcent. c. i. p. 680. and De Anima, l. iii. c. iv. p. 652. Senſible qualities as perceived by the mind, Ariſtotle calls, therefore, παθηματα εν τη ψυχη, of which, he ſays, words are the ſigns: De Interpret. c. i. p. 37: Meaning, thereby, that language expreſſes things as they are perceived, not as they really are. το μεν ουν μητε τα αισθητα ειναι, μητε τα αισθηματα, ισως αληθες· τω γαρ αισθανομενω παθος τουτο εστι· το δε τα υποκειμενα μη ειναι α ποιει την αισθησιν αδυνατον. ου γαρ δη η αισθησις αυτη εαυτης εστιν, αλλα εστι τι ετερον παρα την αισθησιν, ο αναγκη προτερον ειναι της αισθησεως. το γαρ κινουν, του κινουμενου φυσει προτερον εστι· καν ει λεγεται προς αλληλα ταυτα αυτα, ουθεν ηττον. Metaph. l. iv. c. v. p. 879. "To ſay that things perceptible by ſenſe, and the objects of our perceptions, do not exiſt, is perhaps true; for theſe are merely the affections of the percipient: but that there ſhould not be certain cauſes producing ſenſation, and exiſting independently of it, is impoſſible; for ſenſation is not its own work, but there is ſomething beſide ſenſation neceſſarily prior to it, ſince the principle of motion is neceſſarily prior to the movement communicated; and not the leſs, that theſe things are relatives." The exiſtence of imperceptible, and therefore unknown cauſes of our ſenſations, is maintained by Ariſtotle againſt the ancient ſceptics; in whoſe errors he refuted, by anticipation, thoſe of Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, &c. as we ſhall ſee hereafter.

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motions, preciſely at the ſame indiviſible inſtant; for it is neceſſary that the ſame ſimple power ſhould comprehend at once the ſweetneſs and whiteneſs, or whatever elſe be the ſenſations compared, ſince if it comprehended them diſtributively, by its parts however minute, or ſucceſſively in particles of time however ſhort, it could no more draw the reſult of the compariſon, than if the one ſenſation was recogniſed by one man, and the other by another, or one of them recogniſed in the laſt century, and another in the preſent. The perception of truth, therefore, being altogether unrelated to time and ſpace, muſt be totally diſſimilar to any corporeal operation, and ſo eſſentially one ſimple energy, that it cannot without abſurdity be ſuppoſed capable of diviſion. But all the motions and actions of body being performed in ſpace and time, are therefore indefinitely diviſible; and although their ſmallneſs or quickneſs ſoon eſcapes the perception of ſenſe, and ſoon eludes the graſp of fancy, yet the intellect ſtill purſues and detects them, knowing that they can never vaniſh into nothing by their indefinite minuteneſs. By our diviſions and ſubdiviſions without limit, we ſtill leave, in the ſmalleſt particle, body with its properties; and after all the ſteps that poſſibly can be taken, remain preciſely as diſtant from the goal, as at our firſt ſetting out. This goal, therefore, it is impoſſible for us ultimately to attain; but in the language of geometers, infinite will be ſtill interpoſed between operations diviſible and indiviſible, between perceptions of ſenſe and perceptions of reaſon, between the nature and properties of mind and the nature and properties of matter. It is not ſenſe or fancy, but mind alone, that recogniſes itſelf; and this intellectual ſubſtance of which we muſt be contented in our preſent ſtate merely to know the exiſtence, and

The power and dignity of this principle.

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and to exercise the energies, is that which characterises and ennobles the creature man, and which gives him a resemblance to his Maker. It is this which, separated from body, is then only, properly what it is[s], immortal and divine; which does not

[s] De Anima, l. iii. c. 6. which passage is commented by Plutarch from Aristotle himself. Vid. Plut. de Consol. ad Apollon. p. 115. Where he says, that the dead are happy and blessed; and that to speak ill of them falsely is to blaspheme against those far superior to ourselves. This work of Aristotle's was a Dialogue, written in honour of Eudemus of Cyprus. It is mentioned by Plutarch in Dion. p. 967. The passage above alluded to in the work De Anima is strangely perverted by Aristotle's commentators; whose erroneous interpretation is adopted by Warburton in the following passage, as bold in assertion as defective in proof. "Aristotle thought of the soul like the rest, as we learn from a passage quoted by Cudworth * out of his Nicomachean Ethics; where having spoke of the sensitive souls, and declared them mortal, he goes on in this manner: 'It remains that the mind or intellect, and that alone pre-existing, enter from without, and be only divine †.' But then he distinguishes again concerning this mind or intellect, and makes it two-fold, agent and patient, the former of which he concludes to be immortal, and the latter corruptible. The agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible. Cudworth thinks this a very doubtful and obscure passage, and imagines Aristotle was led to write thus unintelligibly by his doctrine of forms and qualities, whereby corporeal and incorporeal substances are confounded together. But had that great man reflected on the general doctrine of the το ἐι, he would have seen the passage was plain and easy; and that Aristotle, from the common principle of the human soul's being part of the divine substance, here draws a conclusion against a future state of separate existence, which, though it now appears all the philosophers embraced, yet all were not, as we said, so forward to avow. The obvious meaning of the words then is this: "The agent intellect (says he) is only immortal and eternal, but the passive corruptible, *i. e.* the particular sensations of the soul will cease after death, and the substance of it will be resolved into the soul of the universe; for it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the soul to a *tabula rasa*, that human sensations and reflections were passions. These, therefore, are what he finely calls the passive intelligent, which he says shall cease, or is corruptible. What he meant by the agent intelligent, we learn from his

* Intellectual System, p. 55.

† λειπεται δε τον νω μονον θυραθεν επεισιεναι, και θειον ειναι μονον.

commentators,

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not decay with our corporeal powers; and whoſe energies are ſo totally different from thoſe of organiſed matter, that whereas our

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commentators, who interpret it to ſignify, as Cudworth here acknowledges, the divine intellect; which gloſs Ariſtotle himſelf fully juſtifies, in calling it θειον, divine*." On this paſſage I would firſt obſerve, that though I had frequently read the *Nicomachean Ethics*, I could not meet with the words cited by Warburton; and for this good reaſon, that ſuch words are not there to be found. In the firſt edition of Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem, that great Author is very negligent in citing his authorities; and in the ſecond edition publiſhed by Birch, we are referred to Ariſtotle de Generatione & Corruptione, l. ii. c. 3. The paſſage quoted, however, is not to be found there, nor in any part of the work on Generation and Corruption. It is to be found, indeed, in the Phyſical Auſcultations; and words to the ſame purpoſe occur in the fifth chapter of the firſt book de Anima. ὁ δὲ νους ἐοικεν ἐγγινεσθαι, οὐσια τις οὐσα, καὶ ου φθειρεσθαι. "It is likely that the mind is a ſubſtance exiſting in the body, and not liable to be deſtroyed with the body." From this and ſeveral other paſſages, where Ariſtotle always ſpeaks with the greateſt modeſty on the ſubject of the human intellect, qualifying his words with a "perhaps," "it is likely," Warburton had no right to conclude that Ariſtotle maintained the pre-exiſtence of the mind as a part of the Divinity. The argument which he brings in ſupport of this aſſertion, "that Ariſtotle calls the active intelligent, Divine," is not concluſive, becauſe Ariſtotle, with other Greek writers, might uſe the epithet "Divine" as ſynonymous with excellent, as the Lacedæmonians, when they admired any one greatly, called him Σιος (inſtead of θειος) ανηρ. Ethic. Nicom. l. vii. c. 1. But the Stagirite ſeldom uſes any word which he does not accurately define, and when he calls the intellect *divine*, or what *is moſt divine in us*; Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. 7; ſub init. he tells us plainly what he means by theſe expreſſions, which he ſays can have no other ſenſe, but either that thought, *i. e.* the energy of intellect, from which only it derives its excellence and dignity, exiſts moſt perfectly in the divine nature; or, ſecondly, becauſe intellect enables us, imperfectly indeed, to comprehend that nature. The learned Reader may compare the following paſſages, Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. l. i. c. ii. p. 841. De Anima, l. i. c. v. p. 625. and Metaphyſ. l. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004. That *intelligence in capacity is prior in time to intelligence in energy, in the individual, but not abſolutely*, means merely that the human mind is capable of intelligence before it becomes actually intelligent; but that all intelligence in capacity is derived from intelligence in energy, that is, from God.

* Divine Legation, vol. i. book iii. ſect. 4.

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our ſenſes are eaſily fatigued, overpowered, and deſtroyed by the force and intenſity of objects ſenſible[h], the intellect is rouſed, quickened, and invigorated by the force and intenſity of objects intelligible; inſtead of being overſtrained or blunted, it ſharpens and fortifies amidſt obſtinate exertions; and finds in

Metaphyſ. l. ix. c. viii. p. 938. & ſeq. and the laſt chapters both of his Phyſics and Metaphyſics. That the mind when ſeparated from the body *is only what it is*, means that it then aſſumes its true nature, activity, and dignity, and is then better and happier than it was before, in which Ariſtotle ſays that many agreed with him. ειπερ βελτιον τῳ νῳ μη μετα σωματος ειναι, καθαπερ ιωθι λεγισθαι, και πολλοις συνδοκει. Ariſtot. de Anima, l. i. c. iii. p. 623. That it then *perpetually energiſes*, not needing the aſſiſtance of memory, is explained by what Ariſtotle ſays on memory, in his book on that ſubject, c. ii. p. 681. & ſeq. in which he ſhews that memory depends on aſſociation of perceptions, and that aſſociation again depends on motion; whereas the intellect is ſimple, impaſſive; and, exiſting independently of ſpace, incapable of motion; except by way of acceſſion or appendage, as a ſailor is moved in a ſhip. De Anima, l. i. c. 3.

Since writing the above note, I find that Lord Monboddo cites and tranſlates part of the paſſage which I have endeavoured to explain; but his Lordſhip, I think, conſtrues it wrong. On the words ου μνημονευομεν δε, ὁτι τουτο μεν απαθες· ὁ δε παθητικος νους φθαρτος, και ανευ τουτου ουθεν νοει, he obſerves, "that what Ariſtotle here ſays of the mind's thinking of nothing without the paſſive intellect refers to the progreſſion from the ſtate of mere capacity in which the intellect is, before it is impreſſed by external objects; which impreſſion is abſolutely neceſſary for its operating in this our preſent ſtate." His Lordſhip here condeſcends to ſpeak rather like a follower of Locke or Hume than as the diſciple of Ariſtotle; and the text will not at all bear his interpretation, for the ανευ τουτου can only refer to the active intellect, without which Ariſtotle ſays the paſſive thinks of nothing. Plutarch expreſſes Ariſtotle's meaning in popular language. παιδεια δε των εν ἡμιν μονον ἐστι αθανατον και θειον, &c. "That of all things belonging to man, the improvement of his mind alone is immortal and divine; —neither to be aſſailed by fortune nor ſhaken by calumny; not to be deſtroyed by diſeaſe nor weakened by old age." Plutarch de Liber. Educand. p. 5. Edit. Xyland. My explication of the obſcure paſſages in Ariſtotle concerning the ſoul is confirmed by what he himſelf ſays on the ſubject of education in the 15th chapter of the ſeventh book of his Politics. The Reader will find the paſſage in the following tranſlation, book iv. c. 15. Ancient Metaphyſics, v. ii. b. iii. c. iv. p. 165.

[h] De Anima, l. ii. c. xii. p. 646.

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in ſuch alone its beſt improvement and moſt exquiſite delight[i].

Ariſtotle's Works referred to three heads.

Having recogniſed the dignity and the powers of man, Ariſtotle, in his works throughout, examines how thoſe powers have been exerciſed in rearing the fair fabric of ſcience, which it was his own ambition to complete and to adorn. Adverſe accidents interrupted, as we have ſeen, from poſterity the full benefit of his labours; yet the treatiſes which emerged amidſt the general wreck of his writings, beſt arrange themſelves under the three-fold diviſion of the objects of human thought; God, Nature, and Man: which diviſion he himſelf ſeems continually to keep in view. Whatever reaſonings relate to theology, though ſcattered in different treatiſes, may be referred, therefore, to his Metaphyſics; a name unknown, indeed, to Ariſtotle, but given to his theological works by his editors, and importing that the fourteen books which bear it, ſhould immediately follow his numerous treatiſes on the ſubject of phyſics or natural philoſophy; that we may not reſt ſatisfied with the knowledge of bare effects, but proceed to the inveſtigation of cauſes, and of the Deity himſelf, the primary cauſe of all[k]. His hiſtories of the heavens and of the earth; of animals, plants, and minerals; and even of man, conſidered merely as a material and ſentient Being, may conformably with modern language be arranged under the head of Nature; though, in Ariſtotle's own acceptation, that term has a more limited ſenſe; and, for a reaſon which will appear

I. God.

II. Nature.

[i] De Anima, l. iii. cc. 5, 6, 7, 8. p. 653. et ſeq. and Ethic. Nicom. l. x. cc. 7 and 8.

[k] Metaph. l. xiii. c. 7. p. 988.

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III. Man.

appear hereafter, is confined to terreſtrial objects, and thoſe exiſting between this earth and the lunar ſphere. Upon the Philoſophy of Man[l], as our Author calls it, that is, of Man conſidered as a ſocial and rational Being, endowed with ſentiment, affection, and intellect, Ariſtotle's writings are as clear and copious as they are ſolid and ſatisfactory. His treatiſes on Logic, Ethics, and Politics, as well as his books on Rhetoric and Poetry, may all be referred to this one head, and viewed as connected parts of one great ſyſtem of knowledge, to which, after the moſt patient examination, it will be found that the labours of his ſucceſſors and detractors have made but ſlender additions.

The proper ſubject of his Organon.

In endeavouring conciſely, but clearly, to communicate to my Readers the reſult of our Author's reaſonings and diſcoveries under the three heads above mentioned, I ſhall begin, for a reaſon which will preſently appear, with that work of his, recently the moſt decried of all, but long extravagantly magnified as the great engine of diſcovery, and ſole inſtrument[m] of univerſal ſcience. Ariſtotle himſelf never viewed it in this falſe and flattering light, nor ever beſtowed on it thoſe pompous titles. The various tracts compoſing the Organon, as it is called, are not even given by him as parts of one and the ſame work.

[l] ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρωπινα φιλοσοφια. Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. ult.

[m] The word ὀργανον, organum, is found in Diogenes Laertius (l. i. ſect. 28.); where Ariſtotle's philoſophy is divided into practical and ſpeculative: the practical comprehending his Ethics and Politics; the ſpeculative, Natural Philoſophy and Logic. Diogenes, however, does not uſe the word in the ſenſe in which it was afterwards taken by Ariſtotle's commentators. Beſides, when Laertius ſays, that logic is a part of ſpeculative philoſophy, he contradicts Ariſtotle himſelf, who divides ſpeculative philoſophy into the three branches of Mathematics, Phyſics, and Theology. Metaph. l. vi. c. i. p. 904.

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work [n]. They all relate, however, to one and the ſame ſubject; ſince dialectic [o], in the ſtrict and proper ſenſe, is merely the art of dialogue, that is, the art of converſing. Ariſtotle's Organon, therefore, rightly underſtood, is nothing more than an endeavour to teach the rational and ſkilful employment of that characteriſtic faculty of man, by which he expreſſes, through appropriate ſigns [p], not only his perceptions of ſenſe, but what is indefinitely more various, the compariſons, abſtractions, and concluſions of his own mind concerning them. It is in this ſenſe that logic, or dialectic, in the order of communicating liberal and univerſal knowledge, ought to precede the more abſtruſe and loftier branches of philoſophy, becauſe, by carefully analyſing the ſigns by which internal operations, as well as external objects, are expreſſed, we remount at once to the origin and ſource both of our notions and of our perceptions; diſcover their intimate connections with each other; and unfold, even to the unexperienced minds of youth, a vaſt intellectual

[n] Even the different works muſt have been arranged otherwiſe than they now ſtand, ſince in ſome of the firſt of them we find references to thoſe now publiſhed as the laſt.

[o] Dialectic is the word often uſed by Ariſtotle himſelf to denote what is commonly called his Logic, or the ſubject of the books compoſing his Organon. Vid. Metaph. l. xiv. c. 4. Rhetor. l. i. c. ii.

[p] των δε ονοματων εκαστον συμβολον εστι. "Each word or name is a ſymbol or ſign." De Senſu & Senſili. l. i. c. i. p. 663. The whole paſſage, beginning with αυτη δε τουτων κριστον, and ending with the words juſt cited, may be abridged as follows: "Hearing is the ſenſe moſt inſtrumental to knowledge, not eſſentially or in itſelf, for the ſenſe of ſeeing diſcovers to us more of the differences of things; but becauſe ſound, which is the object of hearing, is the vehicle of language; which is compoſed of words, each of which is a ſign." Vid. etiam De Interpret. l. i. c. i. p. 36 and 37.

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intellectual treaſure, of which, without being aware of it, they were already in poſſeſſion [q].

His analyſis of language.

Agreeably to theſe principles, the Stagirite defines diſcourſe, or ſpeech, to be ſound ſignificant by compact, of which the parts alſo are ſignificant [r]; all diſcourſe which ſimply affirms or denies, he reſolves into arguments, arguments into propoſitions, and propoſitions into words; which laſt are the ultimate elements of language, becauſe, though ſignificant themſelves, their parts are not ſignificant [s]. Sounds ſignificant by compact are either nouns, that is, names denoting things without any reference to time; or verbs, whoſe ſignification is accompanied with the appendage of time [t]. Nouns are either proper names or appellatives; a proper name denotes one individual only; an appellative denotes various individuals, and often various kinds or claſſes of individuals. The formation of appellatives is, according to Ariſtotle, the united work of abſtraction and aſſociation [u]; abſtraction, by which we ſeparate the combinations

Origin of general terms.

[q] Comp. Ariſtot. Topic. l. i. c. ii. p. 181. & Ariſtot. de Anima, l. iii. c. ix. p. 656.

[r] De Interpret. l. i. c. iv. p. 38.

[s] To obviate objections ariſing from the ſignificant parts of compound words, Ariſtotle ſays, εν δε τοις διπλοις, σημαινει μεν τι, αλλα ουκ καθ' αυτο . . . The ſyllables are ſignificant, but not eſſentially; ſince the whole word is ſignificant by compact; for however ſubtilely words may be analyſed, they will ultimately reſolve themſelves, not into οργανα, but into συμβολα; not into natural inſtruments, but into conventional ſigns. De Interpret. c. iv. p. 38.

[t] Ibid. c. iii. Thoſe parts of verbs, therefore, which do not imply time are merely nouns. Ibid.

[u] Compare Metaph. l. xi. c. 2. pp. 955, 956. Ibid. c. xii. pp. 957, 958. Analyt. Poſterior, l. ii. c. xix. p. 179. & ſeq. De Memor. & Reminiſc. p. 181. & ſeq.

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tions of ſenſe, and conſider a complex object in one view, without attending to the other aſpects under which it may be examined [w]; aſſociation, by which perceptions that are ſimilar naturally revive each other in unbroken ſucceſſion; and, in conſequence of their ſimilarity, are expreſſed by a common name, or appellative, which is equally applicable to them all [x]. In reference to this common name, which is merely a ſign that different objects have been compared together, and found to agree in one or more reſpects with each other, different individuals are ſaid to belong to the ſame ſpecies, and different ſpecies are ſaid to belong to the ſame genus; for in order to explain the nature of things, and to ſee their agreements and differences, it

[w] Metaph. l. xi. c. iii. pp. 956, 957.

[x] δηλον δη ὁτι ἡμιν τα πρωτα επαγωγη γνωριζειν αναγκαιον· και γαρ και ἡ αισθησις ὁτω το καθολυ ἐμποιει. The author here maintains, that even general principles can only be gathered by induction from perceptions of ſenſe, or from repeated acts of memory coaleſcing into one experience (αἱ γαρ πολλαι μνημαι τῳ ἀριθμῳ ἐμπειρια μια ἐστι). And the compariſon by which this intellectual operation is explained equally applies to that by which "τα καθολυ," "abſtract notions," gathered from repeated ſenſations, are generaliſed and embodied in language. "In a flying army, when one man ſtops, the next to him will often ſtop alſo, and ſo on in ſucceſſion, until the whole will ſometimes ſtand firm. The ſame thing happens in the irregular flow of our thoughts. The ſteady contemplation of any individual object in that aſpect in which it agrees with other individuals, will recall many ſimilar objects to the mind; the ſtability of the one will communicate ſtability to the others, and thus give birth to what are called Univerſals, that is, to general terms, equally applicable to an indefinite number of individuals." ὁταν γαρ των ἀδιαφορων ἑνος, πρωτου μεν ἐν τῃ ψυχῃ καθολυ· και γαρ αἰσθανεται μεν το καθ' ἑκαστον, ἡ δε αἰσθησις τυ καθολυ ἐστι. When Ariſtotle ſays that we perceive, by ſenſe, the univerſal, he means that we view the object under that aſpect in which it agrees with other objects; and the contemplation of it under that aſpect only, or, in other words, the conſidering certain appearances of it apart from the reſt, produces in the mind an abſtract notion, of which, though itſelf be particular, the name is general. Metaph. ibid.

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it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe the exiſtence of general ideas, but it is neceſſary that one word or term ſhould, in the ſame ſenſe, be applicable to many individuals, and alſo that one word or term ſhould, in the ſame ſenſe, be applicable to many ſpecies[y].

Their importance.

Independently of this power in man, of expreſſing things that are alike by a common ſign, his knowledge would be confined to the coarſe and complex intimations of ſenſe; he could not form even the moſt common notion of all, namely, that of number, ſince objects could not be enumerated, unleſs they were previouſly referred to the ſame genus or claſs, that is, unleſs they were expreſſed by one common ſign. They muſt be ſo many trees, ſo many animals, or at leaſt ſo many beings; and thus generically united, before they can be ſpecifically or even numerically diſtinguiſhed. For this reaſon Ariſtotle obſerves, that "one" and "being" are, of all terms, the moſt univerſal; they are applicable to all other general terms; they can be ſaid in the ſame ſenſe of them all, but no other term can be correctly ſaid of them, becauſe no other term expreſſes the full extent of their meaning[z]; or, in other words, is uſed as a ſign for all the variety of things which they are employed to denote. Next to them, in point of univerſality, the ten categories immediately follow. Theſe moſt comprehenſive ſigns of things are called, in Latin, Predicaments, becauſe they can be ſaid, or predicated, in the ſame ſenſe of all other terms, as well as of all the objects denoted by them; whereas no other term can be correctly ſaid of them, becauſe no other is employed

The categories.

[y] Analyt. Poſter. l. i. c. xi. p. 141. ibid. c. xxiv. p. 155.

[z] Metaph. l. x. c. 2. p. 945. The το εν και το ον, "unity and being," agree, he obſerves, in the univerſality of their ſignification. They contain all the categories, but are not included in any of them.

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employed to expreſs the full extent of their meaning. They are; ſubſtance, quality, quantity, relation, time, place, action, paſſion, poſition, and habit[a]. All the objects of human thought that can be expreſſed by ſingle words, arrange themſelves under one or other of theſe general terms. Ariſtotle (not indeed in his "Categories," but in his works collectively) explains the nature and properties of each; and thus opens to the inquiſitive mind a wide field of various knowledge, ſince the properties of each predicament belong to all the objects, or claſſes of objects, comprehended under[b] it, and the properties of the whole united extend to all things in the univerſe. But to avoid the reproach of bewildering his reader in barren generalities, the philoſopher frequently applies his reaſonings concerning ſigns to the things ſignified by them; perpetually inculcating, that individuals only have a real exiſtence, and that what are called in the Pythagorean

[a] ἐστι δὲ ταυτα τον ἀριθμον δεκα· τι ἐστι, ποσον, ποιον, προς τι, που, ποτε, κεισθαι, ἐχειν, ποιειν, πασχειν. Topic, l. i. c. 9. p. 285. What is here called τι ἐστι, the author elſewhere calls ſubſtance, as Categor. c. iv. p. 15; where he ſays, that all ſingle words denote either ſubſtances, or quantity, or quality, &c. This tenfold diviſion had been made before Ariſtotle's time, and explained by the Pythagoreans, particularly by Archytas of Tarentum, in his book περι του παντος, "concerning the Univerſe." A great part of that work, in its primitive Doric, is preſerved in Simplicius' Commentary on Ariſtotle's Categories. But Archytas and the other Pythagoreans conſidered as "the principles of things," what Ariſtotle calls σχηματα κατηγοριας, "figures or forms of predication," and λογους καθολου, "univerſal denominations." Thus alſo they were conſidered by Archytas the Peripatetic (Boeth. in Predicam. p. 112.), whom Mr. Harris (Philoſoph. Arrangements, c. ii. p. 31.) confounds with Archytas the Pythagorean. The conſidering of theſe comprehenſive genera as the principles and cauſes of the univerſe with the Pythagoreans, or merely as univerſal denominations with Ariſtotle, conſtitutes as wide a difference as that between a viſionary and a philoſopher.

[b] Categor. c. v. to c. ix. incluſively.

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Pythagorean or Platonic philoſophy, numbers, ideas, immutable and eternal eſſences, are merely the work of human thought expreſſed and embodied in language [c]. This doctrine is nearly allied

[c] Categor: c. v. p. 17. "That if individuals, or the firſt ſubſtances, were not, nothing elſe could be;" ſo that, inſtead of ideas, &c. making them, every thing that exiſts is made by and from them. And again, ειδη μεν ουν ειναι, η ην τι παρα τα πολλα, ουκ αναγκη, ει αποδειξις εσται· ειναι μεντοι ην κατα πολλα αληθες εστιν αναγκη . . . δει αρα τι ειν και το αυτο, επι πλειονων ενιστιν, μη ομωνυμον. "For the purpoſe of demonſtration, it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe the exiſtence of general ideas, but only that one general term can be applied with truth, and in the ſame ſenſe, to many individuals." Analyt. Poſter. l. i. c. xi. p. 141. Compare cxxiv. p. 155. Ετι δε υδεμια αναγκη τι ειναι τουτο παρα ταυτα, ὁτι ην δηλοι, υδεν μαλλον η επι των αλλων, ὁσα μη τι σημαινει, αλλ' η ποιον, η ποσης τις, η ποσον· ει δε αρα, ουχ η αποδειξις αιτια, αλλ' ὁ ακουων. "It is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe, that the general term, denoting any claſs of ſubſtances, expreſſes any thing beſide the different particulars to which it applies, any more than the general terms denoting qualities, relations, or actions. One general term ſtands as the ſign for a variety of particulars conſidered under one and the ſame aſpect; but to ſuppoſe that this term requires one ſubſtantial archetype, or idea, as general as itſelf, is the hearer's fault; ſuch a ſuppoſition not being neceſſary for the purpoſe of demonſtration." The ſimplicity and ſolidity of Ariſtotle's philoſophy was early deſtroyed by confounding it with Platoniſm. The evil has been perpetuated from age to age, by his commentators and pretended followers; not excepting the lateſt of them all, Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo, who perpetually aſcribe to the Stagirite the doctrine of general ideas, which, in the paſſages above cited, he formally denies. Thoſe laſt-mentioned writers acknowledge that Ariſtotle oppoſed Plato, in denying the ſeparate and ſubſtantial exiſtence of ideas, but maintain, that he aſſerted their exiſtence originally in the divine intellect, forming what we call the intellectual world. "From thence proceeds the material world, which is a copy of theſe forms or ideas. The firſt kind of ideas, the Peripatetics called προ των πολλων, "before the many;" the other kind they called εν τοις πολλοις, "in the many;" and theſe laſt are the ſubſtantial forms of the Peripatetics; that is, the form which gives the ſubſtance or eſſence to the thing. And, laſt of all, come the ideas in our minds, which, being formed from the many, and only in conſequence of their exiſting in the many, are ſaid to be επι τοις πολλοις, "after the many." Monboddo Ancient Metaph. vol. i. p. 466. Mr. Harris, in deſcribing this triple order of ideas, ſpeaks to the ſame purpoſe. "By mind we mean ſomething which, when it acts,

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allied to another of Ariſtotle's above explained, that all our direct knowledge originates in perceptions of ſenſe; and in both CHAP. II.

acts, knows what it is going to do; ſomething ſtored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas theſe works are faſhioned. Hermes, book iii. c. iv. p. 380. Again, "To work and to know what one is about is to have an idea of what one is doing; to poſſeſs a form internal, correſponding to the external, to which external it ſerves for an exemplar or pattern. Here then we have an intelligible form which is prior to the ſenſible form." Ibid. p. 376. The ſame authors abound in repetitions of the ſame doctrine, which ſeems indeed to have been univerſally that of Ariſtotle's commentators. But what ſays the author himſelf. I ſhall repeat his own words, leſt I ſhould incur the reproach of ſpeaking harſhly. το δε λεγειν παραδειγμα ειναι και μετεχειν αυτων τα αλλα, κενολογειν εστι, και μεταφορας λεγειν ποιητικας. τι γαρ εστι το εργαζομενον προς τας ιδεας αποβλεπειν; ενδεχεται τε ειναι και γιγνεσθαι οτιουν και μη εικαζομενον. Metaph. l. xi. c. 5. p. 959. "To call ideas exemplars or patterns, and to ſay that other things are made in imitation, or by participation of them, is mere empty ſound and poetical metaphor. Whoever conſidered in working an idea as his model? Things may exiſt or be made that never had an exemplar or archetype." According to Ariſtotle, "the definition is the idea of the thing, and the definition is compoſed of words." ὁ λογος ειδος του πραγματος ... και ὁ λογος συνκειται εξ ονοματων. Comp. De Anima, l. i. c. i. p. 618. and De Senſu, c. i. p. 663. I cannot conclude this note without obſerving, that ſomething nearly akin to Ariſtotle's doctrine concerning the categories or univerſals was revived, in the darkneſs of the eleventh century, by the ſect called Nominaliſts, which had for its author Roſcellinus, a native of Brittany and Canon of Compiegne. But the Stagirite's genuine tenets were generally unknown in that century, and ſo little underſtood afterwards, (being ſtudied only in corrupt verſions, Arabic and Latin,) that the ſect of the Nominaliſts, after the complete triumph of the ſuppoſed Ariſtotelian philoſophy in the twelfth and ſucceeding centuries, were regarded as raſh innovators and philoſophical heretics. Their opinions, however, agreed more nearly with thoſe of Ariſtotle than the opinions of thoſe who believed themſelves the Stagirite's moſt obſequious followers; although the language of the Nominaliſts ſeems to have been extremely liable to be perverted to the purpoſes of ſcepticiſm, as taking away the ſpecific diſtinctions of things; and is in fact thus perverted by Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, and their innumerable followers. But Ariſtotle's language is not liable to this abuſe; he every where maintains the ſtability of truth, and the reality of thoſe ſpecific diſtinctions which general terms are employed to expreſs. He agrees with the Nominaliſts, for example, that the words "horſe" and "dog" have not any correſpondent archetypes or ideas in the mind,

as

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both these capital points, the Learned, after innumerable disputes, carried on with singular eagerness through many centuries, have generally embraced his opinion; and, what is most remarkable, chiefly since the time that undue deference ceased to be paid to his writings, and that his name was no longer superstitiously venerated by those who either read what they did not understand, or who affected to admire what they had never taken the trouble to read.

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as general as themselves, but he maintains that these words imply the result of the comparison of different individuals agreeing in the same εἶδος, the same show or appearance; for the sight, as he observes, is that of all the senses which enables us to perceive the greatest number of the agreements and differences of things, and is therefore most generally useful in classing them; or, in other words, in distinguishing those which are alike by a sign common to them all; that is, by a general name. Metaph. l. iv. c. 7. p. 881. Comp. De Sensu, c. i. p. 662. and Metaph. l. i. c. i. p. 838. To prevent the possibility of mistake or obscurity in the above note, it is necessary to observe, that the word "idea" in English is popularly used, not merely to denote an object of thought, but thought itself. To deny ideas in this latter sense is to deny thinking. But this is not the philosophical meaning of the word, as understood by the pretended followers of Aristotle, any more than by Locke in his Essay on the Human Understanding; by whom, ideas are said to be the objects immediately present to the mind in thinking. Essay, b. i. c. i. p. 13. Now Aristotle, in the following passage, expressly denies the presence or existence of any object in the mind, when it theorises or thinks, distinct from the act of the mind itself. ἐπι των θεωρητικων, ὁ λογος το πραγμα, και ἡ νοησις· ὐχ ἑτερα ων ὀντος τῦ νοουμενυ και τῦ νῦ, ὁσα μη ὑλην ἐχει, το αὐτο ἐσται· και ἡ νοησις τῦ νοουμενυ μια. Metaph. l. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004. In another passage he says, ἡ ψυχη πως ἐστι τα παντα. "The mind is after a sort all things." De Anima, l. iii. c. ix. p. 656. What is meant by τα καθολυ, "generals, universals, ideas," as the words are translated by his pretended followers, he states clearly thus: Ἐστι δ' ἐστι, τα μεν καθολυ των πραγματων· τα δε καθ' ἑκαστον· λεγω δε καθολυ μεν, ὁ ἐπι πλειονων πεφυκε κατηγορεισθαι· καθ' ἑκαστον δε, ὁ μη· οἱον ἀνθρωπος, των καθολυ· καλλιας δε, των καθ' ἑκαστον, &c. De Interpret. c. vii. p. 39. "The distinction is to be made between universals and particulars; universals, which can be predicated of many, as the term "Man;" particulars, as "Callias," the proper name of an individual."

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Diviſion and definition.

The reduction of things to genera or claſſes, by applying to them common names, is the foundation of diviſion and definition, which have been called by a juſt metaphor the firm Handles of Science. Each of the categories, or claſſes, above mentioned, that of ſubſtance for example, may be variouſly divided according to the intent of the diviſion, which may be undertaken for explaining the works of art or of nature; for delineating the inſtitutions of civil policy, or deſcribing the ſtructure of plants and animals; in a word, for examining any object, whether material or intellectual, about which human thought is converſant. But for whatever purpoſe the diviſion is intended, it can be perſpicuous and ſatisfactory only when it deſcends from the more general claſſes, or terms, to thoſe which are leſs general, until it arrives at the loweſt ſpecies of all, which rejects all further partition but into individuals only[d]. The intermediate terms between the higheſt genus and this loweſt ſpecies, ſtand each of them in two diſtinct relations, and therefore receive two different names, that of genus with reſpect to the leſs general terms which they contain, and that of ſpecies with reſpect to the more general terms under which they are contained[e]. Such is Ariſtotle's own doctrine concerning claſſification

[d] Analyt. Poſter. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 175.

[e] Compare Categor. c. ii. p. 15. and Analyt. Prior. c. i. p. 52. The ſubject has been ſtrangely perplexed by miſtaking Ariſtotle's language, which is in itſelf highly perſpicuous. το δε εν ολω ειναι ετερον ετερω, και το κατα παντος κατηγορεισθαι θατερον θατερου, τ' αυτον εστι· λεγομεν δε το κατα παντος κατηγορεισθαι, οταν μηδεν η του υποκειμενου λαβειν, κατα ου θατερον ου λεχθησεται. "To ſay that one term is contained in another is the ſame as ſaying, that the ſecond can be predicated of the firſt in the full extent of its ſignification; and one term is predicated of another in the full extent of its ſignification, when there is no

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claſſification and diviſion; a doctrine continually exemplified in his works throughout, moral as well as phyſical; and admirably illuſtrated by ſome modern writers, eſpecially on the ſubjects of natural hiſtory.

Propoſitions.

Having explained the uſes and functions of ſingle words, the author proceeds to examine their combinations into propoſitions, and the combinations of propoſitions into reaſoning or diſcourſe. According to the meaſure of our deſires or exigencies, our power or inability, language is variouſly moulded into commands, prayers, or wiſhes; but for the purpoſes of inſtruction or argument, it requires the form of an enunciative propoſition, which is defined by Ariſtotle "the affirming or denying one thing of another." But all that can be directly affirmed of any ſubject is, either that it belongs to a certain claſs, or that it is poſſeſſed of certain qualities. Thoſe qualities are either ſuch as neceſſarily inhere in the thing itſelf while it remains what it is, or retains its diſtinctive name; or ſecondly, qualities neceſſarily proceeding from the former; or thirdly, qualities which do not uniformly belong to the ſubject, nor proceed from thoſe uniformly belonging to it, but which accede to it

no particular denoted by the ſubject, to which the predicate does not apply." This remark, which is the foundation of all Ariſtotle's logic, has been ſadly miſtaken by many. Among others, the learned and truly reſpectable Dr. Reid writes as follows: "The being in a ſubject, and the being truly predicated of a ſubject, are uſed by Ariſtotle in his Analytics as ſynonymous phraſes. And this variation of ſtyle has led ſome perſons to think that the Categories were not written by Ariſtotle." See Kaim's Sketches, vol. iii. p. 316. But the two phraſes of "being in a ſubject," and "being predicated of it," are ſo far from being uſed as ſynonymous, that the meaning of the one is directly the reverſe of the meaning of the other.

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it merely by way of adjunct or appendage [f]. Thus we can say of man, that he is an animal, which is the class to which he belongs; that he is an animal capable of reason, which is the quality necessarily inherent in him, while he deserves his distinctive name; that he is capable of learning grammar or geometry, which are qualities necessarily flowing from the former; but when we proceed farther, and ascribe to him qualities not necessarily flowing from those inherent in the species, although they may be found in many individuals, and even many nations, it is plain that these qualities are mere accessions or appendages to his distinctive name or specific character.

The specific difference.

To define a thing, or to define a term, (for when words are considered as signs, these expressions are synonymous,) is to tell, as precisely and perspicuously as possible, what that thing is, or what that term signifies. This can only be done by ascertaining the class to which the object to be defined immediately belongs, and the quality or qualities which, necessarily inhering in it, uniformly distinguishes that object from other objects belonging to the same class or genus. That quality, therefore, or those qualities form what is called the specific difference; because they distinguish the species in question from the other species in the same genus, or the object in question from the other objects that most nearly resemble it. Thus, to define

[f] Topic. l. i. c. viii. p. 285. The Greek word συμβεβηκος is, as far as I know, universally translated "accident;" συμβεβηκοτα, in the plural, "accidents;" from which, "Accidence," denoting the little book that explains the properties of the eight parts of speech, is generally held to be a corruption. But accident, in its proper sense of what is casual or fortuitous, has nothing to do with the one or the other; and Aristotle's meaning of συμβεβηκος ought to be expressed by a Latin or English word derived, not from 'accido,' but from 'accēdo.'

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define the number three, or the triad, we may ſay or predicate of it, that it is a quantity, and that kind of quantity called number, and that kind of number called an odd number; but each of theſe predicates, and all of them united, have a ſignification far more extenſive than that of the ſubject; ſince there are other quantities beſide number, and other numbers beſide odd numbers, and many other odd numbers beſide three. How then are we to proceed to find the exact definition of the triad? We muſt continue to combine ſtill more of thoſe predicates, until the whole of them unitedly will apply to the number three, and to it only; although each of them taken ſeparately, and even any number of them ſhort of the whole, have a far more extenſive ſignification. Thus, with the predicates "number" and "odd" we muſt join that of "firſt," defining the triad "the firſt odd number;" for though the predicate "firſt" applies to the number "two" as well as to "three," yet "the firſt odd number" applies to "three" only[g]. It may be neceſſary here to remark, that, in the accurate language of Ariſtotle, unity is not number, but the element of number[h]; all numbers are compoſed of units, but they themſelves are indiviſible and ultimate elements, incapable as units of farther reſolution[i]. For coarſe practical purpoſes, arithmeticians talk of the parts of unit; but when they do this, they have always previouſly converted unity into number; as when we ſpeak of the tenth of an inch, we muſt neceſſarily have firſt changed the one inch into ten portions; the inch therefore, before it can be divided, ceaſes to be an unit, and is converted into ten.

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[g] Analyt. Poſter. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 173. & ſeq.

[h] διοτι το ἐν αριθμω αρχη, η αριθμος. Metaph. l. x. c. i. p. 943.

[i] οτι γαρ τω ισχατω, ισχατοτερον ουκ αν τι. Ibid. c. iv. p. 946; and again, αντικειται το ἐν και τα πολλα, ὡς αδιαιρετον και διαιρετον. Ibid. c. iii. p. 945.

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According to Ariſtotle, definitions are the fountains of all ſcience[k]; but thoſe fountains are pure only when they originate in an accurate examination and patient compariſon of the perceptible qualities of individual objects; for it is in that caſe only, that our words being the correct ſigns of things, the concluſions drawn from our intellectual operations on the ſigns, exactly apply to the things ſignified by them. We muſt cautiouſly proceed, therefore, from particulars to generals[l], that we may not be cheated by words[m]; endeavouring to diſcover, in each object of our examination, that principal and paramount property in which all its other inherent qualities unite and terminate[n]. To this property we muſt aſſign a name, when an appropriate name for it is wanting; and in the invention of this name, we muſt reſpect the analogies of language[o], that the ſame relations may be preſerved among words which ſubſiſt among the things which they denote[p]. The name, thus invented, is called the ſpecific difference; which, in the objects to which it applies, is not always that quality which is moſt palpable or moſt ſtriking; for many other qualities are often actually

[k] αι αρχαι των αναδειξεων, οι ορισμοι. Analyt. Poſter. l. ii. c. 3. p. 164. Compare Analyt. Poſter. l. ii. c. xvii. p. 178.

[l] δια δει απο των καθ' εκαστα επι τα καθολου μεταβαινειν. Analyt. Poſter. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 176.

[m] αι ὁμωνυμιαι λανθανουσι μαλλον εν τοις καθολου. Ibid.

[n] Analyt. Poſter. l. ii. c. xiv. p. 176. & Topic. l. i. c. iv. p. 182.

[o] ουτω δε ἐσται αν ισως τις λαβοι οις μη κειται ονοματα, ει απο των πρωτων, και τοις προς ἁ αντιστρεφουσι, τιθειη τα ονοματα. Categor. c. vii. p. 23.

[p] Comp. Metaph. l. iv. c. vii. p. 881. ὁ γαρ λογος, ου το ονομα σημειον, ορισμος γιν. ται του πραγματος, & Metaph. l. vii. c. iv. p. 908. c. vi. p. 911. & ſeq.

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actually discovered in them, before we distinguish that most important and most general one, which is implied in all the rest, and which forms, as it were, the basis on which they all stand[q]. This paramount property exists independently in its subject; but none of the other properties can subsist independently of the specific difference, which is therefore the principle in which they originate, and the source from which they flow. In many objects with whose sensible qualities we are most conversant, this source is concealed; yet to remount to it, when possible, is the main business of philosophy, since the more our knowledge is generalised, it will be the more satisfactory, and therefore the more delightful[r].

Syllogism.

The patient examination of objects, and the accurate definition of terms, are continually employed by our philosopher, as the best means for arranging perceptions into science. These, and not syllogisms, are the sole instruments used by himself in the deepest and most various researches that ever exercised the ingenuity of man. Yet his art of syllogism (an art ignorantly depreciated in the present age, and more absurdly magnified in preceding times beyond its real worth) is not therefore useless, although its real uses, as will presently appear, are altogether different from the purposes to which it was long most injudiciously applied. The art of syllogism was entirely Aristotle's invention; and in appreciating his merit as a philosopher, it becomes

[q] το δε ταξαι ως δια εστι, εαν το πρωτον λαβῃ. τουτο δε εστι, εαν ληφθῃ, ὁ πασιν ακολουθει, εκεινῳ δε μη παντα. Analyt. Poster. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 175. The word ακολουθει is used in the same sense, when he says (as quoted above) that ἑν & ὀν, "unity and being," is implied in all the Categories.

[r] Analyt. Poster. l. i. c. xxiv. p. 155.

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comes neceſſary to examine his firſt Analytics, in which that art is contained, that we may be enabled to decide whether the ſuppoſed improvements of his ſyſtem by ſome writers be not ignorant perverſions, and the objections made to the whole of it by others be not ſenſeleſs cavils. CHAP. II.

It was formerly obſerved that every propoſition, affirming or denying one thing of another, muſt affirm or deny that the ſubject of which we ſpeak belongs to a certain claſs, or that it is endowed with certain qualities *. But to affirm one term of another, when both of them are taken in the full extent of their ſignification, is merely to ſay that there is not any ſpecies or any individual contained under the name of the ſubject, to which the name of the predicate does not apply. It matters not whether thoſe names denote ſubſtances or qualities, or any other of the ten predicaments. Whatever they denote, the name of the ſpecies, according to the principles on which all languages are conſtructed, may ſtill be predicated of every individual, and the name of the genus of every ſpecies. When the definition of any term is predicated of that term, the definition and word defined, having exactly the ſame ſignification, they

* The Author proves this by obſerving, that every ſubject muſt either reciprocate with its predicate, or not. If the ſubject reciprocates with the predicate, that is, if the ſubject can in its turn be predicated of it, then the predicate muſt have been either the definition or the property of the ſubject: if the ſubject does not reciprocate, then the predicate muſt have been either ſomething contained in the definition, namely the genus or ſpecific difference, or ſomething not contained in the definition, but acceding to it as an appendage. Theſe relations of genus, difference, &c. which the predicates can ſtand in to their ſubject are called, in the Scholaſtic Philoſophy, the Predicables. They are the only things that can be affirmed or denied of any ſubject, categorically; which means, in the language of Ariſtotle, that can be affirmed of any ſubject merely by the interpoſition of the ſubſtantive verb between two terms. Topic. c. viii. p. 285.

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they both neceſſarily apply to exactly the ſame number of things, and are therefore of exactly the ſame extent. But in all propoſitions not identical, but which affirm or deny one thing of another, the predicate is according to the ſtructure of all languages, naturally more extenſive than the ſubject [t]; becauſe, as before obſerved, to predicate one term of another is merely to ſay that there is not any thing contained under the name of the ſubject to which that of the predicate does not apply. The predicate, therefore, in every propoſition is called the major term; the ſubject, the minor term; and theſe terms are conjoined in diſcourſe by the ſubſtantive verb "is," called therefore the copula. When we ſay "the wall is white," the ſubſtantive verb is expreſſed; the ſame verb is underſtood, when we ſay "Achilles runs;" becauſe the word "runs" may be reſolved into "is running;" being in fact merely an abbreviation of it for the purpoſe of communicating the rapidity of our thoughts with ſuitable rapidity of ſpeech [u]. To prevent impoſition ariſing from the abuſe of words, it is neceſſary to be able quickly to diſcern whether one term can be juſtly predicated of another. Ariſtotle, for this purpoſe, invented the ſyllogiſm, which conſiſts in comparing both the ſubject and the predicate of any propoſition with what is called the middle term, becauſe its natural place is the middle between the other two terms, called therefore the extremes. Let the queſtion be propoſed, whether temperance be a habit? I readily find a middle term which is contained under the more extenſive appellation of habit, and which itſelf contains the more limited appellation of temperance. The terms, therefore, ſtand in

Nature and uſe of ſyllogiſm.

[t] Categor. c. v. p. 17.

[u] ωδιν γαρ διαφερει το ανθρωπος υγιαινει ειπειν, η το ανθρωπος υγιαινει, &c. Metaph. l. v. c. 7. p. 889.

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in this order: Habit, virtue, temperance; or, in the form of propoſitions, CHAP. II.

Virtue is a habit,

Temperance is a virtue;

therefore temperance is a habit. Now the whole cogency of this argument depends on that great principle which preſides in the formation of language, that things, which have a common nature, receive a common name. They may differ in many important particulars, yet having received one common appellation from the particular in which they all agree, the term denoting the genus may be predicated of every ſpecies, and every individual contained under it. Whatever is affirmed or denied of a more general term, may therefore be affirmed or denied of all the more particular terms, as well as of all the individual things to which its ſignification extends. In the language of Ariſtotle, this is expreſſed by his calling thoſe things ſynonymous which have the ſame name in the ſame ſenſe. Thus "man" and "ox" are, according to him, ſynonymous, becauſe the name of animal is equally applicable to both [x]; an obſervation which muſt ſound harſhly to thoſe Engliſh readers who have derived their knowledge of Greek through the circuitous channel of France.

On the baſis of this one ſimple truth, itſelf founded in the natural and univerſal texture of language, Ariſtotle has reared a lofty

Wonderful variety in a ſubject ſeemingly ſo ſimple.

[x] Categor. c. i. p. 14. Words ſynonymous in the modern ſenſe, have nothing to do with philoſophy, whoſe terms, if accurate, cannot be interchangeable. Their proper place is poetry; accordingly we find that Ariſtotle, in his now imperfect treatiſe on that ſubject, had treated of συνωνυμα ὡν πλειω τα ονοματα, λογος δε ὁ αυτος, that is, "of various words meaning the ſame thing;" which agrees with the modern acceptation Simplicius in Categor. fol. viii.

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lofty and various ſtructure of abſtract ſcience, clearly expreſſed, and fully demonſtrated. To convince ourſelves of the wonderful variety in a ſubject, ſeemingly ſo ſimple, it is ſufficient to obſerve, that the middle term may either be the ſubject of both the premiſſes; or the predicate of both; or, as in the ſyllogiſm given above, the ſubject of the major premiſs, in which it is compared with the major extreme, and the predicate of the minor premiſs, in which it is compared with the minor extreme. Theſe various arrangements form what are called the three figures of ſyllogiſm [7]; and in each of theſe three figures, every one of the three propoſitions may be either affirmative or negative; and each of the affirmative and negative propoſitions may be either univerſal or particular; univerſal, when their ſubject is taken in the full extent of its meaning, as "all men are mortal;" particular, when their ſubject in its ſignification is reſtricted to a part of the things which its name properly denotes, as "ſome men are wiſe." If we expreſs theſe four kinds of propoſitions, the univerſal affirmative, the univerſal negative, the particular affirmative, and the particular negative, by the four vowels, a, e, i, o, we ſhall find that they will afford ſixty-four different combinations by threes, which are called the different modes in each figure; and therefore one hundred and ninety-two combinations in the three figures collectively. But the variety does not end here; for propoſitions themſelves are either

[7] It may be proper to remark, that in books of logic there is a fourth figure which is ſaid to have been invented by Galen the phyſician. In this Galenical figure, as it is called, the middle term is predicated of the major, and the minor term is predicated of the middle. In this abſurd figure, the more general term is placed as the ſubject of the more particular. The natural arrangement of the terms is thus totally reverſed. But every ſyllogiſm in this figure, when properly expreſſed, naturally falls under Ariſtotle's firſt figure.

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either pure or modal. A pure propoſition ſimply affirms or denies one thing of another; a modal propoſition affirms or denies with the addition of neceſſity or contingency, poſſibility or impoſſibility. When we conſider, therefore, the numerous combinations that will reſult from theſe new elements variouſly joined with the old, and that every new combination forms a diſtinct ſyllogiſm, it is impoſſible not to admire the perſevering induſtry that could contemplate each ſeparately, and examine how the truth of the concluſion was affected by each ſpecific arrangement.

All ſyllogiſms reduced to thoſe of the firſt figure.

From this induction, the moſt copious and complete that any ſpeculation ever exhibited, Ariſtotle infers that all concluſive ſyllogiſms whatever may be reduced to concluſive modes in the firſt figure[z]; of all which, the truth reſts immediately on the grammatical principle above explained; and of which, therefore, the ſyllogiſm already given may ſerve for an example. When the three terms of a ſyllogiſm, therefore, are accurately defined, and the three propoſitions compoſing it are properly arranged, the juſtneſs of its concluſion may always be perceived by a rapid glance of the mind diſcerning, by means of the minor premiſs, or the propoſition in which the ſubject of the concluſion is compared with the middle term, whether the major premiſs, or propoſition in which the predicate of the concluſion is compared with the ſame middle term, neceſſarily infers the concluſion. For enabling the mind readily to draw this inference in the caſe of all ſyllogiſms whatever, whether their concluſions be affirmative or negative, univerſal or particular, and how awkwardly ſoever their terms may have been arranged, the Author

[z] Comp. Analyt. Prior. c. vii. p. 60. and c. xxiii. p. 79.

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Author has recourſe to no other rules or axioms than thoſe which concern what is called converſion and oppoſition; and that moſt extenſive principle of reaſon which infers the truth of any propoſition by ſhewing, that to ſuppoſe it falſe leads to an abſurdity. To convert a propoſition, is to make its ſubject and its predicate change places. This may often be done ſafely, becauſe in many propoſitions the converſe will retain that truth which was in the propoſition to be converted. All univerſal negatives, for example, can always be completely converted. If no A is B, no B is A; for if B could be predicated of any thing called A, for example of C, then C would fall under the names both of A and of B, which is contrary to the firſt ſuppoſition, that no A is B; or that B cannot be predicated of any thing called A [a]. When one term, therefore, is univerſally denied of another, that other may, without heſitation, be univerſally denied of the firſt. An univerſal affirmative propoſition does not admit of a complete converſion, becauſe, according to what was formerly obſerved, in every ſuch propoſition the predicate muſt apply to all the ſpecies and individuals expreſſed by the name of the ſubject, but the ſubject needs not therefore apply to all the ſpecies and individuals contained under the name of the predicate. But an univerſal affirmative, though it rejects a complete, yet admits of a partial converſion. Thus if every A is B, ſome B muſt be A; for if no B is A, then no A is B, as juſt proved in the caſe of univerſal negatives. Particular affirmatives admit of a complete converſion; for if ſome A is B, then ſome B is A; ſince, when no B is A, no A is B, as formerly proved in the caſe of univerſal negatives. Particular negatives do not at all admit of converſion, either complete or partial

Rules of converſion.

[a] Analyt. Prior. c. ii. p. 52

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partial. Thus, ſome A is not B cannot be converted by ſaying that ſome B is not A, becauſe, though the name of a ſpecies does not apply to ſome things comprehended under the name of its genus, it does not thence follow that the name of the genus does not apply to all the individuals comprehended under the name of the ſpecies [b]. The rules concerning converſion then are, that univerſal negatives, as well as particular affirmatives, may be converted completely; that univerſal affirmatives can only be converted partially; and that particular negatives are totally incapable of converſion. Theſe rules, perhaps, may all be reſolved into one and the ſame primitive truth, of which they are only different expreſſions; yet theſe different expreſſions will on many occaſions render the perception of that truth more diſtinct, and the application of it more eaſy as well as more expeditious. The ſame thing holds here, as with reſpect to the axioms of geometry, concerning the whole and its parts, equality and inequality, greater and leſſer, ſince the comprehenſion of any one of thoſe terms neceſſarily implies the comprehenſion of them all. Yet geometers find it uſeful to repreſent the ſame elementary truth under a variety of forms, that it may be more forcibly impreſſed, and more readily applied; and

[b] The doctrines of Ariſtotle's Organon have been ſtrangely perplexed by confounding the grammatical principles on which that work is built with mathematical axioms. All the modern ſyſtems of logic that have fallen into my hands, employ in demonſtrating the theory of ſyllogiſm theſe two axioms, "Things agreeing with the ſame third agree with each other:" "When one thing agrees with the third, and the other does not, they do not agree with each other." But Ariſtotle tells us, that theſe axioms do not at all apply to the predication of terms, the one of the other; except when thoſe terms denote mathematical quantities. The reaſon why they do apply to mathematical quantities he ſays is, becauſe in them, ἡ ισοτης, ἑνοτης, "equality is ſameneſs;" and in them, equality is ſameneſs, becauſe ὁ λογος ὁ της πρωτης ουσιας εἱς ἐστι. The definition of any particular object denoted by the one, is preciſely the ſame with the definition of any particular object denoted by the other. Metaph. l. x. c. iii. p. 845.

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and the indefinite number of mathematical theorems ultimately reſolve themſelves into a few ſimple propoſitions, which may themſelves perhaps be conſidered as only different expreſſions of one and the ſame original conception of the mind.

Rules of oppoſition.

Upon this great principle of tranſlating the ſame truth into different words, in order to render it more familiar to our thoughts, Ariſtotle next examines the doctrine of oppoſition. Propoſitions may be oppoſite or contrary, which are not contradictory; becauſe the truth of the one does not always infer the falſehood of the other. Thus, "all men are white," "no man is white," are contrary propoſitions, and both of them falſe. "Some men are white," "ſome men are not white," are contrary propoſitions, and both of them true. But if I ſay, "all men are white," "ſome men are not white," the truth of the one propoſition infers the falſehood of the other; becauſe in this laſt caſe only the predicate "whiteneſs" is affirmed of the whole ſpecies, and denied of ſome individuals belonging to it; which is inconſiſtent with the great principle on which all language and all reaſoning is founded [c].

In

[c] De Interpret. c. vii. p. 39. & ſeq. and Analyt. Prior. c. xv. p. 117. & ſeq. To ſhew how groſsly Ariſtotle's logic has been miſtaken, and with what contempt of reaſon and grammar, as well as of good manners, the character of this philoſopher has been aſſailed, I ſhall cite the following paſſage from a late author (Lord Kaims) of conſiderable reputation, and of very conſiderable merit: "His (Ariſtotle's) artificial mode of reaſoning is no leſs ſuperficial than intricate. The propoſitions he attempts to prove by ſyllogiſm are all ſelf-evident. Take for example the following propoſition, 'that man has the power of ſelf-motion.' To prove this, he aſſumes the following maxim, upon which indeed every one of his ſyllogiſms are founded, 'that whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together holds true of every one ſeparately." Lord Kaims' Sketches, vol. iii. p. 306. It would have been charitable in this acute author to have pointed out the paſſage where Ariſtotle maintains, that becauſe it is true of a number of particulars joined together, that they are an hundred or a thouſand, the ſame holds true of every one of them ſeparately. It is impoſſible to reſtrain indignation at ſuch unmeaning jargon, poured out againſt the moſt accurate of all writers.

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The design of Aristotle's first Analytics misunderstood.

In the first Analytics, Aristotle shews what is that arrangement of terms in each proposition, and that arrangement of propositions in each syllogism, which constitutes a necessary connection between the premisses and the conclusion. When this connection takes place, the syllogism is perfect in point of form; and when the form is perfect, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premisses, whatever be the signification of the terms of which they are composed. These terms, therefore, he commonly expresses by the letters of the alphabet, for the purpose of shewing that our assent to the conclusion results, not from comparing the things signified, but merely from considering the relation which the signs (whether words or letters) bear to each other. Those [d], therefore, totally misconceive the meaning of Aristotle's logic, who think that, by employing letters instead of words, he has darkened the subject; since the more abstract and general his signs are, they must be the better adapted to shew that the inference results from considering them alone, without at all regarding the things which they signify.

His second Analytics.

The *form* of syllogisms may be perfect when there is much imperfection in their *matter;* that is, in the premisses from which the conclusion is derived; and which may be either certain or probable, or only seem to be probable, as a face may seem to be beautiful which is only painted. In his second Analytics, Aristotle treats of what he calls Demonstrative Syllogisms, because their premisses are certain. In his Topics, he treats of what he calls Dialectical Syllogisms, because their premisses are only

[d] A truly respectable philosopher says, in speaking of this subject, "Aristotle's rules are illustrated, or rather in my opinion purposely darkened, by putting letters of the alphabet for the several terms." Reid's Appendix to Kaims's Sketches, vol. iii. p. 631.

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only probable; and, in his Refutations of Sophiſtry, he treats of thoſe deceitful ſyllogiſms whoſe premiſſes ſeem to be, but which are not really, probable. As ſophiſtry conſiſts, not only in reaſoning from falſe principles, but in reaſoning unfairly from principles that are true, the Author refers all ſuch erroneous deductions to one head, which he calls "a miſtake of the queſtion;" becauſe, in all of them, the "concluſion or anſwer" will be found to come out otherwiſe than it ought to do when drawn agreeably to the rules of juſt inference [c].

His Topics.

The four claſſes of predicates above explained, Genus, Difference, Property, and Appendage, are applicable to ſingle things or ſingle terms, conſidered ſeparately; there are other predicates which are applicable only to more things or more terms than one, conſidered conjunctly. Theſe conjunct predicates the Author reduces to four claſſes; Agreement, Diverſity, Oppoſition, and Order; under which heads, as well as thoſe firſt-mentioned, he examines in his Topics all the probable arguments by which our affirmations or negations may be either confirmed or invalidated; thus ſupplying a vaſt intellectual magazine, which, when compared with the ſlender additions made to it by ſubſequent writers, atteſts both the unwearied ardour of his application, and the incomparable richneſs of his invention.

His Organon perverted and miſapplied.

In as few words as ſeemed conſiſtent with perſpicuity, I have thus endeavoured to explain the nature and deſign of Ariſtotle's Organon; a work which has often been as ſhamefully miſrepreſented, as it was long moſt groſsly miſapplied. In that ſcholaſtic jargon, which inſolently uſurped during many centuries the name

[c] De Sophiſt. Elench. c. vi. p. 287.

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name of Philoſophy, ſyllogiſms were perverted to purpoſes for which their inventor declares them totally unfit, and employed on ſubjects in which his uniform practice ſhews that he conſidered them as altogether uſeleſs. Our acquaintance with the properties of things, he perpetually inculcates, muſt be acquired by patient obſervation, generaliſed by compariſon and induction; but when this foundation is once laid, the words by which our generalizations are expreſſed, deſerve not merely to be regarded as the materials in which our knowledge is embodied, or the channels by which it is communicated, but to be conſidered in the two following reſpects, as the principles or ſources from which new knowledge may be derived. Firſt, by means of a ſkilful arrangement of accurate and well-choſen terms, many proceſſes of reaſoning may be performed by diſcerning the relations and analogies of words, with a certainty as great, and with a rapidity far greater, than theſe proceſſes could poſſibly be carried on, were we obliged, in every ſtep of our progreſs, to fix our attention on things. Every general term is conſidered by Ariſtotle as the abridgment of a definition[f], and every definition is denominated by him a Collection[g], becauſe it is the reſult always of obſervation and compariſon, and often of many obſervations and many compariſons. The improvements in mathematics have advanced from age to age, chiefly by improving the language, that is, the ſigns, by which mathematical truths are expreſſed; and the moſt important diſcoveries have been made in that noble ſcience, by continually ſimplifying the objects of our compariſons; or, in other

Its real uſes. 1. As an analytic art.

[f] διαφερει δε ιδειν, εαν τις ωλειω φαιη σημαινειν, μοιον δε ωριζμενα. τιθεη γαρ αν επ' ισαγ λογφ, ετερον ονομα. Metaph. l. iv. c. iv. p. 873.

[g] ει δε μη τιθειτο, αλλα απειρα σημαινειν φαιη, φανερον ὁτι ουκ αν ειη λογος. Ibid.

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other words, by finding clear expreſſions for ratios, including the reſults of many others. In all other ſciences, this inveſtigation is of the utmoſt importance; and, in many of them, our knowledge will be found to advance almoſt exactly in proportion to the ſucceſs with which our language is improved. When terms, therefore, are formed and applied with that propriety which perpetually ſhines in the Stagirite's writings, his general formulas of reaſoning afford an analytic art, which may be employed as an engine for raiſing new truths on thoſe previouſly eſtabliſhed; and if modern languages do not afford the ſame advantage preciſely in the ſame degree, it is not from the inefficacy of words as ſigns, but from the inefficacy of ſigns ill choſen and ill arranged; from impropriety of application, contempt of analogy, and abuſe of metaphor.

As ſtrengthening the aſſociating principles, and thereby multiplying the energies of thought.

Under another aſpect, nearly connected with the former, yet really diſtinct from it, Ariſtotle's Analytics, and ſtill more his Topics, have the moſt direct and moſt efficacious tendency to invigorate and ſharpen the underſtanding; and even to animate and cheriſh the ſeeds of invention and genius. The properties and relations of external objects, whether actually preſent to the ſenſes, or treaſured up in the memory, are confined, both as to their kind and number, within narrow limits. But our abſtractions, compariſons, and concluſions reſpecting thoſe objects, expreſſed and embodied in words, are of a much wider and almoſt boundleſs extent. According to that law of mental action by which our Author proves that the current of thought is moved and regulated [h], the relations and analogies of words

[h] See the remarks above made concerning what is commonly called "the aſſociation of ideas." "Ideas are more powerfully aſſociated," (to uſe modern language,) "in proportion to the attention with which they are ſimultaneouſly examined and obſerved."

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words, therefore, will appear to form the main ſpring of intellectual energy; and their connections and dependencies, as compared and claſſed by Ariſtotle in his Topics, muſt have a direct tendency to invigorate and expand the thinking faculty; to revive and brighten thoſe aſſociating bands that might otherwiſe have been effaced; to ſuggeſt thoſe principles of reaſoning which would not otherwiſe occur; and thus to prevent that deception and error which moſt commonly proceeds from partial and incomplete views of our ſubject; from weakneſs of combination, and narrowneſs of comprehenſion. To ſay, therefore, that this part of our Author's Works is converſant entirely about *words*, is not to depreciate or reproach it; for Ariſtotle well knew that our knowledge of *things* chiefly depending on the proper application of language as an inſtrument[f] of thought, the true art of reaſoning is nothing but a language accurately defined and ſkilfully arranged; an opinion which, after many idle declamations againſt his barren generalities and verbal trifling, philoſophers have begun very generally to adopt. Let it always, however, be remembered, that the Author who firſt taught this doctrine, had previouſly endeavoured to prove that all our notions, as well as the ſigns by which they are expreſſed, originate in perceptions of ſenſe; and

obſerved." In Ariſtotle's language, the action of thought depends on the attentive examination of things, and of words which are their ſigns. When not only the things themſelves, but the ſigns expreſſing them, are thus examined, the connections between theſe things will take faſter hold of the mind; the perception of them will be more vivid, and the recollection of them more eaſy and more expeditious. But words are the ſigns not merely of perceptible objects and their qualities, but of the compariſons, abſtractions, and concluſions of the mind with reſpect to thoſe objects and their qualities. An attentive examination of the relations and analogies of words ſerves, therefore, not only to ſtrengthen old aſſociations, but to produce many new ones.

[f] Topic, l. i. c. 15. Metaph. ubi ſupra, and l. v. paſſim.

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and that the principles on which languages are firſt conſtructed, as well as every ſtep in their progreſs to perfection, all ultimately depend on inductions from obſervation; in one word, on experience merely.

Of Truth Demonſtrative.

To abridge Ariſtotle's Works is to treat them unfairly, becauſe (where his text is correct) no author expreſſes his meaning in fewer or more appropriate words. Yet, as it is the purpoſe of this diſcourſe to afford ſuch ſpecimens of every part of his writings, as may ſatisfy the curioſity of one claſs of readers, while it augments or inſpires that of another, I ſhall collect within a narrow compaſs his obſervations on Truth Demonſtrative, that is, on Science; and follow him in his application of thoſe principles to the loftieſt, and, as commonly treated, the moſt abſtruſe ſcience, that ever exerciſed the human intellect.

All inſtruction, and all intellectual diſcipline, he obſerves, proceeds on principles already known and eſtabliſhed. This is manifeſtly the caſe in mathematics, in the arts, and in every kind of reaſoning, which is univerſally carried on either by ſyllogiſm or by induction; the former proving to us, that a particular propoſition is true, becauſe it is deducible from a general one, already known to us; and the latter demonſtrating a general truth, becauſe it holds in all particular caſes. Orators perſuade by examples or arguments, examples being a rhetorical or coarſer kind of induction, as arguments are a rhetorical or coarſer kind of ſyllogiſm.

Wherein it conſiſts.

Truth is the exact conformity of human conception with the real nature of things[k]. Demonſtrative truth, therefore, can apply

[k] το δε κυριωτατον ου, αληθες η ψευδος· τουτο δ' επι των πραγματων εστι συγκεισθαι η διαιρεισθαι . . ψευσται δε ο εναντιως εχων, η τα πραγματα ποτε εστι, η ουκ εστι. Metaph. l. ix. c. x. p. 941. Vid. etiam Metaph. l. v. c. xxix. p. 901.

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apply only to thoſe things which neceſſarily exiſt after a certain manner, and whoſe ſtate is unalterable: and we know thoſe things when we know their cauſes: thus, we know a mathematical propoſition, when we know the cauſes that make it true; that is, when we know all the intermediate propoſitions up to the firſt principles, or axioms, on which it is ultimately built. Demonſtration cannot be indefinitely extended, becauſe the certainty, and even probability of every kind of reaſoning would be deſtroyed, were we to call in queſtion thoſe firſt principles which, in matters of ſcience, are recogniſed by what Ariſtotle calls Intellect, and in matters of practice by what he calls Common Senſe [1].

Rules concerning it.

In demonſtration, the premiſſes are the cauſes of the concluſion, and therefore prior to it. We cannot, therefore, demonſtrate things in a circle, ſupporting the premiſſes by the concluſion; becauſe this would be to ſuppoſe, that the one propoſition could be both prior and poſterior to the other. In all demonſtration, the firſt principles muſt be neceſſary, immutable, and therefore eternal truths, becauſe thoſe qualities could not belong to the concluſion, unleſs they belonged to the premiſſes, which are its cauſes. An affirmative demonſtration is preferable to a negative one, and a direct demonſtration of any truth to that drawn from the abſurdity of ſuppoſing it falſe; becauſe, other things remaining the ſame, the ſhorteſt demonſtration is always the beſt. Ariſtotle debates the queſtion, whether an univerſal demonſtration is better than a particular one; and, as his remarks on this ſubject form an apology for the univerſality and abſtractedneſs of his own reaſonings in many parts of his Works,

[1] αλλα αισθησις ουχ ἡ των ιδιων. Ethic. Nicom. c. vi. p. 8.

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Universal and particular; which preferable.

Works, I shall subjoin a translation, or paraphrase, of the whole chapter[m]. "1st, To some a particular demonstration may seem preferable, because we know any object better by examining itself, than by examining the class to which it belongs. Thus, that the three angles of an isosceles triangle are equal to two rights, may be thought more convincing when proved with regard to the isosceles itself, than when proved with regard to triangles in general, to which class of figures the isosceles belongs; and therefore the particular demonstration may appear better than a general one. 2d, If individuals only have a real existence in nature, and every demonstration supposes the existence of its subject, a general demonstration must be worse than a particular one, because it leads us to suppose the existence of nonentities.

The former more informing and more satisfactory.

In answer to these objections let it be remarked, that the first does not apply, because if the property of having the three angles equal to two rights belongs to the isosceles, not as it is an isosceles, but as it is a triangle, he who demonstrates this truth respecting the isosceles only, less examines the object in itself, than he who demonstrates the same truth respecting triangles in general: for the definition of a triangle enters into that of an isosceles; and because it is a triangle, the isosceles has its angles equal to two rights; so that he who demonstrates universally, better shews the cause and reason of the conclusion, than he who demonstrates particularly; and he shews it from considering the object itself, that is, the definition of the object, and that part of the definition from which the conclusion results. Again, if universals are merely words, denoting certain classes or species, to all the individuals of which they equally apply,

[m] Analytic Posterior, l. i. c. xxiv. p. 154, &. seq.

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apply, there is no reaſon to ſay that they are nonentities when applied to thoſe objects or individuals. Their exiſtence is even firmer than that of any *portion* of the individuals ſignified by them, which is continually liable to corruption or change; whereas the general name denoting the whole ſpecies is not liable to either, but has a preciſe and permanent meaning as long as any objects of that ſpecies continue to exiſt. But to ſuppoſe that univerſals, becauſe they are employed in demonſtration, have any exiſtence independently of the objects or individuals which they denote, is a miſtake chargeable, not on thoſe who employ ſuch terms, but on thoſe who miſconceive their uſe[n].

The more univerſal the demonſtration of any propoſition is rendered, it becomes at the ſame time the more informing and the

[n] Had the learned Lord Monboddo proceeded to read this ſentence, perhaps he would not have quoted that immediately preceding it, to prove that Ariſtotle thought, that "ideas, conſidered as in the divine mind, have an exiſtence, and an exiſtence more real than particulars, becauſe they are eternal and unchangeable." Monboddo's Ancient Metaphyſics, vol. i. p. 470.

Ariſtotle ſpeaks with great caution concerning the divine mind, nor ever ſays that any thing exiſts *in* it. Of ideas or examplars he ſpeaks often, and always contemptuouſly, as of metaphors and vain flouriſhes. Analyt. Poſt. l. i. c. xxii. p. 151. Metaph. l. i. c. vii. p. 853. So that it is plain what he would have thought of the diſtinction, προ των πολλων, εν τοις πολλοις, επι τοις πολλοις; which was adopted by his followers, and is ſo much inſiſted on, as the great doctrine of the Peripatetics, by Lord Monboddo and Mr. Harris. The following paſſage may be quoted to ſhew what Ariſtotle thought of the προ των πολλων, "thoſe eternal exemplars." αυτο γαρ ανθρωπον φασιν ειναι, και αυτο ἱππον και ὑγιειαν, αλλο δε ουδεν· παραπλησιον μεν ποιουντες τοις θεους μεν ειναι φασκουσι ανθρωποειδεις δε. ουτε γαρ εκεινοι θεον αλλο εποιουν η ανθρωπους αιδιους, ουτε ουτοι τα ειδη αλλα η αισθητα αιδια. "They who maintained the eternal exiſtence of ſuch exemplars, as the ideas of man, horſe, health, acted exactly like to thoſe who maintained there were Gods, but that the Gods were of a human ſhape. The Gods of ſuch theologians were nothing more than eternal or incorruptible men; and the ideas of ſuch philoſophers nothing more than eternal or incorruptible objects of ſenſe." Metaphyſ. l. iii. c. xi. p. 861.

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the more ſatisfactory; the more informing, becauſe it comprehends the greater number of particular truths; and the more ſatisfactory, becauſe it demonſtrates theſe truths from their firſt and ultimate cauſe; at leaſt, approximates nearer to this cauſe in exact proportion to its greater univerſality. To deſcend from generals is alſo more natural; becauſe, in matters of ſcience, they are the ſource and fountain of particulars. It has alſo more dignity, becauſe generals are the work of intellect, whereas the more particular propoſitions are, the more nearly they approach to perceptions of ſenſe, in which, when ſtrictly particular, they ultimately terminate.

Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics

From this part of Ariſtotle's Logic, there is an eaſy tranſition to what has been called his Metaphyſics; a name unknown, as above obſerved, to the Author himſelf, and given to his moſt abſtract philoſophical works by his editors, from an opinion that thoſe books ought to be ſtudied immediately after his Phyſics, or Treatiſes on Natural Philoſophy. Conſidered under one particular aſpect, thoſe books may be properly thus arranged *; becauſe, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, the ſtudy of nature, conducted according to Ariſtotle's principles, neceſſarily leads to Deity, and to the moſt delightful of all contemplations, that of the Divine Goodneſs. But, viewed in the full extent of their relations, Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics are intimately connected with every branch of human ſcience, whether natural or moral, ſince their real ſubject (which has been groſsly miſtaken through a prepoſterous arrangement of the treatiſes which they compriſe) is the vindication of the exiſtence and nature of truth againſt the cavils of Sophiſts, and thoſe now called Metaphyſicians;

extend to every branch of human ſcience.

* Topic, l. i. c. 2.

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ficians; and this doctrine concerning truth illuſtrated in the demonſtration of the being of one God, in oppoſition to Atheiſts on one hand, and Polytheiſts on the other. The whole of Ariſtotle's metaphyſical works may be referred to one or other of thoſe two heads; ſince to them the greater part of his treatiſes relate immediately, and the ſmaller part will appear to be merely preparatory, to their diſcuſſion.

Begin with a Philoſophical Vocabulary.

The unſkilfulneſs of his editors[p] has placed near the middle of the work, a book plainly preparatory, ſince it merely exhibits the different acceptation of the terms of which he has occaſion afterwards to make uſe. This fifth book of his Metaphyſics, which ought undoubtedly to ſtand as the firſt, contains in thirty chapters, an accurate philoſophical vocabulary, which Ariſtotle thought peculiarly requiſite as an introduction to the firſt and moſt comprehenſive[q] of all ſciences, that of which truth in general was the ſubject, ſince the terms employed in it having neceſſarily a variety of meanings, it was impoſſible to uſe thoſe ſigns properly, without preciſely aſcertaining the things which they ſignified. Wonder and admiration, he obſerves, are the paſſions naturally excited by the contemplation of the univerſe, whoſe ſublime obſcurity, while it fixes the attention, inflames the curioſity of man, and makes him ambitious to know and comprehend ſo intereſting and magnificent a ſpectacle. But it is impoſſible to know any thing without

[p] Dr. Morton of the Britiſh Muſeum, who has long ſtudied the writings of Ariſtotle with equal diligence and ſucceſs, firſt ſhewed to me, that Samuel Petit, in the fourth book of his *Miſcellanea*, had already placed Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics in nearly the ſame order in which I alſo had arranged them.

[q] αλλα ἡ μεν γεωμετρια και ἡ αστρολογια περι τινα φυσιν ιδιαν εισι· καθολε δε (ἡ πρωτη φιλοσοφια, ſeu θεολογικη,) καθολε πασων κοινη. Metaphyſ. l. vi. c. i. p. 904.

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illuſtrated in words, cauſe or principle.

without knowing its cauſes and principles. Ariſtotle, therefore, begins his vocabulary with an explanation of thoſe terms; he obſerves, that all cauſes are principles; and defines a principle to be that from which any thing exiſts, is made, or is known. The notion of a cauſe always includes that of priority, which is the ſpecific quality belonging to all the different acceptations of the word principle. Ariſtotle enumerates four kinds of cauſes, the ſame word being taken in Greek in four

The material,

different meanings. 1. The material cauſe, that is, the matter from which any thing is made; as braſs of the ſtatue, and ſilver of the goblet; and which are evidently cauſes, ſince, independently of them, neither the ſtatue nor the goblet could exiſt. The braſs and the ſilver have alſo their material cauſes, namely the ſubſtances from which thoſe metals are compoſed; and in the works both of nature and of art, the firſt component ſubſtances, which are ſo ſimple as not to admit of any further

formal,

reſolution, are called Elements. 2. The formal cauſe, which is that ſpecific form or ſhape, or quality, moſt commonly diſtinguiſhed by ſight, which characteriſes each particular object, and gives to it an appropriate nature and eſſence. It is from their agreement in the ſame form or eſſence, that different objects receive a common name; of which name, this form or eſſence is therefore the proper definition. In loſing their appropriate form, objects loſe their name and nature; this form, therefore, is a cauſe of thoſe objects, ſince, independently of it, they would not be at all, or would not continue

efficient,

to exiſt. 3. The efficient cauſe is the principle of motion or change; or, in other words, the maker; which term ſufficiently explains itſelf. 4. The final cauſe, that is, the end or

final.

purpoſe for which any thing is made, and, independently of which

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which end or purpoſe, the maker could not have exerted his power or ſkill; and therefore his work would never have commenced; that is, the thing made would never have exiſted [r]. Of theſe four cauſes, the two firſt are always inherent in the object cauſed: in works of art, the two laſt cauſes are always ſeparate from this object; we ſhall ſee in the ſequel, whether this is alſo the caſe with reſpect to the works of nature.

The ſecond book conſiders words as ſtanding in oppoſition to each other.

Ariſtotle's enumeration of the different meanings of the word "cauſe," which muſt be carefully diſtinguiſhed in all parts of his philoſophy, may ſerve as a ſpecimen of that book, which was intitled "An Explanation of Words with various Significations." That book is naturally followed by the tenth, which ought therefore to ſtand as the ſecond; becauſe, in it, words are conſidered, not ſimply in themſelves, but as ſtanding in the relation of oppoſition or contrariety to each other. It is briefly intitled "The Selection of Contraries," and treats of one and many; likeneſs and unlikeneſs; contraries in the ſame genus, as "white" and "black;" and contraries which are not in the ſame genus, as "corruptible" and "incorruptible." The firſt kind of contraries may ſubſiſt at different times in the ſame ſubject;

[r] Juſtneſs of thought is inſeparably connected with propriety of language. The ſeveral cauſes enumerated by Ariſtotle, the names of which ſound awkwardly in Engliſh, were expreſſed briefly in Greek, each by a particular prepoſition. The material was the ἐξ οὗ; the formal, the καθ' ὅ; the efficient, the ὑφ' οὗ; and the final, the διὰ ὅ: beſides which, the Greeks indicated the means, or inſtrument, by which any thing is done, or made, by διὰ οὗ; and the model after which it was made, by πρὸς ὅ. This model, or exemplar, was conſidered as a cauſe by the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts; the former of whom maintained, that all perceptible things were imitations of *numbers*; and the latter, that they owed their exiſtence to the participation of *ideas*: but wherein either this imitation or this participation conſiſted, theſe philoſophers, Ariſtotle obſerves, omitted to ſhew.

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ſubject; the ſecond, never can; becauſe the firſt kind are merely appendages to the ſubject in which they ſubſiſt, and may therefore be ſeparated from it; but the ſecond are eſſentials [s].

The third book treats of ſcience.

The ſecond and fourth books treat of truth and ſcience; they ought to be conſidered as one, and to ſtand the third in order; ſince they naturally follow the definitions laid down in the firſt and ſecond. His treatiſe on ſcience opens with great modeſty. Its difficulty, he obſerves, ariſes not merely from the ſubject, but from ourſelves, whoſe intellectual ſight (as happens to the eyes of bats) is blinded by what is brighteſt. Much thanks are due, not only to thoſe who have eſtabliſhed truths worthy of being adopted, but to thoſe alſo who have given us opinions worthy of being conſidered. They ſet our faculties to work; and even their errors are uſeful to their ſucceſſors. Had Phrynis never lived, we ſhould not now enjoy the charming melodies of his ſcholar Timotheus [t].

Of ſpeculative philoſophy, truth is the end; and each object participates of truth more or leſs, in proportion as it more or leſs participates of reality. Truth, therefore, is to be found in things eternal and unalterable, rather than in their contraries; becauſe ſuch things are not dependent for their reality on other things, but all others on them.

There cannot be an infinite progreſſion of cauſes.

There muſt be ſome principle or firſt cauſe of whatever really exiſts; for if this were not the caſe, there would be an infinite progreſſion of cauſes. But this infinite progreſſion is impoſſible: 1. With regard to material cauſes; that fleſh, for inſtance, ſhould be made of earth, earth of air, air of fire; and that to this

[s] Metaphyſ. l. x. c. ix. and x. p. 951. & ſeq. [t] Metaphyſ. l. ii. c. i. p. 856.

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this ſeries of productions there ſhould be no end. 2. As to the efficient cauſe or principle of motion; that man, for inſtance, ſhould be actuated by the air, the air moved by the ſun, the ſun by ſtrife, in endleſs ſucceſſion. 3. As to the final cauſe; that exerciſe, for inſtance, ſhould be taken for the ſake of health, and health choſen for the ſake of happineſs, and happineſs itſelf for the ſake of ſome farther object. 4. As to the formal cauſe; that the characteriſing properties of things ſhould be derived one from the other without ultimately terminating in one common ſource. For in all thoſe four caſes alike, to ſuppoſe an infinite ſucceſſion of cauſes, is to ſay that things exiſt without any cauſe at all; ſince, in this infinite chain, every link is merely the effect of the link preceding it, and when the chain is endleſs, there is no firſt link, and therefore no cauſe. Were we deſired to tell which of three things is the cauſe of the other two, we ſhould name the firſt of the three. We could not ſay the laſt, for it is the cauſe of nothing; neither could we ſay the ſecond, for it is the cauſe of one thing only; and though conſidered in relation to that one, it be really a cauſe; yet conſidered in relation to the whole, it is merely an effect; and in the ſame manner all the intermediate links are effects, how numerous ſoever they may be ſuppoſed. The very term "final cauſe" expreſſes an end and boundary; and if there was not ſomething ultimately deſirable on its own account, for the ſake of which other things are deſirable as means, all deſire and all volition would neceſſarily ceaſe; and all intellection would be deſtroyed, if the properties of things could be continually traced up to other properties ſtill more eſſential; that is, if formal cauſes might be traced back in infinite progreſſion, there

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would be no firmneſs for the intellect to reſt on; in other words, no underſtanding [n].

The exiſtence of truth vindicated.

Democritus had ſaid, that truth either did not exiſt; or that, by man at leaſt, it was not to be diſcovered. In the ſame ſpirit of ſcepticiſm, Protagoras maintained that man was the meaſure of all things; which were true or falſe, good or bad, merely according to his conception of them. It is melancholy, Ariſtotle obſerves, to hear thoſe who might be expected beſt to ſee what is true, ſince they moſt ſought and loved it, maintain ſuch opinions; becauſe, were they well founded, to aim at philoſophy would be to court diſappointment, and to purſue truth as puerile a folly as that of attempting to catch birds in their flight. But the misfortune of thoſe philoſophers is, that they confine their inquiries merely to ſenſible and ſublunary objects, which from their own nature, as well as that of the ſenſes by which they are perceived, are indefinite and variable, liable to decay and corruption, and continually appearing under different aſpects to different men; and even to the ſame man, according to the point from which he views them, and the actual diſpoſition of his organs. But theſe variations as to the objects of perception by ſenſe, take place chiefly in ſublunary things, the whole maſs of which is ſo inconſiderable in magnitude, that it bears not any proportion to the univerſe at large, where all is permanent and invariable, and the ſtability of whoſe arrangement ought to convince us, that there is an eternal arranging cauſe [o], and ſome manner at leaſt of firmneſs and conſtancy in the

[n] ἡ νοησις ἐοικεν ἡρεμησει τινι και στασει, μαλλον ἡ κινησει. De Anim. l. i. c. 3. νοησις δε ουκ ἐστι μη ἑστωσης. Metaphyſ. l. ii. c. ii. p. 857.

[o] πως γαρ ἐσται ταξις, μη τινος αἰει μενοντος, &c. p. 983. Natural. Auſcult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335. and c. iv. p. 332.

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the world by which we are ſurrounded [x]. Even here, it belongs to the eye to judge of colours, to the ear to judge of ſounds, and to the other ſenſes to judge of their reſpective objects; and they judge exactly alike, when ſimilarly diſpoſed and ſimilarly circumſtanced. If ſublunary things are generated, and periſh, there muſt be ſome material cauſe from which they are generated; and ſomething that exiſts immutably, even while the deſtruction of one ſubſtance is the production of another. The ſceptics are not convinced by their own arguments. None of them, while in Libya, becauſe he can conceive himſelf in Athens, thinks of walking into the Odeum [y]. They confide more in their eyes, with regard to near than remote objects. As to taſtes and colours, they prefer the judgment of perſons in health to thoſe of perſons in ſickneſs; and when they are themſelves indiſpoſed, they will have more confidence in the prediction of a phyſician than in that of a perſon ignorant of the healing art. But ſenſible objects are neither the whole nor the principal of things. There are, as ſhall be proved hereafter, exiſtences firm and immoveable, and altogether imperceptible to corporeal organs. That our ſenſes do not ſhew us things as they really are, is perhaps true, but that there ſhould not be ſome cauſe of our ſenſation, exiſting independently of the ſenſations themſelves, is impoſſible; becauſe, whatever is produced by motion ſuppoſes a moving power [z], which exiſts independently, and is prior to the thing moved, in the order of cauſality and nature [a].

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[x] Metaph. l. iv. c. v. p. 879.

[y] The Theatre of Muſic at Athens. [z] Idem ibid.

[a] The moving power does not infer the exiſtence of the thing moved, μη αντιστρεφει κατα την του ειναι ακολουθησιν, but the latter infers the former. Ariſtot. Predicam.

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It is the misery of the sceptics still vainly to reason, while they destroy the only base on which all solid reasoning must stand. Some of them do this through ignorance, and others through obstinacy. The latter stand in need, not of conviction, but correction, for the opposers of some truths ought to be chastised, not confuted; as those who deny that we ought to reverence the Gods, or to respect our parents. But it is the grossest ignorance not to know, that all truths cannot be demonstrated; for it is impossible that demonstrations should run back to infinity, without stopping at certain principles or first truths, which are called self-evident, because more certain and more necessary in themselves than any arguments that could be produced in proof of them. To deny a first cause, we have already proved, is to deny all causation: to deny axioms, is, for the same reason, to deny all demonstration, and to subvert the principles on which both reasoning and language are built [b]. The very nature of words infers, that the things signified by them, have a certain determinate mode of existence; for words, even the most comprehensive, are nothing else than signs denoting that certain properties are characteristic of certain subjects. How numerous soever these properties may be, provided they be not infinite, they are still capable of being collected under one name; but if the properties were totally indefinite, there could not be any collection. Each term, therefore, affirms something definitely respecting the object which it denotes [c]; and to say with the sceptics, truth is merely apparent, or that the same thing may be both affirmed and denied

[b] Metaph. l. iv. c. iv. p. 874.

[c] ὁ γαρ λογος ὁυ τὸ ονομα σημαινει, ορισμος γινεται τὸυ πραγματος, p. 881.

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denied concerning the ſame object at the ſame time, is to maintain that it is impoſſible for man, either to reaſon within himſelf, or to diſcourſe with his fellow-creatures [d].

The ſubject continued.

The exiſtence of truth may be evinced, from the various ſhades of error, which gradually receding from the regions of light, finally darken into perfect obſcurity. As truth conſiſts in the agreement of human conception with the nature of things, the brighteſt truths reſult from thoſe ſciences which treat of things ſimple and invariable. In this view, arithmetic and geometry have long held the pre-eminence. The geometer abſtracts from body heat and cold, hardneſs, ſoftneſs, gravity, levity, and all other perceptible contrarieties; and contemplates it only under the two properties of magnitude and continuity; concerning which he demonſtrates innumerable affections, aſcertaining either the magnitudes themſelves, or their proportions to each other. His theorems therefore are more convincing than thoſe of the natural philoſopher, whoſe ſpeculations are more complex [e], as comprehending a greater variety of objects. But there is a ſcience preceding geometry in ſimplicity as well as dignity; which, inſtead of contemplating properties and their affections, contemplates being and its

[d] δει τοινυν των ονοματων ἑκαστον ειναι γνωριμον, και δηλουν ἑν τι, και μη πολλα, μονον δε ἑν· καν πλειονα σημαινῃ, φανερον ποιειν ἐφ' ὁ φερει τουτο τουνομα τουτων· ὁ δη λεγων ειναι τουτο, και μη ειναι, τουτο δ' ὁλως ειναι φησιν, ου φησιν. ωστε ὁ σημαινει τουνομα, τουτο ου φησι σημαινειν, p. 984. When it is ſaid that each name ſhould denote one, Ariſtotle means ἑν, as explained p. 888. τα δε φυσει λεγομενα ἑν, ὡν η ουσια μια· μια δε η συνεχεια η ειδει η λογῳ. That unity is aſcribed to things whoſe ſubſtance is one; one in continuity, form, or definition; one in form or appearance, is what our eyes tell us is one; one in definition, is what our reaſon tells us is one; the ſpecific quality being ſometimes viſible, ſometimes intelligible. See above, p. 66.

[e] ακριβεστατα των επιστημων αι μαλιστα των πρωτων εισι· αι γαρ εξ ελαττονων ακριβεστεραι των απ' προσθεσεως λεγομενων, οιον αριθμητικη γεωμετριας, &c. p. 842.

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its properties[f]. This ſcience may be juſtly called the firſt philoſophy, and theology: it may be called the firſt philoſophy, becauſe all other ſciences imply it, and borrow from it their principles[g]; and it may be called theology, becauſe all the claſſes of being, as quantity, quality, and relation, finally reſt on ſubſtance; and God is the firſt, the one neceſſary and independent ſubſtance, whoſe non-exiſtence implies a contradiction, and from contemplating whoſe nature our knowledge of being and its properties is ultimately derived[h].

Ariſtotle's introduction to his hiſtory of the firſt philoſophy, or theology.

Having given to his readers a glimpſe of this ſublime ſubject, our author proceeds in examining the principles of things according to his uſual method; firſt explaining the ſentiments of his predeceſſors in ſcience, before he endeavours to eſtabliſh his own ſyſtem. The book publiſhed as the firſt, and that publiſhed as the third, treat of principles; and together form only one diſcourſe, which ought to ſtand as book the fourth. The elaborate exordium of this book ſeems to account for its being conſidered as the beginning of the whole treatiſe. "That all men," our author obſerves, "are naturally fond of knowledge, is proved from the pleaſure which they univerſally take in the exerciſe of their ſenſes; which exerciſe they love on its own account, independently of any end or uſe. But of all our ſenſes, the ſight is that which we moſt delight to exerciſe, and that independently of its aſſiſtance in the buſineſs of life; for even when we have nothing to do, we prefer this exerciſe to all other employments; the cauſe of which is, that the eye affords to us more knowledge, and makes us acquainted with more of the

[f] Metaph. l. iv. c. i. p. 869. and Metaph. l. xiii. c. iii. p. 983.

[g] Metaph. l. iv. c. ii. p. 871. & ſeq. [h] Metaph. l. iv. c. iii. p. 872.

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the differences of things, than any of the other ſenſes. All animals are endowed with ſenſation; but in ſome only, ſenſation is followed by memory. Thoſe who are endowed with memory, are ſuſceptible of inſtruction; and even without inſtruction, (ſince incapable of hearing,) attain a wonderful degree of ſagacity, as appears in bees, and in ſome reſembling tribes. The powers of hearing and remembering infer the capacity of being taught by inſtruction as well as by experience; of which capacity inferior animals participate in a ſmall degree, but which in man is exalted into art and ſcience. His experience, alſo, ariſes from memory; many particular remembrances combining into our experience. From experience, again, both art and ſcience are derived; art being nothing more than the general reſult of various experience; as when we obſerve that a certain medicine is beneficial to Socrates, to Callias, and many others, we infer that it will alſo be ſo, to all others labouring under a ſimilar malady. In each particular caſe, therefore, we can aſſign a cauſe why the medicine ſhould be adminiſtered; and the man of art is preferred to the mere empiric, becauſe he can thus explain the reaſons of his practice, and communicate his ſkill to others. The practice of the empiric, however, may often be far more ſucceſsful; and even his ſkill in the healing art may be far greater; for if his knowledge is derived only from individuals, it is with individuals only he has to do. Arts, therefore, are admired rather for their ingenuity than utility; and the farther they are removed from the common uſes of life, our admiration of them is the greater. Such arts, indeed, are the lateſt in invention; for men muſt be provided with neceſſaries and accommodations, before they can attain that freedom of mind which is requiſite

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for ſpeculation. The mathematical ſtudies, therefore, firſt aſſumed a ſyſtematic form among the prieſts of Egypt, who enjoyed independent leiſure. We make theſe obſervations to ſhow how men are led from ſenſe and memory to experience; from experience to art, and from practical arts to ſpeculative ſciences; till they finally reach the moſt lofty ſpeculations of all, concerning the firſt principles of the univerſe.

The nature and dignity of this ſcience.

The ſcience containing theſe ſpeculations is called wiſdom; and thoſe by whom it is cultivated, are eminently diſtinguiſhed as the wiſe. The particulars in which it differs from other ſciences are, that it is the moſt univerſal, the moſt difficult, the moſt accurate; and, merely for its own ſake, of all ſciences the moſt deſirable. It is the moſt univerſal, becauſe the knowledge of firſt principles is the ſource of all other knowledge; it is the moſt difficult, becauſe it is of all ſciences the fartheſt removed from ſenſation; it is the moſt accurate, becauſe its object is the moſt ſimple, being unaccompanied with any acceſſaries; as geometry is more ſimple than phyſics, and arithmetic than geometry. It is alſo the moſt deſirable on its own account, ſince in proportion as men poſſeſs all other goods of the mind and body, they become moſt ambitious of attaining this knowledge; which is coveted, loved, and ſought merely for itſelf, independently of any further end than the pleaſure of enjoying it. A freeman, in oppoſition to a ſlave, lives for himſelf, not for another; ſo this ſcience is of all the moſt liberal, terminating completely in itſelf. It may therefore be deemed above the rank of humanity, (ſince men are naturally ſlaves to innumerable wants,) and a ſcience fit only for gods; ſo that if the gods, as the poets ſay, are capable of envy, this ſcience ought to draw down the divine diſpleaſure on thoſe who

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who cultivate it. But the Divinity cannot poſſibly be ſubject to envy; and the poets, even by the common proverb, are acknowledged to be liars. This ſcience, therefore, is moſt valuable, becauſe, in two reſpects, the moſt divine; firſt, as the Divinity being a cauſe or principle, is therefore its object; ſecondly, as the Divinity, to whom the univerſe is but one great truth, alone fully comprehends it. Although all other ſciences are more neceſſary than this, yet none is better. CHAP. II.

With this preface Ariſtotle introduces his hiſtory of what he calls wiſdom, theology, and the firſt philoſophy; and then proceeds to ſhow that of the two great ſchools, the Ionian and the Italic, the philoſophers of the former were attentive ſolely to groſs material cauſes, whereas thoſe of the latter wandered in the chimerical regions of ideas and numbers; ſubſtituting for the real cauſes of things metaphyſical abſtractions, which were the mere creatures of their own intellect. The materialiſts differed widely from each other. Thales maintained water to be the firſt principle of things; probably, as our Author ſays, obſerving that the nouriſhment, as well as the ſeeds, of moſt natural objects are moiſt; and that heat, perhaps life, is produced by fermentation. He might alſo allege the opinions of divines and poets long before his own age, who conſidered Oceanus and Tethys as the fathers of generation; and who make the gods ſwear by Styx, that is by water, as the moſt to be revered of all things, becauſe the moſt ancient. Anaximenes and Diogenes perceived that water might be reſolved into air; and therefore maintained air to be the original principle of bodies. The cauſe of fire was defended by Hippaſus and Heracleitus, who ſaw all things expanded, animated, and revived by heat; and differing from each other in proportion as they Its hiſtory.

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participated of the different degrees of the caloric, from the extreme of condenſation to that of rarefaction. Empedocles conſidering all theſe three ſubſtances as principles, added to them earth as a fourth principle; and called theſe four the elements, becauſe he ſuppoſed that all things were compoſed of them, that all things might be reſolved into them, and that they themſelves were ſimple, indeſtructible, and totally incapable of farther reſolution[1]. Anaxagoras introduced the obſcure doctrine of the omæomeria, or the production of bodies from indefinitely ſmall organic particles, exactly reſembling the bodies themſelves; and therefore maintained principles to be infinite.

In this inveſtigation, which reſpected only the material cauſe, philoſophers were naturally led to inquire what made theſe principles or elements (whether one, many, or infinite) change their actual ſtate. In works of art, they perceived that the materials were totally inactive; that the iron did not make itſelf into a ſaw, nor the braſs into a ſtatue. To anſwer this queſtion, ſome maintained, contrary to experience, that all things were one, and unalterable. Others aſcribed an active power to fire, which produced all the changes which we behold, by its operation on the other elements. But of the order and beauty which prevail in the univerſe, neither fire nor any ſimilar ſubſtance could be ſuſpected of being the cauſe; nor was it poſſible that ſuch regular effects ſhould reſult from blind chance. Philoſophers were again compelled therefore, by the force of truth itſelf, to look for ſome higher principle; when one, far wiſer than the reſt, like a ſober man among drunken babblers, pronounced mind to be the primary cauſe of the

[1] Metaph. lib. i. c. iv. p. 844, & ſeq.

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the beauty and harmony of the univerſe. This opinion was aſſerted in plain language by Anaxagoras of Clazomene; but the firſt author of it was his countryman Hermotimus[k]. Yet Anaxagoras himſelf, though he employs mind as a machine for making the world, introduces it, however, only when compelled by neceſſity; and prefers having recourſe rather to every other cauſe in explaining the phænomena of nature[l].

Fifth book, concerning ideas as cauſes of the univerſe.

We ſhall not follow Ariſtotle further in examining the tenets of the Ionian ſchool; much leſs are we inclined to enter into his ſixth, ſeventh, and eleventh books; where he examines, with a degree of attention, of which the ſubject would now appear totally unworthy, the *numbers* of Pythagoras, and the *ideas* of Plato; thoſe intellectual abſtractions which the wildneſs of philoſophy had converted into the primary cauſes of the univerſe; thus ſubſtituting ſhadows for realities. Theſe three books properly conſtitute one, which ought to ſtand as the fifth, and be intitled, Concerning Ideas or Univerſals conſidered as Cauſes of the Univerſe.

The proper arrangement of the five remaining books.

In his eighth book, he explains his own doctrine concerning natural philoſophy; that is, concerning things liable to motion or change; which ſubject is treated more fully in his eight books of Phyſicks, and in his treatiſe concerning Generation and Corruption. This eighth book ought therefore to ſtand as the ſixth. The ſeventh book, which is now printed as the ninth, treats of Energy; a word, as we ſhall ſee, of mighty import in the Ariſtotelian philoſophy; from the explanation of which he naturally paſſes to the three concluding books of his Metaphyſics, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and twelfth, which treat of a being totally diſtinct from matter; neceſſary, eternal, infinite in

[k] Metaph. l. i. c. iii. p. 844.

[l] Ibid. l. i. c. iv. p. 844.

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in perfection; one ſubſtantially and numerically, the primary cauſe of motion, himſelf immoveable[m]. Theſe three laſt books, which ought to ſtand as the eighth, ninth, and tenth of what is now called his Metaphyſics, are intitled, by Ariſtotle himſelf, his Works concerning Philoſophy[n]; meaning thereby, as he elſewhere explains it, the firſt philoſophy or theology[o].

Ariſtotle's natural philoſophy.

In travelling over the vaſt ſpace which ſtill lies before us, we ſhall follow the order preſcribed by our Author; beginning therefore with the Philoſophy of Nature, which is treated in various parts of his works, where the ſame doctrines are repeated nearly in the ſame words. In his Analyſis of Material Objects, his reſearches penetrate far beyond thoſe vulgar and ſpurious elements, firſt propoſed by Empedocles, earth, water, fire, and air; which are ſo far from being ſimple and unalterable, that they may be converted with great facility, and are in fact perpetually changing the one into the other[p]. But, in relation to human perception, Empedocles' diviſion is not without merit; ſince the ſenſe of touch, the moſt ſure and ſcientific of all our ſenſes, acquaints us with only four different qualities of bodies, diſtinguiſhed by the names hot, cold, moiſt, and dry. Ariſtotle endeavours to prove, by induction, that all other differences perceived by the touch, reſolve themſelves into theſe four; whereas no one of theſe four can be reſolved into any of the other three.

His analyſis of the ſuppoſed elements.

The qualities, therefore, above mentioned, may be regarded as the fitteſt for diſtinguiſhing the different kinds of bodies from each other; and theſe four qualities, in their moſt ſimple combination with each other, will thus form the characteriſtics[q] of the elements

[m] ἐν μεν αρα και λογῳ και αριθμῳ, το πρωτον κινουν ακινητον ον. See p. 1001 and 1003.

[n] Ethic. Eadem, l. i. c. viii.

[o] Metaphyſics, l. vi. c. i. p. 904.

[p] Degenerat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. iii. p. 517.

[q] Ibid. p. 515, 516.

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elements as discovered by the sense of touch. But these qualities combined by two, that is, in the manner the most simple, form only four combinations. The elements, therefore, are four. The combination of coldness with dryness is called earth; of coldness with humidity, water; of heat with dryness, fire; of heat with humidity, air. Those elements are most easily convertible, which have one quality in common. Thus water is changed into air, when the quality of cold is destroyed by the caloric [r]. What was before water has now the two characteristics of air, viz. humidity and heat; and, when the latter it added in due proportion, the water evaporates, and mounts to the sky, where it remains, until a new cause again deprives the air of its heat, and makes it fall to the ground in rain. In the same manner, fire may be converted into air, and air into fire; for fire is warm and dry, and air is warm and moist; and the element will therefore be denominated either fire or air, according to the prevalence of the dryness or humidity. Water, too, will be easily converted into earth; since both being cold, but the former moist, and the latter dry, the moisture need only to be overcome by the dryness to make water earth; and dryness need only to be overcome by moisture to make earth water. When the elements possess not any common quality, their transmutation is more slow and difficult. To make water into fire, it is necessary that both its cold and its moisture should be overcome by the contrary principles of heat and dryness; and to make air into earth, or earth into air, the two characteristic qualities of both elements must also be changed. These changes, however, are continually happening around us; the air being first converted into

Their continual transmutations.

[r] More properly calorific. Το θερμαντικον—Το δε δυναμενον θερμον ειναι, παροντος του θερμαντικου και πλησιαζοντος, αναγκη θερμαινεσθαι. "What has the capacity of receiving heat, must be heated by the approach and presence of the caloric." P. 508.

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into water, and the water into earth. Fire alſo is viſibly generated; for flame, which is a ſpecies of fire, conſiſts of nothing but burning ſmoke, which itſelf is compoſed of air and earth [s].

The perpetual changes of the elements and their compounds produce the ever-varying ſpectacle which we behold around us, and are themſelves produced by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies acting in concert with thoſe laws of motion which God has impreſſed on his lower works [t]. Earth naturally tends to the centre of the univerſe; water riſes above earth; air above water; and fire above air. A gravitating principle, therefore, belongs properly to earth; and an anti-gravitating, to fire; which always ſeeks the extremities; and is therefore the great miniſter of the Almighty in moulding the forms of things [u]. The intermediate elements of air and water have only a relative gravity, being heavier than fire, and lighter than earth [w]; and this relative gravity diſappears when they are either in, or below, their proper place [x]: yet that air itſelf is heavy, appears evidently from this, that a bladder filled with air is heavier than when it was void of that element [y].

From

[s] De Generat. et Corrupt. l. ii. c. iv. p. 518.

[t] συνεπληρωσε το ὁλον ὁ θεος εντελεχεια ποιησας την γενεσιν· ὑτω γαρ μαλιστα συνειροιτο τω ειναι, διο το εγγυτατω ειναι της ουσιας το γιγνεσθαι αει την γενεσιν. Ibid. p. 525.

[u] De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. viii. p. 523.

[w] De Cœlo, l. i. c. viii. p. 444.

[x] De Cœlo, p. 490. et ſeq.

[y] De Cœlo, l. iv. c. iv. p. 490. The brevity of the expreſſion renders it doubtful whether the experiment was made by exhauſting or by accumulating the air. While writing this paſſage, a book fell in my way of a very eminent profeſſor, Dr. Adam Smith, in which I met with the following paſſage: "Thoſe facts and experiments, which demonſtrate the weight of the air, and which no ſuperior ſagacity, but chance alone, preſented to the moderns, were altogether unknown to them (the ancients before the time of Archimedes)." Smith's Eſſays on Philoſophical Subjects, p. 101.

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From the active[z] principles of heat and cold, and the paſſive[a] ones of dryneſs and humidity, the denſity, rarity, hardneſs, ſoftneſs, tenacity, friability, in one word, all the mixed properties of bodies are derived[b]; and from them are compounded the higheſt meteors of heaven[c], as well as the metals and minerals in the boſom of the earth[d]. The hardeſt of thoſe foſſils are produced from dry exhalations or humid vapours; which are the material cauſes of thoſe permanent ſubſtances, and the efficient cauſes of the moſt tremendous convulſions; for the earthquakes are not cauſed, as Democritus ſuſpected, merely by the agency of water burſting the too narrow caverns in which it had been accumulated and pent up, but by the agency of heat, which, converting this water into vapour, gives to it a power of overthrowing the weightieſt mountains which reſiſt its expanſion[e].

The immediate cauſes of the mixed properties of bodies, and of natural phænomena.

Ariſtotle's doctrine concerning the tranſmutation of the elements, vulgarly ſo called, (a doctrine long held viſionary by his pretended followers,) is countenanced by recent experiments[f], which

Refutation of the doctrine of atoms.

[z] Meteor. l. iv. c. i. p. 584.
[a] Ibid.
[b] De Generat. & Corrupt. p. 515.
[c] De Meteor. l. ii. c. iv. p. 558.
[d] De Meteor. l. iii. c. vi. p. 583.
[e] Ibid. p. 566. & ſeq.

[f] I have juſt read a ſmall German volume, intitled, "Antiphlogiſtiſche Chemie," by Johann. And. Scherer, Vienna, 1792, 8vo. which is written with the purpoſe of proving, that the moſt important of the diſcoveries which have eſtabliſhed the antiphlogiſtic ſyſtem, called on the Continent the ſyſtem of Lavoiſier, had been made by our countryman Mayow upwards of an hundred years ago. This wonderful young man, for he died at the age of 34, was acquainted (as his words are quoted by Scherer) with the compoſition of the atmoſphere; the nature of what is now called vital or dephlogiſticated air; the origin and common nature of acids; the doctrines of combuſtion, fermentation, reſpiration, &c. as explained by Lavoiſier, and other authors of the antiphlogiſtic ſyſtem of chemiſtry. Scherer makes the compariſon with great fairneſs, ſtating the modern doctrines in his own German text, and placing Mayow's Latin in notes at the bottom of the page, from an edition of his works publiſhed at the Hague

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which ſhow that water may be reſolved into different gaſes, or airs; that atmoſpheric air itſelf is capable of reſolution; and that the moſt ſubtile fluids enter into the compoſition of ſolid bodies, which may again, by the agency of the calorific, be changed into fluids. But our Author did not reſt ſatisfied with any diſcoveries that mere experiment could make, nor with any analogical deductions from ſuch diſcoveries, of which the moſt celebrated was the Syſtem of Atoms, as explained by Democritus. That philoſopher, whom Ariſtotle often cites and refutes, but on whom he beſtows the juſt praiſe of unextinguiſhable curioſity and indefatigable induſtry[g], thought it an invincible argument in favour of his atoms, that if body was infinitely diviſible, it would finally vaniſh into nothing. Ariſtotle denies both the poſition and the inference. The error of Democritus, he obſerves, aroſe from thinking, that, becauſe a body might be divided *any where*, it might therefore be divided *every where*. In a line, a point may be taken *any where*, but points cannot be taken *every where*, becauſe one point cannot be contiguous to another[h]. Bodies, therefore, cannot actually be divided to infinity, and therefore cannot vaniſh into nothing; but as the minuteſt

in 1681, intitled, "Johannis Mayow, Londinenſis, &c. Opera omnia Medico-Phyſica." Mayow was born in London in 1645, where he died in 1679. He was a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. In 1668 he publiſhed there "Tractatus duo de Reſpiratione & de Rachitide;" and, in 1674, he publiſhed the ſame five Treatiſes, which were afterwards republiſhed at the Hague. This work contains, beſides the two tracts above mentioned, I. "Tractatus de Sal-nitro et Spiritu Nitro Aerio," (which he calls Spiritus Vitalis Igneus, p. 1. and Aer Purus Vitalis, p. 281, the name which is likely to prevail.) II. "De Reſpiratione Fœtus in Utero." III. "De Motu Muſculorum & Spiritibus Animalibus."

[g] ὁυτος δὲ Δημοκριτος ἐοικε μεν περι ἁπαντων φρονησαι, p. 494. De Generat. & Corrupt. p. 2.

[h] De Gener. & Corrupt. l. i. c. ii. p. 497.

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minuteſt particle ſtill poſſeſſes all the properties of body, it is ſtill capable of diviſion, and therefore not an atom [i].

Of change, and its different ſpecies.

According to our univerſal experience reſpecting the viciſſitudes of ſublunary things, our Author obſerves, that there are no realiſings of non-entity, and no abſolute reductions of exiſtence into nothing. Theſe viciſſitudes or changes may all be reduced to the four following [k]: 1. A change of place, called lation, the firſt and moſt ſimple ſpecies of change, which is implied in all the three following kinds. 2. A change of quantity, which muſt conſiſt either in augmentation or in diminution. 3. A change of quality, called alteration; as from hard to ſoft, from health to ſickneſs. 4. A change in ſubſtance, which conſiſts in generation and corruption [l]; and which is ſufficiently exemplified in what is above obſerved concerning the tranſmutations of the elements. When any regularly organized object changes its place, its quantity, or its quality, the object itſelf, it is plain, ſtill remains the ſame eſſentially, though altered in its acceſſories. But when it changes in ſubſtance, that is in the unknown cauſe from which all its preceptible qualities proceed, is there reaſon to believe that the continuity of exiſtence is broken, and that one thing is totally annihilated, and another actually created? Ariſtotle thinks not; and that in this change, as well as in every other, there is ſomething that departs, ſomething that accedes, and ſomething

Lation.

Change as to quantity.

Alteration.

Generation and corruption.

[i] The obſcurity of this paſſage will be removed, by conſidering what he afterwards proves, that our notion of infinity is entirely negative; and that to ſuppoſe body actually divided to infinity, implies a contradiction, κατα ενεργειαν μεν ουδεν εστι απειρον, δυναμει δε εστι την διαιρεσιν. Ibid. p. 499.

[k] De Generation. & Corrupt. l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 498. &. ſeq. & Phyſic. Auſcult. l. iii. c. i. p. 340.

[l] Idem ibid.

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The first matter.

ſomething that ſtill remains; a ſomething, indeed, that eſcapes ſenſe, and even eludes fancy, but of which we get a glimpſe [m] from reaſon, as of a ſhadowy and obſcure exiſtence, ſuſceptible of all qualities, but unendowed with any. What iron is to the ſaw, or marble to the ſtatue, preciſely the ſame is this *firſt matter* to all the natural productions which diverſify and adorn the earth. It poſſeſſes not in itſelf any characteriſtic or eſſentiating quality; never exiſting therefore apart; but before it quits one form, conſtantly aſſuming another [n]. As the ſecondary elements, and all the compounds formed of them, are moulded into works of art by the hand of man, that inſtrument of inſtruments, to which human nature owes ſo much of its accommodation and comfort, ſo this primary element is moulded by the hand of God into what are called the works of nature; none of which exiſt in a rude chaotic ſtate, but of which each is diſtinguiſhed by its peculiar characteriſtic; and all admirably adapted

[m] ἐξ ἁπαντων των γιγνομενων τουτο ἐστι λαβειν, αν τις ἐπιβλεψῃ, αἰσθησει λεγομεν, ὁτι δει αιει το ὑποκεισθαι το γιγνομενον. Natural. Auſcult. l. i. c. viii. p. 324.

[n] ἡμεις δε φαμεν ὑλην τινα των σωματων των αἰσθητων, αλλα ταυτην ου χωριστην, αλλα αιει μετ' ἐναντιωσεως, ἐξ ὡν γινεται τα καλουμενα στοιχεια . . . ου γαρ το θερμον ὑλη του ψυχρου· ου τουτο πυ θερμου· αλλα το ὑποκειμενον ἀμφοιν. ἐστι δε τριττον μεν· το δυναμει σωμα αἰσθητον ἀρχη δευτερον δε, αι ἐναντιωσεις· λεγω δε οιον θερμοτης και ψυχροτης· τριτον δε ἡδη πυρ και ὑδωρ· ταυτα μεν γαρ μεταβαλλει εις ἀλληλα· αἱ δε ἐναντιωσεις ου μεταβαλλουσι. De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. i. p. 515. "We ſay that perceptible bodies have for their principle a certain ſtuff or matter, which exiſts not ſeparately, but is always endowed with ſome one of the contraries, hot or cold, moiſt or dry; and from theſe two, matter and one of the contraries, the elements are compoſed. For heat ſupplies not the materials for cold, nor cold for heat; but there is a certain ſubject ſuſceptible of either of theſe contraries. So that this ſubject-matter is the firſt conſtituent principle, or element of perceptible bodies; the ſecond, the contraries of which this matter is ſuſceptible; the third, the compound elements of fire, water, &c.; which, as we have ſaid, change into each other; but the contraries do not ſo change." See alſo De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. 6.

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adapted to anſwer their reſpective ends. This peculiar characteriſtic, by which objects are diſtinguiſhed, Ariſtotle calls their appearance or form, becauſe the ſight, of all our ſenſes, is that which gives us moſt information concerning the differences of things.

What is meant by the works of nature.

Works of art are eaſily diſtinguiſhed by their outward ſhape; but the primary form of phyſical productions lies within; for all their ſenſible differences reſult from that internal principle determining their motion to or from a certain ſtate, and of reſt during a certain time in that ſtate; which principle is called their nature. Of this nature we ſee, for example, the effects in plants, when they fix their roots in the earth, rear their ſtems, expand their leaves, and ſcatter their ſeeds; which operations, were theſe organiſed bodies endowed with intelligence, could not be more ſkilfully performed for the preſervation of the individual, and the propagation of the kind [o]. Plants, therefore, act,

[o] Natur. Auſcult. l. ii. c. viii. p. 336. &. ſeq ατοπον δι το μη οισθαι ἑνεκα του γινεσθαι εαν μη ἁθρει το κινουν βεβουλευσαμενον· και τοι και ἡ τεχνη ου βουλευεται· και γαρ ει ην εν τῳ ξυλῳ ἡ ναυπηγικη, ὁμοιως αν τῃ φυσει εποιει· ὡστε ει εν τῃ τεχνῃ ενεστι ἡ ενεκα του, και εν τῃ φυσει ενεστι. μαλιστα δι δηλον, ὁταν τις ιατρευῃ αυτος ἑαυτον· τουτῳ γαρ ὁμοιον ἡ φυσις. Ibid. p. 338. "It is abſurd to think, that becauſe we do not ſee the moving principle actually deliberating, that it therefore acts at random, and not with an end in view. Art, then, we muſt ſay, acts at random; for if the art of ſhip-building was in wood, it would not act more judiciouſly *for making a ſhip*, than nature *does for nouriſhing, preſerving, and propagating a tree*. If there is deſign in art, there muſt alſo be deſign in nature. This is moſt plain when a man, being a phyſician, cures himſelf. Nature acts like this man. But nature, as well as art, ſometimes acts beſide or beyond her intention; and ſometimes fails in the execution of her own purpoſes. De Republica. l. i. c. vi. p. 302. By the compound word αυτοματον, (ὁταν αυτο ματην γινηται,) Ariſtotle expreſſes nature effecting either more or leſs than the ſpecific ends or purpoſes to which her reſpective operations invariably tend. Natural. Auſcult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335. This, he obſerves, happens through the concurrence or acceſſion of cauſes or circumſtances, (indefinite in number, ſince things innumerable may accede to

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act, not indeed with, but by intelligence, in conſequence of that nature or form which they have received from the firſt cauſe of motion and order[p]. The conſtituent principles of things, therefore, are matter and form; and in all the changes which they undergo, there is a form which departs, a form which accedes, and a ſubſtance which remains, namely the firſt matter. Unleſs this doctrine is admitted, the continuity of exiſtence would, in this lower world, be perpetually interrupted; each deſtruction would be an annihilation, and each production an evocation of non-entity into exiſtence. The firſt matter being totally inactive, all change muſt proceed from matter endowed with form. But things exactly ſimilar cannot produce any change on each other, becauſe having all properties in common,

to the ſame thing, and cauſes innumerable may concur with the ſame cauſe; Natural. Auſcult. l. ii. c. iii. p. 331.) vitiating Nature's operations and deforming her works. Nature operating κατα συμβεβηκος, and thereby producing effects not in her intention, is called αυτοματον, or chance; and art operating κατα συμβεβηκος, and producing effects not in her intention, is called τυχη, or fortune. Chance, or fortune, therefore, cannot have any exiſtence independently of intention or deſign. Ariſtotle, therefore, concludes ſublimely, that "if the heavens themſelves were the work of chance, this would only prove that intelligence had been the cauſe of many ſtill nobler works, and was the cauſe of the univerſe itſelf." Natural. Auſcult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335. Chance and fortune, therefore, are merely abridged expreſſions to denote nature and art producing unintentional and therefore unuſual effects. Comp. Natural. Auſcult. l. ii. c. iv. v. vi.; Metaph. l. v. c. xxx. and l. vi. c. ii. Ethic. Nichom. l. vi. c. iv. Magn. Moral. l. ii. c. vii. How unjuſtly is our Author treated by modern writers, (vid. Brucker. Hiſtor. Philoſoph. in Ariſtotel. paſſim, & Voyage du Jeune Anacharſis, vol. v. c. lxiv. p. 349.) when they arraign his impiety, on account of his doctrine of chance and fortune! Our inimitable Poet far better expreſſes the ſenſe of his philoſophy:

Shall burning Ætna, if a ſage requires,
Forget to thunder, and recall her fires.

Ethic. Epiſt. iv. ver. 123, & ſeq.

[p] τον χρονον αει προλαμβανει ενεργεια ετερα προ ετερας εως της του αει κινουντος πρωτου. "There is a continual progreſſion of efficient moving principles up to the firſt mover." Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 939.

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common, the one cannot communicate any thing to the other, nor act on that other any more than on itſelf[q]. Neither do things diſparate, that is, totally diſſimilar, admit of any reciprocal action. Whiteneſs has no action on ſtraightneſs, any more than hardneſs has on bitterneſs; becauſe neither of thoſe qualities tends to exclude the qualities to which they are reſpectively oppoſed; and both the whiteneſs and ſtraightneſs, as well as the hardneſs and bitterneſs, may ſubſiſt harmoniouſly in the ſame ſubject. By the acceſſion of whiteneſs, therefore, the ſubject is not altered as to its ſtraightneſs, nor by the acceſſion of any one quality is it altered as to any other quality totally diſſimilar to the former. To effect this alteration or change, the qualities or forms muſt be incapable of remaining in the ſame ſubject, which no ſooner admits the one, than it rejects the other. But this is the nature of what are called contraries, heat and cold, moiſt and dry, black and white, ſtraightneſs and crookedneſs, order and confuſion; and of all thoſe things which belong to one common genus, but are of a different ſpecies, that is, as formerly explained, which are ſimilar in one reſpect[r], and diſſimilar in another. By the reciprocal actions and ſufferings of thoſe contraries, in their utmoſt extremes and their intermediate ſtates, all the changes are effected which we behold in the world around us. One flavour deſtroys

How her operations are performed.

Contraries.

[q] ὑπο αλληλων γαρ πασθειν ταναντια αδυνατον. Natural. Auſcult. p. 325. De General. & Corrupt. l. i. c. vii. p. 506. The ſubject in which the contraries inhere is properly acted upon, and changed from the one contrary to the other; from cold to hot, white to black. When Ariſtotle ſpeaks of the actions and paſſions of forms, qualities, or contraries, he always ſuppoſes them clothed with matter. Ibid.

[r] The materials of white, black; order, confuſion, &c. are the ſame. εστι δη των αυτων τα μεν ποιητικα, τα δε ὑπο τυτων παθητικα. τα μεν αν αντιτραφει, ὁσων η αυτη ὑλη εστι, και ποιητικη αλληλων, και παθητικη ὑπο αλληλων. De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. x. p. 507.

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deſtroys a flavour that is contrary to it, one colour its contrary, and complexly one body acts on a body endowed with many contrary qualities. Ariſtotle claims not for his own diſcovery, that contraries are the elements of generation and corruption, and of all the leſſer changes obſervable in material objects. That doctrine, he obſerves, was firſt eſtabliſhed by the ſchool of Pythagoras [s], which arranged contraries into two claſſes; the better, and the worſe: as light, darkneſs; good, evil; finite, infinite: and thenceforth adopted by all philoſophers, compelled thereto by the force of truth [t]. One of theſe contraries, it was obſerved, departs as ſoon as the other accedes; three things, therefore, are concerned in every mutation or change, the matter which ſtill remains one and the ſame; the contrary which accedes, called in general form; and the contrary which departs, which Ariſtotle calls in general privation [u]. This term, like many others employed by our author, is merely a ſign to mark a thing indefinite and unknown; for the contrary which accedes, or, in other words, the characteriſing quality, is ſomething certain and definite; but the form which departed in order to make room for this characteriſing quality, and without the departure of which the change could not have been effected, is, in a great meaſure, uncertain and indefinite: thus there is but one form of health, and innumerable forms of ſickneſs; one form of order, innumerable forms of confuſion; or in things more ſimple, each body has its definite colour or colours; but it may have been changed to any of theſe colours, for inſtance,

Form, and privation.

[s] οἱ δὲ Πυθαγορειοι, και ὁσοι και τινες αἱ ἐναντιωσεις, ἀπεφηναντο, &c. Metaphyſ. l. i. c. v. p. 846.

[t] Natural. Auſcult. l. i. c. v.

[u] Ibid. l. i. c. viii. p. 325. των ἐναντιων ἡ στερα συστοιχια στερησις. Ariſtot. Metaph. paſſim.

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instance, to black, either from its contrary white, or from any of the intermediate shades between those opposite extremes *.

In the changes which material substances undergo, they reciprocally act on each other; in other words, both substances are agents, and both patients. This is illustrated by what happens in mixture; which, according to Aristotle, consists in this, that two substances, acting on each other, produce a third substance specifically different from either; and of which each, the minutest part, is specifically different from each, the minutest part, of either of the composing ingredients. Leucippus and Democritus, the fathers of the mechanical philosophy, endeavoured to explain mixture as well as all other natural appearances by atoms and a vacuum, commensurate pores, the motions, figures, and positions of the minute particles of matter. But Aristotle justly observes, that if mixture depended merely on mechanical causes, there would be no such thing to the keen sight of Lynceus, which could always distinguish these composing ingredients, how minutely soever they were subdivided, from each other; and easily perceive that what, to our obtuse senses, appeared to be the production of a new substance, was nothing more

* Natural. Auscult. l. i. c. vi. p. 331. Aristotle maintained a definite number of colours against the atomic philosophers, who made them depend on the indefinite variety of the figures and dispositions of minute corpuscles, τα ειδη των χρωματων εστι ωρισμενα και ουκ απειρα. De Sensu & Sensiti, c. iii. p. 667. He considered colours also as bearing the same relation to light, which sharpness and flatness do to sound: ωσπερ γαρ ανευ φωτος ουχ οραται τα χρωματα; ουτω δη και ανευ ψοφου το οξυ και το βαρυ. De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 641. How strangely were his doctrines perverted by the scholastics! And how nearly did they in themselves approach to inductions from experiments with which he was not acquainted!

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more than the minute ſubdiviſion and new arrangement of two old ones [x].

Tranſition to his theology.

Subſtances endowed with different characteriſing qualities, in other words, different forms which have the ſame matter, are fitted for reciprocally acting on each other. But there is a higher order of forms, which act, without ſuffering; and of which, the higheſt of all muſt *neceſſarily* be impaſſive. A patient is ſaid, with equal propriety, to be cured, either by the phyſician's ſkill, or by the medicines preſcribed. The medicines, while they act, are alſo acted upon; are warmed, cooled, or undergo ſome ſuch alteration. But the phyſician's ſkill ſuffers nothing from the effect produced on the patient; and by this compariſon, Ariſtotle ſays we may conceive why, of ſubſtances not immerged in the ſame matter, the one may produce a change on the other, without being reciprocally affected by it.

The form, ſpecies, or ſight.

To know phyſical objects is to know their cauſes; the efficient and final, which are principles external to thoſe objects; and the material and formal, which, exiſting in the objects themſelves, are the elements into which they muſt intellectually be reſolved. The formal cauſe is that by which each object is characteriſed and diſtinguiſhed; and from which, as from a perennial and abundant ſpring, its ſenſible qualities, as well as latent powers, perpetually flow. Ariſtotle did not think that, in the preſent ſtate of our exiſtence, we could remount to this fruitful ſource, and behold things as they are [y]; but in all his inquiries it is conſtantly his endeavour to approximate as nearly as poſſible to

[x] De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. x. p. 507. Ariſtotle illuſtrates his doctrine by obſervations on the mixture of metals, one of which is noticed by my ingenious friend Dr. Pearſon. See Philoſoph. Tranſ. for the year 1796, p. 432.

[y] Metaph. l. ii. c. i. p. 856.

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to this *ſpecies*, *form*, or *ſight*, which words he often employs merely as ſigns for things ſought; and to diſcover in each object that eſſentiating characteriſtic, whether ſubſtance or property, on which its perceptible qualities depend[a]. Familiar with the correct geometry of his times, he diſcerned the concatenation of truths, which being linked indiſſolubly together, unite the moſt diſtant and ſeemingly unconnected extremes. Of each object he inveſtigates the true definition; and of each ſcience, the *principal* theorem; becauſe the foundation and bond of union of its parts; juſtly thinking, that the variety of our apparent knowledge is often the proof of our real ignorance; and that true ſcience improves in proportion as many particular propoſitions reſolve themſelves into one general truth. Under the influence of this generaliſing ſpirit, the true ſpirit of philoſophy, he is carried ſometimes beyond the bounds preſcribed to the human intellect; but his errors are always thoſe of a man of genius; and what adventurer in ſcience ever ſucceſsfully contended in the field of truth, without ſometimes being tempted to launch on the ocean of conjecture?

Of the laws regulating this lower world.

Nothing in nature, he obſerves, exiſts in a totally crude and abſolutely unorganiſed ſtate; but it is the inward organization, or inviſible form, which moulds the external ſhape of bodies; and impoſes on the motion, producing their various figures and appearances,

[a] Metaphyſ. l. vii. c. ii, xi, xiii. It is worthy of remark, that Ariſtotle *did* preciſely that which he is blamed by Bacon, Hobbes, Malbranche, &c. for not doing; and declared it impoſſible to do that which he is blamed for having attempted. By examining, comparing, and claſſing the perceptible qualities of things, he endeavoured to make them known by a definition, affirming this examination to be the only method by which they could be known and defined. ιδειν γαρ ειχομεν αποδιδοναι κατα την φαντασιαν περι των συνδεδημενων, η των παντων, η των πλειστων, τοτε περι της ουσιας εξομεν τι λεγειν ὁτι μαλιστα. Ibid.

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appearances, the laws and limits of its action. In exerting this inherent power of forms, fire ſeems to be their principal miniſter[a]; for fire, the moſt ſubtile of material principles, and of which light ſeems to be a modification[b], always diffuſes itſelf through bodies, and ſeeks their extremities, by which their outward conformation is delineated and defined. There are forms of a peculiar nature, as we ſhall prove hereafter, that ſeem to be totally ſeparable from matter, becauſe they are capable of energies and pleaſures totally unrelated to any of its properties; but the forms of moſt phyſical objects are inſeparably combined with the material principle, becauſe independently of it, they would not anſwer any poſſible end. Of what uſe would be the nutritive power of plants, were there not ſome material ſubſtance to be nouriſhed? To what purpoſe would ſerve the fierce inſtincts of the lion, ſeparated from his fangs, his paws, and his brawny members? It is highly unreaſonable, therefore, to believe the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine concerning the ſeparate exiſtence of thoſe ſubſtantial forms[c]; and not leſs unreaſonable to admit the opinion ſo ſtrongly inculcated by ſome poets and philoſophers, that ſuch forms migrate from one body to another[d].

In

[a] De Part. Animal. l. ii. c. vii. p. 986.

[b] πυρος η τοιουτου τινος παρουσια εν τω διαφανει. De Anima, l. ii. c. vii. p. 638.

[c] Natural. Auſcult. l. ii. c. ii. p. 329.

[d] De Anima, l. i. c. iii. p. 624. It is pleaſant to find Hobbes, in the 4th chapter of his Leviathan, and in many other parts of his works, combating, under the name of Ariſtotle's philoſophy, abſtract eſſences, ſubſtantial forms, and innumerable other doctrines, metaphyſical as well as moral and political, with nearly the ſame arguments by which Ariſtotle, their ſuppoſed author, had long before victoriouſly refuted them. Malbranche and the French philoſophers in general treat the Stagyrite with not leſs unfairneſs, and ſpeak of his opinions with not leſs ignorance. I ſcarcely except Rapin,

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The ſtate of capacity and energy between which all objects in it fluctuate.

In the language of Ariſtotle, the word "nature" is confined to that part of the univerſe ſituate within the lunar ſphere; which, according to a philoſophy preceding his own times, was regarded as the intermediate iſthmus ſeparating terreſtrial and periſhing, from celeſtial and immortal, things[e]. In its primitive and proper ſenſe, nature peculiarly applies to this lower world, which is the region of perpetual change, and in which all things are continually fluctuating between the extremes of generation and corruption; whereas the heavenly bodies, whether originally created, or the eternal production of an eternal cauſe[f], appear, as far as our experience reaches, to perform their unwearied motions exempted from the viciſſitudes of renovation or decay. Every thing therefore in nature, that is, in this lower world, may be conceived as exiſting in two different ſtates; ſo called, though variable, becauſe relatively more ſtable than the other changes to which they are liable. The firſt ſtate of their exiſtence, both abſolutely[g], and in the order of human conception,

Rapin, whoſe account of Ariſtotle, hitherto regarded as the beſt, is diſgraced by great inaccuracies. It is not eaſy to conceive how a writer, who had not acquired his notion of Ariſtotle's writings at ſecond hand, ſhould ſo totally miſtake their aim as Rapin does in ſpeaking of the Ethics to Eudemus. See Comparaiſon de Platon & Ariſtotle, p. 345. Edit. Amſterdam. 1686.

[e] Gale's Opuſcula Mythol. p. 516.

[f] ὥστε το τη γενισει ὑστερον, τη φυσει προτερον ειναι. Natural. Auſcult. l. viii. c. x. p. 422. : and we ſhall ſee hereafter that things exiſting in capacity muſt proceed univerſally from things exiſting in energy.

[g] No tenet of the Peripatetic philoſophy is thought more clearly aſcertained than the eternity of the world; and this tenet, I believe, is univerſally aſcribed to Ariſtotle by all writers whatever, both ancient and modern. The brevity and energy of our author's ſtyle, often gives to him indeed the appearance of dogmatiſing where he is only inveſtigating; but, in the following paſſage, he ſpeaks concerning the eternity of the

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ception, is that of their maturity and perfection; in the ſtate of a tree, a horſe, and a man. But with reſpect to the individuals of thoſe, as well as all other claſſes, though they always univerſally proceed from other individuals in a ſtate of maturity, it will be found that they all undergo innumerable changes, before they attain, by ſlow and inſenſible degrees, the perfection of their nature. As the rude marble is gradually formed by art into a beautiful or majeſtic ſtatue, ſo ſeeds and embryos, ſcarcely perceptible to the ſenſes, expand, by aſſimilating their proper nouriſhment, into the wonderfully organiſed productions called plants and animals. Such progreſſive and ever varying natures may be conſidered therefore as exiſting either in a ſtate of capacity for attaining a certain form and maturity, a thing as different from abſolute incapacity as ſleep is from death; or in a ſtate of actuality and perfection, which qualifies them for performing their reſpective functions, and exerting their peculiar energies. What then is change or motion in its moſt comprehenſive and philoſophical ſenſe? It is the paſſage from a ſtate of imperfection to perfection, from capacity

the world with the ſame becoming modeſty that he ſhows on other ſubjects unfathomable to mere reaſon. Having mentioned that principle in the works of nature, analogous to art in the productions of man, which makes the ſtems of plants ſhoot upwards, while their roots fix deeply in the earth; which gives to animals their determinate organiſation and proper ſhape, diſtinguiſhable in their reſpective members, adapted to ſpecific and ſalutary purpoſes, he proceeds thus: μαλλον εικος τον ουρανον γεγενησθαι υπο τοιαυτης αιτιας, ει γεγονεν, και ειναι δια τοιαυτην αιτιαν μαλλον η τα ζωα τα θνητα· το γε εν τεταγμενον και ωρισμενον πολυ μαλλον φαινεται εν τοις ουρανιοις, η περι ἡμας. De Part. Animal. l. i. p. 970. "It is more likely that the heavens were produced by ſuch a cauſe, if indeed they were produced, and that they ſubſiſt through the efficacy of ſuch a cauſe, than periſhing animals, ſince definite arrangement and regular harmony are conſpicuous far more in celeſtial than in terreſtrial things." Beſides this, when Ariſtotle's doctrine of time is underſtood, we ſhall ſee that he means by the eternity of the world ſomething very different from the ſenſe commonly affixed to thoſe words.

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Motion defined.

pacity to energy; or, the reverſe of this, from energy to mere capacity. For this reaſon Ariſtotle, anticipating the ſubtile principles which gave birth to the ſublime geometry of Newton and Leibnitz, expreſſes an object in itſelf too fugitive for words to repreſent, by the limits or extremes between which it fluctuates; calling motion the perfection of mere capacity, becauſe the immediate end at which mere capacity aims; and an imperfect energy or actuality, becauſe until the productive motion ſtops, the object is only approximating to its moſt perceptible and moſt perfect ſtate [h].

Space and time.

Ariſtotle obſerves, that the four kinds of change or motion, formerly deſcribed, all finally reſolve themſelves into lation, or change of place [i]; and that place is only a modification of ſpace, that

[h] Ariſtot. Natural. Auſcult. l. iii. c. i, ii, iii. p. 339. & ſeqq. Had Mr. Locke known what Ariſtotle meant by motion, his candour would not have allowed him to ſpeak of this definition as he does in the following paſſage: "What more exquiſite jargon could the wit of man invent than this definition, 'the act of a being in power, as far forth as in power?' which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous abſurdity, to gueſs what word it could ever be ſuppoſed to be the explication of. If Tully, aſking a Dutchman what *beweeginge* was, ſhould have received this anſwer in his own language, that it was "actus cutis in potentia, quatenus in potentia," I aſk whether any one can imagine he would thereby have underſtood what the word *beweeginge* ſignified, or have gueſſed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would ſignify to another, when he uſed that ſound?" Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, vol. ii. b. iii. c. 4. p. 26. But Ariſtotle, who had taught before Mr. Locke that, what the latter calls ſimple ideas, could not be defined, ("φαμεν τουνυν, ὁτι ουκ των ἁπλων ουκ ἐστι της ζητησεως, οὐδε διδαξις, ἀλλα τις ἑτερος τροπος της ζητησεως των τοιουτων." Metaphyſ. l. vii. c. xvii. p. 925. Vid. etiam, pp. 910 & 929.) would have more eaſily explained to Mr. L. his own definition of motion, than Mr. L. could have explained to Ariſtotle what he meant by the idea of a triangle, which is neither rectangular, obtuſangular, nor acute-angular, but at once none and all of theſe together—the ſuppoſed exiſtence of which ideas, and an infinity of others of the ſame kind, is the principal baſis of the whole Eſſay on Human Underſtanding.

[i] Natural. Auſcult. l. viii. c. x. p. 421. Metaph. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1003.

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that unſubſtantial being of which no other definition can be given but that it is the recipient of body[k]. As our conception of ſpace originates in that of body, and our conception of motion in that of ſpace, ſo our conception of time originates in that of motion; and particularly in thoſe regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect ſimilarity to each other, are correct meaſures of the continuous and ſucceſſive quantity called Time, with which they are conceived to co-exiſt. Time therefore may be defined the perceived number of ſucceſſive movements; for as number aſcertains the greater or leſſer quantity of things numbered, ſo time aſcertains the greater or leſſer quantity of motion performed[l]. An inſtant is not a part, but the boundary of time[m]; whoſe elements are the perceptible intervals bounded by inſtants[n]. If body, therefore, had a beginning, ſo muſt ſpace, motion, and time, which are conceived merely as affections of body, or of each other[o]. If body cannot be ſuppoſed infinitely extended, without ſuppoſing a contradiction, (for what quantity can actually exiſt of which the magnitude cannot be aſcertained and expreſſed?) ſo neither can any of its properties; and therefore motion cannot be infinite; nor time, which is conceived ſolely as the meaſure of motion, a mere fiction of the fancy, poſſeſſing no real exiſtence independently of us and our thoughts. The very eſſence of infinity, again, conſiſts in privation; it is a word denoting not a conception, but the negation of all conception; ſo that the errors committed on this ſubject by the ancients, and repeated by ſome modern philoſophers, and

[k] Natural. Auſcult. l. iv. c. i, ii. &c. p. 351—364.
[l] Ibid. p. 367.
[m] Phyſ. Auſc. p. 397.
[n] Ibid. l. iv. c. xiv. &c. p. 364—373.
[o] Metaph. l. v. c. xiii. p. 894.

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and even ſome modern mathematicians [p], proceed from their realiſing a non-entity, and aſſigning a poſitive archetype, or what they call an idea, to a word, which is merely a ſign that no ſuch archetype or idea exiſts. Body and ſpace cannot be conceived as infinite either in greatneſs or littleneſs; and although its adjunct of motion or time is imagined to be ſo conceived, this ariſes from a mere illuſion of the fancy, which, not retaining the parts of time firſt taken, continually adds new parts, but without increaſing the whole; ſince the former parts are continually annihilated, as the latter are created [q]. To realiſe infinity muſt, in all our reaſonings, neceſſarily lead to abſurdity; thus, to give our Author's example, to ſuppoſe an infinite progreſſion of cauſes in making and arranging the world, is the ſame thing as ſuppoſing it made or arranged without any cauſe at all [r].

It

[p] "La grandeur (ſays the admired Fontenelle) eſt ſuſceptible d'augmentation ſans fin. Elle n'eſt donc pas & ne peut être ſuppoſée dans le même cas, que ſi elle n'étoit pas ſuſceptible d'augmentation ſans fin: or ſi elle n'étoit pas ſuſceptible d'augmentation ſans fin, elle reſteroit toujours finie; donc étant ſuſceptible d'augmentation ſans fin, elle peut être ſuppoſée infinie." See the ſame reaſoning throughout his treatiſe, intitled, Elémens de la Geometrie de l'Infini. It is eaſy to perceive how much this ingenious man, and his innumerable followers, might have been benefited by reading the third book of Ariſtotle's Phyſics, c. iv. to chapter xiii. both incluſive, p. 342—350. ου αφαιρειται δε ὁ λογος ὑδε τους μαθηματικους την θεωριαν, αναιρων ὑτως ειναι το απειρον, ὡς ενεργειᾳ ειναι επι την αυξησιν ὡς αδιεξιτητον· ὑδε γαρ νυν δεονται τυ απειρυ, ὑδε χρωνται, αλλα μονον ειναι ὁσην αν ϑελωσι πεπερασμενην· τῳ δε μεγιϑει μεγιϑει τον αυτον ἐστι τετμησθαι λογον ὁποτλικουν μεγεϑος ετερον, ὡστε προς μεν το δειξαι εκεινως ὑϑεν διοισει· το δε ειναι, εν τοις ὡσι εσαι μεγεϑεσι. Ibid. c. xii. p. 350. "We do not deſtroy the ſpeculations of mathematicians, when we aſſert that infinite magnitude cannot exiſt. For in theſe ſpeculations, they neither employ nor need to employ infinite, but only a finite magnitude as great as they pleaſe; and the ſmalleſt may be divided in the ſame proportions with the greateſt. For finding proportions, therefore, it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe the exiſtence of what is impoſſible."

[q] Metaph. l. v. c. xiii. p. 350.

[r] Ibid. l. ii. c. ii. p. 857.

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Ariſtotle's aſtronomy.

It is both the glory and the ſhame of Ariſtotle's abſtract philoſophy, that his general concluſions are correct, when ſome of the arguments, by which he maintains them, are faulty. This is peculiarly manifeſt in the uſe which he makes of the erroneous ſyſtem of aſtronomy, which prevailed in his own age, to vindicate the doctrines contained in his books of Phyſics. His treatiſe concerning the Heavens, indeed, deſcribes with perſpicuity and preciſion the celeſtial phænomena; while, at the ſame time, it informs us of the ſublime notions given by the firſt Pythagoreans and their contemporaries, of the diſtances, figures, motions, and magnitudes of the planets [s]; that the moon abounded with inhabitants; that the milky-way conſiſted of contiguous cluſters of ſtars [t]; and, conjecturing what it is the boaſt of modern aſtronomy to have confirmed, that the ſame principle which makes the heavenly bodies approach to their centre, perpetually impels them in their orbits, by proportionably increaſing their celerity [u]. Ariſtotle's own ſagacity led him to perceive that, in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, all was regular, eaſy, and harmonious; and to reject with diſdain thoſe childiſh fictions, by which the moving principles of the univerſe were degraded by a ſuppoſed analogy with the laborious exertions of mortals in ſublunary and periſhing ſcenes [w]. But he did not think the aſtronomical theory of the Pythagoreans ſufficiently juſtified by obſervation: teleſcopes were not to be invented till a far later period; and to thoſe who held Ariſtotle's doctrine concerning ſpace and time, the argument in favour of the earth's motion, reſulting from the otherwiſe inconceivable velocity of the heavens,

[s] De Cœlo, l. ii. c. xiii. p. 465.

[t] Meteor. l. i. c. viii.

[u] De Cœlo, l. ii. c. i. p. 452. Comp. c. xiii. p. 465. & l. i. c. viii. pp. 443, 444. & l. ii. c. ix. p. 462.

[w] Ibid. p. 451. & c. vi. p. 458.

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heavens, is not calculated to afford conviction. The earth, therefore, as the heavieſt of bodies, he places at the centre; around which, the ſun, moon, planets, and fixed ſtars perpetually performed their reſpective revolutions[x]; the only kind of motion or change to which theſe etherial[y] ſubſtances, unchangeable in their eſſence, were ſuppoſed to be liable; whereas the earth and all its productions, the metals and minerals in its bowels, the plants and animals on its ſurface, together with the vapours and meteors between that ſurface and the lunar ſphere, were obnoxious to a great variety of complicated motions, which changed their characteriſing qualities or eſſence, and rendered the diſſolution of one object the production of another. On the hypotheſis, therefore, of the ſtability of the earth and the daily revolution of the heavens, Ariſtotle argues, that the material univerſe cannot be infinite; becauſe, could a radius be infinitely extended from the earth's centre to the remoteſt body in the univerſe, that body could never perform a complete circular revolution[z]; ſince an infinite extent of ſpace could not be paſſed over in a definite time. Space therefore cannot be infinite, becauſe ſpace is only the receptacle of body, the place where body may ſubſiſt; and, if ſpace is not infinite, neither is motion, which depends on ſpace; nor time, which depends on motion. Unalterable and divine ſubſtances exiſt, therefore, in a manner totally unfathomable to our preſent faculties. In this manner, the firſt Supreme Deity exiſts *neceſſarily*[a]; neither generated in ſpace,

[x] De Cœlo, l. ii. paſſim.

[y] Meteor. l. i. c. iii. p. 530.

[z] De Cœlo, l. i. c. v. p. 437.

[a] καθαπερ εν τοις εγκυκλιοις φιλοσοφημασι περι τα θεια πολλακις προφαινεται τοις λογοις, ὁτι το θειον αμεταβλητον αναγκαιον εἰναι το πρωτον και ακροτατον, p. 446.

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ſpace, nor growing old in time, unchangeable and impaſſive, enjoying the beſt and moſt perfect life through all eternity [b].

Ariſtotle makes amends for his airy ſpeculations in aſtronomy, by well explaining, in oppoſition to Democritus, the true principles of corpuſcular attraction, which gives to the earth its globular form [c]. This, he obſerves, is further aſcertained by the phænomenon of lunar eclipſes, in which the bounding line is always perceived to be circular. The earth therefore, he ſays, is plainly a ſphere, and but a ſmall [d] one, compared with many others, its periphery not exceeding 37,000 miles [e]. He ſpeaks with ſuch raptures, as the calmeſt of philoſophers could feel, of the beauty and grandeur of the heavenly motions, whoſe celerities, how frightful ſoever to fancy, yet being harmoniſed by proportion, might be ſteadily contemplated by the intellect [f]. Had he known the diſcoveries of Galileo and Kepler, he might perhaps have been a Newton. But aſtronomy being one of thoſe ſciences which requires long-continued obſervation for its baſis, was left by Ariſtotle in the ſame imperfect ſtate in which he found it; and yet, by the perverſeneſs of ſtupidity, it was that part of his works which, in the ages of darkneſs, was moſt warmly admired, and moſt obſtinately and moſt ſuperſtitiouſly defended.

His doctrine concerning the earth and its productions.

From the magnitudes and motions of the heavenly bodies, Ariſtotle deſcended to a humbler ſubject, the productions of the earth; which are connected, however, with man, by far more numerous [g] and powerful relations, namely, thoſe of his daily wants. This globe which we inhabit ſeems to have undergone various

[b] De Cœlo, c. ix. p. 446. [c] Ibid. l. iv. c. vi. p. 492. & l. ii. c. xiv. p. 470.
[d] Meteor. l. i. c. iii. p. 529. [e] Ibid. p. 471. [f] Ibid. p. 451 & 463.
[g] De Part. Animal. l. i. c. v. p. 974.

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various revolutions, to have been overwhelmed by inundations and ſhattered by convulſions, which ſwept away nations with their cities and their arts; ſo that the moſt valuable inventions have innumerable times been loſt, and times innumerable been recovered. Of the productions with which our earth abounds, many give indications of theſe direful viciſſitudes; and many appear to have emerged from the wreck of ſome dreadful cataſtrophe. Both as the hiſtorian and the interpreter of nature, our Author endeavoured to embrace and exhauſt the complete ſcience of the globe; and if we may judge of thoſe parts of his works which are loſt or imperfect, by thoſe which have come down to us entire, it muſt have been no eaſy matter to determine whether moſt admiration was due to his deſcriptions of the great maſſes of nature, ſeas, rivers, mountains, and meteors [h], or to his minute diligence in treating the ſeveral objects of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. His books on plants and minerals no longer remain [i]; but both his hiſtory of animals, and his philoſophy reſpecting that hiſtory, have come down to us in a far more perfect ſtate than any other portion of his writings concerning natural knowledge.

His hiſtory of animals and other works relative to that ſubject.

On the ſubject of Zoology, his treatiſes are compriſed in fifty books, of which twenty-five are happily preſerved among his works. The hiſtory of animals occupies nine books; the following ſixteen are employed in explaining their general affections or properties, and their principal parts or members. Four books

[h] Meteor. l. i. c. i. p. 518. See the great views which he there gives of his undertakings.

[i] The two ſhort books on plants, p. 1007—1030. vol. ii. edit. du Val. are ſpurious. In the laſt chapter of the third book of his Meteorology, he ſays he is to proceed to give an account of all the different foſſils and metals; but that account nowhere appears.

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books treat of their parts; five treat of generation; the remainder, of their ſenſations and motions, inſpiration and reſpiration, ſleeping, waking, youth, old age, life, and death; in the knowledge of which particulars, the liberal ſtudy of Zoology, or, in Ariſtotle's language, its philoſophy, appears to him principally to conſiſt. As he extends that term to its full and proper ſenſe, denoting by it the knowledge of whatever has animal life, the firſt four books of his hiſtory, beginning with what is moſt ſtriking and palpable, the outward conformation of animals, divides and diſtinguiſhes, in relation to this complex object, and in compariſon with the human form, as that which is moſt familiarly known, the inhabitants of the earth, the water, and the air, from the enormous whale and maſſy elephant to the ſcarcely perceptible productions of duſt and rottenneſs[k], enumerating and defining with incomparable accuracy the agreements, differences, and analogies that prevail, in point of external organization, among all living tribes, and ſometimes referring to his treatiſes on Comparative Anatomy, which are now unfortunately loſt. In the three following books, he examines the different claſſes of animals with reſpect to the commencement, duration, and term of their generative powers. His eighth book examines their habitation and nouriſhment; and the concluding

[k] Buffon (vol. iii. p. 223.) carries Ariſtotle's ſyſtem of ſpontaneous generation much farther than the author intended, when he makes him ſay that "the firſt men ſprung from the earth in the form of worms." Our author is conſtantly miſrepreſented by being made to ſpeak abſolutely, when he ſpeaks merely hypothetically. His words are ωσπερ εγιγνοντο ποτε γενεσις. De General. l. iii. c. ii. And we ſhall find hereafter, that the reſult of all Ariſtotle's inquiries into nature is a concluſion directly oppoſite to the following of Mr. Buffon, namely, "qu'il y a peut être autant d'étres, ſoit vivans, ſoit végétaux, qu'il ſe reproduiſent par l'aſſemblage fortuit de molecules organiques, qu'il y a d'animaux ou de végétaux qui peuvent ſe reproduire par une ſucceſſion conſtante de générations." Supplement à l'Hiſt. Nat. tom. viii. p. 18.

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cluding book of the hiſtory contains their manners and habits, enumerates their friends and enemies, and explains the ordinary means by which each claſs provides for its preſervation and defence. In taking this wide ſurvey of animated nature, Ariſtotle pretends not to comprehend its indefinitely varied branches (ſince infinites of every kind ſpurn the limits of ſcience); but in the multitude of important and well-aſcertained facts which he relates, and which is incomparably greater than can be found in any work of equal compaſs, it is his main purpoſe to illuſtrate the general heads above mentioned, and to explain the properties or affections common to the greateſt or moſt diſtinguiſhed portion of the whole animal kingdom. To theſe general heads or common properties, he conſtantly has reſpect in the hiſtorical part of his work; ſo that his minuteſt obſervations reſpecting the minuteſt inſects and leaſt-organized animals, will be often found to elucidate or confirm ſome important law of the animal œconomy[1].

His philoſophy of natural hiſtory.

His Syſtem, that is, in the popular ſenſe of the word, his nomenclature, is indeed imperfect. The world created by a microſcope, had not any exiſtence for the philoſophers of antiquity; and, by the improvements of this invention, new worlds perhaps may be brought to light in endleſs ſucceſſion. But in the chain of being, mortal eyes, however aſſiſted, can contemplate only the middle links, of which, though our glaſſes have ſhewn to us a greater number than were ſeen by Ariſtotle,

[1] Take the following example: The σηπια is a ſpecies of the Mollia, (fiſhes ſo called becauſe their ſoft parts are without, and their hard within,) which was long degraded by modern naturaliſts to the rank of ſea plants. Ariſtotle remarks, with regard to this ſpecies, that when the female is attacked, the male boldly defends her; but when an attack is made on the male, the female conſults her own ſafety by flight. Females, except in defence of their young, are leſs courageous than males, and leſs forward to give aſſiſtance. Hiſtor. Animal. l. ix. c. i. p. 922. & ſeq.

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Ariſtotle, yet have they not brought us nearer to what ought to be the reſult of beholding the extremity of the chain. This reſult, the hiſtory of nature in animals, the Stagyrite, by the intellectual eye of reaſon and analogy[m], endeavoured to reach and reveal; analyſing, defining, demonſtrating; ſometimes penetrating deeply into nature's myſteries; ſometimes encountering difficulties which the human intellect is unable to ſurmount; often foiled in his exertions, yet always renewing the combat with reanimated hope. Knowledge, he thought, was more likely to be ſtruck out from the colliſion of error than to emerge ſpontaneouſly from confuſion[n]; and while his theories are attacked and defended, exploded and revived, the facts which he collected with unexampled diligence, and which he relates with inimitable preciſion, will for ever ſupport his fame, and inſtruct the moſt diſtant ages of poſterity. Our wider ſurvey of the globe has indeed increaſed our acquaintance with quadrupeds; and the invention of glaſſes has multiplied to our eyes the ever-diminiſhing tribes of inſects, and enabled us to examine more accurately their germs and organs; yet it will not be eaſy to prove that modern writers have added any thing of importance to Ariſtotle's obſervations on birds, or that any of their works diſplay even an equal degree of knowledge on the ſubject of fiſhes[o].

It

[m] The expreſſion of an anonymous writer preſerved in Suidas, is bold in the extreme: Αριστοτελης γραμματευς ην της φυσεως, τον καλαμον αποβριχων εις ων. "Ariſtotle was Nature's ſecretary, having dipped his pen in intellect." Suid. in Αριστοτελης.

[n] Metaph. paſſim.

[o] In proof of this, I ſhall cite the teſtimony of an author, which derives great weight from the accuracy of his own obſervations, and the importance of his own diſcoveries. "Queſti fatti finora rapportati in ordine allo ſuiluppo delle ouva nei peſci ſpinoſi, ſono

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By what means he was enabled to render this philoſophy ſo complete.

It may ſeem extraordinary that, on a branch of ſcience, which, like all other parts of natural hiſtory, is náturally progreſſive, our author ſhould have attained ſuch accurate and extenſive knowledge in ſo early an age of the world. But Ariſtotle was the friend of a man as extraordinary as himſelf, from whom he received two favours, which, to a mind like his, muſt

ſono quelli pochi che ho potuto oſſervare nelle rare occaſioni che mi ſi ſon preſentati delle loro covate gattate, & gia ſuiluppantiſi. E percio la ſerie di tali fatti e di multo interrotta, ne' continuata come a giorni noſtri e' quella dello ſviluppo del ſeto nelle uova della gallina. E quando io reflettendo ſu di queſta mancanza, ſcorro la Storia degli Animali di Ariſtotele, non poſſo non eſſere da ſtupore preſo, in eſſo leggendo veduti quei fatti, che a noi non ſi ſon potuti che a ſtento manifeſtare; & relevati poi con tutta la nettezza, & poſti in parallelo coi fatti gia' riconoſciuti nelſeto di gallo: & tanto maggiormente in me creſce lo ſtupore, quanto che allora uſo non vi era degli inſtrumenti microſcopici, che a tempi noſtri abbiamo grandemente perfezzionati. E quindi non poſſo che di ſdegno accendarmi contra dei moderni Izziologi, vedendo per lor balordaggine traſcurato quanto la veneranda antiquità avea ſcritto ſa queſto particulare, & a quello ſoſtituite falſe oſſervazioni, illuzioni aſſurde ed incoerenti." "Theſe are the few obſervations concerning the development of the eggs of ſhell-fiſh, which I have been able to make on the few occaſions on which I found the impregnated gems in the act of diſcloſure; obſervations of which the ſeries has been greatly interrupted, nor continued to the preſent times, like thoſe which relate to eggs of birds. When I conſider this defect, and turn to Ariſtotle's Hiſtory of Animals, I am ſeized with aſtoniſhment at finding, that he ſhould have fully and diſtinctly ſeen the facts which we have been able only very imperfectly to perceive; that he ſhould have deſcribed them with the utmoſt preciſion, and compared them with the well-known obſervations concerning the eggs of birds. My aſtoniſhment is the greater, when I reflect that he was unaſſiſted by microſcopes, which inſtruments have in our days been greatly perfected; and I cannot therefore repreſs my indignation againſt thoſe modern Ichthyologiſts, whoſe ſtupidity, neglecting the lights thrown on their ſubject by venerable antiquity, has ſubſtituted in their ſtead falſe obſervations, abſurd and incongruous inferences." Memorie Sulla Generazione dei Peſci, di Philippo Cavolini. Compare p. 55. and p. 92. with Ariſtotle's Hiſtory of Animals, b. vi. c. viii. and c. xiii. To the petulant queſtions in Athenæus, l. viii. p. 352. "From whom did Ariſtotle learn the minute particularities which he tells of fiſhes? From Proteus or Nercus?" No, (we may anſwer with Iſ. Caſaubon,) but from fiſhermen. Vid. Caſaubon Animadverſ. in Athenæum, l. viii. p. 388.

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muſt have been of ineſtimable value. Alexander enabled him to rebuild and adorn his native city, for the benefit of his contemporaries[p], and to improve ſcience for the benefit of poſterity[q]. Upon his firſt entering Babylon, that inimitable prince eagerly demanded, for the uſe of his preceptor, the aſtronomical tables preſerved in that ancient capital above nineteen centuries, and remounting 2234 years beyond the Chriſtian æra[r]; and Pliny labours to deſcribe with what ardour and zeal the ſame illuſtrious conqueror, during the courſe of his expedition, collected as preſents to be ſent to Ariſtotle, at the expence of 200,000l.[s], and by the activity of ſeveral thouſand men, whatever rarities were to be found in parks or ponds, in aviaries or hives, or were to be procured by hunting, fiſhing, and fowling, in the wide extent of Aſia. Such were the reſources of Ariſtotle for writing the hiſtory of animals, beſides the aſſiſtance of a great library, which Strabo ſays that, to the beſt of his knowledge, he was the firſt perſon that knew properly how to arrange[t]. By combining with the deſcriptions in his books the obſervation of thoſe living wonders tranſported from the Eaſt, Ariſtotle, who preferred a philoſophical reſidence in Athens to the honour of perſonal attendance on the maſter of the world, compoſed, in the tranquillity of the Lyceum, his immortal work, which a Pliny profeſſes to abridge[u], and a Buffon deſpairs to rival[w].

In the wide ſurvey which our author takes of the heavens and of the earth, as well as in the minute diligence with which he

[p] Plin. l. vii. c. 29.

[q] Idem, l. viii. c. 16.

[r] Porphyrius apud Simplicium in Ariſtot. de Cœlo.

[s] Comp. Plin. ubi ſupra, & Athenæum, p. 398. edit. Caſaub.

[t] πρωτος ων ισμεν συναγαγων βιβλια, και διδαξας τους εν αιγυπτω βασιλεας βιβλιοθηκης συνταξιν. Strabo, l. xiii. p. 609.

[u] Plin. ubi ſupra.

[w] Hiſtoire Naturelle, t. i. p. 63. & ſeq.

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he examines the productions of the latter, whether inanimate or living, it is his perpetual aim to remount from effects to cauſes, and to lead us from perceptible qualities to thoſe inviſible principles by which they are produced. Theſe principles, not being objects of ſenſe, can be diſcovered only by making fair inferences from obſervation and experience. In this manner Ariſtotle treats, in three books, a ſubject which naturally follows his hiſtory of animals, inveſtigating thoſe principles on which their nutrition, ſenſation, and appetite, with all their perceptible powers and actions, depend. In this treatiſe, intitled "Concerning the Soul," his language is perpetually and neceſſarily metaphorical, becauſe words, in their origin, being univerſally expreſſive merely of perceptions of ſenſe, metaphors become indiſpenſable in expreſſing the deductions of reaſon. Of material as well as intellectual ſubſtances our knowledge, he obſerves, reſults entirely from their perceptible qualities, that is, from what our univerſal experience teaches us to regard merely as the effects of hidden cauſes, ſcarcely conceivable to ourſelves, and of which our notions are totally incommunicable to other men but by images and compariſons drawn from ſenſible objects. When Ariſtotle ſpeaks philoſophically of fire, he calls it "the power of communicating heat." In the ſame manner, the hidden cauſes neceſſary for explaining the properties and actions of animals, he calls "the nutritive, ſentient, motive, and rational," that is, the collecting "power;" and as, from the phenomena of body, he inferred the exiſtence of a ſubſtance called Matter; ſo, from the phenomena of ſenſation, reaſon, and intelligence, he inferred the exiſtence of a ſubſtance called Mind; of which latter ſubſtance our knowledge is equally

The ſoul or mind in its moſt general ſenſe.

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certain with that of the former[x]. But as ſome of the moſt noted philoſophers before him had attempted to explain every thing by matter and its properties[y], Ariſtotle, on the other hand, thinks that it is by mind chiefly that all natural productions are characteriſed and diſtinguiſhed; meaning, by mind, that inward principle and inviſible form whoſe effects are diſplayed in the external organization of things, as well as in their perceptible properties and actions. In this ſenſe, therefore, the terms "form" and "mind" are applied to whatever characteriſes and diſtinguiſhes, whether that be merely a ſpecific and principal quality; or whether it be a ſubſtance inſeparable from matter, becauſe ſeparately unfit for any end or uſe[z]; or whether it be a ſubſtance capable of actions and pleaſures peculiar to itſelf, and ſo totally different from thoſe of body, and any of its variable affections, that, when ſeparated from this mortal frame, it will then, and then only, aſſume its natural activity, perfection, and dignity[a].

The book intitled "Concerning Energy," connects his natural philoſophy with his theology.

The doctrine of the mind naturally brings Ariſtotle to what is publiſhed as the ninth book of his Metaphyſics, but which, as above mentioned, ought to ſtand as the ſeventh. It is intitled "Concerning Energy," a word of mighty import in our author's philoſophy, ſince his doctrine on that ſubject is a *link* in the grand chain, by which he connects the earth with the heavens, and nature with the Deity. The ſtate of energy, as oppoſed

[x] δηλον δε και ότι ἡ μεν ψυχη ουσια ἡ πρωτη, το δε σωμα ὑλη· ουδε ανθρωπος η το ζωον το εξ αμφοιν. Metaph. l. vii. c. xi. p. 919. and l. i. De Anima, c. v. p. 625.

[y] Metaph. l. viii. c. ii. p. 927. [z] Ibid. l. viii. c. iii. p. 929.

[a] De Anima, l. i. c. iii. p. 623. and c. v. p. 625. and Metaph. l. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004.

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oppoſed to that of capacity, was already explained; but it may be a matter of ſome curioſity more minutely to examine diſtinctions, independently of which this great philoſopher thought it impoſſible to mount up from things viſible and periſhing to things inviſible and eternal. Energy, then, as the word denotes, is always ſaid in reference to action; and that is ſaid to exiſt in energy, which executes its peculiar work, or performs its peculiar function [b]. The ſtate of energy is the moſt perfect ſtate of exiſtence in which any object can be exhibited; as a maſter thinks he has perfected his ſcholar when he ſhews him performing ſkilfully the proper work of the art in which he was inſtructed [c]. Though energy always implies action, yet all actions are not energies. The actions of building, carving, healing, learning, reſpectively terminate i a houſe, a ſtatue, health, and ſcience. But the actions of thought, of life, and of happineſs, (which is a kind of life,) have not any natural limit, but may proceed eternally revolving on themſelves, perfect without addition, complete in every inſtant [d]. That things eſſentially different may be diſtinguiſhed by different names, Ariſtotle calls limited actions, motions; the unlimited, energies; obſerving, that in the ſcale of being there is a continual aſcent from mere powers and capacities to motions or imperfect energies, properly ſo called, becauſe terminating in nothing more excellent than themſelves [e]. Thoſe operations, which terminate in a certain work, are only perfect in the work or production in which they are fixed and concentrated; as painting

The nature of energy explained.

[b] Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 339. Comp. Metaph. l. ix. c. vi. p. 936.

[c] Idem ibid. [d] Metaph. l. ix. c. vi. p. 937.

[e] Comp. Metaph. l. xiii. c. ix. p. 990. & p. 991, and Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 938.

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painting in the picture, building in the edifice [f]. But energies not terminating in any work or production, are complete and perfect in themſelves. The former belong in a certain ſenſe to the work in which they are embodied [g]; the latter can belong only to the energiſing principle, which, when unceaſingly active, as the firſt efficient cauſe was proved neceſſarily to be, is ſimple, unmixed, and pure energy [h].

The firſt energy eternally and ſubſtantially active.

On ſuch a principle as this, eternally and ſubſtantially active, both the heavens and the earth depend [i]. He is the ſpring of motion, the fountain of life, the ſource of order and of beauty [k]. All our obſervations and all our reaſonings lead us irreſiſtibly to this concluſion; for in all the motions or changes of body or matter, there muſt always be one part acted upon as well as another that acts, otherwiſe no action, and therefore no motion, could poſſibly take place. But when we ſeparate this acting part from the inert maſs with which it is united, the ſame reaſoning will ſtill apply to it; it cannot be ſelf-moved wholly [l], and the part which gives the impulſe muſt always be different from that which receives it [m]. By our diviſions and ſubdiviſions without end, we ſhall therefore never come nearer to a ſolution than at firſt ſetting out, but ſhall always be compelled to conſider matter as ſomething fit to be moved, changed, or acted upon, but

[f] Comp. Metaph. l. xiii. c. ix. p. 990. & p. 991. and Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 938.

[g] Metaph. l. ix. c. vi. p. 936.

[h] ὁ γαρ νους ενεργεια. Metaph. l. xiv. c. vi. p. 999.

[i] εκ τοιαυτης αρα αρχης ηρτηται ὁ ουρανος και ἡ φυσις. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1000. and Phyſic. Auſcult. l. viii. c. vii. p. 418.

[k] το πρωτον παντων κινουν παντα. Metaph. l. xiv. c. iv. p. 998. Comp. c. vi. p. 999. and l. xii. c. iii. p. 975. and l. ix. c. viii. p. 930.

[l] Phyſic. Auſcult. l. iii. c. i. p. 340.

[m] Ibid. l. viii. c. vi. p. 417.

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His attributes.

but conſtantly deriving its motion, change, or activity from ſome foreign cauſe[n]. The prime mover, then, is neceſſarily [o] immaterial; and therefore indiviſible, immoveable, impaſſive, and invariable [p]; ever actuating this viſible ſyſtem, as is plain from the phænomena, according to the beſt principles both of intellection and volition, which exactly coincide [q], when traced up to Deity, their ultimate ſource. The phenomena of the univerſe are not unconnected and epiſodical, like an ill-written tragedy; but all of them regulated and adjuſted with conſummate harmony [r]. The Divinity, who comprehends and directs the whole, is not himſelf diviſible in parts, nor comprehenſible by magnitude, ſince all magnitude may be meaſured [s]; and what finite magnitude can exert infinite power [t]? He ever is what he is [u], exiſting in energy before time began, ſince time is only an affection of motion, of which God is the author [w]. That kind of life which the beſt and happieſt of men lead occaſionally, in the unobſtructed exerciſe of their higheſt powers, belongs eternally to God in a degree that ſhould excite admiration in proportion as it ſurpaſſes comprehenſion [x].

This

[n] Phyſic. Auſcult. l. viii. c. vi. p. 417.

[o] Ibid. l. viii. c. vi. p. 416. & ſeq.

[p] Metaph. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1000. and 1001.

[q] τουτων (in reference to the οφικτον and νοητον) τα φρωτα τα αυτα. Comp. Metaph. l. ix. c. ix. and l. xiv. c. vii.

[r] ωσ ἐοικε ἡ φυσις επεισοδιωσης . . ὡσπερ μοχθηρα τραγωδια. Metaph. l. xii. c. iii. p. 975.

[s] Metaph. l. xiii. c. x. p. 991. [t] Ibid. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1001.

[u] δει αρα ειναι αρχην τοιαυτην ἡς ἡ ουσια ενεργεια. Metaph. l. xiv. c. vi. p. 999. Comp. De Cœlo, l. ii. c. xiii. p. 466.

[w] Metaph. l. xiii. c. viii. p. 992. and το κινουν αιδιον, και πρωτερον του κινουμενου. και το πρωτερον ουσιας, ουσιαν αναγκαιον ειναι. Metaph. l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1002.

[x] ει δε μαλλον. ετι θαυμασιωτερον. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1001.

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That Deity the ſource of Being handed down from antiquity.

This doctrine was delivered down from the ancients, and remains with their poſterity, in the form of a fable; which, with many additions to it, has been employed for the ſervice of legiſlation, and for bridling the paſſions of the multitude[y]. The Gods have thence been repreſented as endowed with human forms, and agitated by human paſſions; from which ſtrange ſuppoſitions, many conſequences not leſs ſtrange have very naturally been derived. Yet, from the motley maſs of fiction, if we ſeparate this ſingle propoſition, that Deity is the firſt of ſubſtances, it will appear to be divinely ſaid; and to have been ſaved, as a precious remnant, in the wreck of arts and philoſophy, which, it is probable, have often flouriſhed, and often fallen to decay[z].

Ariſtotle refutes the materialiſts and metaphyſicians.

Such is Ariſtotle's doctrine in his books intitled "Concerning Philoſophy;" the far greater part of which is employed in refuting two claſſes of writers, who may very properly be called the Materialiſts and the Metaphyſicians. The former contenting themſelves with the properties and laws of matter and motion, beyond which they thought it impoſſible to penetrate, miſtook effects for cauſes, and confounded the maker[a] with his works: The latter, who were the more modern, and alſo the more faſhionable of the two, perverted logical analyſis by applying it to phyſical ſubjects[b]; and ſubſtituting words for things, ſought

[y] Metaph. l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1003.

[z] Idem Ibid.

[a] το αιδιον κοσμω, l. xiv. c. x. p. 1006. This muſt ſound harſh to thoſe who do not underſtand Ariſtotle's notion of the eternity of the world, in the ſenſe in which it is above explained.

[b] Compar. Metaph. l. xii. c. iv. p. 977. l. xiii. c. ii. p. 981. & ſeq. and l. xiv. c. i. p. 995.

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ſought for firſt cauſes in numbers, ideas, contraries, and other metaphyſical abſtractions; or, in Ariſtotle's language, general terms; which, the more general they become, diverge the wider[c] in their nature from energies, the only ſubſtantial and efficient principles in the univerſe[d]; and all proceeding from the firſt energy or ſubſtance, who is both ſpecifically and numerically one[e]. This doctrine perfectly agrees with that beautiful harmony diſcernible in the works of the firſt mover; which are all of them connected by the moſt intimate relations[f]; and whoſe arrangements uniformly conſpire to one great and ſalutary end[g]: For the perfection, excellence, and beauty, diſcernible in the univerſe, are to be aſcribed to its Maker, not leſs than the regular arrangement of a well diſciplined army is aſcribed to its general[h]. This doctrine only is conſiſtent:

Goodneſs of God.

"One rules alone, one, only one, bears ſway;
"*His* are the laws, and Him let all obey[i]."

This

[c] Compar. Metaph. l. xiii. c. ii. p. 982. and l. xiv. c. v. p. 998.

[d] Comp. l. xiii. c. vii. p. 988. and l. xiv. c. ii, iii. p. 996.

[e] ἐν μεν αρα και λογῳ και αριθμῳ το πρωτον κινουν ακινητον ον. l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1003. Things are one ſpecifically or λογῳ, when they are collected into one count, and expreſſed by one word or κατηγορημα, the definition of which applies equally to them all. Material things may be one ſpecifically, though many numerically: but this cannot hold as to energies; ſo that if there were as many different heavens as there are different men, the firſt neceſſary being would ſtill be numerically, as well as ſpecifically, one. Compar. Phyſ. Auſcult. l. viii. c. vii. p. 418. & ſeq.

[f] ουχ ὁτως εχει, ὡστε μη ειναι θατερου θατερου, l. xiv. c. x. p. 1005. & Phyſ. Auſcult. l. viii. c. vii. p. 418.

[g] προς μεν γαρ ἐν, ἁπαντα συντετακται. Ibid.

[h] Comp. l. xii. c. iv. p. 976. & l. xiv. c. x. p. 1004. Pliny, l. ii. c. i. & l. xxvii. c. ii. ſtrangely miſtakes his great maſter in natural hiſtory. The ſame errors he commits elſewhere in ſpeaking of God, Nature, the world, &c.

[i] Iliad, l. i. v. 204. quoted Metaph. l. xiv. c. ult. p. 1006. Cicero greatly miſ-

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The ſame doctrine inculcated in his exoteric or popular works.

This ſyſtem of theology, not leſs ſatisfactory than ſublime, Ariſtotle tells us that he had often inculcated, not merely in his acroatic works, which were lectures confined ſolely to his pupils, but alſo in his exoteric or popular writings, intended for the inſtruction of the public[k]. If this aſſertion cannot be diſproved, his character will be reſcued from the charge of diſhoneſty, in teaching a double doctrine, one to his pupils, and another to the world. Cicero[l] indeed ſays, that the Greek philoſophers (meaning our author in particular) did not "ſeem always to hold the ſame language in their popular and in their more accurate works;" which variation was, ſurely, to be expected; ſince, in the former, they often reaſoned, as Ariſtotle himſelf tells us, looſely or according to vulgar conception, and in the latter ſtrictly or philoſophically. But as to the fundamental points of his moſt important doctrines, Ariſtotle frequently refers from thoſe of his books, "which were diſtinguiſhed by pregnant brevity, cloſeneſs of thought, and quickneſs of tranſitions[m]," to his more expanded, more perſpicuous, and more popular productions[n]. Much circumſpection indeed became

repreſents his original, "Inde deinde illi tot Dij ſi numeramus etiam Cœlum, Deum," &c. De Natur. Deor. l. i. c. xiii.

[k] καθαπερ εν τοις εγκυκλιοις φιλοσοφημασι περι των θειων πολλακις προφαινεται τοις λογοις ὁτι το θειον αμιγες ὑπαρχον παν το πρωτον και ακρατατον. De Cœlo, l. i. c. ix. p. 446.

[l] De Fin. l. v. c. v.

[m] Simplicius (ad Categor. in Procem.) thus characteriſes the acroatic, in contradiſtinction to the exoteric works, "ἡ ἐσοχυολογια, ἡ των ἐνδον πυκνοτης, και το της φρασεως συνεσταλμενον. To the laſt clauſe I have given a ſenſe more conformable to truth than that which the words naturally preſent.

[n] Simplicius Comment. in Ariſtot. de Cœlo, fol. 67. Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. iii. & xiii. l. vi. c. iv. Ethic. Eudem. l. i. c. viii. l. ii. c. i. De Republ. l. iii. c. vi. & l. vii. c. i.

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became a philoſopher, deteſting ſuperſtition and deteſting democracy, yet living and teaching in the boſom of Athens; a city ſhamefully deformed by whatever is moſt abject in the one, and moſt wild in the other. But there is not a ſhadow of proof that, in any part of his writings, he encouraged or approved either of thoſe groſs popular deluſions; though it is highly probable that he arraigned their folly and abſurdity with more freedom in the Lyceum, than his prudence would have allowed him to expreſs in the Pantheon or the Forum.

The objection made to Ariſtotle's philoſophy, as not built on experiment.

An objection very commonly made to Ariſtotle's philoſophy is, that he is regardleſs of experience, and too fond of hypotheſis. In the whole extent in which this reproach is uſually urged by his detractors, it betrays ignorance in the extreme; ſince the principles of every one of his treatiſes are drawn ſolely from experience; and, in almoſt every ſtep that he takes, to experience he continually recurs for trying and confirming his concluſions. That he was not ſparing of experiments, in the modern ſenſe of the word, upon thoſe ſubjects on which he thought that a philoſopher might conſiſtently make uſe of them, is evident from his mechanical queſtions, his problems, his diſcourſes on the general properties or affections of animated nature, and, above all, from his doctrine of ſenſation, memory, recollection, and other powers of the ſoul or mind; which is entirely experimental. But Ariſtotle was contented with catching Nature in the fact, without attempting, after the modern faſhion, to put her to the torture; and in rejecting experiments operoſe, toilſome, or painful, either to their objects or their authors, he was juſtified by the habits of thinking, almoſt univerſally prevalent in his age and country. Educated in free and martial republics, careleſs of wealth, becauſe uncorrupted by

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luxury, the whole tribe of ancient philoſophers dedicated themſelves to agreeable only and liberal purſuits, with too proud a diſdain of arts merely uſeful or lucrative. They ranked with the firſt claſs of citizens; and, as ſuch, were not to be lightly ſubjected to unwholeſome or diſguſting employments. To bend over a furnace, inhaling noxious ſteams; to torture animals, or to touch dead bodies, appeared to them operations not more miſbecoming their humanity, than unſuitable to their dignity. For ſuch diſcoveries as the heating and mixing of bodies offers to inquiſitive curioſity, the naturaliſts of Greece truſted to ſlaves and mercenary mechanics, whoſe poverty or avarice tempted them to work in metals and minerals; and to produce, by unwearied labour, thoſe coloured and ſculptured ornaments, thoſe gems, rings, cups, and vaſes, and other admired but frivolous elegancies, of which (in the opinion of good judges * of art) our boaſted chemiſtry cannot produce the materials; nor, were the materials at hand, ſupply us with inſtruments fit to ſhape. The work-ſhops of tradeſmen then revealed thoſe myſteries which are now ſought for in colleges and laboratories; and uſeful knowledge, perhaps, was not the leſs likely to be advanced, while the arts were confined to artiſts only; nor facts the more likely to be perverted, in order to ſupport favourite theories, before the empiric had yet aſſumed the name, and uſurped the functions, of the philoſopher.

His philoſophical language

To the Stagirite, it appeared to be the proper buſineſs of philoſophy, not to multiply or collect facts, but to arrange and to

* I remember a ſtrong expreſſion of the late Mr. Wedgewood, in ſpeaking of the Portland Vaſe, that the making of it "implied a ſcience of chemiſtry, of which we have not yet the elements."

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to explain them. This can only be done through the medium of a well-defined and highly cultivated language; and the language of Ariſtotle will be found the moſt copious and complete, and at the ſame time the moſt preciſe and elegant, ever employed by any philoſopher; ſerving at once as the readieſt channel of conveyance, and the fitteſt inſtrument for diſcovery. In his phyſical, as well as in his moral works, facts known and aſcertained are reduced to their ſimpleſt expreſſions, and thoſe doubtfully inferred, or barely ſuſpected, are, according to the true ſpirit of analyſis, denoted by words merely expreſſive of relations to things previouſly known. It is true that, in ages of ignorance, when Ariſtotle's ſuppoſed tenets were read in barbarous and diſguſting tranſlations, the terms employed by him, as ſigns of things ſought, and which, unleſs marked by ſigns, could never poſſibly be diſcovered, were as groſsly miſtaken, as they have been ſince ſhamefully miſrepreſented. In the ſcholaſtic philoſophy, that uſeleſs maſs of inſipid dulneſs, which inſolently arrogated to itſelf the name of Ariſtotleiſm, the ſchoolmen reſted in the names of occult qualities for explaining the phenomena both of mind and matter; and neglecting the repeated warnings of him whom they called their great maſter, and who well knew how liable the beſt things are to abuſe, they perverted the ſtudy of nature into metaphyſical ſubtlety and vain logomachy. But the ſame ſtupid ignorance which made them incapable of appreciating the Stagirite as a philoſopher, rendered them prone to worſhip him as a god. This imaginary divinity and his adorers were aſſailed by the giants of the ſixteenth century; who, in their rage to puniſh ſuch groſs intellectual idolatry, confounded the maſter with his diſciples, arraigned Ariſtotle for opinions which he had never held,

miſtaken and perverted.

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degraded him from honours which he had never uſurped; and adopting his favourite method of analyſis, endeavoured ungratefully and inſidiouſly to deſtroy his well-earned fame with the inſtrument which he himſelf had formed and ſharpened. But whatever unmerited diſgrace may have been thereby reflected on ſome ſpeculative doctrines, which I have here attempted briefly to explain, his practical philoſophy, which may be read in the following tranſlation, will ſtill vindicate his fair claim to be regarded as one of the beſt inſtructors of mankind, on the more important ſubjects of Ethics and Politics.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE poet Gray writes thus in a letter to a friend: "For my part I read Ariſtotle, his poetics, politics, and morals; though I do not know well, which is which. In the firſt place, he is the hardeſt author by far I ever meddled with. Then he has a dry conciſeneſs, that makes one imagine one is peruſing a table of contents rather than a book: it taſtes for all the world like chopped hay, or rather like chopped logic; for he has a violent affection for that art, being in ſome ſort his own invention; ſo that he often loſes himſelf in little trifling diſtinctions and verbal niceties; and what is worſe, leaves you to extricate him as well as you can. Thirdly, he has ſuffered vaſtly from the tranſcribers, as all authors of great brevity neceſſarily muſt. Fourthly and laſtly, he has abundance of fine uncommon things, which make him well worth the pains he gives one." See Gray's Letters.

In this firſt book, our Author ſays "abundance of fine uncommon things," on the ſubjects of human nature, virtue, and happineſs. His mode of compoſition, however, is ſo totally different from that to which the caprice of faſhion has given

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BOOK I.

given its temporary ſanction, that much labour and much ſkill muſt be employed, to adapt the form of his work to the taſte of modern readers; to whom both his method and his ſtyle, which formerly appeared to deſerve admiration [a], may now ſeem to demand apology. His method requires, that every ſubject of diſcuſſion ſhould be accurately defined, and completely divided; and that, how complex ſoever its nature may be, the compound ſhould be reſolved into its conſtituent elements; viewed in its birth and origin; and examined, in all its changes, varieties, augmentations, and diminutions. This mode of proceeding appeared to him peculiarly uſeful in moral and political queſtions, whoſe connections and relations are ſo intimate and ſo extenſive, that erroneous concluſions, on ſuch ſubjects, proceed far more frequently from narrowneſs of ſurvey, than from inaccuracy of reaſoning. In practical matters above all, this full and comprehenſive examination ſeemed indiſpenſably neceſſary, to prevent haſty deciſion, to inſpire cautious diſtruſt; and thus to arreſt the progreſs of paſſion and frenzy in a career which might leave them without retreat.

But, with whatever other advantages a treatiſe written with this ſtrictneſs and ſeverity of method may be accompanied, it certainly is not calculated to afford *gratuitous* information. To apprehend its meaning diſtinctly, and to perceive its full ſcope, demands much attention and much reflection on the part even of the reader. His patience is likely to be ſoon exhauſted by the too painful taſk; eſpecially if his taſte has been corrupted by thoſe flowery and fallacious productions of the times, whoſe authors (men of narrow views and ſelfiſh minds, and ſo long habituated

[a] Cicero Topic. c. i. p. 171. Edit. Olivet. & paſſim.

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habituated to party politics, that they have loſt all reliſh, and almoſt all perception of truth,) are contented to confound and darken a whole region of ſcience, provided they can throw a falſe glare on one favourite and faſhionable ſpot. This darling topic they exert themſelves to beautify and illumine; adorning with eloquence and metaphors, and all the embroidery of declamation, the dangerous inference that is drawn from their erroneous, becauſe imperfect, argument. Nothing can be more ſmooth, or more eaſily followed by the reader, than the whole progreſs of their diſcourſe. But the very circumſtance which renders it ſo eaſy and ſo popular, alſo makes it of no value. The ſubject has been conſidered under one partial aſpect; a different view of it is taken; the incomplete theory is aſſaulted by another equally imperfect; and both of them ſo flimſy and cloud-built, that they are unable to withſtand even the ſoft impreſſions of their adverſe debility. Yet each party triumphs for a while in the bubble of its own creating, and vainly deems it irreſiſtible; a falſe confidence, that often gives birth to the greateſt practical errors. Ariſtotle's method is directly the reverſe: his works require attention, but they repay it; they will fully compenſate, in ſolid inſtruction, for their defect (if it may be called one) in point of deluſive entertainment.

The Stagirite's ſtyle is not leſs unfaſhionable than his method. It diſplays not any allurements to catch the reader's fancy; it diſdains every attempt to excite ſurpriſe, to provoke mirth, to inflame, ſooth, or gratify paſſion. The thirſt for knowledge is the only want which the Author profeſſes to ſupply; and this thirſt, he was of opinion, will ever be beſt quenched

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in the clear ſtream of unadorned reaſon; as that water is the pureſt and moſt ſalutary, which has neither taſte nor colour.

Ariſtotle did not, like his maſter Plato, baniſh poets from his Republic. He himſelf courted the Lyric muſe, and reached her loftieſt flights. But he never underſtood by what perverſity of purpoſe the agreeable illuſions of poetry could be aſſociated and mixed with the ſober ſcience of politics. In all practical matters, he knew the danger of ſaying any thing to the heart and paſſions, which would not bear to be examined by the light of the underſtanding. In tranſlating incomparably the moſt valuable part of his works, I have attempted therefore to imitate his preciſion and energy, as far as that can be done without leaving the fainteſt trace of his obſcurity. My aim throughout is to adhere rigidly to his ſenſe; to omit nothing which he ſays; to ſay nothing which he has omitted; but to endeavour, to the beſt of my abilities, to expreſs his meaning, agreeably as well as forcibly; ſince a mere verbal tranſlation would convey not only an inadequate, but often a very falſe, impreſſion of the Greek original.

Words, as our Author teaches, are both the ſigns of things, and the materials in which our compariſons, abſtractions, and concluſions concerning thoſe things are embodied. The words of one language, therefore, will often be very imperfectly expreſſed by thoſe of another; and the more complex their ſignifications are, the diverſities between them will naturally be the wider. To the terms employed in the ſciences of Ethics and Politics, this obſervation is peculiarly applicable. The original term, and that by which it is tranſlated, not comprehending

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hending exactly the ſame identical notions, the Engliſh word which correſponds to the Greek in one of its meanings, will often not expreſs it in another. The phraſeology, therefore, muſt be occaſionally varied; and the ambition to attain propriety and excellence, will thus ſometimes give to a tranſlation, the appearance of looſeneſs and inaccuracy. In many caſes, exact equivalents to ſingle Greek words, are not to be found either in Engliſh, or in any other language. One term, therefore, muſt frequently be rendered by ſeveral; and the tranſlation neceſſarily degenerating into a paraphraſe, will often gain in perſpicuity and popularity, what it loſes in preciſion and energy [b]. From the philoſophical arrangement of the Greek tongue, and the ſingular fondneſs of Greek writers for abſtract and univerſal concluſions, words denoting the higher genera or claſſes, are employed by them on many occaſions, when terms more ſpecific would anſwer the purpoſe better, and ſound more gracefully, in Engliſh. With regard to this particular, I have ſometimes ventured to prefer to ſtrictneſs of verſion, a compliance with the genius of modern tongues, and with the taſte of modern readers.

My

[b] When the Greek language was more familiarly known than it is at preſent, Ariſtotle's ſtyle was acknowledged by the beſt critics to poſſeſs the higheſt of all merits, that of expreſſing his deep and various wiſdom always in the fitteſt terms. Dicendi quoque incredibili quadam cum copia, tum etiam ſuavitate. Cicero Topic. c. i. p. 171. Edit. Oliveti. Quintilian ſpeaks to the ſame purpoſe: Quid Ariſtotelem? quem dubito ſcientia rerum, an ſcriptorum copia, an eloquendi ſuavitate, an inventionum acumine, an varietate operum, clariorem puto. "Why need I mention Ariſtotle? concerning whom I am in doubt, whether he is rendered more illuſtrious by the magnitude and variety of his writings, his univerſal ſcience, the acuteneſs of his inventions, or the ſuavity of his diction." Quintil. Inſ. Orat. l. x. c. i. p. 224. Edit. Bipont.

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My principal deſign and only ambition is to convey, in the preſent ſtate of public opinion with reſpect to fundamental principles, a clear notion of thoſe writings of the Stagirite which he intitled his "Philoſophy concerning Human Affairs [c]." His Ethics, I believe, no man can read without becoming the better; and his Politics, I think, no ſtateſman can ſtudy, without becoming the wiſer. But the corrupt and mutilated ſtate of his works compelled me, reluctantly, to uſe ſome freedom with their form, in order the more completely to preſerve their ſubſtance. In different books, and even in different chapters of the ſame book, the ſame thoughts often recur in nearly the ſame words. Theſe uſeleſs repetitions, proceeding commonly from the fault of unſkilful editors, I thought it my duty to retrench; and continually to aim at ſelecting that expreſſion in which the ſenſe is moſt fully conveyed. A tranſlation is a portrait; but that the portrait may pleaſe, the original ſhould be ſhown with its moſt becoming expreſſion, and in its beſt attitudes.

[c] ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία.

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BOOK I.

ARGUMENT.

Human action—Operations and productions—Happineſs—Opinions concerning it—It conſiſts in virtuous energies—Proved by induction—Solon's ſaying concerning it explained—Analyſis of our moral powers.

BOOK I.

Chap. 1.

Human action terminates either in operations or in productions.

SINCE every art and every kind of knowledge, as well as all the actions and all the deliberations of men, conſtantly aim at ſomething which they call good; good, in general, may be juſtly defined, "that which all deſire." But among the various ends and purpoſes of our activity and purſuit, there is this important difference, that ſome conſiſt merely in operations, and others chiefly in productions. Of thoſe arts or actions of which production is the chief end, the work is more valuable than the operation by which it was produced; and, as there is a wide variety of arts and actions, there muſt be a correſpondent variety of ends: of the medical art, health; of ſhipbuilding, a veſſel; of generalſhip, victory; of œconomy, riches. It often happens that arts riſe one above another in dignity, and that all thoſe of an inferior ſort are ſubſervent to one principal, their natural and acknowledged ſovereign. Thus bridle making is ſubſervient to horſemanſhip; and horſemanſhip to war; and the end of the ſubſervient art is plainly leſs valuable than that of the art to which it miniſters, becauſe the former is purſued merely for the ſake of the latter. This holds univerſally, whether

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Chap. 2.

ther the ends of human action consist in operations or in productions.

It belongs to politics to investigate the chief end of man.

But if there be an ultimate end of all human pursuit, an end desirable merely in itself, (and unless there be such an end, desire, proceeding to infinity, will terminate in a baseless vision,) this ultimate end must be what is called good; and of goods, the best. The knowledge of it, also, must greatly contribute to the benefit of life; serving, as a butt to bowmen, for the direction of our views and actions. Let us, therefore, endeavour to delineate it carefully, first premising that the investigation of it belongs to that master-science called politics; a science which regulates and appoints what are the other sciences, as well as what are the arts that ought to be introduced into cities, what kinds of them the different classes of citizens ought respectively to learn, and to what extent each in particular ought to be known and cultivated. The most honourable functions of a civil or military nature; those of the orator, financier, or general, are but instruments employed by politics for promoting human happiness; which, if precisely one and the same in states and individuals, must, with regard to the former, be more difficult both to produce and to maintain. How delightful is it to make individuals happy! but to effect the happiness of states is an employment still more divine. Such then is the aim of this work, which is entirely of a political nature [d].

It

[d] In the Magna Moralia, l. i. c. i. p. 145. the following reason is given why Ethics should be considered as a part of politics, ὅτι δὲ ἠθικὸν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατὸν πρᾶξαι ἄνευ τοῦ ποιόν τινα εἶναι, &c. "That it is impossible to do any thing in politics, without having men endowed with certain habits; wherefore Ethics," he observes, "are likely to be a part as well as the principle and source of politics."

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The proper method of treating moral and political philoſophy, and the fit character of its hearers.

It will be our endeavour to attain that accuracy which the nature of the ſubject admits; for perfection is not required in all the labours of the mind, any more than in all the works of the hand. Political juſtice or virtue ſeems liable to this uncertainty, that it depends rather on law than on nature. The good, or end, at which this virtue aims, ſeems to be not leſs doubtful; ſince much evil is frequently its reſult. Many are ruined by their wealth, and many by their courage. In matters ſo little ſtable we muſt be contented, therefore, with catching the general reſemblance of truth; and our concluſions will deſerve to be approved, if in moſt caſes they are found to hold true; for it is the part of wiſdom to be ſatisfied in each ſubject with that kind of evidence which the nature of the ſubject allows; it not being leſs abſurd to require demonſtrations from an orator, than to be contented with probabilities from a mathematician. Of performances in each ſcience, thoſe only can appreciate the merit by whom that ſcience has been ſtudied. From a work on politics, therefore, thoſe alone can derive much benefit who have acquired a general and practical knowledge of human nature. Youth is not the ſeaſon for ſuch a ſtudy; for youth is unexperienced in the buſineſs of life, which is both the ſource and the object of all ſound political reaſoning. It makes not any difference whether a man is young in point of years, or in point of character; for his inaptitude ariſes entirely from his boyiſh purſuits, and childiſh opinions. But to thoſe whoſe paſſions have been diſciplined by the maturity of years and reaſon, this kind of knowledge will afford both pleaſure and profit. Thus much concerning our ſubject, the mode of treating it, and the character of thoſe to whom our diſcourſe is addreſſed.

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BOOK I. Chap. 4.

Different opinions concerning happineſs.

Let us reſume, therefore, by inquiring, ſince all our thoughts and deſires aim at ſome kind of good, what is the end of the ſcience called politics: or, in other words, what is the principal of all thoſe goods reſulting from the proper direction of human action? Its name is univerſally[e] acknowledged; both the learned and the multitude call it happineſs[f]. But as to the thing itſelf, there is a wide diverſity of opinion between philoſophers and the vulgar. The latter place happineſs in things viſible and palpable: in pleaſure, wealth, honour; and, often changing their minds, they place it, when ſick, in health; when poor, in riches; and when they reflect on their own ignorance, they deem thoſe moſt happy who can boaſt their attainments in ſcience. Some philoſophers again think that beſides all theſe particular and relative goods, there is a good in itſelf abſolutely, the cauſe of this quality in other things, which deſerve to be called good merely becauſe they participate of this abſolute goodneſs. It would be uſeleſs to enumerate all the opinions on this ſubject; let it ſuffice to mention the moſt prevalent, or the moſt reaſonable. It ought not to eſcape our notice that, in all our inquiries, we may either proceed from principles, or mount up towards them. Plato, therefore, doubted which of the two was the beſt mode of inveſtigation; as, in Olympic Stadium, whether the proper courſe proceeded from the judges to the goal, or from the goal to the judges[g]. In other ſciences, we ought to begin from the things beſt known; either abſolutely in themſelves, from

[e] σχιδον υπο των πλειστων ὁμολογειται. "Almoſt acknowledged by the moſt," which ſeems merely a modeſt way of ſpeaking, not tolerable in Engliſh.

[f] το δε ευ ζην και ευ πραττειν ταυτον ὑπολαμβανουσι τῳ ευδαιμονειν. "To live well and to act well, they reckon ſynonymous with being happy." This ſentence is omitted.

[g] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. v. p. 228.

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from the ſimplicity and ſtability of their nature; or relatively to the inquirer, becauſe moſt familiar to his ſenſes, his obſervation, and experience[g]. But in Politics, we ought to begin by operating on the moral nature of man, ſince the firſt requiſite is to have diſciples habituated to the practice of virtue. Such perſons either know, or will ſoon underſtand, principles[h]. But thoſe of a different character may attend to Heſiod.

> The beſt and nobleſt of the human kind
> Are thoſe endow'd with a deep-thinking mind;
> Nor are *they* uſeleſs, who ſuch men obey,
> Submitting ſtill to wiſdom's lawful ſway;
> But he, who though unfit his ways to rule,
> Yet will not to a wiſer go to ſchool,
> That man is, ſure, a good-for-nothing fool[i].

Chap. 5.

Thoſe opinions examined.

To return from this digreſſion, men's notions of happineſs may eaſily be conjectured from the lives which they lead. The groſs vulgar of mankind think of nothing but pleaſure, and therefore lead a life of mere ſenſual enjoyment; conſtrained like ſlaves, and ſtupid as cattle. Their error is excuſable, ſince many of the great ſet them an example, which themſelves ſeem

[g] For the ſake of perſpicuity I have here expanded Ariſtotle's thought by borrowing expreſſions frequently repeated in his Analytics and Metaphyſics.

[h] Ariſtotle ſays, they know that the thing is, and therefore need not be taught its cauſe; they have a practical knowledge of virtue, which is better than its theory; and this practical knowledge is itſelf a principle inſtilled and confirmed by experience and cuſtom. See the end of chapter vii. It may be further obſerved, that our author, with his uſual modeſty, ſays, *perhaps* we ought to begin with the things beſt known to ourſelves; and *therefore* thoſe only are qualified to ſtudy politics with advantage, who have been previouſly trained to good morals. I have inverted the order, becauſe the latter is proved in chapter iii.

[i] Heſiod, Ἔργων, i. 293.

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ſeem to have copied from the ſottiſh Sardanapalus. A ſecond plan of life is that purſued by men of activity and enterpriſe, who eagerly engage in the public concerns of their country, and have honour for their object. But this honour is a thing too ſuperficial and flimſy to be the happineſs of which we are in queſt. It ſeems to depend not leſs on thoſe who confer honours, than upon thoſe on whom they are conferred. But happineſs, we foreſee, muſt be ſomething independent and permanent. Beſides, theſe troubleſome honours are courted chiefly for the purpoſe of flattering ſelf-love, for removing our ſuſpicions of our own unworthineſs, and for rendering us in our own conceit virtuous and happy. For this reaſon we take moſt pride in being honoured by men of ſenſe, by thoſe who beſt know us, and for meritorious actions. Virtue, therefore, is plainly more valuable than honour, even in the eſtimation of thoſe by whom honour is moſt coveted; ſince the latter is purſued merely as the ſign and ſhadow of the former. But virtue alone does not conſtitute happineſs. A man poſſeſſed of virtue may be aſleep or inactive; he may never, through life, have an opportunity of exhibiting his good qualities; and notwithſtanding theſe qualities, he may frequently be involved in the greateſt diſaſters. Such a man was never, except for argument's ſake, pronounced happy. But enough on this ſubject, which has been already treated in our popular diſcourſes. A third plan of life is that of the ſpeculative philoſopher, which ſhall be examined in the ſequel. A life of money-making and commerce is plainly a ſtate of toil and trouble; and riches cannot be the good inquired after, becauſe they are deſired, not on their own account, but for the purpoſes which they anſwer; and are valuable, not as ends, but merely as inſtruments. The other ſchemes of happineſs

happineſs are, therefore, preferable to that of the money-maker; but even thoſe, it appears, are defective; in confirmation of which many arguments may be produced, which we ſhall not at preſent urge.

Chap. 6.

Examination of Plato's opinion concerning the chief good; and refutation of the doctrine of ideas.

It may, perhaps, be better to conſider good, abſolute and univerſal; which, according to ſome philoſophers, is the only real good, by the mere participation of which other things are entitled to this epithet. To me the taſk of examining this opinion is unpleaſant and arduous, becauſe the doctrine of univerſals and ideas was introduced by thoſe for whom I have the greateſt friendſhip [k]. Yet a philoſopher ought to demoliſh even his own ſyſtems, when they ſtand in the way of truth; nor ought the ſacred name of friendſhip ever to obſtruct a thing ſtill more ſacred than itſelf. Thoſe who introduced the doctrine of ideas allow that it is not applicable to things prior in order the one to the other [l], and therefore not applicable to number. But the word "good" applies equally to ſubſtances, to modes, and to relations; although ſubſtances are certainly prior in order to modes and relations, which are the affections or appendages of ſubſtances. The word "good" therefore, when applied to both, is not taken in the ſame ſenſe; and therefore it does not

[k] The author means Plato. He ſays, in his Magna Moralia, p. 145, that Pythagoras firſt treated of virtue, but improperly; ſince he explained the ſcience of Ethics by that of numbers, confounding ſpeculations altogether heterogeneous. Socrates ſpoke better and more perſpicuouſly: but his theory is imperfect, becauſe he makes the virtues matters of ſcience; whereas ſcience belongs only to the intellect or rational part of the ſoul, while the virtues belong not only to that, but (as will be fully explained hereafter) to the irrational part, conſiſting in the paſſions and appetites. Plato followed, well diſtinguiſhing the rational and irrational principles, but perplexing and darkening the ſubject of Ethics, by mixing with it the doctrine of ideas.

[l] Eudem. Ethic. l. i. c. viii. p. 201.—See alſo Analyſis, p. 84. & ſeq.

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not denote any common idea. Good, indeed, is ſaid in as many ways as being: thus it is applied to God, and the human mind, which are ſubſtances; to the virtues, which are qualities; to utility, which is a relation; to mediocrity, which is a quantity; to the critical moment, which is time; and to a fit reſidence, which is place [m]. It is plain, therefore, that the word "good" applied to things ſo different, does not denote any one idea common to all thoſe claſſes or categories. If it did, all kinds of good would belong to one and the ſame ſcience. But we find that various ſciences are requiſite for aſcertaining the different kinds of good, even in one and the ſame category. Thus, the critical moment in war is aſcertained by a general; in diſeaſe, by a phyſician. The medical ſcience determines what is mediocrity with reſpect to diet; and the gymnaſtic, what is mediocrity in point of exerciſe. It is difficult to know wherein conſiſts the difference between the idea of a man and a man, ſince both muſt be defined by the ſame terms. The ſame obſervation applies to good, and the idea of good. The eternity aſcribed to the latter does not make any difference; for that which is white now, is as much white, as what has continued white for an indefinite length of time. The Pythagoreans reaſon better when they diſtinguiſh various kinds of good and evil [n]; in which they ſeem to be followed by Speuſippus [o]. But of this ſubject we ſhall treat hereafter. Some uncertainty ſeems ſtill

[m] Ariſtotle ſays, στερα τοιαυτα, meaning the other categories, See above, p. 58.

[n] Ariſtotle ſays, they placed one in the co-arrangement of good. See above, p. 112.

[o] Ariſtotle is ſuppoſed to have taken it amiſs that Plato ſhould have preferred to him his own nephew Speuſippus, as his ſucceſſor in the academy; and this private pique is thought to have influenced him in his philoſophical oppoſition to his maſter's doctrines. Were this true, it might be expected that his oppoſition would not have been leſs marked to Speuſippus, whom he here goes out of his way to commend.

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ſtill to adhere to the obſervations above made, becauſe we have not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed the two kinds of goods; thoſe which are loved and purſued for their own ſake only, and thoſe which are loved and purſued merely becauſe they are fitted to produce or preſerve the former, or to ward off the contrary evils. Let us ſeparate therefore from things merely uſeful to ſome further end, things called good in themſelves, and conſider whether this epithet is beſtowed on all of them preciſely in the ſame ſenſe. What are theſe goods in themſelves, unleſs ſuch things as we wiſh to obtain and enjoy for their own ſake only; pleaſures, honours, the exerciſe of our ſight or underſtanding? Such things may be uſeful, but they are not merely uſeful, ſince, independently of any purpoſe which they anſwer, they are deſired on their own account. Are all ſuch things then called good, for the ſame reaſon that ſnow and ceruſe are both called white, becauſe they excite one and the ſame ſimple perception of whiteneſs? This is not true; for pleaſure is good in one ſenſe, honour in another, intellection in a third; in each of the three, the word "good" has a different meaning; which would not be the caſe if the idea of good was as ſimple and uniform as that of white; a doctrine that totally confounds the ſpecific diſtinctions of things. Why then is the ſame appellation applied to ſuch different objects? Not ſurely by chance; but becauſe thoſe objects are ſomehow related to each other, as proceeding from one cauſe, tending to one end, or connected by ſome analogy; as the underſtanding is called the eye of the mind, having the ſame relation to it, which the eye has to the body. But ſuch nice ſpeculations belong not to the preſent ſubject[p]; for if there be

[p] Ariſtotle ſays, that it is not neceſſary at preſent accurately to aſcertain why different things are called good, any more than to treat accurately concerning the general idea of goodneſs.

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be a general idea of goodneſs, common to all things called good, and ſeparable from them, it is plain that this ſeparate goodneſs cannot be an object of human attainment, and therefore need not be an object of human purſuit. None of the arts or ſciences contemplate this general idea as their example or pattern[q]; or conſider it as affording the ſmalleſt aſſiſtance for attaining the different ends at which they reſpectively aim. Of what benefit would ſuch a contemplation be to the embroiderer or the architect? The phyſician does not conſider good in general, but the good, or health of man, or rather of that particular man who happens to be his patient; for with individuals only he has to do.

Chap. 7.

A delineation of the ſupreme good;

Let us return again to the ſought-for good, and try to find out what it can be. We ſee that it is a different thing in different arts and actions: one thing, for example, in the art of phyſic; another in the art of war. What then is the good peculiar to each? Is it not that for the ſake of which all the other operations of the art are performed; as in phyſic, health; in war, victory; in architecture, a houſe; and in all our actions and deliberations, the end at which they aim? If then there is an end or purpoſe in life itſelf, the good ſought for muſt conſiſt in this; and if more ends than one, in theſe. This inveſtigation therefore brings us back to the ſame concluſion as before; but we muſt endeavour, if poſſible, to render the matter ſtill more perſpicuous. Since there are various objects of our purſuit, ſome of which are deſired merely for the ſake of other things, and never rationally for their own, ſuch as riches, a flute,

[q] The author ſays, that though this general good be neither πρακτον nor κτητον; neither an object of human practice nor human attainment, yet it may be thought to ſerve as a παραδειγμα, or pattern; and therefore removes this objection, which he had propoſed to himſelf.

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flute, and whatever comes under the deſcription of means or inſtruments, it is plain that none of theſe can be the good of which we are in queſt, and which muſt be ſomething complete and perfect in itſelf; for we call that more perfect which is deſired on its own account, than that which is deſired as a means towards ſome further end: and that more perfect which is never deſired but as an end, than that which is deſired both as a means and as an end. Happineſs is never deſired but for its own ſake only. Honour, pleaſure, intelligence, and every virtue, are deſirable ſurely on their own account, but they are alſo deſirable as means towards happineſs. But happineſs, we have ſaid, is never deſired as a means, becauſe it is complete and all-ſufficient in itſelf, which the good ſought for ought to be; and all-ſufficient, not merely for the individual, but for his parents, children, family, friends, and fellow-citizens, ſince man is by nature a ſocial being; yet to this ſocial principle limits are aſſigned, for if it diverged to infinity [r], there would be a deſire without an object [s]: but of this we ſhall ſpeak hereafter. That is all-ſufficient, which, taken by itſelf, renders life an object of deſire. Such we ſay is happineſs, which, ſeparate and alone, is the moſt deſirable of all things; and therefore united with the leaſt of other goods, ſtill entitled to pre-eminence [t]; complete and perfect in itſelf, and the ultimate end of all our deſigns and actions.

which conſiſts in virtuous energies.

But to call happineſs the beſt thing in the world, (which none will diſpute,) does not clearly explain wherein human happineſs conſiſts. This will beſt appear, if we conſider what is the peculiar work and proper buſineſs of a man. A muſician, a ſculptor,

[r] Ariſtotle ſays, to his children's children, and the friends of his friends, in endleſs ſucceſſion.

[s] See above, p. 91.

[t] The good added to happineſs is ὑπεροχὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ſuperabundant.

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ſculptor, and every other artiſt, has his reſpective operation and work, in the performance of which his main excellence lies; and can it be imagined, while ſhoemakers and carpenters have their proper taſks aſſigned to them, that Nature intended man for idleneſs? His eyes, and hands, and feet, and all his other parts, have their peculiar functions; and ſhall there be no function different from any, or all, of theſe, belonging to the whole? Wherein does this function conſiſt? To live, is common to him with plants. The mere power of growth and nutrition belongs not therefore to the preſent queſtion. The ſenſitive life follows next, which is common to man with horſes, oxen, and the whole animal kingdom. There remains then a life of rational action; whether he exerciſe reaſon himſelf, or obey the reaſon of another. In ſuch a life his real buſineſs conſiſts; and that man does his buſineſs the beſt[t], who acts moſt rationally through life; the virtue of each individual of a ſpecies, depending on the excellence with which he performs the work peculiar to that ſpecies alone. The proper good of man conſiſts then in virtuous energies[u], that is, in the exerciſe of virtue continued through life; for one ſwallow makes not a ſummer; neither does one day, or a ſhort time, conſtitute happineſs. Let this ſerve for a ſketch of good—that univerſally coveted object, which will afterwards be more fully delineated: for, it ſhould ſeem, that an accurate outline may eaſily be filled up; eſpecially with the aſſiſtance of time, from

[t] The author illuſtrates this, by ſaying that the buſineſs of a harper, and of a good harper, is the ſame; the difference between them ariſing only from the ſuperior excellence with which the latter performs his work.

[u] Ariſtotle here introduces his diſtinction between virtue and the energy of virtue. See above, p. 133. This ſenſe is expreſſed in the text, in language more familiar to the modern reader.

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from which arts derive their improvement. Let us remember alſo what was before obſerved, that more accuracy ſhould not be expected from an author, than is conſiſtent with the nature of his ſubject, and his deſign in treating it. Both the bricklayer and the mathematician are converſant with perpendiculars; but the former conſiders them only as uſeful in his work; the latter examines their nature and properties, becauſe abſtract truth is the object of his ſtudy. Unleſs the example of the bricklayer be followed in other matters, the principal ſubject will often be exceeded and obſcured by the mere acceſſories. Let it alſo be remembered, that we ought not to be over curious in the inveſtigation of cauſes; concerning ſome things it is ſufficient to know that they are, without knowing their reaſon. This is the caſe with thoſe firſt principles which reſult from perceptions of ſenſe, from induction, and from cuſtom [x]. We ought carefully to draw them from their reſpective ſources, and exert our utmoſt care that they be correctly aſcertained. This is of the higheſt importance in all our inquiries; in which, that which is begun well, is more than half ended; ſince much light is thereby diffuſed through every ſubſequent part of our ſpeculations.

Chap. 8.

This opinion conſiſtent with the properties aſcribed to happineſs.

We ſhall examine this chief good or happineſs, not merely in its definition, but in the properties rightly aſcribed to it. Truth only is conſiſtent; and if our notion of happineſs be juſt, it will not be diſcordant with thoſe properties. Goods are

[x] Our author adds, αλλαι δι αλλων, which may be tranſlated, "and other principles ariſe from other ſources." But this does not appear to me to be his meaning, becauſe I do not find any other ſources mentioned in any part of his works: The αλλαι αλλων muſt then mean that ſome of thoſe principles ariſe from one of thoſe ſources, and ſome from another, which is implied in the tranſlation.

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are divided into three kinds: thoſe of the mind, thoſe of the body, and thoſe conſiſting in externals. We give the preference to the firſt of the three, which we regard as the ſovereign good; placing happineſs in mental energy; an opinion ancient and univerſal among philoſophers. We do right alſo in placing the chief end and main purpoſe of life in action. From this, it reſults that happineſs is ſeated in the mind; a truth confirmed by the common ſenſe of mankind embodied in language; "living well," or "doing well," being expreſſions ſynonymous with happineſs. In all their inquiries on the ſubject, men ſeem to have been led to concluſions nearly reſembling the notion of happineſs above given. Some place it in virtue, others in prudence, others in wiſdom; ſome join pleaſure; others add externals; and thoſe different opinions have either been long held by the greater part of mankind, or more recently introduced by moſt reſpectable philoſophers. It is not credible, that either party ſhould totally miſtake the truth. Our notion nearly agrees with theirs who place happineſs in virtue; for we ſay that it conſiſts in the action of virtue; that is, not merely in the poſſeſſion, but in the uſe[r]. The mere poſſeſſion is conſiſtent with a ſtate of ſleep, or liſtleſs apathy, from which no good can reſult. But the virtuous man, when he acts, muſt act well, and be happy; as, in the Olympic games, the prize is gained only by the combatants; not by thoſe, whatever their merits may be, who decline entering the liſts. To ſuch men virtue is the higheſt pleaſure; for pleaſure reſides in the mind, and each is moſt pleaſed with what he moſt loves. Thus the lover of horſes is pleaſed with horſes; the lover of ſhows, with ſhows; and the lover of juſtice is no leſs pleaſed with juſtice; and

[r] Ariſtotle here oppoſes habit to energy, as well as poſſeſſion to uſe.

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and the lover of virtue, with virtue. The multitude, indeed, purſue different pleaſures, becauſe they do not rightly apprehend in what true pleaſure conſiſts. But pleaſure, ſtrictly ſo called, is the delight of a virtuous man, whoſe life needs not an appendage of falſe joys, containing the perennial ſpring of true pleaſure in itſelf. For he is not a good man who delights not in good actions; and vain is the praiſe of juſtice, liberality, and other virtues, by thoſe who feel no gratification in their practice. In the eſtimation of a wiſe man, virtue is pleaſant becauſe it is honourable and good; his happineſs is one regular whole; not broken and disjointed like that in the Delian inſcription:

"The faireſt good is juſtice; health, the beſt;
"The ſweeteſt far, to taſte of what we love."

All theſe qualities belong to the beſt energies, in which, we ſay, happineſs conſiſts. The opinion of thoſe who add externals, is not ill-founded; ſince, independently of them, it is often impoſſible, at leaſt very difficult, to exhibit virtue in its full luſtre[s]. Many operations muſt be performed by inſtruments; under which name I include friends, wealth, and political power. The want of ſome advantages; for example, of honourable deſcent, of promiſing children, or of dignity of preſence;

[s] In the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. ii. p. 196., Ariſtotle makes an important diſtinction between the things in which human happineſs conſiſts, and thoſe without which it cannot be completely enjoyed; ει τινι των ημετερων το ζην ευ· και των απαντων, τοις ανθρωποις εκ ενδεχεται ειναι, &c. "Health is different from the things by which it is upheld, and life from thoſe by which it is rendered comfortable. The ſame holds with regard to all the actions and habits of men." The confounding happineſs with the externals, without which, in our dependent ſtate, it cannot be completely enjoyed, is conſidered by our author as one of the great ſources of immoral practice, as well as of erroneous theory.

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preſence; deprives happineſs of its ſplendour: and the man ſeems leſs qualified for attaining it, who is deformed in body, friendleſs, childleſs, and forlorn [a]. Wherefore ſome place happineſs in external proſperity [b].

Chap. 9.

Which depends on our own exertions.

It comes then to be conſidered, whether happineſs is acquired by inſtruction, cuſtom, or ſome other kind of exerciſe; or merely by the diſpenſation of fortune and the gods. There is not any gift ſurely that might more reaſonably be expected to deſcend from heaven, ſince, of all human poſſeſſions, happineſs is the moſt valuable. But this queſtion will be more fitly examined in another place. For happineſs, even though it deſcend not from heaven, but be attained by ſtudy and exerciſe on earth, is yet moſt divine in itſelf; the end and prize of virtue, which all may gain by due exertion, who are not maimed in their minds. The acquiring of happineſs by ourſelves, is preferable to owing it to fortune [c]; it moſt probably therefore is thus acquired; ſince nature always effects her purpoſes by the beſt means; a point aimed at by art, and every intelligent cauſe, and which the beſt cauſe always attains: and to leave happineſs, the faireſt and beſt of things, to the diſpoſal of fortune, would be a mark of negligence not diſcernible in any other of the arrangements of nature [d]. That happineſs is acquired by ourſelves,

[a] Ariſtotle adds, "or who having had good friends and promiſing children, has loſt them."

[b] What is added, ενιοι δε την αρετην, "and ſome place it in virtue," ſeems ſuperfluous.

[c] For this he aſſigns two reaſons in the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. iii. p. 197. ει δ' εν τω, αυτον ποιον τινα ειναι, και τας κατ' αυτον πραξεις, κοινοτερον αν ειη το αγαθον και θειοτερον, &c. "If good or happineſs conſiſts in the quality of our actions and characters, it muſt be both more common and more divine; more common, becauſe a greater number may attain it; and more divine, becauſe it will depend upon our own exertions." Idem ibid.

[d] There is, perhaps, an intentional obſcurity in the whole of this paſſage. Ariſtotle does

ourſelves, agrees alſo with its definition, "that it conſiſts in virtuous energies." Other things, we have ſaid, are neceſſary, as a certain length of time; and others are ſerviceable, as inſtruments. The ſame concluſion correſponds with what we ſaid in the beginning, namely, that politics aimed at promoting the higheſt felicity of man; the principal care, therefore, of all good ſtateſmen has always been, to form their fellow-citizens to virtue. Neither an ox nor a horſe, nor any other animal, is denominated happy; becauſe virtuous energies cannot be aſcribed to them. Nor is this epithet beſtowed on children, whoſe imperfect age affords only a promiſe of happineſs. But many are the viciſſitudes of life; and thoſe who have long been proſperous, may, towards the concluſion of their days, be involved in calamities rivalling the far-famed diſaſters of Priam. None will call thoſe happy, who, after ſuffering ſuch evils in life, die a wretched death.

Chap. 10.

Solon's ſaying, that none can be pronounced happy till dead.

Ought we, then, to adopt the ſentiments of Solon, "that no man can be called happy while he lives?" Is he therefore happy when he dies? or is not this too abſurd to be ſaid, eſpecially by thoſe who place happineſs in action? It does not appear that Solon had this meaning, but only that a man might, at death, be congratulated upon his eſcape from the evils and calamities of life. Yet this opinion is liable to contradiction; for a man when dead, is, with regard to proſperity and adverſity, in the ſame ſtate with a man who meets with either of them when alive,

does not expreſsly deny the interference of the gods; but afterwards, confounding this interference with fortune, ſays, that it is not reaſonable to believe that nature, or (as explained in other paſſages) the God of nature, ſhould commit ſuch an important object as human happineſs to the direction of ſo blind a guide as fortune. But in the ſtrict philoſophical ſenſe, happineſs, as well as all other things, is ultimately to be referred to the Deity as its cauſe. Metaphyſ. l. i. c. ii. p. 841.

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alive, without being ſenſible of them; and is in this manner ſtill within the reach of the good or bad fortune which befals his children and their deſcendants. And how unſtable is the proſperity of families? What vaſt degeneracy in the ſons of happy and illuſtrious fathers? Yet it ſeems abſurd to ſuppoſe the ſtate of the dead affected and altered by theſe revolutions, and not leſs abſurd to ſuppoſe that the happineſs of children ſhould not be ſhared by their parents. But the ſolution of the queſtion firſt propoſed, will enable us to ſolve the other difficulties.

This ſaying explained.

Solon ſaid that we muſt look to the end; meaning thereby, that we might then juſtly ſay, not that a man was, but that he had been, happy. Is it not therefore abſurd to think that, while he actually was happy, this epithet could not be applied to him, becauſe of the viciſſitudes of life to which he was expoſed? If happineſs changes with fortune, it will be as variable as the colours of the camelion. But this is not true: for the propriety of our conduct depends, not on our fortune, but on our manner of uſing it; and virtuous energies are the genuine ſource of happineſs, as the vicious are of miſery. This is atteſted by the queſtion juſt ſtarted concerning the importance of ſtability to happineſs.

The peculiar ſtability of virtuous energies.

Of all human things, habitual energies of virtue are the moſt ſtable; they are more permanent than even the ſciences; and of the virtues themſelves, the moſt valuable are the firmeſt; forming the continual meditation and delight of thoſe whom they adorn. For this reaſon, they alone are not liable to be forgotten or loſt; but are an immoveable property in the thoughts and life of a good man; who, whatever may befal him, will behave gracefully; approving his conduct exact, ſquare, and blameleſs. Slight misfortunes are unable to ſhakehis well-balanced happineſs; but, in

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in the uſe of a great proſperity, his excellence will ſhine more conſpicuous: and when perſecuted by painful and afflicting calamity, which not only impedes his preſent exertions, but darkens his future proſpects, his worth will irradiate the gloom, while he reſiſts and ſurmounts the ſevereſt ſufferings, not by ſtupid inſenſibility, but by generous magnanimity; for, if our own actions be the ſovereign arbiters of our lot, a virtuous man can never be wretched; becauſe he will never render himſelf an object either of hatred or contempt. Of the circumſtances in which he is placed, he will always make the beſt and moſt honourable uſe; as a good general, and a good artiſt, employs the forces, and the materials, with which they are reſpectively entruſted, always to the beſt advantage. A happineſs founded on ſuch a baſis, can never ſink into miſery; although it muſt be ſhaken by tragic misfortunes, from which it will not ſoon recover its natural ſtate. Yet, in conſequence of virtuous exertions, continued through a ſufficient length of time, a good man, competently furniſhed with the accommodations of life, will reſume his wonted ſerenity; and may be pronounced happy, notwithſtanding the viciſſitudes to which he is ſtill expoſed; at leaſt poſſeſſed of ſuch happineſs as is conſiſtent with the condition of humanity.

Chap. II.

How the dead are affected by the condition of the living.

We are not therefore to aſcribe happineſs only to the dead, (for thus Solon's ſentiment is commonly underſtood,) eſpecially ſince to ſuppoſe that the dead are totally inſenſible to the misfortunes of their kinſmen and friends on earth, is neither conformable to common opinion, nor conſiſtent with the ſocial principles belonging to human nature. It would be endleſs to enumerate and deſcribe the various forms of calamity and woe, by the differences of which even the living are very differently

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differently affected; but the ſympathy of the dead with ſuch miſeries, bears leſs proportion to that of the living, than the ſympathy of ſpectators at the theatre bears to that of ſpectators in the real tragedies of life. It may deſerve conſideration, whether the dead at all participate in the good or bad fortune of their living friends; but if they do, it is reaſonable to think that the events of this world affect them too ſlightly, to render ſuch of them as are miſerable happy, or thoſe that are happy miſerable.

Chap. 12.

That happineſs is above praiſe.

Let us proceed then to determine whether happineſs be the object of praiſe, or rather of honour; for it is plain that its nature is not doubtful, and that it never can be blamed or deſpiſed. That only is an object of praiſe, which is endowed with certain qualities or habits, that naturally terminate in ſome ſalutary effect. For this reaſon we commend juſtice and courage, as well as ſtrength and ſwiftneſs, and every virtue; but the praiſes which belong to men, are ridiculous when applied to the gods, whoſe perfections are the objects of emotions of a higher nature; we bleſs and honour and magnify them; and even thoſe things which, from ſome reſemblance to them, are called divine. Happineſs, therefore, is exalted above praiſe, by the excellence and divinity of its nature. Wherefore Eudoxus[e] ingeniouſly defended the pretenſions of pleaſure to be called the ſovereign good; ſaying, that it was confeſſedly not the object of praiſe, and therefore ſomething better. But praiſe properly belongs to virtue, the only ſource of thoſe exertions of mind or body on which juſt encomiums are beſtowed; to examine which particularly, belongs to the ſubject of Rhetoric.

[e] Eudoxus, the ſcholar of Plato, and legiſlator of his countrymen, the Cnidians.—He is again mentioned by our author in the tenth book of his Ethics.

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toric. This, then, is clear, that the value of happineſs is not relative, but abſolute; it is complete and perfect in itſelf; and, being the ultimate end to which all praiſe-worthy things are referred, is itſelf the object, not of praiſe, but of veneration and honour [f].

Chap. 13.

The knowledge of the mind a neceſſary preparation for moral ſcience.

But ſince happineſs reſults from virtuous energies, by examining the nature of virtue, we ſhall be more likely to underſtand that of happineſs. The true ſtateſman is chiefly ſolicitous about virtue, exerting himſelf to the utmoſt to inſpire his fellow-citizens with a reſpectful deference for good laws. Such were the legiſlators of Crete and of Sparta; and others, perhaps, who were animated by the ſame enlightened principles of public ſpirit. To inveſtigate the nature of virtue belongs to every liberal ſyſtem of politics, and therefore to our preſent ſubject, of which human happineſs is the end, and human virtue the means; underſtanding, thereby, the virtue of the mind, in the exerciſe of which happineſs conſiſts. The true ſtateſman therefore ought to know the mind, as much, or rather more, (becauſe his purſuit is ſtill more excellent,) than the phyſician does the body; and we ſee that the more liberal ſort of phyſicians beſtow no ſmall pains in gaining an accurate knowledge of the latter. To enter into ſpeculations, not connected with practice, is

[f] This ſubject is explained more clearly in the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. i. p. 203. The author diſcriminates the words ευχωμαι επαινος and ευδαιμονισμος: the firſt of which applies to particular actions; the ſecond to habits; and the third to the ends and enjoyments which are thereby accompliſhed or attained. The Engliſh language does not admit of ſuch nice diſtinctions; and ευδαιμονισμος, "beatification," is an appropriate term in the Romiſh church, which could not, without doing violence, be diſtorted to a philoſophical ſenſe.

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is beſide our preſent purpoſe. We ſhall make uſe of that diſtinction between powers rational and irrational, which is ſufficiently explained in our popular diſcourſes, without inquiring whether theſe two are ſeparable from each other, like the parts of the body and every thing diviſible, or whether they be two merely to the intellectual eye, though as incapable of corporeal diviſion as are the convexity and concavity of the ſame circle [ε]. The irrational powers of the ſoul are diſtinguiſhable into different kinds. Thoſe which contribute to nutrition and growth are the ſame in man arrived at maturity, and in the child unborn, and even in plants. Any virtue belonging to them cannot be dignified with the epithet of human, ſince their energies are moſt perfect in ſleep, during the total inactivity of thoſe higher powers, by which men are peculiarly characteriſed and individually diſtinguiſhed; wherefore it is ſaid, that for nearly one half of their lives, the ſame lot befals the good and the bad, the happy and the miſerable; except that, in conſequence of ſome remains of wakeful motions, the dreams of the former will commonly be more agreeable. But enough of this, which is foreign to our preſent ſubject. There is another part of the ſoul, which, though irrational itſelf, is capable of combining with reaſon;

Our moral powers compounded of the rational and irrational principles of our nature.

ε διαφερει δε ουδεν ουδε ει μεριστη ἡ ψυχη, ουδε ει αμερης· εχει μεντοι δυναμεις διαφορους. Eudem. l. ii. c. i. p. 204. Ariſtotle ſays, that it makes not any difference as to the preſent ſubject, whether the ſoul be diviſible or indiviſible; it is ſufficient that it have diſtinct powers or faculties; that is, diſtinct principles to which all the complicated operations of the mind, and all the wide variety of human action may be traced. It will not be eaſy to point out what improvement has been made ſince the days of Ariſtotle, either in the inveſtigation of thoſe principles from the phenomena, or in the application of them when diſcovered, to explain the highly-diverſified operations obſervable in the intellectual and moral world.

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reaſon; and, when thus combined, is virtuous and praiſe-worthy. This appears in perſons endowed with ſelf-command, but not completely confirmed in that habit. Reaſon exhorts them to prefer the better part, but another power impels them to the contrary ſide, and violently reſiſts reaſon; in the ſame manner as limbs affected by the palſy refuſe obedience to our determinations, and aſſume one direction when we wiſh them to move in another. A ſimilar reſiſting power exiſts in the mind, though the falſe motion impreſſed by it is not perceptible to the ſenſes. This power, though irrational [h], is capable of combining with reaſon, and ſubmitting to its control, as appears in men endowed with ſelf-command [i] or continency, and ſtill more in thoſe whoſe minds are harmoniſed by temperance. The appetites therefore are of a higher order than the mere powers of growth and nutrition, becauſe they are capable of liſtening to reaſon, as children do to their parents, whoſe admonitions they underſtand and obey, in a ſenſe quite different from that in which they afterwards underſtand and know mathematical truths. If we chooſe to call alſo this part of the ſoul rational, there will then be two different principles of reaſon in the mind, the firſt of which poſſeſſes reaſon abſolutely in itſelf, whereas the ſecond is only capable of harkening to the reaſon of another. On this diſtinction,

[h] This power, he ſays, is ſomething different from reaſon, but how different it is unneceſſary to inquire; which relates to what is explained above.

[i] Self-command or continency, in Greek ἐγκρατεια, implies that a man is impelled by corrupt appetites, which he has ſtrength of mind ſufficient to reſiſt; temperance, in Greek σωφροσυνη, implies that his appetites have been ſo thoroughly ſubdued by cuſtom and reaſon, that they no longer have any tendency to rebel. This latter, in its higheſt perfection, is that delightful harmony of ſoul in which our moral improvement terminates.

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BOOK I.

diſtinction, the diviſion of the virtues into the intellectual and moral, is founded. Wiſdom, intelligence, and prudence belong to the former claſs; liberality and temperance to the latter. In reference to morals, we do not ſay that a man is wiſe or intelligent, but that he is meak or temperate. Good men are praiſed for good habits; and all praiſe-worthy habits are called virtues.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK II.

THE moſt profound as well as the moſt elegant of all modern writers on the ſubject of political Ethics, the immortal Grotius, in his treatiſe on the laws of war and peace, obſerves, that Ariſtotle holds the firſt rank among philoſophers, whether we eſtimate him by the perſpicuity of his method, the acuteneſs of his diſtinctions, or the weight and ſolidity of his arguments[a]. This criticiſm is fully juſtified by the book before us, in which our author treats of the nature of moral virtue, ſhews by what means it is acquired, proves by an accurate induction that it conſiſts in the habit of mediocrity, and lays down three practical rules for its attainment. This part of his work will bear that trial which he regards as the teſt of excellence; "it requires not any addition, and it will not admit of retrenchment." The objections made to it, as falling ſhort of the purity and ſublimity of Chriſtian morality, will equally apply to all the diſcoveries of human reaſon, when compared with "that divine light which, coming into the world, gives, or offers, light to every man in it[b]. But the critics who make objections[c] to Ariſtotle, would urge

[a] Grotius in Prolegom. [b] John, c. i. v. 9.

[c] See ſome of them ſtated in Grotii Prolegom. de Jure Belli & Pacis.

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BOOK II.

urge them with leſs confidence, if they attended to two remarks on which our author often inſiſts; firſt, that practical matters admit not of ſcientific or logical accuracy; ſecondly, that the virtues of which he is in queſt, are all of them merely relative to the condition and exigencies of man in political ſociety, being thoſe habits, acquired by our own exertion, in which, when confirmed, we ſhall uniformly act our parts on the theatre of the world, uſefully, agreeably, and gracefully. In Ariſtotle's philoſophy, man is the judge of man; in Chriſtianity, the judge of man is God. Philoſophy confines itſelf to the periſhing intereſts of the preſent world; Chriſtianity, looking beyond thoſe intereſts, takes a loftier aim, inſpires the mind with nobler motives, and promiſes to adorn it with perfections, worthy of its ineſtimably valuable rewards. Yet to the man of piety, it may be a matter of edification, to compare the virtue of philoſophical firmneſs with the grace of Chriſtian patience; and to obſerve how nearly the rules diſcovered by reaſon and experience, as moſt conducive to the happineſs of our preſent ſtate, coincide with thoſe precepts which are given in the Goſpel in order to fit us for a better.

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BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

Moral virtues acquired by exercise and cuſtom—Conſiſt in holding the mean between blameable extremes—Teſt of virtue—The virtues, habits—The nature of theſe habits aſcertained—Why vices miſtaken for virtues, and converſely—Practical rules for the attainment of virtue.

BOOK II. Chap. 1.

VIRTUE being twofold, intellectual and moral, the former is produced and increaſed chiefly by inſtruction, and therefore requires experience and time; the latter is acquired by repeated acts or cuſtom, from which, by a ſmall change[d], its name is derived. None of the moral virtues, therefore, are implanted by nature; for properties given by nature, cannot be taken away or altered by cuſtom; thus the gravity of a ſtone, which naturally carries it downward, cannot be changed into levity, which would carry it upward, were we to throw it in that direction ten thouſand times; and fire, which naturally ſeeks the extremities, cannot be brought by cuſtom to have a tendency towards the center: nor, in a word, can any law of nature be altered by cuſtom. The moral virtues, therefore, are neither natural nor preternatural; we are born with capacities for acquiring them, but they can only be acquired by our own exertions. Powers, implanted by nature, precede in the order of exiſtence their operations; which is manifeſt with regard to the ſenſes. The powers of ſeeing and hearing are not acquired by repeated operations of thoſe faculties; but, on the contrary, they exiſted in us before we exerciſed them, and continue to exiſt

The moral virtues not implanted by nature.

Proof of this.

[d] ηθος ab εθος.

BOOK II.

They are acquired by exerciſe and cuſtom.

exiſt in us, though they ſhould ceaſe to be exerciſed. But the habit of moral virtue, like all other practical arts, can be acquired or preſerved by practice only. By building, we become architects; by harping, muſicians; and, in the ſame manner, by acts of juſtice, we become juſt; and by acts of courage, courageous. This is atteſted by what happens in whole nations; whoſe characters reſult from their conduct. All legiſlators wiſh to make virtuous and happy citizens: but they do not all attain this end; for the virtues are like the arts, acquired by a right, and deſtroyed by a wrong, practice. Architects and muſicians thus become good or bad; and if this were not the caſe, inſtruction would be ſuperfluous. The ſame holds in the virtues. By correctneſs, or the contrary, in our tranſactions with mankind, we become juſt or unjuſt; according to our behaviour in circumſtances of danger, our characters are formed to courage or cowardice; and in proportion as we indulge or reſtrain the excitements to anger and pleaſure, we become adorned with the habits of meekneſs and temperance, or deformed by thoſe of paſſionateneſs and profligacy. In one word, ſuch as our actions are, ſuch will our habits become. Actions, therefore, ought to be moſt diligently attended to; and it is not a matter of ſmall moment how we are trained from our youth; much depends on this, or rather all [c].

Chap. 2.

What are the rules by which our actions ought to be ſhaped in order to attain virtue.

Since the preſent treatiſe is not merely a theory, as other parts of our works, (for the inquiry is not "wherein virtue conſiſts," but "how it may beſt be attained," without which the ſpeculative knowledge of it is not of the ſmalleſt value,) we muſt begin by examining, by what rules our actions ought to be ſhaped, becauſe by them our habits and characters are moulded. That our conduct ought to be agreeable to right reaſon, may be

[c] The ſame ſubject is treated in the Magna Moralia, l. i. c. vi.; and in the Eudemian Ethics, l. ii. c. ii.

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be here assumed as an axiom; but it will afterwards be shewn what this right reason is, and what reference it has to the other virtues. Let us not forget, what was formerly observed, that practical matters admit not of logical precision; and that greater accuracy of language ought not to be expected, than is consistent with the nature of the subject. The propriety of action admits not of definite rules, any more than the exact quantity of food or exercise conducive to health. This observation holds true with regard to the science of morals as well as of medicines; but is peculiarly applicable to the particular cases belonging to both sciences; which cases are so dissimilar to each other, that it is impossible to include them under any common precept; and the man of morals, like the pilot and the physician, must comply with the exigencies of the moment, and vary his behaviour with the variation of circumstances. Notwithstanding this instability in the nature of the subject, we must endeavour to give some assistance to those who aim at virtue. First, then, it is worthy of remark, that propriety of conduct always consists in a mean or middle between two vicious extremes; and as the health and strength of our bodies visibly depend on a due proportion of food and exercise, equally remote from superabundance or penury; so is the health and vigour of our minds destroyed by superabundance or penury of those very things or qualities, by the due proportion of which those excellencies are acquired, maintained, or augmented. This we may perceive holds true with respect to courage, temperance, and every other virtue. He who flies from every danger, is a coward; he who rushes on every danger, is a madman; the man who indulges in every pleasure, is a voluptuary; and the man who, with rustic austerity, rejects the most allowable pleasures, may be justly charged with an insensibility misbecoming his nature. The virtues of courage and temperance, which are destroyed

That it consists in holding the mean between two vicious extremes.

This proved by induction.

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BOOK II.

ſtroyed by exceſs or deficiency, are therefore preſerved by mediocrity; and on obſerving this golden mean depend not only the origin and increaſe of the virtues[f], but the energy or operation by which their proper work is effected; for as a ſtrong conſtitution, which is produced or confirmed by much food and much exerciſe, enables a man to bear with ſafety a great meaſure of either; ſo, by reſiſting the temptations of pleaſure, we acquire temperance; and having become temperate, we can reſiſt ſuch temptations: by reſiſting the emotions of fear amidſt dangers, we acquire courage; and having become courageous, we are able to face dangers.

Chap. 3.

The ſureſt teſt of virtue is the pleaſure felt in exerciſing it.

The pleaſure or pain reſulting from acts of virtue, affords the beſt criterion concerning the confirmation of the habit. He who abſtains from bodily pleaſures, and rejoices in his temperance, is truly poſſeſſed of this virtue; he who grieves at his abſtinence is, on the other hand, a voluptuary. A man of courage faces dangers with pleaſure, at leaſt without pain; a coward, always with the latter. Moral virtue is therefore occupied about regulating our pleaſures and pains; for the love of pleaſure ſtimulates us to profligacy, and fear of pain withholds us from the path of honour. Plato ſays well, that right education conſiſts in teaching us to rejoice, and to grieve, at ſuch things as are the proper objects of thoſe emotions. Virtue is ſeen in affections and actions, all of which are accompanied either with pleaſure or with pain; and therefore virtue is neceſſarily converſant about pains and pleaſures; as is proved alſo by the neceſſity of rewards and puniſhments, which are moral medicines; and, like all other medicines, in their nature contrary to the diſeaſes which they are fitted to cure. Beſides, every

[f] Ariſtotle adds, "their deſtruction," which is produced by a departure from this mean, ſo that their energies have the ſame cauſes with their generation, augmentation, and deſtruction; only with regard to the laſt, theſe cauſes act in a contrary direction.

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every habit of the mind is intimately connected with thoſe things by which it is rendered better or worſe; which happens to virtue with regard to pleaſure and pain; for our morals are vitiated by purſuing or avoiding either of them with undue ardour; at improper times, in improper places, or on improper occaſions. The virtues, therefore, have been ſuppoſed to conſiſt in apathy; erroneouſly indeed, becauſe they conſiſt in the due regulation, not in the total extinction, of paſſion; and paſſion properly directed, is productive of happineſs; improperly, of miſery. For, as there are three objects naturally preferred, namely, honour, profit, and pleaſure; and three naturally ſhunned, namely, diſgrace, loſs, and pain; a virtuous man knows practically how to eſtimate the value of all thoſe things in their relation to human happineſs; a knowledge, of which the man enured to vicious habits is totally unſuſceptible. But the two characters are principally diſtinguiſhed by their various degrees of ſenſibility to the different kinds of pleaſure; the love of which is implanted in all animals, and of which one kind or other neceſſarily accompanies every object of preference; both profit and honour being purſued as pleaſures. Our natures indeed are deeply tinged, and as it were engrained, with the love of pleaſure, which, being nouriſhed and growing ſtronger with our frame, is moſt difficultly moderated; eſpecially when it has become the ſtandard by which things and actions are appreciated. The great buſineſs of morality, therefore, lies in reſtraining the undue purſuit of pleaſure, and the undue averſion to pain. As Heracleitus ſays, it is more difficult to contend with pleaſure than with anger; but the moſt difficult part is that beſt fitted for ſhewing the excellence of the performer. The moraliſt and ſtateſman, therefore, muſt bend their utmoſt attention towards regulating the behaviour of thoſe intruſted

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to their care, in thoſe particulars on which their merit or demerit chiefly depends. But enough has been ſaid to ſhew, that moral virtue is converſant about pains and pleaſures; that the actions from which it originally ſprings, either augment or deſtroy it, according as they are well or ill directed; and that the ſame good works to which its exiſtence is due, are thoſe in which it continues to be conſtantly employed.

Chap. 4.

Solution of a difficulty reſpecting the mode of acquiring virtue.

A doubt ariſes, why we ſhould ſay that men acquire juſtice by doing juſt actions, or become temperate by obſerving the rules of temperance; ſince, if they perform ſuch actions and obſerve ſuch rules, it ſhould ſeem that they muſt be already endowed with thoſe virtues; in the ſame manner as a man who writes or who performs according to the rules of grammar and muſic, is already a grammarian and a muſician. But this does not hold true even with reſpect to the arts; for a man may write grammar, merely by imitation, by chance, or by the direction of another; but to be a grammarian, he muſt himſelf underſtand the art. Beſides this, the perfection of works of art is in themſelves; but the whole merit of virtuous actions depends on the diſpoſition of the actor: firſt, that he performed them with knowledge; ſecondly, with deliberation and preference; thirdly, that he preferred and performed them on their own account; and laſtly, that he is firm and immovable in his virtuous reſolutions. The firſt of theſe requiſites only, viz. that of knowledge, is eſſential to the artiſt; but in conſtituting the character of a virtuous man, mere knowledge is of little avail, and the other three particulars of the greateſt: ſtability in virtuous practice reſults from repeated acts of virtue; in conſequence of which, not only thoſe acts are ſuch as a virtuous man would perform, but he who performs them is rightly diſpoſed, and virtuouſly affected. It is therefore truly ſaid, that we acquire juſtice and temperance

Four things requiſite to conſtitute a virtuous character.

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temperance from acting juſtly and temperately; ſince, independently of our own actions, we never could acquire thoſe virtues. But the multitude, neglecting practice, think to acquire virtue by theory; like thoſe patients who conſult phyſicians, but uſe none of their preſcriptions. Such phyſic will not benefit the body; nor ſuch philoſophy the mind.

Chap. 5.

That the virtues are neither paſſions nor capacities, but habits.

We muſt next examine, whether virtue be a paſſion, a faculty, or a habit; for theſe are three diſtinct principles in the mind. By paſſion, I mean every emotion accompanied with pain or pleaſure; as love, anger, fear, courage, envy, joy, friendſhip, hatred, tenderneſs, emulation, pity. By faculty, I mean, in this place, the capacity of being affected by thoſe paſſions; by anger, grief, or pity. By habit, I mean the habitude or relation which our minds bear to thoſe paſſions; as whether we are affected too much or too little by anger, both which are wrong; or affected by it moderately, on proper occaſions, which only is right: the ſame obſervation applies to all other paſſions. Neither the virtues nor the vices therefore can be paſſions; becauſe it is not in reference to the paſſions that we are denominated good or bad, and are regarded as the objects of praiſe or of blame. It is not our fear or anger ſimply, but the degree of thoſe paſſions, that conſtitutes the propriety or impropriety of our conduct; and renders us the juſt objects of commendation or reproach. Beſides, fear and anger, and all other paſſions, are emotions independent of our own deliberation and preference; but the virtues always imply an act of compariſon, and the preference of one ſort of conduct to another. Farther, we are ſaid to be moved and impelled by paſſion, but our characters are diſpoſed and ſettled by virtue; for which reaſon the virtues cannot be called capacities; and alſo, becauſe we are neither praiſed nor blamed in reference to our

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our being ſuſceptive or capable of paſſion. Theſe capacities, beſides, are implanted by nature; which the virtues, as we have already proved, are not. Since then they are neither paſſions nor faculties, it remains that they ſhould belong to that claſs called habits[g].

Chap. 6.

The nature of this habit aſcertained.

It is not enough to ſay that virtue is a habit; we muſt further aſcertain what is the nature of that habit. Every virtue, then, tends to conſtitute the perfection of that object to which it belongs, and to fit it for performing properly its peculiar functions. Thus, the virtue of the eye conſtitutes the perfection of that organ, and qualifies it for ſeeing diſtinctly: and the virtue of a horſe conſtitutes the perfection of that animal, and qualifies him for running ſwiftly, for bearing his rider, and for diſdaining fear at the approach of an enemy. The virtue of a man, therefore, muſt be that habit which conſtitutes the perfection of his nature; and fits him for performing properly his peculiar functions. How this habit is to be attained, we have explained already; but the matter will be rendered more perſpicuous by further examining the nature of virtue. From every thing continuous and diviſible, we may take the half, a greater part, or a leſſer. The half may be conſidered as the mean proportional between the extremes of too much and too little, from which it is equally remote; and conſidered in relation to the object itſelf, this mean proportional is always one and the ſame; but conſidered in relation to man, this juſt mean continually varies, becauſe the middle between the two vicious extremes of too much or too little is, in reference to him, that which is neither more nor leſs than propriety requires. Thus, if ten be the greater extreme, and two the leſſer, ſix muſt be the arithmetical

[g] The ſame ſubject is treated in Magna Moral. l. i. c. v.; and in the Eudemian Ethics, l. ii. c. iii.

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arithmetical mean, becauſe it exceeds the leſſer, as much as it is exceeded by the greater. But in regulating human actions, which, like all other motions, are things continuous and diviſible[h], the ſame ſimple rule will not apply: for two pounds may be too ſmall an allowance, and ten too large; yet he who directs the regimen of the wreſtlers, will not therefore preſcribe univerſally ſix pounds, which might be too little for Milo the wreſtler, though far too much for one beginning his exerciſes: the ſame thing holds as to the quantity of labour which he enjoins to be performed, in running, wreſtling, and the other branches of the gymnaſtic. Thus, he who is ſkilful in directing actions of any other kind, will carefully avoid exceſs or defect, but find out and prefer the golden mean; which is the object that every good artiſt always keeps in view, ſince the higheſt commendation of works of art conſiſts in ſaying that they admit neither of addition nor retrenchment. But virtue, which is the perfection of nature itſelf, is far ſuperior to art, which only imitates her operations, in aiming at the juſt mean between two vicious extremes. I ſpeak here of moral virtue, which is converſant about paſſions and actions, all of which admit of mediocrity, as well as of exceſs or defect. Thus we may be too much or too little affected, with deſire or averſion, courage or fear, anger or pity, pain or pleaſure. Both extremes are bad; and the paſſion is then only proper and correct, when we are affected ſuitably to its cauſes, its objects, and its ends: when this is the caſe, both the paſſion, and the action proceeding from it, are juſtly praiſed as virtuous; becauſe they do not deviate from the mark at which they ought to aim. The Pythagoreans, therefore, did well in aſſigning definite to the co-arrangement of

That the virtues do not admit of exceſs or of defect, nor the vices of mediocrity.

[h] ἡ μεν γαρ κινησις συνεχης· ἡ δε πρακτις κινησις, Eudem. l. ii. c. iii. p. 205.

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of good, and indefinite to that of evil[h]; for there is but one right road; but the ways of error are innumerable. The former is as difficult as the latter is eaſy; it is difficult to hit the mark, but eaſy to miſs it;

"Virtue is ſtill the ſame, but vice has various forms."

The former, therefore, is the habit of preferring and obſerving mediocrity in our paſſions and actions, agreeably to the rules of right reaſon: virtue then, in its eſſence, is mediocrity; in its effect, it is excellence, and the higheſt excellence[i]. But neither all paſſions nor all actions admit of mediocrity; for there are many whoſe very names infer exceſs and blame; as the paſſions of impudence, malice, and envy; and the actions of adultery, theft, and murder. Such paſſions and ſuch actions are in themſelves deteſtable exceſſes: and for the ſame reaſon, there cannot be any mediocrity in cowardice, injuſtice, or intemperance; nor any exceſs or defect in the virtues of courage or wiſdom; nor univerſally can mediocrity or virtue admit of exceſs

[h] See Analyſis, p. 112.

[i] This is the cleareſt meaning I can affix to κατα το ιν αμεσοτης. But Ariſtotle when he calls virtue, in one ſenſe, an extreme, ſeems to allude to what is ſaid in his ſecond Analytics concerning the ὁροι συμπερασματικοι, the termini concluſorii, and the difference between them and definitions, ſhewing the eſſence, that is, the cauſe which makes any thing to be what it is. Thus, What is it to ſquare an oblong? This queſtion may be anſwered, or in other words, the ſquaring may be defined by ſaying, either that it is to find a ſquare equal to an oblong; or, that it is to find a line which is a geometrical mean between the ſides of the oblong. The former definition is called συμπερασματικος, becauſe when the mathematician demonſtrates, that the ſquare conſtructed on a line, which is the mean proportional between the ſides of the oblong, is equal to that oblong, he draws the concluſion, "a ſquare, therefore, is found equal to an oblong:" but the ſecond definition tells, not only that the ſquare is equal to the oblong, but the cauſe which makes it to be ſo. In the ſame manner, when we call virtue the higheſt excellence or perfection of any object, we only tell, in other words, what is meant by virtue; but when we call it mediocrity, we define it by its eſſence, and ſhew the cauſe which makes it to be the higheſt excellence.

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That all the virtues consist in mediocrity, proved by induction.

exceſs or defect; nor the vices, which are all of them extremes, admit of a virtuous mediocrity.

In practical morality, general principles are of little uſe, unleſs they be applied to particulars, in which all practice conſiſts, and by which all general principles muſt, if true, be confirmed. Let the various paſſions or emotions therefore be arranged in a diagram[k], and we ſhall ſee that the degree of them conſiſtent with propriety always lies in the middle between two blamable extremes. Thus, in encountering or avoiding dangers, courage holds the middle place between raſhneſs and timidity: in obeying or reſiſting ſolicitations to pleaſure, temperance holds the middle place between voluptuouſneſs, and a vice which, being uncommon, is nameleſs, but which we ſhall call unfeeling apathy. In pecuniary matters, liberality is the mean between extravagance and parſimony. The prodigal is too careleſs in throwing away money, and at too little pains to acquire it. The miſer pays exceſſive attention to the acquiſition of money, and exceſſive attention to the keeping of it. There are other qualities relating to money, as magnificence with its contrary extremes of niggardlineſs and waſteful profuſion; which diſtinctions will be afterwards explained[l]. As to honour and diſhonour, magnanimity is the middle term between boaſtful pride and mean-ſpirited abaſement; and there is another quality or habit which bears the ſame proportion to magnanimity which liberality does to magnificence, conſiſting in the propriety of our affection with reſpect to ſmall and ordinary marks of honour,

[k] The diagram, or delineation, which is here wanting, may be partly ſupplied from Ethic. Eudem. l. ii. c. iii. for even there it is extremely incomplete.

[l] In the firſt chapters of the Fourth Book.

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BOOK II.

nour, whereas magnanimity conſiſts in the propriety of our affection with reſpect to thoſe which are great and extraordinary. In the common intercourſe of life, men are diſtinguiſhed by too much or too little deſire of honour; the exceſs and the defect are both marked by names [m], but the intermediate and praiſeworthy degree of the affection is nameleſs; wherefore the extremes contend with each other about the middle place; and, as either happens to obtain it, we praiſe a decent pride or a becoming humility. The reaſon of this incongruity in our judgments will be afterwards explained: we proceed at preſent according to our propoſed plan. With regard to anger, ſome men are too ſuſceptible, and others too unſuſceptible of this paſſion; and others commonly indulge it only in that degree which is laudable. Theſe different diſpoſitions or habits are not accurately diſtinguiſhed by names. We ſhall call the intermediate and proper degree of the affection meekneſs; which inclines, however, more to the extreme of phlegmatic endurance, than to that of immoderate iraſcibility. There are three other virtues or proprieties, which, though different, are yet nearly allied to each other, and all of them diſtinguiſhable in the ordinary intercourſe of words and actions; bearing different relations, the one to truth, and the other to pleaſure; and that which relates to pleaſure, either confined to matters of paſtime and amuſement only, or comprehending all the complicated buſineſſes of life, whether they be gay or ſerious. Neither theſe proprieties themſelves, nor the various and contrary deviations from them, are accurately diſtinguiſhed by names; but it is neceſſary that they

[m] The perſons diſtinguiſhed by the exceſs and defect, were called φιλοτιμοι and αφιλοτιμοι: but there was only one of theſe adjectives, which afforded an abſtract φιλοτιμια, denoting the diſpoſition or habit.

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they ſhould here be conſidered, in order to ſhew that the praiſe-worthy habit in trivial as well as in important actions, always lies in the middle between two blameable extremes; and as names are wanting, we muſt, as in other caſes, take the liberty of making them, both for the ſake of perſpicuity, and to keep unbroken the connexion of our diſcourſe. In the habit or diſpoſition relative to the true exhibition of our characters in word and action, let the propriety or virtue which lies in the middle be called plain-dealing; and the impropriety or vice, by which we aſſume good qualities which do not belong to us, be called oſtentation; and that, by which we diveſt ourſelves of the good qualities with which we are really endowed, be called diſſimulation or irony. In matters relating to pleaſure and merriment, there is a virtue in facetiouſneſs; buffoonery is the impropriety on the one ſide, and ruſtic ſimplicity on the other. In the more ſerious concerns of life, but which have ſtill pleaſure for their object, the virtue of companionable friendlineſs is diſtinguiſhed, on the one hand, from quarrelſome moroſeneſs; and, on the other, both from unmeaning officiouſneſs, and intereſted flattery. Even in mere affections which do not exert themſelves either in words or deeds, modeſty is praiſed as holding the middle place between baſhful timidity, and frontleſs aſſurance. An honeſt indignation at the proſperity of the worthleſs is eaſily diſtinguiſhable, both from envy which pines at the proſperity of all alike, and from that depraved pleaſure which none but the moſt vicious can receive from beholding the unmerited ſucceſs of artful villany or ruffian violence[a]. But concerning thoſe habits,

[a] νεμεσητικια in the Latin verſions is tranſlated *malevolentia*, which does not at all expreſs Ariſtotle's meaning: malevolence wiſhes ill to all mankind, even to the good, and therefore is grieved at their proſperity; but the vice here ſpoken of is that depraved

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BOOK II.

habits, we ſhall treat more fully hereafter, and alſo concerning juſtice, which muſt be divided into two kinds, before we can diſtinguiſh wherein the propriety of each kind conſiſts; and likewiſe concerning the intellectual virtues.

Chap. 8.

Why vices are often miſtaken for virtues; and converſely.

Of thoſe three diſpoſitions or habits, of which that in the middle is only right, the extremes are contrary to, and at variance with, each other, and alſo with the virtue which lies between them. For as in a line divided into equal, and alſo unequal, parts, the half is great when compared with the ſmaller diviſion, but ſmall when compared with the greater; ſo of human paſſions and actions, their proper and moderate degree appears an exceſs or defect juſt as it happens to be compared with either extreme. To the fool-hardy, courage appears cowardice; and to the coward, raſhneſs*. The voluptuary deems temperance inſenſibility; and the ſpendthrift calls liberality avarice; each puſhing the extreme, which happens to form part of his own character, into the place of honour. It is worthy of remark, that the extremes are not only more contrary to each other than either of them is to the middle, but alſo that one of them often bears a falſe reſemblance to this middle, and is frequently miſtaken for it. Thus raſhneſs often paſſes for bravery, and profuſion for liberality: but cowardice is never miſtaken for courage, nor voluptuouſneſs for temperance; although temperance is

depraved pleaſure which wicked men take in beholding the ſucceſs of arts like to their own. In this ſenſe only, Ariſtotle could ſay νεμεσις ἐστι μεσοτης φθονου και ἐπιχαιρεκακιας, that indignation was the middle between envy and the vice here ſpecified: for envy grieves at proſperity well merited, but ἐπιχαιρεκακια rejoices at proſperity unmerited; which are two extremes equally remote from that affection by which we rejoice at the proſperity of good men, and grieve at the proſperity of the wicked.

* Ariſtotle ſays, that the courageous man, compared with the coward, ſeems fool-hardy, and therefore the coward calls him raſh.

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is ſometimes called inſenſibility, and inſenſibility temperance. This irregularity proceeds from two cauſes; firſt, the one extreme is really nearer than the other to that proper affection which lies between them. Raſhneſs is nearer than cowardice to the virtue of courage; and therefore cowardice, the moſt diſtant extreme, is moſt properly oppoſed to courage. The ſecond cauſe is, that mankind in general being more inclined to one extreme than the other, thoſe vices to which we are naturally moſt prone, are moſt the objects of our blame as well as of our attention. Thus, with regard to pleaſure, moſt men are prone to err rather on the ſide of indulgence, than on that of abſtinence. Voluptuouſneſs therefore is the vice naturally oppoſed to temperance [p].

Chap. 9.

Practical rules for the attainment of propriety of affection and action.

Enough has been ſaid to ſhew that virtue conſiſts in mediocrity. But this middle point, either in paſſions or actions, it is not eaſy to hit; for, as a man muſt have ſome knowledge in geometry to find the centre of a circle, ſo it belongs not to thoſe ignorant of Ethics to obſerve the rules of propriety. Every one is capable of being angry, or of giving away money; but how much, when, to whom, in what manner, and for what end or purpoſe, are queſtions which it is not eaſy for every one to reſolve; and of which, as the proper ſolution is extremely rare, ſo it is highly praiſeworthy. He, therefore, who would not err widely from the point of propriety, muſt make it his firſt care to keep at a diſtance from the moſt blameable extreme; and as Calypſo adviſes,

"Steer by the higher rock; leſt whirled around
We ſink, beneath the circling eddy drown'd [q]."

In

[p] The ſame thoughts are expreſſed in other words, and illuſtrated by other examples, in the Ethics to Eudemus, l. ii. c. v.

[q] Pope's Iliad, b. xii. v. 263, 264. But Ulyſſes, and not Calypſo, ſays this, Il. xii. v. 108.

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In doing this we ſhall imitate the ſkilful pilot who, when he cannot hold the courſe which he deſires, ſails the neareſt to it poſſible; and of two evils prefers the leaſt. We ought next to conſider to which of the two extremes or faults we are moſt prone; for different men are more or leſs eaſily beſet by different faults or vices, and what theſe are by which each is moſt liable to be entangled, he will beſt diſcover by attending to the pleaſure which he has in indulging, or the pain in reſtraining them. In order to correct his character, he muſt bend it, in a contrary direction, as we ſtraighten a crooked ſtick; but, above all, he muſt beware of the blandiſhments of pleaſure, of which we are ſeldom impartial or uncorrupt judges: treating this fair enchantreſs, as the aged ſenators in Homer did the beautiful Helen, whoſe words on this occaſion cannot be too often repeated, nor their example too ſtrictly imitated.

> "They cry'd, no wonder, ſuch celeſtial charms
> For nine long years have ſet the world in arms;
> What winning graces! what majeſtic mien!
> She moves a goddeſs, and ſhe looks a queen!
> *Yet hence, Oh, Heaven! convey that fatal face,*
> *And from deſtruction ſave the Trojan race*[r]."

By thus baniſhing pleaſure, we ſhall be leſs liable to error. Such, briefly, are the precepts by which propriety of affection and action may be attained; a thing for which it is extremely difficult to lay down general rules, which are at all applicable to the indefinite variety of particular caſes; and to aſcertain, for inſtance, with whom we ought to be angry, how long, to what degree, and for what reaſons or purpoſes. Sometimes we praiſe the defect, and call inſenſibility meekneſs; ſometimes we praiſe the exceſs, and call iraſcibility manhood. He who deviates

[r] Iliad, iii. v. 203, &c.

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deviates but a little from the middle point, commonly escapes blame; great deviations become perceptible, but the precise degrees of blame which they respectively merit cannot be accurately expressed in words; and in such practical matters[a], common sense is the sole and ultimate judge. This only is certain, that mediocrity is always praiseworthy; and that, in order to attain it, we must, for the reasons above given, incline ourselves, according to circumstances, sometimes to the one extreme, and sometimes to the other.

[a] In things perceptible by sense, or objects of sensation, as contradistinguished from objects of intellection; in which latter only, accuracy is attainable. See above, p. 141.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK III.

In this Book, Ariſtotle examines the ſpecific diſtinctions between moral virtue and other habits of the mind. The habit of moral virtue implies the deliberate preference of one kind of conduct to another; and deliberate preference implies freedom of choice. Thoſe actions are voluntary, which have their principle in ourſelves; thoſe are involuntary, which proceed from an external cauſe. Building on accurate definitions and ſolid diſtinctions, the philoſopher proves, with equal perſpicuity and energy, that our moral conduct is the proper object of praiſe or blame, of reward or puniſhment. His reaſonings and ſpeculations ſoar above and ſuperſede the abſtruſe, or rather the frivolous queſtion, introduced by his perverters the ſchoolmen, concerning the freedom of the human will; a queſtion which continued to be agitated, long after their other ſubtilties were condemned to oblivion. With Ariſtotle, all will is free-will; ſince nothing can be more free than that which is voluntary: and although ſome actions originating in ourſelves are conſidered as of a mixed nature, becauſe they are performed reluctantly, though ſpontaneouſly, this happens merely becauſe, of two evils, we naturally chooſe the leaſt: ſuch actions, how contrary ſoever to our will in their own nature, being nevertheleſs volun-

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tary in reference to the unfortunate circumſtances in which we happen to be placed.

His work, hitherto, proceeds with great regularity. He began by proving that the happineſs of man conſiſts in the exerciſe of the moral and intellectual virtues; or, in his own technical language, "that happineſs is energy directed in the line of virtue." As his definition of happineſs implies an acquaintance with the nature of virtue, and the knowledge of virtue implies that of the mind in which this habit reſides, he explains the different parts or principles of the mind, whether rational or irrational; ſhewing that both principles neceſſarily co-operate in the acquirement of good moral habits, as well as in the approbation of good moral characters. This ſyſtem is totally different from that which regards morality as founded ſolely or ultimately on feeling; whether a moral ſenſe, ſympathy, or any other modification of merely ſenſitive nature; an abſurd doctrine, liable to groſs and dangerous perverſion; and which has often been employed to juſtify, and even to produce the wildeſt practical errors. Having explained his theory of Ethics, the Author proceeds to the practice; and concludes this Book with the examination of courage and temperance.

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BOOK III.

ARGUMENT.

Moral election and preference.—Our habits voluntary.—Courage.—Its different kinds distinguished.—Temperance.—Natural and adventitious wants.—Comparison of intemperance and cowardice.

BOOK III. Chap. 1.

What is meant by the epithet voluntary as applied to human actions.

VIRTUE is relative to passions and actions; of which, those only which are voluntary, are the objects of praise or blame; and those which are involuntary, are the objects always of pardon, and sometimes of pity. In treating of virtue, therefore, it is necessary clearly to explain what is meant by the epithets *voluntary* and *involuntary*; the force of which words ought to be fully understood by legislators, when they establish rewards and punishments. Those actions and those crimes, then, are involuntary, which are either done by compulsion, or committed through ignorance. We are said to act or move by compulsion, when the principle of action or motion is not in ourselves, but external; as when we are driven before the force of the wind, or impelled by strength greater than our own. But it is doubtful whether those evils are voluntary which we either encounter through motives of honour, or endure through the fear of greater calamities. Thus, if a tyrant commands us to commit some act of baseness, having in his power our parents and children, whose fate depends on our obedience; and when sailors or merchants in a storm throw their goods overboard to save their lives; such actions are of a mixed nature, but rather voluntary, because, at the moment of doing them, they are matters of choice; and the true motive to any action is that by

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which we are actuated at the time of performing it. Beſides, the principle of motion is in ourſelves, and may be exerted or not at pleaſure. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary in reference to the unfortunate circumſtances in which we are placed, though independently of thoſe circumſtances they are much againſt our will; and therefore, conſidered abſolutely, are involuntary.

Actions of this mixed kind are ſometimes the objects of high panegyric, when we boldly encounter pain and diſgrace for the ſake of great and honourable advantages: and when we decline this conflict, we often render ourſelves the objects of reproach. But to encounter difficulties and diſgrace without the expectancy of honour or advantage, is the part only of a fool. On other occaſions, though we receive not any praiſe, yet we meet with pardon, when our virtue yields to terrors too powerful for the weakneſs of humanity: but the degree in which it yields, is ſtill in our power; for there are ſome criminal acts to which neither threats nor violence can ever compel thoſe who, rather than commit them, would ſuffer the moſt wretched death. In Euripides' Alcmæon, the reaſons for which that hero ſays he is forced to commit matricide, are only worthy of ridicule.

It is difficult to determine what goods are to be preferred, and what evils are to be encountered; and ſtill more difficult in time of action and danger to adhere firmly to our predetermined reſolutions. For the moſt part, men are forced to ſuffer diſgrace, only for the ſake of avoiding pain; and as theſe evils are of a different kind, it is not eaſy fairly to compare, and exactly to appretiate them: but when pain is preferred to diſgrace, our manlineſs is praiſed; when diſgrace is preferred to pain, our effeminacy is blamed. On the whole then, what actions are compulſory? Are they thoſe only whoſe principle is external,

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and in which the immediate agent has not any voluntary ſhare? Or, ſhall we call thoſe actions compulſory, which, though matters of choice relatively to the unfortunate circumſtances in which we are placed, are yet, when conſidered in themſelves, abſolutely againſt our will? We ſay, that ſuch acts ought to be conſidered rather as voluntary, becauſe all actions being converſant about particulars only, muſt depend on circumſtances, and leave room for the preference of one motive to another. If it ſhould be ſaid that pleaſures and honours conſiſting in things external to ourſelves, the actions performed for their attainment, are alſo compulſory, all actions whatever would then deſerve this epithet, becauſe all proceed from ſuch motives. But it is abſurd to accuſe pleaſure, which cannot be the object either of puniſhment or blame; and not ourſelves, who are too eaſily ſeduced by it; and equally abſurd to conſider ourſelves as the cauſe of our good actions, and pleaſure as the cauſe of our bad ones. Thoſe actions only, therefore, are properly compulſory, whoſe principle lies without, and which are totally independent of our own voluntary co-operation.

We ſaid that crimes committed through ignorance are involuntary. But this aſſertion is not univerſally true; for thoſe only are involuntary, which produce pain and repentance. He who has committed a wickedneſs through ignorance, and feels no compunction for the act, cannot be ſaid indeed to have done voluntarily what he did not intend; nor, on the other hand, is his action involuntary, ſince he feels not any uneaſineſs for the commiſſion of it. But as *his* action is *involuntary* who repents; *his*, who repents not, may be called *not voluntary*: that things of different natures may be expreſſed by different names. A diſtinction is alſo to be made, between acting *through* ignorance and

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BOOK III.

and *with* ignorance. A man drunk, or in a paſſion, is guilty of violence *through* intoxication or anger, not *through* ignorance, though ignorantly; and every bad man is ignorant of what things it is his duty either to do or to avoid; an ignorance profound and univerſal, inſeparably connected with his pravity of will and election, and therefore inexcuſable. But in the particular actions, which, becauſe committed through ignorance, ſeem entitled to pardon or pity, it will often be uſeful to diſtinguiſh, between the agent and the action, its ſubject, end, the manner how, and the inſtrument with which it is performed. None but a madman can be ignorant with regard to all thoſe particulars. In whatever he has done, every one in his ſenſes muſt know that he himſelf was the agent; but he may not know that he was doing wrong; as thoſe who blab in ſpeaking, beg pardon for words which eſcaped them unintentionally; or, as Æſchylus[t] profaned the myſtical terms, not knowing them to be ſuch; and, in actions, a man ſhowing a catapult, diſcharged that formidable engine; and Meropé would have ſlain her own ſon, taking him for an enemy; poiſons have been given inſtead of remedies; ſome perſons have been killed by thoſe who inſtructed them in their exerciſes; and others have been ſlain with ſpears thought to be blunted, or with ſtones miſtaken for pumice. The reſult of ſuch actions being totally different from what the agents intended, they are juſtly deemed involuntary, when accompanied with pain and repentance; whereas thoſe actions ſeem moſt voluntary, which not only proceed from our own movements, but which are begun, carried on, and terminated

t Æſchylus was acquitted by the Areopagus for divulging ſome expreſſions uſed in the myſteries, having proved that he was not initiated, and therefore did not know what he ſaid. Clemens Alexandrin. ſtrom. ii.

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terminated with a clear perception or knowledge of their real nature and end. To which of the two claſſes then ſhall we aſcribe things done through anger or appetite? If we call them involuntary, brute animals, and children, who are yet incapable of reaſon, can never act voluntarily. But appetite and anger are principles of human nature, as well as reaſon itſelf; and when they prompt us to act amiſs, are not leſs voluntary than when they prompt us to act properly; to repel injuries, and to defend our perſons; to gratify hunger which promotes health, or to gratify curioſity which promotes knowledge. That which is involuntary is painful, but the gratification of our natural appetites is highly pleaſing. Beſides, what does it import us to ſay, that things done in paſſion are leſs voluntary than thoſe done on reflection, ſince guilty tranſports of paſſion ought to be as carefully avoided and ſhunned as deliberate villainy? The actions of man too often proceed from anger or concupiſcence; which irrational impulſes, being moving principles in the human frame, cannot, without abſurdity, be conſidered as involuntary [y].

Chap. 2.

Of moral election and preference.

Having thus diſtinguiſhed actions and paſſions as voluntary and involuntary, we next proceed to treat of that intentional election or preference of one plan of conduct to another, which ſeems, ſtill more than actions themſelves, to compoſe the nature and eſſence of virtue, and to conſtitute the diſtinction of characters. This election or preference is not only voluntary, but ſomething more [z]; for it belongs not to brute animals and children,

[y] See Magna Moralia, b. i. c. xiii.; and Ethic. Eudem. b. ii. c. vii.

[z] ετι πλειον το εκουσιον. "Voluntary," is an epithet of more extenſive application. It applies to actions that are not "deliberate." Moral election therefore implies ſomething more than merely what is "voluntary."

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BOOK III.

children, whoſe actions are voluntary; nor to voluntary acts done ſuddenly, with ſuch precipitate haſte as leaves not any time for compariſon, election, or choice. Thoſe who name it inclination, paſſion, or opinion, ſeem to miſtake its nature. For the paſſions, whether founded in anger or concupiſcence, are common to man with the brute creation; but this election or preference is peculiar to himſelf. The intemperate man acts from paſſion, without election; but the man of true temperance acts from election, without paſſion[y]. The calm motive, by which he is actuated, is a thing ſo different from paſſion or deſire, that it is frequently ſet in direct oppoſition to them: but deſire cannot be oppoſed to deſire, nor any one paſſion to itſelf. Pleaſure and pain are the ultimate moving principles which ſet all the deſires and paſſions to work, but the actions of good men depending on a higher cauſe, do not obey their impulſe. Neither ought this intentional preference or election to be confounded with mere inclinations or wiſhes, though it appears to be nearly connected with them. We may wiſh for things impoſſible, as immortality; or things not depending on ourſelves, as that ſuch a player or wreſtler may gain the prize. But to prefer impoſſibilities, is the part only of a madman; and moral election or choice implies, that the goods preferred may be obtained by our own exertions. Beſides, our wiſhes relate principally to ends; our preferences, to means: we wiſh for health,

[y] ὁ ακρατης επιθυμων μεν πραττει, προαιρεμενος δε ου· ὁ εγκρατης δ' ανεπαλλοτ, προαιρουμενος μεν, επιθυμων δ' ου. "The intemperate man acts deſiring, not preferring; the temperate man (quite the reverſe) acts preferring, not deſiring." The full ſenſe of this paſſage will appear hereafter, when we come to treat of the important diſtinctions between temperance and ſelf-command on the one ſide, and intemperance, or weakneſs and wickedneſs, on the other: diſtinctions eſſential to a complete theory of Ethics, but which Ariſtotle is the only author that clearly explains.

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health, we prefer the means neceſſary for attaining it; "to wiſh for happineſs," is correct language; "to prefer happineſs," is an expreſſion highly inaccurate: our preferences ſeem univerſally to relate to things within our own power. Moral preferences, therefore, are not merely opinions; which latter may relate to things impoſſible, eternal, and unchangeable; and which are characteriſed by the epithets "true" and "falſe," not by thoſe of "good" and "bad;" which apply only to our preferences or elections. Theſe laſt differ not only from opinion in general, but from every opinion in particular; for by no opinion whatever, and which is merely an opinion, are our characters marked as good or bad. Our preferences aſcertain the morality of our actions and habits. But our opinions merely tell us what it is that we chooſe or reject; wherein it may be uſeful or hurtful; and how it may prove either the one or the other. Our opinions are eſtimated by their truth, our preferences by their propriety; the former are unſtable like their cauſes, the latter are regulated by our own experience; and what opinion tells us to be the beſt road, is not always that which we chooſe to follow, our vices dragging us in an oppoſite direction[z]. To determine whether this moral preference is either preceded by, or accompanied with opinion, belongs not to the preſent queſtion, which conſiſts only in deciding whether theſe two be one and the ſame. We ſee that they are not. What then can this moral preference be, ſince it belongs not to any of the claſſes above mentioned? It plainly is voluntary, but alſo ſomething more, ſince it implies deliberation and reaſon; and, as its name indicates, is that which, after due

[z] —— Video meliora proboque
Deteriora ſequor. HOR.

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Chap. 3.

About what objects it is converſant.

due compariſons made by the underſtanding, the will prefers as beſt [a].

But it is worthy of conſideration, whether all queſtions be the objects of ſuch deliberations and compariſons, or ſome queſtions only. There are ſome points concerning which none but a fool or madman would heſitate a moment; and we are not ſaid to deliberate concerning things eternal and unalterable, as the exiſtence of the univerſe, or the incommenſurability of the ſides of a ſquare with its diagonal. Neither do we deliberate concerning things merely fortuitous, as the finding of a treaſure; nor concerning thoſe which either naturally or neceſſarily always happen after the ſame manner, as the ſeaſons of draughts and tempeſts; the riſing, ſetting, and motions of the planets. Nor do all human affairs, that is, all thoſe depending on the exertions of man, form a fit ſubject for our deliberation. The Lacedæmonians do not deliberate what is the conſtitution of government moſt ſuitable to the Scythians; becauſe the conduct of the Lacedæmonians cannot have any efficacy in eſtabliſhing it. The proper object of deliberation, therefore, conſiſts in thoſe practical matters, which depend on our own exertions; ſince theſe are the only things that remain unmentioned. Nature, neceſſity, fortune, intellect, are all of them conſidered as cauſes; but our deliberations bear a reference to thoſe cauſes only which it is in our own power to influence and control. Things ſubjected to ſtrict rules, admit not of deliberation; for example, in writing the letters of the alphabet, we have only to follow the practice preſcribed. But the great field for deliberation

[a] See Ethics to Eudemus, b. ii. c. vii, viii, ix, x.; and Magn. Moral. b. i. c. xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii.

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beration lies in thoſe practical arts which are uncertain and doubtful; phyſic, œconomy, and navigation, rather than the gymnaſtic; becauſe the more precarious their operations are, the more patient deliberation is requiſite; it is more neceſſary therefore in arts than in ſciences; and muſt be conſtantly exerciſed about thoſe things which, as they are not fortuitous, happen, for the moſt part, after the ſame manner; but concerning which, it is not eaſy for human wiſdom to foreſee how they will, in any given caſe, fall out. In matters of this kind, which are of high moment, we do not chooſe to act without the advice of counſellors, miſtruſting our own ſagacity. It was before obſerved, that we do not deliberate concerning ends, but concerning the means by which they may be attained. A phyſician never examines, whether he ſhall cure his patient; nor an orator, whether he ſhall perſuade his audience; nor a ſtateſman, whether he ſhall promote public proſperity. But the means through which thoſe ſeveral purpoſes may be beſt attained, are the proper objects of their reſpective deliberations; which often extend to a long ſeries of reaſoning: for the immediate inſtruments, or agents, through which their deſigns may be effected, muſt often be procured by means of others more remote, and thoſe, by others naturally prior; until they arrive finally at the firſt efficient cauſe; which, as in a mathematical inveſtigation or analyſis, is frequently the laſt in the order of diſcovery. The ſtateſman, too, as well as the mathematician, when he comes to an impoſſibility, there ſtops; and tries ſome other road, which may lead to the end in view: as for example, if money be wanted, and cannot poſſibly be found, his ſchemes, which muſt be ineffectual without it, are immediately laid aſide; but he does not deſiſt from his purpoſe until he has

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examined not only his own reſources but thoſe of his friends; for what may be done by our friends, is in our own power, ſince they may be ſet to work by a principle in ourſelves. Our deliberations, therefore, relate to inſtruments, to agents, to materials, and to means; and not only to the cauſes by which, but to the manner in which, our actions are to be performed, our conduct regulated, and our purpoſes effected. On the other hand, our ends and purpoſes themſelves are never ſubjects of deliberation; neither are we ſaid to deliberate concerning thoſe particulars, which are merely perceptions of ſenſe, as whether this bit of bread be well baked; neither can our deliberations be indefinite or endleſs, becauſe this would imply a deſire without an object. Moral preference, then, is not deliberation, but that which, after mature deliberation, is preferred as moſt agreeable to the commanding principles in our nature. In this preference, deliberation terminates; and from it, action commences. This natural progreſs appears in the Heroic Polities, faithfully delineated by Homer. The wiſdom of the ſenate deliberates, and prefers, and declares its reſolves to the people; who immediately carry them into execution. Moral preference, then, relates to thoſe things only which may be accompliſhed by our own exertions; it is appetite or affection, combined with, and modified by, reaſon [b]; and, as above obſerved,

[b] The ſagacious Polybius analyſes with Ariſtotle the moral principle or faculty into reaſon or intellect, operating on the ſocial and ſympathetic nature of man. The paſſage is in the part of Polybius tranſlated by Hampton, in whoſe words I ſhall give it. "From the union of the two ſexes, to which all are naturally inclined, children are born. When any of theſe therefore, being arrived at perfect age, inſtead of yielding ſuitable returns of gratitude and aſſiſtance to thoſe by whom they have been bred, on the contrary, attempt to injure them by words or actions, it is manifeſt that thoſe who behold the wrong, after having alſo ſeen the ſufferings and the anxious cares that were

The cauſes which move the will.

obſerved, converſant, not about ends, but about the beſt means by which they may be attained.

Volition, on the contrary, is, as above ſaid, converſant only about ends; which conſiſt, according to ſome, in real, and, according to others, in ſeeming, good. The opinion of thoſe who think that the will is moved only by what is really good, involves this contradiction, that the volitions of a bad man are not voluntary; and the opinion of thoſe who think that

were ſuſtained by the parents in the nouriſhment and education of their children, muſt be greatly offended and diſpleaſed at ſuch proceeding. For man, who, among all the various kinds of animals, is alone endowed with the faculty of reaſon, cannot, like the reſt, paſs over ſuch actions with indifference; but will make reflection on what he ſees; and comparing likewiſe the future with the preſent, will not fail to expreſs his indignation at this injurious treatment; to which, as he foreſees, he may alſo at ſome time be expoſed. Thus again, when any one who has been ſuccoured by another in the time of danger, inſtead of ſhewing the like kindneſs to this benefactor, endeavours at any time to deſtroy or hurt him; it is certain that all men muſt be ſhocked by ſuch ingratitude, through ſympathy with the reſentment of their neighbour; and from an apprehenſion alſo, that the caſe may be their own. And from hence ariſes, in the mind of every man, a certain *notion* of the nature and force of duty, in which conſiſts both the beginning and the end of juſtice. In like manner, the man, who, in defence of others, is ſeen to throw himſelf the foremoſt into every danger, and even to ſuſtain the fury of the fierceſt animals, never fails to obtain the loudeſt acclamations of applauſe and veneration from all the multitude; while he who ſhews a different conduct, is purſued with cenſure and reproach. And thus it is that the people begin to diſcern the nature of things honourable and baſe, and in what conſiſts the difference between them; and to perceive that the former, on account of the advantage that attends them, are fit to be admired and imitated, and the latter to be deteſted and avoided." Polybius, l. vi. c. 6. The doctrine contained in this paſſage is expanded by Dr. Smith into a theory of moral ſentiments. But he departs from his author in placing the perception of right and wrong in ſentiment or feeling ultimately and ſimply. This alſo was the doctrine of Hutcheſon, who aſcribes our notions of virtue and vice to what he calls a moral ſenſe *. Polybius, on the contrary, maintains with Ariſtotle, that theſe notions ariſe from reaſon or intellect operating on affection or appetite; or, in other words, that the moral faculty is a compound, and may be reſolved into two ſimpler principles of the mind.

* Hutcheſon's Moral Philoſophy.

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BOOK III.

that the will is moved only by ſeeming good, deſtroys all natural motives to volition, and makes it dependent merely on human caprice. If ſuch opinions muſt at firſt ſight be rejected, let us, then, ſay, that real good is the natural cauſe of volition, but that each individual prefers what ſeems good to himſelf; a good man, what is truly good; and a bad man, what he happens to think ſo; juſt as we ſee, in different habits and conſtitutions of body, the ſame things are not equally conducive to the health of all alike, but wholeſome things agree with healthy conſtitutions, whereas the ſickly often delight moſt in things naturally unwholeſome. In the ſame manner the moral conſtitution of a virtuous man, being congenial with truth, appreciates things by their real worth; for ſuch as our habits are, ſuch will be the eſtimates which we form of honour, pleaſure, and every object of deſire. This perhaps is the chief excellence of virtue, that it enables us to ſee the true value of things, and to meaſure them by a correct ſtandard. But the multitude, deceived by appearances, purſue pleaſures as the only good, and ſhun pain as the only evil.

Chap. 5.

That our habits are voluntary.

Ends are, then, the objects of volition; and the means of attaining them are the objects of deliberation and preference; which, being converſant only about ſuch things as are in our own power, the virtues immediately proceeding from them muſt alſo be in our own power, and voluntary, as well as the contrary vices. The poet's ſentiment therefore is but partially true:

"None chooſes wretchedneſs, or ſpurns delight[c]."

The

[c] ουδεις εκων πονηρος ουδ' ακων μακαρ. "Nobody is willingly wicked, or happy againſt his will." The ſentiment is aſcribed to an ancient tragedian. Ethic. Nicom. edit. Oxford, p. 108. and to Heſiod, "εν ταις μεγαλαις." Euſtrat. in Moral. Ariſtot. p. 62. The verſe originally meant that nobody was willingly *miſerable*, &c. that ſenſe being given to the word πονηρος in Heſiod. Suidas ſays, that Heſiod wrote a catalogue of illuſtrious women in five books, from which work Euſtratius conjectures this verſe may be copied.

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The latter clauſe cannot be diſputed; but the former muſt be denied, otherwiſe we muſt reject the doctrine juſt eſtabliſhed, that man is the author of his own actions; and that thoſe things, whoſe principles or cauſes are in ourſelves, are alſo in our own power. Yet theſe truths are atteſted by common ſenſe and univerſal experience. Criminal actions are puniſhed by law, when not committed either through compulſion or ignorance; in which caſes they are pardoned, as not proceeding from ourſelves. Praiſe-worthy actions, on the other hand, are encouraged and honoured; that as men are deterred from vice by the dread of puniſhment, they may be excited to virtue by the hope of reward. But were not our conduct voluntary, ſuch perſuaſives to virtue would be uſeleſs and abſurd; and there would be no more ſenſe in exhorting a man to his duty, than in perſuading him not to feel cold or heat, thirſt or hunger. Crimes committed through ignorance are only excuſable when the ignorance is involuntary; for when the cauſe of it lies in ourſelves, it is then juſtly puniſhable; as in that ancient law which inflicts a double penalty on crimes done in drunkenneſs [d]. The ignorance of thoſe laws, which all may know if they will, does not excuſe the breach of them; and neglect is not pardonable, where attention ought to be beſtowed. But perhaps we are incapable of attention. This however is our own fault; ſince the incapacity has been contracted by our continual careleſſneſs; as the evils of injuſtice and intemperance are contracted by the daily commiſſion of iniquity, and the daily indulgence in voluptuouſneſs. For ſuch as our actions are, ſuch muſt our habits become; a truth confirmed by ſuch univerſal experience, that to be ignorant of it betrays the groſſeſt

[d] This, and other laws of the ſame tendency, will be conſidered in the "Politics."

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groſſeſt ſtupidity. It is plain therefore that our vices are voluntary; ſince we voluntarily do thoſe things which we know muſt produce them. But does it depend merely on our own wills to correct and reform our bad habits? It certainly does not; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, who has deſpiſed the adviſe of his phyſician, to recover that health which is loſt by his own profligacy. When we have thrown a ſtone, we cannot reſtrain its flight; but it depended entirely on ourſelves, whether we ſhould throw it or not. The villain and the voluptuary are therefore voluntarily ſuch; becauſe the cauſe of their turpitude lies ſolely in themſelves. Not only the vices of the mind, but even the imperfections of the body, are juſt ſubjects for reproach, when they are not natural, but produced through our own indolence or neglect. We pity blindneſs, lameneſs, or deformity, when they proceed from cauſes independent on thoſe afflicted with them; but they are juſt objects of reproach, when contracted through drunkenneſs or any other ſpecies of debauchery; and, in the ſame manner, all vices and imperfections are blameable which originate in ourſelves [c].

Objections anſwered.

But ſhould any endeavour to excuſe their wickedneſs, by ſaying that all men aſpire after apparent good, but that the appearances or phantaſms which make us aſſign to things this important epithet, ariſe not from our own ſuggeſtion, but depend on our conſtitution and character, it may be anſwered, that in as far as we ourſelves are the cauſes of this conſtitution and character, we alſo muſt be the cauſes of theſe phantaſms or appearances. But if the two former depend not at all on ourſelves, and villains, when they commit wickedneſs, do it merely through ignorance of the ends at which they ought to aim; and

[c] The Magna Moralia, and Ethics to Eudemus, as above.

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and virtuous men, on the contrary, when they perform virtuous actions, do them merely through Nature's bounty in furniſhing them with a moral or intellectual eye, which enables them to diſcern what is truly good; this ſurely would, in the latter, be the beſt and faireſt of pre-eminences, a prerogative not adventitious but innate[f], not acquired by inſtruction or example, but growing up ſpontaneouſly with the admirable frame of their natural conſtitution. Firſt of all, if this were the caſe, virtue would not be voluntary any more than vice, ſince both would ſolely depend on the original organization of our minds. But if we ourſelves are in any degree the artificers of our own characters; and if it depends on our own voluntary acts, what ſort of habits we ſhall form; and, if not entirely what ends we ſhall purſue, at leaſt what means we ſhall uſe for their attainment; then both our virtue and our vices will be voluntary; and, as ſuch, the former will be the objects of praiſe and reward, and the latter of blame and puniſhment.

Tranſition to the conſideration of each virtue in particular.

We have thus given a ſketch of the virtues in general, ſhewing that they are practical habits, conſiſting in mediocrity, dependent on ourſelves, voluntary, and agreeable to right reaſon. Actions and habits are not preciſely in the ſame ſenſe voluntary; the former are voluntary throughout, from beginning to end; but the beginnings only of habits, which gain force, like maladies, by degrees, until they become irreſiſtible; even theſe

[f] This word is uſed in other parts of Ariſtotle's works to diſtinguiſh natural powers from thoſe acquired by our own exertions. Thus in his Metaph. l. ix. c. v. Απασων δε των δυναμεων ουσων, των μεν συγγενων, οιον των αισθησεων, των δε εθει, οιον της τω αυλειν· των δε μαθησει, οιον της των τεχνων. "The moſt general diviſion of powers is into three, which are innate, like the ſenſes; thoſe acquired by cuſtom, like the power of playing on the flute; and thoſe acquired by inſtruction, like many of the arts."

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BOOK III.

theſe however are alſo voluntary, ſince their cauſes were ſuch, namely, the actions by which they were formed. We now proceed to conſider the ſeveral virtues in particular; wherein each conſiſts, to what object it relates, and in what manner it relates to them; whence their number will be manifeſt:—and firſt, concerning courage.

Chap. 6.

The definition and nature of courage.

This virtue, as we formerly obſerved, conſiſts in the moderation and propriety of our affections and actions in reference to thoſe cauſes and circumſtances which either excite fear, or inſpire confidence. Since whatever is evil is in ſome degree formidable [s], fear is defined "the dread of evil," and of evil of every kind, infamy, poverty, diſeaſe, friendleſſneſs, and death. But courage is not diſplayed in univerſal fearleſſneſs; for not to fear infamy is the part of impudence and baſeneſs; whereas the worthy and reſpectable character has always the keeneſt ſenſe of ſhame, and the ſtrongeſt averſion to diſgrace. Yet impudence ſometimes paſſes for courage; and may be ſo called, by a metaphor; ſince it reſembles that virtue in being equally fearleſs. Neither poverty nor diſeaſe, nor whatever proceeds not from any voluntary turpitude, ought, perhaps, to be much dreaded by thoſe who aſpire to the dignity of virtue; yet fearleſſneſs, as to ſuch objects, does not conſtitute what is properly called courage, though it ſometimes receives metaphorically that name: for thoſe who tremble at the ſound of war, may be liberal of their money, and fearleſs of poverty; thoſe, ſurely, are not cowards, who dread the inſults likely to fall on their wives or children; nor are thoſe to be dignified with the epithet of courageous, who, with the calm intrepidity of ſlaves, endure

[s] φοβερὰ δὲ λέγονται τὰ φοβερά· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἁπλῶς κακὰ εἶναι, ἢ κακά. "We fear things formidable, which, to expreſs them in one word, are evils."

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endure the proſpect of diſgraceful ſtripes. To what kind of terrors, then, does courage render us ſuperior? To the greateſt of all, the fear of death; for death ſeems of all things the moſt formidable; becauſe, in common opinion, it is the ultimate limit of all our pains and pleaſures, beyond which there is neither good nor evil. Yet courage is not alike ſhewn in contempt for every form of death. This virtue appears not conſpicuous in diſeaſe or ſhipwreck, but in an honourable death in the field of battle, which is, of all, the faireſt and moſt illuſtrious; as is atteſted by the honours with which it is rewarded, both by republics and kings. Courage, therefore, is peculiarly diſplayed in encountering death in battle, and in ſetting warlike dangers at defiance: not but that a brave man will be fearleſs during a ſtorm at ſea, or on a ſick-bed; but his fortitude is different from that of ſailors, who are rendered fearleſs through experience and cuſtom; whereas he, perceiving no means of ſafety, ſubmits with indignant [h] intrepidity to a death, from which no honour can be reaped, and in which no exertion of manhood can be diſplayed.

The

[h] ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς αὐθέτειρον ὑπαρχει. Both Ulyſſes and Eneas thought with our author.

With what a cloud the brows of Heaven are crown'd?
What raging winds? What roaring waters round?
'Tis Jove himſelf the ſwelling tempeſt rears;
Death, preſent death, on every ſide appears.
Happy! thrice happy, who in battle ſlain,
Preſt, in Atrides' cauſe, the Trojan plain, &c. Odyſſ. V. v. 390.

And Æneas,

O ter quaterque beati,
Queis ante ora patrum, Trojæ ſub mœnibus altis,
Contigit oppetere, &c. Æneis, l. i. v. 98.

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BOOK III. Chap. 7.

The ſame evils which terrify one perſon are not formidable to another; though there are ſome of ſuch an irreſiſtible nature, as to ſhake the firmeſt minds, and to inſpire fear into all poſſeſſed of underſtanding. But thoſe objects of terror which ſurpaſs not the ſtrength of human nature, differing from each other in magnitude, as well as do the grounds of confidence, courage will diſcriminate between real and apparent dangers; and make us meet the former as brave men ought, unſhaken and dauntleſs, ſubjecting the inſtinctive emotions of fear to the dictates of reaſon and of honour. For we betray our weakneſs, not only when we fear things really not formidable, but when we are affected in an undue degree, or at an improper time, by objects of real danger. A brave man avoids ſuch errors; and, eſtimating things by their real worth, prefers the grace and beauty of habitual fortitude to the deluſive ſecurity of deformed cowardice. Yet he is not leſs careful to avoid that exceſs of intrepidity, which, being rarely met with, is, like many other vices, without a name; though nothing but madneſs, or a moſt ſtupid inſenſibility, can make any man preſerve, amidſt earthquakes and inundations, that unſhaken compoſure, which has been aſcribed to the Celts[1]. An overweening eſtimate of the cauſes of confidence, and a conſequent exceſs of courage, is called audacity; a boaſtful ſpecies of bravery, and the mere ape of true manhood. What the brave man *is*, the raſh and audacious man wiſhes to *appear*; he courts and provokes unneceſſary dangers, but fails in the hour of trial; and is, for the moſt part, a bluſtering bully, who, under a ſemblance of pretended courage, conceals no inconſiderable portion of cowardice.

[1] Alexander, who perhaps knew them better than his preceptor, conſidered the "κελται or καλαται, or γαλαται," the Celts or Gauls, as an arrogant and boaſtful nation. Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. i. p. 5.

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cowardice. But the complete and genuine coward eaſily betrays himſelf, by fearing either things not formidable, or things formidable, in an undue degree; and his failing is the more manifeſt, becauſe it is accompanied with plain indications of pain; he lives in continual alarm, and is therefore ſpiritleſs and dejected; whereas courage warms our breaſts, and animates our hopes. Such then is the character of true courage, as oppoſed to audacity on one hand, and cowardice on the other. It holds the middle place between thoſe vicious extremes; it is calm and ſedate; and though it never provokes danger, is always ready to meet even death in an honourable cauſe. But to die, rather than endure manfully the preſſure of poverty, or the ſtings of love, or any other cruel ſuffering, is the part of a coward; who baſely flies from an enemy that he has not ſpirit to encounter; and ignominiouſly quits the field, where he might have ſuſtained a ſtrenuous and honourable conflict.

Chap. 8.

There are five kinds of courage, beſides that properly ſo called. The firſt kind is the political, which moſt reſembles that above deſcribed; becauſe it is inſpired by legal honours and rewards, and upheld by legal puniſhments and infamy. Courage therefore chiefly prevails, where cowardice is moſt ſtigmatiſed. Homer will ſupply us with examples; hear thoſe of Hector and Diomed:

Shall proud Polydamas before the gate
Proclaim, his counſels are obeyed too late,
Which timely followed but the former night,
What numbers had been ſaved by Hector's flight [k]?

And Diomed,

But ah, what grief! ſhould haughty Hector boaſt,
I fled inglorious to the guarded coaſt [l]?

This

[k] Il. xxii. v. 140. & ſeq. [l] Il. viii. v. 179. & ſeq.

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This political courage moſt reſembles genuine valour, becauſe it originates in the love of glory and the ſhame of reproach, which are virtuous and honourable motives. Nearly alike to it, is that bravery which is inſpired into ſoldiers by their generals; but inferior in merit, ſince engendered not by ſhame, but by fear; and by the dread not of diſgrace but of puniſhment. For generals compel by threats; as Hector:

"On ruſhed bold Hector, gloomy as the night;
Forbids to plunder, animates the fight,
Points to the fleet; for by the Gods, who flies,
Who dares but linger, by this hand he dies;
No weeping ſiſter his cold eye ſhall cloſe,
No friendly hand his funeral pile compoſe.
Who ſtops to plunder at this ſignal hour,
The birds ſhall tear him, and the dogs devour [m]."

Thoſe who advance, fearful of ſtripes, ſhould they retreat; and thoſe who ſtand their ground, in conſequence of obſtacles to their flight, all ſuch loſe the merit of bravery, becauſe they are brave on compulſion. Experience and cuſtom may produce likewiſe an artificial bravery; wherefore Socrates thought that courage was a matter of ſcience. Each is moſt courageous in what he beſt underſtands; and therefore ſoldiers in battle, ſince they know the emptineſs of many of the terrors with which the parade of war is accompanied. To the ignorant, therefore, they appear truly valiant; beſides, their experience has taught them ſkilfully to employ their weapons, and by what means they may beſt defend themſelves, and moſt effectually aſſault their enemies. They contend therefore with all the advantage which a practiſed prize-fighter enjoys over an ignorant ruſtic;

[m] Il. xv. v. 194. & ſeq.

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ruſtic; or that men completely armed enjoy over naked troops; for in ſuch combats, ſpirit and manhood yield to armed dexterity. But when the odds are againſt them, the courage of diſciplined mercenaries ſpeedily fails, and they are the firſt to fly; whereas the national troops remain and are ſlain; which recently happened at the Hermæus, where the Theban citizens preferred death to an ignominious ſafety, while their auxiliaries, though they behaved valiantly in the beginning of the action, no ſooner diſcovered their inferiority in ſtrength, than they baſely betook themſelves to flight; fearing death more than diſgrace. Anger is often called to the aſſiſtance of manhood; and men ſeem courageous through paſſion, like wild beaſts which turn, when wounded, and attack their purſuers; for both valour and anger makes us regardleſs of danger.—Whence Homer ſays:

Inflaming thus the rage of all their hoſts [n];

And

Each Trojan boſom with new warmth he fires [o].

Theſe paſſages imply, that the excitement of anger is auxiliary to courage; which, however, in man, ought to originate in a ſenſe of honour, whereas in beaſts it ſprings only from the ſmart of pain; for they turn on their purſuers, only when they are afraid or hurt; but, in their native woods or marſhes, they venture not to approach human kind. Manly courage, therefore, cannot reſult from the irritation of pain, or from that blind paſſion which ruſhes, improvident, on unknown dangers. Even the unfeeling aſs, when hungry, does not, through the fear of blows, forſake his paſture; and adulterers, impelled by luſt, have exhibited ſignal examples of boldneſs;

[n] Il. xvi. v. 658. [o] Il. vi. v. 626.

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BOOK III.

boldneſs; but ſuch things are far remote from true courage. Yet, of all paſſions, anger is the moſt nearly allied to this virtue, and would entirely accord with it, if directed by mature deliberation, and controlled by maxims of honour. Even in men, anger is painful, and revenge is ſweet: yet acting under the impulſe of ſuch paſſions, they are not courageous but quarrelſome; for neither reaſon nor moral principle has any ſhare in their behaviour; which has ſomething in it reſembling courage, but is not that virtue. Nor are perſons buoyed up by hope courageous; for they are confident of ſucceſs, only becauſe they have often conquered. This confidence, indeed, reſembles that of true courage; but it proceeds from a different principle, the opinion of ſuperiority, and the conſequent ſenſe of ſafety; and like the ſpurious valour of drunkards, (who are brave while ſucceſsful,) fails them under the ſlighteſt reverſe of fortune. But true courage ſurmounts real and known dangers, becauſe it is honourable to reſiſt them, and baſe to ſink under them. It is beſt ſeen in ſudden emergencies, becauſe, on ſuch occaſions, undiſturbed firmneſs cannot be aſſumed, but muſt be the reſult of confirmed manly habits. Perſons ignorant of the dangers which they encounter, have alſo a falſe ſemblance of courage; they are ſomewhat allied to thoſe buoyed up by hope, but are of a ſtamp ſtill inferior, their boldneſs being founded on miſtake, and therefore deſtitute of merit: for when they either know or ſuſpect the truth, they betake themſelves to ſhameful flight; as the Argives did, after encountering the Lacedæmonians, whom they miſtook for Scyonians. We have now deſcribed, who are truly courageous, and who only ſeem to be ſo.

Though

Though the office of courage conſiſts in moderating the impulſe of raſh boldneſs, as well as the exceſs of cautious timidity, yet its principal buſineſs is employed about the latter; becauſe it is more difficult, and therefore more praiſeworthy, to endure pain, than to reſiſt pleaſure; and we endure pain when we ſilence the dictates of fear, and encounter real dangers with manly fortitude. Yet the end and eſſence of courage are truly pleaſant, though the pleaſure diſappears amidſt the crowd of painful circumſtances with which it is accompanied. In the Gymnaſtic games, the prize-fighters contemplate with pleaſure the crowns and honours with which their victories are rewarded: but their laborious exertions, and repeated wounds, are uneaſy and painful. The ſplendour of the prize, which is ſmall, is loſt therefore in the gloomy magnitude of ſurrounding circumſtances. The ſame thing happens as to courage. Death and wounds are painful to a brave man, and reluctantly encountered; yet he meets and defies them, becauſe it is honourable to do ſo; and although the more diſtinguiſhed he is in virtue, and therefore in happineſs, he well knows that his loſs in death will be the greater, and therefore the more deeply laments the dangers to which he is expoſed; yet, on this account, his courage is only the more conſpicuous in preferring a glorious death to a happy life. The exerciſe therefore of laborious virtue is painful in its progreſs, and only delightful as it approaches the goal. But there are mercenary ruffians, who, though endowed with little true courage, are ready, for their miſerable hire, to throw away their lives, which are of ſtill leſs value. Thus much concerning courage; of which we may delineate the nature, from the obſervations above made [p].

We

[p] Vid. Magna Moral. l. i. c. xiii.; and Eudem. l. iii. c. i.

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BOOK III.

Chap. 10.

Of the definition and nature of temperance.

We now proceed to ſpeak of temperance, which, as well as courage, is employed in regulating the irrational, and merely animal part of our conſtitution. Temperance, we have ſaid, is the habit of mediocrity in our affections with reſpect to the objects which afford pleaſure; and alſo (though in a different manner, and an inferior degree) with reſpect to thoſe which give pain. Ungoverned voluptuouſneſs is the reverſe of temperance. We farther proceed to examine what kinds of pleaſure it is the office of temperance to regulate. Pleaſures are commonly diſtinguiſhed, as either corporeal or mental. Of the latter kind is the pleaſure which we derive from virtue or from knowledge; with both of which we are delighted, becauſe we love them; and that, without any bodily ſenſation, but merely through mental affection. Neither temperance nor voluptuouſneſs are converſant about ſuch pleaſures, nor about any others not originating in the body. Men fond of the marvellous, and who delight in relating idle ſtories from morning to night, are called prattlers, not profligates: nor are thoſe guilty of intemperance who indulge exceſſive grief for the loſs of their fortunes or of their friends. Temperance relates therefore to bodily pleaſures only, but not even to them univerſally. It reſtrains not the gratification which the eye receives from colours, figures, and pictures, nor that given to the ear by declamation or muſic. There is a propriety, doubtleſs, in the affection with which we deſire, and the degree in which we indulge, thoſe pleaſures; but they who act properly in ſuch particulars, are not denominated temperate; nor thoſe who act improperly, intemperate. Nor do temperance and intemperance apply to our reſtraint or indulgence with regard to the pleaſures derived from the ſenſe of ſmell, except by way of acceſſion,

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ceſſion, that is, when grateful odours are conſidered as an acceſſory to agreeable ſenſations derived from the taſte or touch. To be delighted with the fragrancy of flowers and fruits, and of thoſe aromatics which perfume the altars of the Gods, is never regarded as ſenſuality; but a propenſity to vicious indulgence may appear in the pleaſures received from thoſe artificial ſcents which are employed for heightening perſonal allurements, and from the odour of thoſe delicacies which form the luxury of our tables; becauſe, in theſe caſes, the perceptions of one ſenſe naturally bring into our thoughts the perceptions of other ſenſes, which are too often indulged with groſs and beaſtly intemperance. The inferior animals, when hungry, are delighted with the ſmell of their food; but this delight in them happens alſo, as above explained, by way of acceſſion; dogs are pleaſed with the ſcent of the hare, becauſe they delight in eating that animal; and lions are pleaſed, not with the bellowing of the bull, but with devouring him; and the bellowing only pleaſes them, becauſe it is a proof that their prey is near to them. The ſight of the deer or wild goat alſo delights them, becauſe it affords the expectation of ſoon taſting their fleſh. Temperance, therefore, is converſant about thoſe pleaſures only, which are common to us with beaſts; and in which an exceſſive indulgence is therefore juſtly deemed the loweſt depravity. Thoſe pleaſures depend entirely on the touch and taſte, but far more on the former; the taſte being properly that ſenſe which diſcriminates different flavours, as is done by thoſe who critically examine wines and ſauces. But the beaſtly ſenſualiſt has little or no pleaſure in any thing except mere corporeal contact in eating and drinking, as well as in venery. Wherefore the voluptuary Philoxenus wiſhed his neck as long as a crane's, that his gratification in the act of ſwallowing might be the more

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durable. Temperance, therefore, is chiefly converſant about regulating the pleaſures of that ſenſe, of which, as it is of all the moſt common, the improper indulgence is the moſt blameable and moſt debaſing; ſince it belongs to us, not as men, but as mere animals. To love and take delight in ſuch gratifications, is to diveſt ourſelves of the man, and to put on the wild beaſt: for the more liberal pleaſures of the touch, ſuch as the warmth produced by friction and exerciſe in the *gymnaſia*, fall not under this head; intemperate voluptuouſneſs in contact, not extending to the whole body, but centering in particular parts of it.

Chap. II.

Natural and adventitious deſires.

Of our deſires and appetites, ſome are common and natural; others, peculiar and adventitious. Every animal needs and deſires nouriſhment, either dry or moiſt; and ſometimes both; and in the vigour of life, every man, as Homer ſays, wiſhes for a mate. But all do not deſire either the ſame objects; nor is every particular object alike neceſſary to the happineſs of every individual; the deſire of particular objects, therefore, is often conſidered as peculiar and adventitious. This deſire may nevertheleſs be natural to him who feels it, ſince different men have different inclinations; and one perſon may receive much delight from that which cannot afford any gratification to another. In our natural deſires, there are few improprieties; the ſole error conſiſting in exceſſive indulgence. Gluttony, which, inſtead of ſatisfying, overloads the ſtomach, is the vice only of the moſt abject of the human kind. But in adventitious and unnatural pleaſures, there is ſcope for the wildeſt and moſt various errors; which reſult, not only from the exceſſive degree, but from the improper and even odious objects, of our deſires; as well as from the unbecoming manner and unſeaſonable occaſions on which they are indulged.

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dulged. Intemperance, then, is an exceſs with regard to pleaſure; and juſtly reprobated. With regard to pain, the office of temperance is different from that of fortitude. The intemperate man is grieved at miſſing pleaſure; which, by his perverſity and folly, is thus abſurdly converted into a perpetual ſource of pain; ſince he deſires it with diſtreſſing anxiety, and both abuſes it when preſent, and ſorrows after it when it is gone. But temperance, which is not to be ſeduced by pleaſures within its power, cannot grieve at the loſs of thoſe which are placed beyond its reach. Extreme inſenſibility to pleaſure is not the lot of human nature: even brute beaſts prefer one kind of food to another. The fault therefore of being too little affected by pleaſure, as it ſeldom or never occurs, is not diſtinguiſhed by a name. But temperance holds the middle place between this nameleſs vice and the oppoſite extreme. The man endowed with temperance is ſo far from delighting in, or enjoying, the pleaſures of the voluptuary, that he beholds them with deteſtation and diſguſt. He indulges in none but lawful pleaſures, and in them ſeaſonably and ſoberly; and not being intoxicated by them when preſent, does not painfully long for them when abſent. His health, his fortune, and above all his honour and his duty, preſcribe laws to his appetites. The profligate prefers ſenſual pleaſures to all things beſide: the man of temperance eſtimates them at their true value, and that a low one [9].

Chap. 12.

Compariſon of intemperance and cowardice.

Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice; the former proceeding from the deſire of pleaſure, the latter from the averſion to pain: and ſuch is the nature of pain that it diſturbs and deſtroys the frame of mind of thoſe who behold its approach, and

[9] Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxii, Eudem. l. iii. c. ii.

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and anticipate its pangs. Pleaſure not producing theſe effects, the intemperate indulgence in it is therefore more voluntary, and conſequently more blameable; eſpecially ſince there are innumerable opportunities in life for reſtraining our purſuit of unlawful or improper pleaſures, and thereby acquiring a confirmed habit of temperance, the ſeveral acts of which are unattended with danger. The reverſe of this happens as to cowardice; the opportunities for correcting it are much fewer in number, and the experiment is dangerous. But though particular inſtances of cowardice are in ſome meaſure involuntary, through the invincible terror which produces them, and which impels thoſe affected with it to throw away their ſhields, and to commit other ſhameful actions, yet the frame and habit of mind from which ſuch actions flow, ſeems to be more a matter of choice; whereas the frame and habit of mind from which intemperance flows, ſeems leſs voluntary than the particular inſtances of it; for no one can will or chooſe, that by his internal conſtitution he ſhould be the ſport of vicious propenſities, and ungovernable appetites. The word denoting intemperance in Greek is applicable to the wanton and unchaſtiſed petulance of boys, which bears a near analogy to what is called intemperance in men. Which of the two was the primary meaning of the word, it is not material to inquire; for the tranſition is extremely natural from the one ſignification to the other, nothing ſtanding more in need of chaſtiſement than depravities which increaſe by indulgence; to which depravities, paſſions as well as boys are peculiarly liable. For boys are actuated almoſt ſolely by paſſion, pleaſure being their ruling purſuit; the deſire of which, unleſs it be reſtrained by higher principles and controlled by authority, will tranſgreſs all reaſonable bounds; and, gaining ſtrength by

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by repeated acts of indulgence, will finally deſtroy and extinguiſh the light of reaſon itſelf. Our deſires therefore ought to be few and moderate, and as obedient to the dictates of reaſon, as boys to the commands of their maſter. By ſuch habitual regulation, they will gradually harmoniſe with the higher powers of our nature, and at length terminate in the ſame excellent and honourable end; exhibiting the ſteady luſtre of virtue; and exactly conforming, as to their object, degree, time, and all other circumſtances, to the ſtrict rules of propriety. So much concerning temperance.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK IV.

HAVING treated of the virtues of courage and temperance, which, how different ſoever in many reſpects from each other, agree in this particular, that they both conſiſt in the proper government of the irrational or merely ſenſitive part of our nature, the author proceeds in the fourth book, to explain the nature of liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, meekneſs, courteſy, plain-dealing, and facetiouſneſs. As things are beſt underſtood by compariſon, he points out and defines the blameable extremes (for example, of niggardlineſs and profuſion) which ſtand in direct oppoſition to each other; and which are both of them contrary, though not always in a like degree, to the praiſeworthy habit which lies between them. He ſhows that there is an intermediate, but anonymous habit, highly deſerving of approbation, between the extremes of ambition and blameable inſenſibility to honour: obſerving on this and other occaſions, that many of the virtues, as well as of the vices, are not accurately diſtinguiſhed by names; and that from this imperfection of language, much confuſion reſults; for when the intermediate and praiſeworthy habit is nameleſs, each of

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the extremes will ſtrive to thruſt itſelf into the middle place, which is the poſt of honour; and that habit which is approved as virtue by one claſs of men, will be condemned as vice by another. He examines whether ſhame can be claſſed with the virtues, ſince it ſeems rather a paſſion than a habit. He explains what is meant by a conditional virtue, in oppoſition to virtue ſimply and abſolutely; and proves that ſhame is at beſt only a virtue of the conditional and imperfect kind.

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BOOK IV.

ARGUMENT.

Liberality.—Vices oppoſite thereto.—Magnificence; its contraries.—Magnanimity.—Meekneſs; its contraries.—Courteſy; its contraries.—Plain-dealing; its contraries.—Facetiouſneſs; its contraries.—Shame.

BOOK IV. Chap. I.

Liberality, and the vices contrary to it.

WE proceed to ſpeak of liberality, which ſeems to be that virtue which bears a peculiar relation to property. For the praiſe of liberality is not acquired by courage in war, moderation in pleaſure, or juſtice in judgment, but by the propriety of our behaviour in receiving or beſtowing money, or whatever things can be meaſured by money; and principally in beſtowing them. Of the propriety of our conduct in relation to property, prodigality and niggardlineſs are the two contrary and blameable extremes. Niggardlineſs always refers to thoſe who ſet more than a juſt value on money: but prodigality is ſometimes employed to expreſs extravagant profuſion joined with inordinate intemperance; for thoſe are called prodigals, who waſte their fortunes in ruinous pleaſures, and thus ſignally debaſe themſelves by complicated worthleſsneſs. Yet prodigality more properly ſignifies one ſimple vice, that of ruining ourſelves by our own fault; for he ruins himſelf by his own fault, who waſtefully conſumes his property, that is, the means

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by which his life is ſupported; and in this acceptation we take the word. Property falls under the deſcription of things uſeful; which may either be uſed rightly or abuſed; and he only can uſe them rightly, who is adorned with the virtue appertaining to them; namely, liberality. The uſe of money conſiſts in expending or beſtowing it: for the taking or keeping of money relates to poſſeſſion rather than to uſe. The virtue of liberality therefore is more conſpicuous in beſtowing handſomely, than either in receiving what is our due, or in refuſing what we ought not to accept. For virtue conſiſts rather in acting our part well, than in avoiding what is amiſs. This active virtue alone is the proper object of praiſe and gratitude; for it is more meritorious to part with what is our own, than to abſtain from what belongs to another; which latter may be praiſed indeed as juſtice, but not as liberality; and to accept what is ſtrictly due to us, is not entitled to any degree of praiſe. None are more beloved than the liberal, becauſe their virtue is extenſively uſeful, diffuſing itſelf in benefits. But the motive from which their actions proceed, is what chiefly conſtitutes their excellence; for liberality, like every other virtue, muſt keep the beauty of propriety in view; ſelecting its objects, and proportioning its extent, according to thoſe rules which right-reaſon preſcribes. The critical moment for beſt conferring a favour muſt alſo be carefully ſtudied; and they muſt be conferred cheerfully, at leaſt not painfully: and when any one of theſe conditions is wanting, whatever acts of bounty a man may perform, he will not carry off the palm of virtuous and graceful liberality. If the gifts beſtowed on others occaſion pain to ourſelves, it is a proof that we prefer money to the beauty

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beauty of generous actions; and if we are rapacious in acquiring money, we cannot be truly liberal in employing it. A man of real beneficence will not be importunate in ſolicitation. He will be delicate as to accepting favours; but will enrich himſelf by the diligent management of his own affairs, that he may acquire materials for his bounty, which will be diſtributed with caution, that it may never fail the deſerving. It belongs to his character to be more provident for others than for himſelf; and to extend the meaſure of his beneficence far beyond thoſe limits which the prudence of ſelfiſhneſs would preſcribe. But our liberality is relative to our wealth; it conſiſts, not in the value of our gifts, but in the temper and habit of the giver; and he who gives the leaſt of all, may be the moſt liberal of all, if what he gives bears the higheſt proportion to his ſubſtance[r]. Men of hereditary eſtates are more inclined to liberality, than thoſe whoſe fortunes are their own work; the former have never known the ſeverities of want; and all men are diſpoſed to love and cheriſh their own works, as parents and poets. It is not eaſy for a liberal man to be rich, ſince he is nice in receiving money, not retentive in keeping it; and always ready to give it away, on no other account than that of the proper or beneficent purpoſes to which it may be applied. Fortune, therefore, is continually accuſed of enriching thoſe who are leaſt worthy of her favours. But this happens naturally, without the interference of fortune; ſince wealth cannot well be poſſeſſed by thoſe who employ not the ordinary means by which it is acquired and accumulated. Yet true

[r] Verily I ſay unto you, that this poor widow hath caſt more in, than all they which have caſt into the treaſury. St. Mark, c. xii. v. 43.

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true liberality avoids unneceſſary and ſuperfluous expence, leſt the ſource ſhould be dried up, from which only its ſalutary ſtreams can plenteouſly flow. Whoever lives beyond his income, is ſtrictly a prodigal, and he only; for kings, how great ſoever their expenditure may be, are never branded with this appellation; becauſe it ſeems difficult for their munificence to exceed the meaſure of their reſources. The liberal man, both in great and in ſmall matters, and both in giving and receiving, behaves with cheerful ſerenity, becauſe his behaviour is always proper, and always conſiſtent with his character. As propriety in giving and receiving depends on the ſame principle of moderation in our deſires with regard to money, he who gives properly, will not improperly receive; ſince contraries cannot reſult from the ſame principle, nor ſubſiſt in the ſame ſubject. Should it happen that a liberal man conſumes more than he ought, and on an improper occaſion, he will doubtleſs lament it, but with that calm and moderate compoſure which becomes his character; for it is the part of virtue not only to joy and grieve from fit motives, but to aſſign proper limits to thoſe emotions. The liberal man is, in matters of intereſt, of an accommodating temper; he is open to impoſition and injury, becauſe he does not value money beyond its real worth, and is more uneaſy at having omitted to do what he ought, than at doing too much; living in direct oppoſition to the avaricious rapacity of Simonides *. The prodigal, again, is directly the reverſe;

* A poet of the Iſle of Ceos, and the firſt on record who proſtituted his mercenary muſe for the vile purpoſe of gain. He was born 558 years before Chriſt, and lived ninety years; the companion and favourite of many of the princes and grandees of his time. As his avarice increaſed with his age, he apologized for it by ſaying that the purſuit of money was the only delight which time had left to him. Conf. Fragment. Callimac.

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reverſe; both his joy and his grief ſpring from improper motives, and both ſhew themſelves in unſeemly and immoderate degrees; which will be more manifeſt in the ſequel. Prodigality and avarice are both of them exceſſes, and both of them defects. Prodigality is exceſſive in giving, and defective in receiving; avarice is defective in giving, and exceſſive in receiving, and ſcraping together the meaneſt and moſt ſordid gains. The qualities which compoſe and ſupport prodigality, are not eaſily united: it is difficult for him who is careleſs of receiving, to continue laviſh in beſtowing; for his funds, if he is a private man, will ſoon be exhauſted. The prodigal, therefore, is better than the miſer, becauſe his malady is more curable. Age, and the experience of want, will correct his extravagance; and, as he ſtill ſhows a generoſity of nature, though unwiſely and unſeaſonably, cuſtom and good example will convert his thoughtleſs profuſion into decent and graceful liberality; ſince his deviations from the right path proceed rather from folly than from depravity and turpitude. For this reaſon ſuch a prodigal is preferable to the miſer; and alſo becauſe the former benefits many, and the latter, no one; not even himſelf. But thoſe who are prodigal of their own, are for the moſt part rapacious of what belongs to others; and finding it impoſſible to ſupply their wild extravagance by honourable means, abſtain from no ſource of gain, however impure and polluted it may be; ſo that even their bounties have nothing liberal in them, being with-held from virtue in diſtreſs, and laviſhed on paraſites, flatterers, and on the idle retinue of vice and folly. For the greater part of prodigals unite profligacy with

Callimac. apud Spanheim. v. i. p. 264 and 337. Plutarch. An ſeni capiend. Reſpublica, V. ii. p. 786. Athen. xiv. c. xxi. Fabric. Bibliot. Græc. V. i. p. 591.

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with prodigality; and inſenſible to the beauty of virtue, fall victims to the allurement of pleaſure. But though this happens to the undiſciplined prodigal, yet, under proper management, he may be brought into the middle and right path; whereas avarice is incorrigible; for it is increaſed by old age and every kind of infirmity; and it ſeems more congenial to human nature than the contrary vice, there being in every country more hoarders than ſpendthrifts. It alſo extends to extraordinary lengths, and aſſumes a variety of forms; the immoderate love of money leading ſome men to daring rapacity, and others to ſordid parſimony; for there are niggardly miſers, and tenacious ſcrape-pennies, who either through a ſenſe of juſtice, or through fear, are careful in abſtaining from ſhameful gains, and meanly ſparing of their property, leſt they ſhould be forced, as they ſay, on diſhoneſt expedients for ſubſiſtence. Their maxim is, neither to borrow nor to lend, neither to give nor to receive; becauſe, ſhould they accept any thing from others, they think it will be difficult always to avoid giving to others ſomething in return. But rapacious avarice ſticks at no expedient by which money may be acquired; ſubmits to the baſeſt drudgery, practiſes pimping or uſury, and thinks no profit too infamous or too minute, which, by frequent repetitions, may accumulate into a great gain. Both kinds are alike diſgraced by their falſe eſtimate, and inordinate love of money; ſince, for the ſake of profit, and that a ſmall one, they encounter and endure a burdenſome load of infamy; which is an evil that even the greateſt profits cannot poſſibly compenſate. Thoſe who aſpire to great and ſudden acquiſitions of wealth, ſuch as tyrants who ſtorm cities and plunder temples, are not branded with the reproach of.

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of avarice, but of impiety and villany. The pirate, the pick-pocket, and the gameſter, are guilty of illiberal rapacity; ſince the two firſt encounter, for the ſake of gain, not only danger but diſgrace; and the laſt plunders and ruins his friends and acquaintances, whom a man of liberal principles wiſhes always to benefit. They are all equally debaſed by a ſhameleſs preference of wealth to worth; and by bartering things incomparably more valuable, for unjuſt and illiberal gains. Illiberality, therefore, is the vice moſt properly oppoſed to the virtue of liberality; for it is a greater, more extenſive, and more univerſal evil, than the vice of prodigality, which holds the contrary extreme. So much concerning mediocrity in our paſſions and actions with regard to money, and whatever money can purchaſe, as well as concerning the vicious extremes which are inconſiſtent with this praiſeworthy and meritorious habit[t].

Chap. 2.

Magnificence, and its contraries.

We naturally proceed to treat next of magnificence; for that likewiſe ſeems to be a virtue reſpecting money; but differs from liberality in this, that it relates to money in one view only, namely, the ſpending of it; and in this, it exceeds the meaſure which mere liberality would preſcribe. The very name of magnificence indicates a certain magnitude, joined with propriety, in expence; and the magnitude or ſplendour of our expence is eſtimated by the occaſion on which it is employed; for that might be great in a trierarch[u], which would be ſmall in an ambaſſador to the public ſolemnities of Greece; and the propriety depends both on the object of the expence, and on the

[t] Vid. Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxiv.; et Eudem. l. iii. c. iv.

[u] The rich citizens of Athens were liable to the burden of equipping gallies for the public ſervice; in which they often vied with each other in diſplaying their patriotiſm to the ruin of their fortunes. Lyſ. Orat. paſſim.

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the character and ſituation of the perſon who incurs it. He is not called magnificent who ſpends his money with propriety on ſmall or ordinary occaſions, like him

" Who often gave the hungry beggar bread:"

For magnificence is not ſimply liberality, but ſomething more; the former implying the latter, though the latter does not imply the former. Magnificence holds the middle place between two blameable extremes, of which the one, in matters of expence, falls ſhort of what is ſuitable to our circumſtances or to the occaſion, and the other oſtentatiouſly exceeds them. To be truly magnificent requires no ſmall degree of judgment; ſince it infers a graceful theory of moral propriety, and a ſkilful harmony in great expenditure; for as we ſaid in the beginning, habits are characteriſed by the acts and energies from which they ſpring, and which in a man of real magnificence muſt be great and decorous; the work worthy the expence, and the expence ſuiting and rather exceeding the work. A man truly magnificent, is actuated by the love of moral beauty, which is the principle of all the virtues. His generoſity is large and liberal, without ſtrictneſs of accounts; his conſideration being, not how much any thing will coſt him, but how it may be done moſt handſomely. For the magnificence is not in the expence, but in the manner of employing it; which muſt be ſuch, not merely as propriety would dictate, for this belongs to liberality, but ſuch as will ſtrike the ſpectators with wonder. It is moſt conſpicuous in temples, dedications, ſacrifices, and whatever concerns the Gods: and in thoſe honourable benefactions which generous patriots confer on the community; the equipment of gallies, public entertainments, and dramatic exhibitions. As magnificence muſt be conſiſtent with propriety, it can never be the

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the virtue of a poor man, in whom every attempt towards exerciſing it muſt be egregious folly. It becomes thoſe only who poſſeſs great hereditary wealth, or who have enriched themſelves by great and ſplendid exploits; and it is moſt honourably diſplayed on the public occaſions above mentioned. It may be ſhown alſo in matters of private concern, when they are ſuch as occur but once in our lives, as a marriage; or ſuch as intereſt the whole community, or at leaſt the members of the government; as the reception and entertainment of ſtrangers, and the honours and preſents beſtowed on them at their departure: for the expences of a magnificent man are public, not perſonal; and preſents to ſtrangers ſomewhat reſemble dedications to the Gods. To build a houſe ſuitable to a great fortune, is a work of magnificence, for it is a public ornament; and works are magnificent in proportion to their durability, provided propriety always be obſerved, for the ſame monuments will not ſuit Gods and men, nor the ſame ornaments become tombs and temples. Magnificence, we have ſaid, is not meaſured ſimply by the expence, but by the expence in reference to the object on which it is beſtowed. The magnificence, doubtleſs, riſes in proportion to the magnitude of that object; but a beautiful bauble, of little or no value, may be a magnificent preſent to a child; becauſe, though trifling in itſelf, yet being conſiderable with reſpect to the occaſion, it atteſts the noble liberality of the donor. True magnificence is far remote from unſeaſonable oſtentation, which makes a parade of wealth on ordinary and mean occaſions; the oſtentatious man receives his gueſt at a friendly dinner, as if he were celebrating a marriage feſtival; and when he exhibits dramatic entertainments, decks, after the awkward faſhion of the Magareans, his comic actors in the purple trappings of tragedy;

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gedy; catching popular admiration by unſeaſonable and abſurd extravagance; while, on the other hand, he is meanly parſimonious at times when true magnificence might properly be diſplayed. The vice oppoſite to magnificence betrays niggardlineſs throughout, even in the midſt of the moſt profuſe expence; for, in ſome minute particular, an attention to a pitiful ſaving will be diſcovered, which ruins the beauty and gracefulneſs of the whole, as it proves that whatever has been done, was done ſparingly and painfully; and that the performance, if great, far ſurpaſſed the mind of the performer. Theſe two contrary habits are both of them vices, but not very reproachful ones, ſince they neither do harm to others, nor evince groſs turpitude in the mind which harbours them [x].

Chap. 3.

Magnanimity.

Magnanimity, as the name imports, is converſant about great things; what theſe are let us firſt conſider; contemplating not the habit itſelf, but the perſon actuated by it, which will bring us to preciſely the ſame concluſions. A magnanimous man is he, whoſe character being of great worth, is eſtimated by himſelf at its full value. He who forms a groſsly falſe eſtimate of himſelf is a fool; and none of the virtues are conſiſtent with folly: while the man who, conſcious of his defects, appreciates his ſmall merits by a fair and juſt ſtandard, may be praiſed for his good ſenſe and modeſty, but cannot paſs for magnanimous; which epithet always implies dignity and excellence; this beauty of the mind requiring, like that of the body, elevation and magnitude; for perſons of a diminutive ſtature, are not called beautiful, but neat and elegant. A mean-ſpirited [y] man under-rates his own merits; and the vain-glorious boaſter arrogates

[x] Eudem. l. iii. c. vi. [y] Ariſtotle ſays "little-minded."

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rogates to himſelf merits, of which he is by no means poſſeſſed; but the more ſolid merit he poſſeſſes, his vain-glory is the leſs; whereas mean-ſpiritedneſs is the greater, in proportion to the excellence of the worth which is ſo improperly appreciated by its poſſeſſor; for how contemptible would he be, even to himſelf, were his real character of little or no value! The magnanimous man eſtimates himſelf at the higheſt rate, yet no higher than he ought; and conſcious of his inward worth, thinks himſelf entitled to whatever is held moſt precious; to what the moſt exalted of men claim as the higheſt of all rewards; and to what all men confer on the Gods as their acknowledged due; in a word, to honour, the greateſt and moſt invaluable of external goods. Magnanimity, therefore, is peculiarly converſant about honour, and its contrary, ignominy; holding the middle place between vain-glory that unfairly courts undue honours, and mean-ſpiritedneſs that improperly rejects even thoſe that are due. But though, in point of propriety, magnanimity holds the middle place, yet, in excellence and dignity, it riſes to the ſummit; for it heightens and enlarges every virtue; and the moſt boaſtful vain-glory never proudly arrogated more than true magnanimity has fairly claimed. This illuſtrious habit of the mind cannot bear an alliance with any kind of vice. It is moſt oppoſite to cowardice or injuſtice; for, from what motive can he, who thinks of nothing ſo highly as of his own character, exhibit himſelf under ſuch deformities? And if we apply to particular inſtances, or ſurvey individual characters, we ſhall find that thoſe who affect magnanimity without real worth, infallibly expoſe themſelves to ridicule. For, honour, which is the meed of virtue, cannot belong to the worthleſs; and magnanimity forms, as it were, the ornament

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ment of the virtues, ſince it cannot ſubſiſt without them, yet heightens, extends, and magnifies them, wherever they are found. True magnanimity then is a thing moſt difficult, ſince it implies the perfection of moral rectitude. It delights, moderately, in great honours beſtowed by the deſerving, as meeting with its due, or leſs: for with perfect virtue no honour can be fully commenſurate. It accepts however ſuch honours, becauſe nothing better can be beſtowed; but of vulgar honours, or from vulgar men, it is altogether diſdainful; and is as inſenſible to their reproach, as careleſs of their applauſe. Wealth, power, good or bad fortune, it will meet and ſuſtain with the ſame dignified compoſure, neither elated with proſperity nor dejected by adverſity; for to a magnanimous man thoſe things are deſirable chiefly as the ſigns of honour; and, if he bears honour itſelf with moderation, much more muſt he thus bear thoſe things which are only its ſigns, and deſired merely on its account; ſince to him who thinks not too highly of honour, nothing beſides can poſſibly appear great. Magnanimity, therefore, ſometimes paſſes for ſupercilioufneſs; eſpecially ſince great external proſperity ſeems to heighten and increaſe it; for nobility is honoured; and men of wealth or power, being diſtinguiſhed by great ſuperiority of advantages, will always find perſons ready to do them honour; and though honour belongs properly to virtue alone, yet virtue, adorned with great external proſperity, will ſeem doubly entitled to pre-eminence. But, in reality, the moſt proſperous fortune, when deſtitute of virtue, affords not any juſt ground for ſelf-applauſe; it gives to us neither a high opinion of ourſelves, nor a fair claim to be highly thought of by others; and as it is incapable of inſpiring true magnanimity, it too frequently begets inſolence and

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ſupercilioufneſs; ſince worthleſs men cannot bear gracefully the gifts of fortune, but abuſe their fancied ſuperiority by treating others contemptuouſly and unjuſtly; whereas the contempt ſhown by the truly magnanimous, is juſt; their opinions being formed on reflection, as thoſe of the multitude are taken up at random. A man of magnanimity neither courts dangers, nor willingly encounters them on ſlight occaſions. But when a worthy occaſion requires it, he is unſparing of his life, thinking that to live is not, under all conditions, eligible. He is eager to confer favours, and aſhamed of receiving them; becauſe the former is a mark of ſuperiority, the latter the reverſe; he therefore repays every kindneſs with intereſt, that the perſon who firſt obliged him, may become his debtor. He hears with more pleaſure a recital of the good offices he has performed, than that of the favours which he has received. Wherefore Thetis does not expatiate on her benefits to Jupiter[y], nor the Lacedæmonians on thoſe which they had conferred on the Athenians[z]; but rather on the kindneſs they themſelves had received at their hands; for magnanimity having few wants, ſeldom needs that aſſiſtance which it is always diſpoſed to afford; it is lofty towards the great and proſperous, but behaves modeſtly towards men in moderate circumſtances; to riſe above the former, has difficulty and dignity; but to magnify ourſelves in company with the latter, betrays a lowneſs and littleneſs of mind, not leſs ungenerous and vulgar, than making a parade of our ſtrength or courage amidſt weakneſs and cowardice. Magnanimity contemns trivial honours; and diſdains, even in great things, to act a ſecond part. It is ſlow in action, and averſe to exertion, except when great honour may be obtained, or great actions are to.

[y] Homer. Ilias. l. i. v. 503. & ſeq.

[z] Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. p. 609—613. Edit. Leunclav.

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to be performed: not buſied about many things, but confined to thoſe which are great and ſplendid. A magnanimous man is as open in his hatred as in his friendſhip; for concealment is the part of fear; he regards truth more than opinion, and ſhows himſelf manifeſtly in his words and actions, declaring his mind with full freedom; which indicates both his own love of truth and his contempt for the opinions of others; but this openneſs of character is liable to one exception, for he is much given to *irony*, diſſembling his merits before the vulgar, who are unworthy to appreciate them. He can ſhow undue complaiſance for no one's humours, except thoſe of his friends; for flattery is a low and ſervile vice. He is not prone to admire, for he deems nothing great. He is not mindful of injuries, which his magnanimity teaches him to deſpiſe. He is no man's panegyriſt or ſlanderer; he talks not of himſelf, nor does he blame others; not ſpeaking ill even of his enemies, except when their inſolence excites his indignation. As to things of ſmall import, or even daily uſe, he is no petitioner or complainer; for that would ſhew too much concern about them. His poſſeſſions are diſtinguiſhed for their beauty and elegance rather than for their fruitfulneſs and utility; becauſe the former qualities are more nearly allied to that independence and all-ſufficiency to which he aſpires. The gait of a magnanimous man is ſlow; his tone of voice grave, his pronunciation firm. Haſte and rapidity betoken too much ſolicitude. *He* therefore is ſeldom in haſte, who deems few things worthy of his purſuit; nor is he often eager who thinks few things of importance: quickneſs and ſharpneſs of voice proceeding from earneſtneſs and eagerneſs. Such then are the characteriſtics of magnanimity, of which mean-ſpiritedneſs is the defect, and vain-glory the exceſs; qualities which, though

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not very hurtful to others, yet ſhow much imperfection in the minds which harbour them. The little-minded man deprives himſelf of thoſe advantages to which he is entitled. He is ignorant of himſelf and of his own worth, otherwiſe he would aſpire to thoſe advantages which he really deſerves. His fault however conſiſts rather in ſluggiſhneſs than folly; he draws back from noble actions and illuſtrious enterpriſes, as things much above him; and even excludes himſelf from that external proſperity which fortune throws in his way. But the vain-glorious man is ignorant of himſelf ſtill more conſpicuouſly; and even to folly. He engages in undertakings the moſt honourable, but far above his abilities; and in which his ſignal failure manifeſtly convicts him of unworthineſs. He delights in the ornaments of dreſs, and all other ſhowy externals. He makes a parade of his proſperity, and boaſts of it in the vain hope of being honoured on its account. Yet mean-ſpiritedneſs is more contrary than vain-glory to true magnanimity; becauſe the former vice is more frequently met with, and is alſo attended with worſe conſequences. Such then is the nature of magnanimity, or that virtue which is converſant about great and extraordinary honours [a].

Chap. 4.

Of the propriety of affection and conduct with regard to honour.

There ſeems to be another virtue alſo converſant about honour, and bearing the ſame proportion to magnanimity, which liberality bears to magnificence. This virtue, as well as liberality, relates, not to what is great and extraordinary, but to what is ordinary and moderate: and as liberality teaches us to behave with propriety in the purſuit of ordinary and moderate profits, ſo this nameleſs virtue teaches us to behave with propriety in the purſuit of ordinary and moderate honours. A man

[a] Vid. Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxvi.; Eudem. l. iii. c. v.

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man may either be more or leſs deſirous than he ought, of glory as well as of gain; he may ſeek both thoſe objects on improper occaſions, and by undue means. An ambitious man is more fond of honour than he ought; an unambitious man, leſs than he ought; not caring to reap the natural reward even of praiſeworthy exploits: the former recommends himſelf by his ſpirited manlineſs and emulation of excellence; the latter, by his moderation and modeſty; and from the imperfection of language in not aſſigning diſtinct names to the different degrees of our affections, the ſame word excites either praiſe or blame, according to the ſenſe in which it is taken: ambition is a ſubject of commendation, when it denotes a more than vulgar love of honour; it is a term of reproach, when it denotes the ſame affection in an immoderate and unwarrantable degree; and as a term is wanting to denote that middle ſtate of the affection, which is alone conſiſtent with propriety, the contrary extremes contend with each other for the vacant place of pre-eminence. Whatever things admit of exceſs or defect, admit alſo of this middle ſtate, which is alone praiſeworthy. This is the caſe with the deſire of honour, which may be too ſtrong, too weak, or in a moderate and proper degree; a degree not marked by any diſtinct term, and which, by the ambitious, is called low-mindedneſs; and by the low-minded, ambition; thus appearing to either extreme the vice oppoſite to itſelf. This happens with regard to ſome other virtues; each of the extremes uſurping the middle place, becauſe the middle itſelf is not diſtinguiſhed by a name.

Chap. 5.

Meekneſs, with its contraries.

Meekneſs is propriety of affection with regard to the cauſes and circumſtances which naturally provoke anger; or rather, as names are wanting to denote either a mediocrity or the

oppoſite extremes of this affection; meekneſs, though verging towards the anonymous extreme, conſiſting in defect, is thruſt into the middle place. The extreme conſiſting in exceſs, may be called iraſcibility; and anger being a paſſion excited by a variety of different cauſes, and under a variety of different circumſtances, it can only be commendable when it reſults from a proper cauſe, is directed towards proper objects, is ſeaſonable in its commencement, moderate in its degree, and limited in its duration. If meekneſs be a praiſeworthy quality, even the meek man muſt be affected with anger under the conditions above ſpecified. For meekneſs denotes freedom from unreaſonable perturbation, and a due reſiſtance to paſſion, in compliance with the higher powers of our nature; inclining, indeed, to the defective extreme; ſince a meek man is not reſentful of injuries, but always prone to pardon them. The incapacity of feeling juſt provocation is certainly a fault; which, when it proceeds beyond a certain pitch, borders on folly; it denotes a ſtupid inſenſibility of character; and he who does not feel wrongs as he ought, cannot be well qualified to repel them; he will ſubmit, with the meanneſs of a ſlave, to inſults offered either to himſelf or to his friends. An exceſſive propenſity to anger diſplays itſelf in a great variety of ways; it is excited by improper cauſes, and is determined towards improper objects; it appears in immoderate or exceſſive degrees; in ſome men it burſts forth ſuddenly into intemperate rage; in others, it ſettles into unjuſtifiable and permanent reſentment. All thoſe extravagancies of paſſion do not take place at once; for multiplied exceſſes of vice are deſtructive of each other; and ſhould they fall with their full weight on one individual, their burden would be intolerable. Iraſcible men, though moved to paſſion

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too ſuddenly, in immoderate degrees, and on improper occaſions, are yet eaſily pacified; if they be ſoon angry, they are alſo ſoon pleaſed, which is the beſt circumſtance attending them; and which happens from this, that they do not reſtrain their paſſion, but give free vent to it; their quickneſs of temper plainly ſhewing their affections and intentions, which they have no ſooner made manifeſt, than they are ready to be appeaſed. The exceſs of this diſpoſition, which takes offence againſt every perſon, and on every the ſlighteſt occaſion, receives its name, in Greek, from two words denoting the ſharpeſt aſperity of choler. The reſentful and implacable temper retains anger long, becauſe it does not give free vent to it; for, to vent anger in vengeance naturally appeaſes it, by ſubſtituting pleaſure in the ſtead of pain; but paſſion reſtrained, gathers ſtrength by compreſſion; and as it remains hid within the breaſt, the gentle power of perſuaſion cannot be applied for its alleviation; it muſt be digeſted by the internal vigour of the conſtitution, which is a work of time. A fell and ſavage temper directs its immediate anger againſt improper objects, and is implacable in its reſentment, until it is fully ſatiated with vengeance. The exceſſes of anger are more oppoſite than its defects to the virtue of meekneſs; becauſe they occur more frequently; becauſe human nature is too prone to be immoderate in its reſentment; and becauſe perſons of iraſcible and querulous tempers are the moſt troubleſome to live with. From what was above obſerved, it is plain that words cannot accurately expreſs all the conditions, as to time, place, perſon, cauſe, and degree, which render anger praiſeworthy or blameable. He who deviates a little on either ſide from the exact point of propriety, eſcapes blame, becauſe his ſlight error eſcapes obſervation.

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tion. The incapacity of feeling or reſenting an injury, is ſometimes praiſed as meekneſs; too ſtrong a propenſity to anger, is ſometimes extolled as manhood, and regarded as indicating a diſpoſition fit for command. The preciſe middle point, in which alone propriety conſiſts, cannot be accurately aſcertained in words, becauſe it is determined only by a perception of ſenſe; and the ſenſes do not perceive minute variations. This however is plain, that the middle habit is laudable, and the extremes blameable, more or leſs, in exact proportion to their greater or leſſer deviations, in point of all, or any, of the conditions above ſpecified. This laudable mediocrity, therefore, ought to be our conſtant aim; and let this much ſuffice concerning the diſpoſitions and habits that have a reference to the cauſes and circumſtances that naturally provoke anger [b].

Chap. 6.

Courteſy, with its contraries.

In the intercourſe of life and ſociety, there are men of a fawning diſpoſition, ever prone to praiſe, totally averſe to contention, and who think it incumbent on them to give pleaſure to all with whom they converſe. There are others of ſo peeviſh a temper, that they are continually contradicting and croſſing all thoſe with whom they have to do; and who feel not the ſmalleſt concern for the pain occaſioned to others by their churliſh aſperity. That both theſe habits are blameable, is manifeſt; and alſo that there is an intermediate habit between fawning flattery and ſavage ſeverity, which is truly laudable, becauſe it diſtributes its approbation and diſapprobation in due meaſure, according to the circumſtances of the caſe. This intermediate habit is not diſtinguiſhed by a name; it moſt reſembles friendſhip, for ſhould affection be added to the companionable qualities of a man endowed with this habit, he would

[b] Vid. Eudem. l. iii. c. iii.

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would be a moſt delightful friend: but it differs from friendſhip in this, that it does not include any peculiar affection towards thoſe with whom we converſe; and the perſon adorned with this laudable habit, does not approve from love, nor diſapprove from hatred, but becauſe it is his nature and character to beſtow his approbation and diſapprobation agreeably to thoſe rules which moral propriety preſcribes; whether he has to do with acquaintances or ſtrangers; with familiar friends, or with perſons altogether unknown to him; except, that his behaviour to each of thoſe claſſes of perſons will be marked with ſuch diſtinctions as circumſtances require; for we ought not to teſtify as much pleaſure at the merit of mere ſtrangers as at that of our friends; nor to be equally complaiſant to the follies of the latter, as to thoſe of the former. The man of courteſy and civility (for theſe are the words by which the habit in queſtion may moſt nearly be expreſſed) will, in the intercourſe of ſociety, behave himſelf univerſally as he ought: his aim will be, never needleſsly to offend; but to gratify and pleaſe thoſe with whom he lives, on all occaſions on which it poſſibly can be done conſiſtently with utility and propriety. But the courteous man will not betray his own intereſt or honour, or even thoſe of the perſons with whom he converſes, for the ſake of affording a ſmall and unſeaſonable pleaſure. He will reſiſt their opinions, when to reſiſt them gives ſmall pain; whereas to approve them would be injurious or diſgraceful either to others or to himſelf. His behaviour will vary with the rank and dignity, with the degree of his familiarity or connexion, and with a variety of other circumſtances belonging to the perſons with whom he converſes, but will be always regulated by propriety. Pleaſure, we have ſaid, will be his aim; but without ſacrificing

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ſacrificing intereſt or honour to pleaſure, or a greater pleaſure to a leſſer. Such then is this intermediate habit, which is nameleſs in Greek; and of which the extremes are, on one hand, univerſal and indiſcriminate complaiſance, which, when it proceeds from motives of intereſt, is called flattery; and, on the other, churliſh aſperity and contentious peeviſhneſs. As there is no term to expreſs the intermediate and laudable habit, the extremes only ſeem to ſtand in oppoſition to each other, and alternately arrogate the praiſe of virtue, though in fact they are both vices; and as ſuch, in direct oppoſition to the praiſeworthy habit above deſcribed.

Chap. 7.

Plain dealing, and its contraries.

The virtue which lies between the extremes of diſſembling concealment and arrogant oſtentation is converſant about nearly the ſame objects with courteſy; except that this has a reference to the pleaſure of thoſe with whom we live, whereas that has a reference to truth in our words and actions. It is worth while to conſider alſo this praiſeworthy, though anonymous, habit; becauſe by thus ſhewing that each particular virtue conſiſts in mediocrity, we ſhall beſt explain the nature of virtue in general, and moſt clearly eſtabliſh the truth of our moral theory. The characteriſtics of thoſe who give pleaſure or pain in the intercourſe of ſociety, have already been deſcribed; we proceed to ſpeak of thoſe who are adorned by truth and frankneſs, or degraded by falſehood and diſſimulation. There are men who arrogate to themſelves good qualities, of which they are entirely deſtitute, and who amplify the good qualities of which they are poſſeſſed, far beyond their real meaſure and natural worth. The ironical diſſembler, on the other hand, either conceals his advantages; or if he cannot conceal, endeavours to depreciate their value; whereas the man of frankneſs and

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and plain-dealing ſhews his character in its natural ſize: truth appears in all his words and actions; which repreſent him exactly as he is, without addition and without diminution. Each of theſe three habits diſplay themſelves either from the ſpontaneous impulſe of our character, or from motives of intereſt; and when men have not any reaſon for acting otherwiſe, they indulge the bent of their characters, either to plain-dealing on the one hand, or to the oppoſite kinds of deceit above ſpecified. There is a deformity in falſehood, which renders it odious in itſelf; whereas truth is beautiful and praiſeworthy: and plain-dealing is the intermediate habit or virtue between the oppoſite extremes or vices of him who would paſs himſelf for more than he is worth, and of him who conceals, or diſſembles, his advantages. Of thoſe two kinds of deceit the former is the moſt blameable; we ſhall treat of both, after having firſt ſpoken of plain-dealing. By this word we do not mean the faithful performance of contracts or engagements, nor any of thoſe things which have a reference to juſtice or injuſtice in our tranſactions; for ſuch matters as theſe belong to another branch of virtue: but we mean the undiſguiſed truth and downright honeſty which are apparent in ſome men's behaviour, when no intereſt whatever is at ſtake, merely becauſe ſuch plain-dealing is moſt agreeable to their character. Such men will naturally be juſt in their tranſactions, ſince they who avoid deceit which is harmleſs, will ſtill more avoid fraud which is injurious to others and diſgraceful to themſelves. This habit is praiſeworthy, even when it inclines to the defective extreme of diſavowing or concealing advantages that really belong to us; it derives a comelineſs from avoiding to make a parade of invidious diſtinctions, and of our own ſuperiority, which

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which is always mortifying to others. The vice of oftentatious vanity, and falſe arrogation of merit, when it proceeds not from any intereſted motive, ſhews great weakneſs and levity; but its folly is more conſpicuous than its turpitude; when it ſprings from a love of honour or praiſe, which we muſt be conſcious that we do not deſerve, it is indeed highly contemptible, but is in that caſe leſs odious than when it has its ſource in the love of money, or of any thing by which money may be gained. The virtues and vices juſt mentioned depend like all others not on our natural powers or propenſities, but on election and habit: it is from habit that ſome delight in plain-dealing, others in deceit; and that ſome take a pleaſure in practiſing deceit for the purpoſes of glory, and others for thoſe of gain. The former aſſume the ſemblance of qualities, of which the reality would entitle them to congratulation and praiſe; the latter arrogate to themſelves qualities, which, if they really poſſeſſed them, might be ſucceſsfully employed in promoting the pleaſure or alleviating the pain of others; and to which qualities it is not eaſy to prove that they are only vain pretenders: to this claſs of deceivers belong phyſicians, ſophiſts, and ſoothſayers. The ironical diſſembler has more of the grace of propriety, becauſe he conceals or depreciates his real advantages, in order to avoid the ſwelling pomp of oſtentatious arrogance. Such men cannot appear to be actuated by motives of intereſt: they are ſometimes inclined to diſſemble even the moſt honourable advantages; as happened in the caſe of Socrates. But there is a littleneſs and affectation in diſſembling advantages inconſiderable in themſelves, and too manifeſt to be concealed; ſuch diſſemblers are contemptible, and that ſometimes in point of vanity and oſtentation; witneſs the Lacedæmonians with their ſhort beggarly

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dreſs; for an aſſumed poverty is frequently as oſtentatious as the parade of riches. Diſſimulation, therefore, to be graceful, muſt be uſed with reſpect to things not too open and viſible: but the arrogation of advantages which do not belong to us is the vice commonly oppoſed to the virtue of plain-dealing; becauſe it is the worſt of the two extremes.

Chap. 8.

Facetiouſneſs, and its contraries.

As life requires repoſe from ſerious employment, and this repoſe may be enlivened by amuſement, there ſeems to be a virtue relative to the intercourſe of men in their hours of relaxation and merriment, regulating both the matter and the manner of their converſation. The ſtrain of this converſation may be more auſtere or more ludicrous than it ought, or may flow in that happy medium which is alone conſiſtent with propriety. He who ſeeks to raiſe laughter on all occaſions indiſcriminately, without regard to decency, or to the pain inflicted on the object of his ridicule, is a low and contemptible buffoon: he who is himſelf totally incapable of exciting mirth, and who is ſo far from reliſhing, that he is highly offended with the innocent jeſts of others, indicates a roughneſs and ſavageneſs of character, unbending hardneſs, and unſocial auſterity; whereas true facetiouſneſs conſiſts in graceful flexibility of mind and manners, which can aſſume all ſhapes, and which becomes all; for as the habits of the body are known by its motions, ſo are thoſe of the mind. An immoderate propenſity to ridicule being a more prominent and more conſpicuous quality than the contrary extreme of ſullen and ruſtic gravity, and the greater part of mankind being inclined to delight in merriment, without anxiouſly examining whether it originates in a pure and proper ſource; buffoonery often paſſes for facetiouſneſs, although there be the greateſt difference between the coarſeneſs of the one, and the

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the elegance of the other; for in facetiouſneſs, which is the middle and proper habit, an eaſy pliancy of humour is adorned with a graceful dexterity which ſkilfully avoids whatever is indecent and illiberal; never debaſing the delicate gaiety congenial to the character of well educated citizens, by the ſmalleſt approximation to the vile raillery of profligates and ſlaves. The progreſs of letters and civility has a powerful influence on the refinement of wit and humour; witneſs the difference between the ancient and modern comedy. In the former, the moſt ſhameful reproaches, expreſſed in the coarſeſt language, formed a principal ſource of the public entertainment; in the latter, the audience are taught chiefly to reliſh the faint inſinuation, and the delicate hint: with reſpect to beauty and gracefulneſs, the two ſtyles of writing are marked by the ſtrongeſt differences. But by what circumſtance is true facetiouſneſs characteriſed? Whether does it conſiſt in ſaying that only which becomes a well educated citizen? or, may it be characterized by the avoiding of offence? or, thirdly, by the communication of pleaſure? Or rather is not ſuch a habit in its nature indefinite, ſince things pleaſing to one audience, may be highly offenſive to another: for things which we are pleaſed to do, we will not be much offended to hear; and thoſe which we are pleaſed to hear, we in ſome meaſure ſeem to do; but perſons well educated preſcribe juſt limits both to their words and actions. The laws prohibit certain reproaches, when made ſeriouſly; they ſhould perhaps alſo prohibit malicious raillery. A man endowed with urbanity and facetiouſneſs is a law unto himſelf. Such then is this intermediate habit; whereas the extreme of buffoonery renders the mind in which it ſubſiſts a ſlave to low humour; for the buffoon neither ſpares others nor himſelf;

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himſelf; and provided he can excite laughter, condeſcends to ſay what no man of an elegant turn of mind would venture to repeat, or even endure to hear. But the auſtere and ſolemn character is, on the other hand, totally unfit for the intercourſe of ſociety in hours of relaxation; to the entertainment of which he not only does not contribute any thing himſelf, but glooms by his unſeaſonable ſeverity the merriment of others. There are then three laudable habits which have a reference to our behaviour in ſociety; the firſt conſiſts in a fair exhibition of our own characters; the other two relate to the pleaſure of thoſe with whom we live; and of theſe two, the one conſiſts in heightening that pleaſure in hours of relaxation; the other, in promoting it amidſt the ordinary employments of life [c].

Chap. 9. Of ſhame.

Shame can ſcarcely be numbered among the virtues; for it ſeems to be rather a paſſion than a habit. It is defined, the fear of diſgrace; and, like another kind of fear, it appears on the countenance; for men, when aſhamed, bluſh, and when afraid of death, grow pale: both ſeem to be affections of the body, and therefore more properly to be claſſed with paſſions than with habits. Shame is not graceful in every period of life; it only becomes youth. Young perſons, we think, ought to be extremely ſenſible to ſhame; becauſe, as they are chiefly actuated by paſſion, they would be thereby ſeduced into many diſgraceful exceſſes, were they not reſtrained by a ſenſe of ſhame. We praiſe the bluſhing modeſty of youth, but nobody would think ſhamefacedneſs in old age a fit ſubject of commendation: for perſons of mature years ought to be incapable of any action, on account of which ſhame can be felt; for as ſhame can

[c] Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxviii.; Eudem. l. iii. c. vii.

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can be felt only for things baſe or blameable, it cannot belong to men of confirmed virtue, who will avoid all ſuch actions, whether they be really blameable in themſelves, or only of evil report. Bad men alone can be guilty of bad actions; and it is the wildeſt abſurdity to flatter ourſelves, that though we do what is wrong, yet we may eſcape the guilt thereof by being heartily aſhamed of our conduct. Shame is cauſed only by ſuch actions as are voluntary; and baſe actions a good man will never voluntarily commit. Shame then can at beſt be conſidered only as a conditional virtue; that is, it may belong to a good man particularly circumſtanced; for on the ſuppoſition, that he ſhould have performed a bad action, he certainly would be aſhamed of it. But the virtues, properly ſo called, are things deſirable and graceful on their own account, ſimply and abſolutely, independently of any ſuppoſitions or conditions whatever. Impudence indeed is a vice; but it does not therefore follow, that its contrary is a virtue; for there is not any room for ſhame, where nothing ſhameful is either done or intended. For a ſimilar reaſon, ſelf-command, which is often ſo highly commended, is only a conditional virtue, as ſhall be proved hereafter. We now proceed to ſpeak of juſtice.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

BOOK V.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK V.

THIS Fifth Book is entirely dedicated to the important ſubject of juſtice. Ariſtotle explains the different acceptations of the word, and diſtinguiſhes the different kinds of juſtice ſtrictly ſo called. Political juſtice, again, is either diſtributive or commutative; which laſt our author, for a reaſon given in the text, calls corrective. He ſhews wherein thoſe kinds of juſtice differ; the one being regulated by proportion, and the other by equality. The difference is pointed out between what our lawyers call the *mala in ſe*, and the *mala prohibita*; and the diſtinction clearly explained between *doing harm* and *committing injury*. Ariſtotle concludes with examining the nature of equity in contradiſtinction to that of juſtice; and illuſtrates his doctrine concerning the latter, by conſidering the queſtion whether a man can be guilty of injury towards himſelf. As the author introduces not any thing ſuperfluous, (for his account of the origin and uſe of money is eſſentially connected with the ſubject,) he comprizes within a narrow compaſs a ſolid and ſatisfactory explanation of thoſe great commanding principles which uphold civil ſociety; an explanation exempt from thoſe ambiguities and contradictions, which too often occur in the innumerable

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volumes in which his opinions have been unfaithfully reported, or unskilfully commented. Yet had succeeding writers improved and enriched his observations, the present Book would have the fairest claim to attention, as containing the first attempt to treat fully and scientifically the most important subject on which the pen of any author can possibly be employed.

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BOOK V.

ARGUMENT.

Difference between intellectual and moral habits.—Different acceptations of the word injuſtice.—Juſtice ſtrictly ſo called.—Diſtributive juſtice.—Corrective juſtice.—Retaliation.—Natural juſtice, independent of poſitive inſtitution.—Misfortunes.—Errors.—Crimes.—Equity.

BOOK V. Chap. I. Juſtice.

In examining juſtice and injuſtice, we muſt explain to what kind of actions they relate; what kind of virtue juſtice is, and what are the extremes or vices between which this virtue may be found. We ſhall thus follow the ſame method which has been purſued in the preceding parts of this diſcourſe. All deſcribe juſtice as that habit which qualifies men to practiſe juſt actions with inclination and pleaſure; injuſtice is the reverſe; and this general deſcription may ſuffice for our preſent purpoſe. Juſtice, we have ſaid, is the habit which qualifies men to practiſe juſt actions with pleaſure; becauſe the moral habits differ eſſentially from the intellectual in this, that the latter, as well as mere powers and capacities, may be ſubſervient to quite contrary purpoſes; and thoſe endowed with the intellectual habits, or ſciences, may exerciſe them ſpontaneouſly and agreeably in producing directly contrary effects. But the moral virtues, like the different habits of the body, are determined by their nature

Difference between intellectual and moral habits.

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to one ſpecific operation: thus a man in health acts and moves in a manner conformable to his healthy ſtate of body, and never otherwiſe, when his motions are natural and voluntary; and in the ſame manner the habits of juſtice or temperance uniformly determine thoſe adorned by them, to act juſtly and temperately. Yet habits of all kinds are often known by their contraries; thus, if a good habit of body conſiſts in denſity and firmneſs of fleſh, a bad habit muſt conſiſt in its ſoftneſs and rarity. When the word denoting any habit is taken in different ſenſes, the word denoting its contrary is likewiſe, for the moſt part, employed with equal latitude: thus the different meanings of injuſtice correſpond with thoſe of juſtice; both thoſe words having reſpectively various ſignifications, which, on account of their near affinity to each other, are ſeldom accurately diſtinguiſhed; for when a word denotes two things totally unlike, its ſeparate meanings are manifeſt; as, for inſtance, in the Greek word which is applied equally to denote the collar-bone, and the key of a door. Let us examine then in how many acceptations the word injuſtice is uſed. A man who violates law is called unjuſt, as well as he who aſpires to any undue advantage, and is not contented with equality: ſince what is unlawful or unequal is unjuſt, and juſtice muſt be conformable to the principles of law and of equality. Injuſtice conſiſts in deſiring more than our ſhare, not of all things indiſcriminately which fall under the denomination of good, but of thoſe only which it is ſuppoſed to be good fortune to obtain; and which, though univerſally deemed good in themſelves, are often evils to thoſe who obtain them. Such goods mankind in general wiſh for and purſue; though, in fact, they ought

In how many acceptations the word injuſtice is taken.

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ought rather to pray that things abſolutely good, may be good in relation to themſelves; and always to prefer and chooſe thoſe only which are likely to be ſo. An unjuſt man does not neceſſarily chooſe the greater ſhare; ſometimes he prefers the leſſer; and that always, when the things in his option are evils. But as the leſſer of two evils is in ſome meaſure a good, he ſeems always to deſire the greater ſhare, and is thence called in Greek an uſurper of more than his due; though, in reality, according to circumſtances, he chooſes ſometimes the greater, and ſometimes the leſſer ſhare, but always an unequal one; ſo that his real turpitude conſiſts in acting contrary to equality or to law; an oppoſition to both of which, is common to every ſpecies of injuſtice. Since, then, whatever is unlawful is unjuſt, juſtice may be ſaid to conſiſt in acting agreeably to the laws of our country. But laws regulate the tranſactions of life, either with a view to the benefit of the public at large, or with a view to the benefit of that portion of the ſtate which is inveſted with ſovereignty, whether that has been acquired by pre-eminence in virtue, or attained by any of thoſe other means through which ſovereign authority is eſtabliſhed. In one ſenſe, therefore, juſtice comprehends every thing that has a tendency either to produce or to maintain the happineſs of men in political ſociety. The law preſcribes to citizens who are ſoldiers, not to leave their ranks, not to fly, not to throw down their arms; that is, it commands them to behave themſelves with bravery. The law alſo prohibits all thoſe ſubject to its authority from adultery, and every ſpecies of debauchery which is injurious to others; which is nothing elſe than to command its ſubjects to be temperate. It alſo pre-

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ſcribes meekneſs, in the injunctions, "thou ſhalt not ſtrike," "thou ſhalt not revile:" and in the ſame manner, partly by precepts, and partly by prohibitions, the law more or leſs accurately defines the rules and practice of the other virtues; ſo that juſtice, taken in the ſenſe of conformity to law, comprehends the whole of virtue, not indeed ſimply and abſolutely, but in reference to thoſe with whom we are connected; being another name for the ſtrict performance of all thoſe relative duties which are eſſential to the happineſs of ſocial life. Viewed in this light, juſtice is the firſt and brighteſt of all the virtues; more worthy of admiration than either Heſperus or Lucifer; ſince according to the proverb,

"Juſtice alone compriſes every virtue."

It is indeed the perfection of virtue, ſince it is not only the beſt conſtitution of our internal frame, but the external exerciſe of whatever is praiſeworthy in behaviour towards others; and even the whole community, however extenſive, of which we are members[d]. There are many capable of acting uprightly within a limited domeſtic ſphere, whoſe imperfections become manifeſt

[d] This paſſage is expanded and adorned by Cicero in language the moſt glowing and impreſſive, "Eſt quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffuſa in omnes, conſtans, ſempiterna quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quæ tamen neque probos fruſtra jubet, neque improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec abrogari fas eſt, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari poteſt. Nec vero aut per Senatum, aut per populum ſolvi hac lege poſſumus. Neque eſt quærendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alius: nec erit aliud lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia poſthac: ſed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex et ſempiterna et immortalis continebit; unuſque erit communis quaſi magiſter et imperator omnium Deus ille, legis hujus inventor, diſceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipſe ſe fugiet, ac naturam hominis aſpernabitur; ac hoc ipſo luet maximas pœnas, etiamſi cætera ſupplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit." Fragment. de Republic. l. iii.

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manifeſt on a wider and more exalted theatre. Wherefore Bias well obſerved, "that government ſhows the man;" for he who is entruſted with the exerciſe of power, is placed in multiplied relations with reſpect to others, and the whole commonwealth. Juſtice, therefore, ſeems to contribute to the benefit rather of thoſe towards whom it is exerciſed, than of thoſe who are endowed with this virtuous habit; becauſe it is the nature of this habit always to bear a reference to our tranſactions with the world. The worſt of men are thoſe whoſe vices injure themſelves and their friends; the beſt are thoſe, whoſe virtues benefit not only themſelves and their friends, but the community at large, and the whole ſociety of mankind. This, indeed, is a noble, becauſe a difficult taſk. Juſtice, then, conſidered in this view, is not a part, but the whole of virtue; and its contrary, injuſtice, is not a part, but the whole of vice. Wherein virtue and juſtice differ, is evident from the obſervations above made. They are preciſely the ſame thing viewed under two different aſpects; and denominated virtue when conſidered in relation to the mind adorned by this praiſeworthy habit; but called juſtice when conſidered in relation to thoſe towards whom it is exerciſed.

Chap. 2.

Juſtice properly ſo called.

But our preſent inquiry is concerning juſtice taken in a more limited ſenſe, and denoting one virtue in particular; and alſo concerning injuſtice as ſignifying one particular vice, diſtinct from every other. That ſuch a ſpecific injuſtice, as well as juſtice, exiſts, appears from the following conſideration; that he who commits any other baſeneſs, is indeed guilty of wrong, but does not thereby benefit his fortune; which is plain, from the examples of him who throws away his ſhield through

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comardice, who reviles his neighbour through ungovernable aſperity of temper, or who refuſes, through illiberality, any pecuniary aid to thoſe who have claims on his bounty. But a man may benefit his fortune by uſurping more than his due ſhare of worldly goods, without incurring the blame of all, or any, of theſe vices. His conduct, however, is culpable, and we arraign his injuſtice. There is then a particular kind of injuſtice differing from that above mentioned, and bearing the relation to it, of a part to the whole: in the firſt ſenſe, unjuſt is ſynonymous with unlawful; in the ſecond, it implies the breach of a particular claſs of laws, namely, that which prohibits any man from benefiting himſelf at the expence of his neighbour. One man commits adultery for the ſake of gain, another pays dearly for his criminal pleaſure; the vice of the former, is aggravated injuſtice; that of the latter, is profligate intemperance. All other wrongs may always be referred to ſome particular ſpecies of vice; the commiſſion of adultery, to intemperance; the deſertion of our companions in war, to cowardice; an aſſault, to unbridled violence of anger: but that wrong which is committed for the ſake merely of gain, is referred to no other vice than that of injuſtice; not that injuſtice above deſcribed, which is ſynonymous with wrong in general, but a ſpecific vice, bearing the ſame relation to the former, which the ſpecies does to the claſs under which it is included; for injuſtice, both in its large and in its limited ſenſe, has always a reference to our tranſactions with others; its very eſſence conſiſts in our behaving amiſs in thoſe tranſactions: but injuſtice, ſtrictly ſo called, implies that our miſconduct reſults from the deſire of promoting our own profit or honour,

or

or whatever we think gainful to ourſelves[e]; whereas injuſtice, largely taken, comprehends all thoſe improprieties in our behaviour towards others, which are inconſiſtent with the character of a virtuous man. We proceed then to explain the nature and properties of juſtice and injuſtice, ſtrictly ſo called. This ſpecies of injuſtice was ſaid to conſiſt, not in what is unlawful merely, but in what is alſo unequal; for whatever is unequal is unlawful; ſince laws, properly made, aſſure to each individual his equal ſhare, that is his due, in his tranſactions with his fellow-citizens; but many things are unlawful which are not unequal, becauſe laws relate to many other objects beſides the diſtribution and adjuſtment of intereſts and honours; enforcing, by authority, the practice of every virtue, and upholding a ſyſtem of education by which this practice may, through diſcipline and cuſtom, be rendered eaſy and agreeable. Whether ſuch an education properly falls under the ſcience of politics, will afterwards be examined[f]; for under all forms of government indiſcriminately, perhaps the character of the good man will not be found compatible with that of a good citizen. The particular kind of juſtice now under conſideration, is employed either in diſtributing to each citizen his due ſhare of honour, wealth, and all other advantages, in the political partnerſhip, or commonwealth, of which he is a member; or in regulating, by the rules of right, thoſe tranſactions, whether voluntary or involuntary, which happen between fellow-citizens; and where wrong has on either ſide been committed, in correcting this wrong,

[e] Ariſtotle ſays, "for the ſake of honour, money, ſafety, or for that which would include all theſe in one word."

[f] Ariſtotle examines this queſtion in his Politics, which work is merely a continuation of his Ethics to Nicomachus.

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wrong, by again ſetting the parties, as far as may be, on a foot of equality with each other. Voluntary tranſactions are thoſe in which both parties voluntarily concur; ſuch as buying, ſelling, borrowing, lending, letting, hiring, pledging, depoſiting. Involuntary tranſactions are either ſecret or open; the ſecret are, theft, adultery, poiſoning, ſeduction of other men's ſlaves, proſtitution for hire of other men's wives, premeditated murder, and the bearing of falſe witneſs. The open but involuntary tranſactions include all violent and manifeſt aggreſſions on the perſons, property, or reputation of others; ſuch as aſſault, maiming, impriſonment, death, robbery, ſlander, inſult.

Chap. 3.

Diſtributive juſtice.

Juſtice implies equality; and this equality lies in the middle between two extremes, the greater and the leſſer: for whatever admits of diviſion into two unequal parts, may alſo be equally divided. But equality, being a relative term, always ſuppoſes the compariſon of two things at leaſt. Diſtributive juſtice, therefore, always implies two things, and alſo two perſons between whom thoſe things are divided. If the perſons are exactly equal, ſo ought to be their ſhares; but if the perſons are unequal, the ſhares ought alſo to be unequal in the ſame proportion: for complaints and ſtrife always will ariſe, when either perſons of unequal worth meet with preciſely the ſame treatment; or when perſons of nearly equal worth are diſtinguiſhed from each other by too conſiderable differences. This is univerſally acknowledged; but men's notions of worth vary with their political principles. In democracies it is meaſured by liberty; in oligarchies, by wealth or birth; in ariſtocracies, by virtue. Juſtice, however, plainly conſiſts in proportion, which is the equality of ratios; and proportion, whether diſcrete or continuous,

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continuous, always implies four terms; ſince when continuous, one of the terms muſt be taken twice. Diſtributive juſtice always requiring four terms at leaſt, implies that the ſhares bear the ſame proportion to each other as do the perſons among whom theſe ſhares are diſtributed; for proportion is applicable to all quantities, and not merely to numbers. If the firſt ſhare therefore be to the firſt man, as the ſecond ſhare to the ſecond; then alternately, the firſt ſhare will be to the ſecond ſhare, as the firſt man to the ſecond man; and as each of the antecedents is to its conſequent, ſo will both the antecedents be to both the conſequents. This is what is called by mathematicians geometrical proportion, conſiſting, as we have ſaid, in equality of ratios; which equality is in the middle between exceſs and defect; for if one of the ratios were greater or leſſer than the other, the proportion, or, in other words, the juſtice of the diſtribution, would be deſtroyed. In diſtributive juſtice, the four terms are all of them diſtinct, the one from the other; conſiſting of two perſons, and two ſhares, at leaſt; none of which can be taken twice in the ſeries. The proportion therefore is not continuous, but diſcrete; and when proportion is violated, injuſtice immediately follows. This evidently appears in actions: for the injurious perſon has more, the perſon injured has leſs, than their reſpective ſhares of good; of evil, the reverſe; for the leſſer evil is conſidered as a good [s].

Chap. 4.

Commutative and corrective juſtice.

The remaining ſpecies of juſtice is properly diſtinguiſhed by the epithet of corrective: it applies to the mutual tranſactions between men, whether voluntary or involuntary. It differs from

[s] I thought it unneceſſary to ſubjoin with Ariſtotle, that the leſſer evil is conſidered as a good becauſe it is to be preferred to the greater; that good is always deſirable, and, of two goods, the more deſirable is the greater.

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from distributive justice in this, that the latter consists in geometrical proportion, and requires that the shares should have the same ratio to each other as the persons among whom they are divided; so that each citizen may find himself treated according to his deserts, and those who contribute most to the public benefit may meet with proportionally higher remunerations. Corrective justice also implies equality, but an equality of a different kind, founded not on geometrical, but on arithmetical, proportion; for the law does not make any difference in its correction or punishment, whether a good man has injured a bad one, or a bad man a good. It contemplates merely the hurt done or the injury sustained; and endeavours to set the two parties, the one of whom is wronged by the other, on the same foot of equality on which they formerly stood. The words gain and loss are not indeed applicable in all cases where one man is injured by another; they can be properly used only when the injuries done may be estimated in money; but in all cases whatever, he who has committed an injury should be compelled, as far as may be, to make reparation, which, when complete, reduces the parties to that condition of equality from which they set out, by giving back to the loser what had been taken from him by the gainer. Corrective justice, then, holds the middle place between gain and loss. In their disputes with each other, men have recourse to a judge, as to a living fountain of justice; who, as it is his business to adjust differences, and mediate between contending parties, is often styled a mediator. This office he performs by finding the middle term between the unequal extremes of gain and loss; in the same manner as if, a line being divided into two unequal parts, he cut from the greater part its excess above half the line, and added

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added it to the leſſer. When the whole is divided equally, each party has his due, becauſe the ſhares are alike; and this equality is the middle arithmetical term between the greater and the leſſer extreme. It is the duty of a judge to find this middle term; from which function, he appears in Greek to have derived his appellation; for juſtice in this language means an equal diviſion; and a judge, an equal divider. When, from two equal quantities, a part is taken from the one and added to the other, the latter will exceed by two parts: for were the part taken away deſtroyed, it would exceed by one; it exceeds the middle term therefore by one; and this term exceeds the quantity from which the part was taken away by one. By this means we may learn, that in order to correct inequality, and thereby to do juſtice, we muſt take from the greater extreme that by which it exceeds the middle, and add this exceſs to the leſſer. This plainly appears in geometry by means of a diagram; but the ſame thing holds in all other arts, which would ſpeedily be ſubverted, and all human ſociety overturned, unleſs equality and juſtice were tolerably well maintained in the actions and intercourſe of life; and proper correctives applied where theſe bonds of ſociety are materially violated. The words gain and loſs are introduced by the voluntary tranſactions of men; in which, he who got more than he gave in exchange, was ſaid to gain by the bargain; and he who got leſs, to loſe; as in buying and ſelling, and all other legal contracts. But when the bargain was equal, each party was ſaid to have his due. Juſtice, then, even in ſuch tranſactions as are involuntary, conſiſts in a middle term between a certain kind of gain and loſs, and requires that the parties ſhould be reduced, as nearly as may be, to that condition of equality in which they

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Chap. 5.

Retaliation does not apply to juſtice, either diſtributive or corrective.

ſtood with regard to each other, before any ſuch tranſaction took place.

Retaliation ſeems to ſome to be the whole of juſtice. This opinion was held by the Pythagoreans; who defined juſtice to be "reciprocity of doing and ſuffering." But retaliation will not apply either to diſtributive or to corrective juſtice; although the law of Rhadamanthus ſays, "The completeſt juſtice conſiſts in making a man ſuffer the ſame ills that he has committed." This rule, however, is liable to innumerable exceptions. Thus, if a general ſhould ſtrike a ſoldier, the blow muſt not be retorted; but to ſtrike a general, or any other perſon inveſted with authority, requires that the offender ſhould be puniſhed more ſeverely than by mere retaliation. The difference alſo is very great between voluntary and involuntary injuries; to the latter of which Rhadamanthus' rule is totally inapplicable. Yet the commercial intercourſe of nations, and of individuals in the ſame nation, is maintained by a reciprocation, not indeed of the ſame, or ſimilar, but of proportional benefits and injuries. When injuries are offered by one ſet of perſons, and cannot be retorted by another, the latter claſs look on themſelves as nothing better than ſlaves: when benefits, on the other hand, are conferred, but without any proſpect of being returned, there is an end to that interchange of good offices, which is the main pillar of civil ſociety; a truth acknowledged by thoſe commonwealths who have erected temples to the Graces on the moſt conſpicuous ſituations; that man might continually be reminded of the duty of gratitude, the favourite virtue of thoſe divinities; and that thoſe who had received and returned favours, might always be ready to renew the laudable contention among themſelves, by mutually provoking each other to works of kindneſs.

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The nature and uſe of money.

The comfort of life requires an interchange of different works and exertions. The bricklayer, for example, muſt exchange the production of his labour with the ſhoemaker; and the bargain will be juſt, when the works exchanged bear the ſame proportion to each other, as do the exertions of the artiſans by whom they were produced. If the exertions of the bricklayer be more valuable for their duration, or their difficulty, than thoſe of the ſhoemaker, the works produced by the latter muſt, to render the bargain equal, bear the ſame proportion numerically to thoſe produced by the former: thus, if the bricklayer has conſumed a thouſand times as much labour in making a houſe, as the ſhoemaker has done in making a pair of ſhoes, a thouſand pair of ſhoes muſt be given for one houſe. The ſame thing happens with reſpect to all other arts, which derive their whole utility from the mutual exchange of different ſorts of labour, and which could not long be maintained unleſs the exertions of one artiſan in one way were nearly balanced and compenſated by thoſe of another artiſan in another. A community could not ſubſiſt, compoſed wholly of phyſicians, or wholly of huſbandmen; it muſt conſiſt of phyſicians and huſbandmen, and other claſſes of individuals employed in different trades and different profeſſions. But that operations and works of ſuch different kinds ſhould be fairly exchanged for each other, it is neceſſary that they ſhould be nearly commenſurate; that is, that all of them ſhould be capable of being eſtimated with tolerable accuracy by compariſon with one common meaſure. Hence the introduction of money; by means of which all thoſe operations and works are compared in value with each other, and their relative exceſſes or deficiencies aſcertained with ſufficient correctneſs for all practical

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tical purpoſes. In reality, value depends on the mutual wants of men, which form the great bond of ſociety; for unleſs their wants were mutual, exchange could not be effected: but money is uſed by convention as the repreſentative of all things wanted; ſince it ſerves as a pledge and ſurety, that whenever thoſe wants occur, they will be ſpeedily gratified; and its name is derived from the word ſignifying law, which indicates that it is founded, not on nature, but on convention; and that human laws, which have thought fit to employ it as a meaſure of value, may, at pleaſure, ſet this uſe of it aſide, and employ ſome other meaſure in its ſtead. Money, which repreſents the value of all other things, varies in its own; but its variations are leſs conſiderable than thoſe of moſt other ſubſtances. It ſerves therefore to fix their price, and to render them commenſurate with each other, thus performing a function eſſential to the exiſtence of civil ſociety; for communities could not ſubſiſt without exchange; nor exchange, without equality; nor equality, without a common meaſure. The various kinds of labour, and the works thereby effected, cannot indeed be accurately compared, and exactly meaſured, either by each other or even by money; but they may, by means of the latter, be eſtimated with ſufficient correctneſs for maintaining that commercial intercourſe which is eſſential to the ſupply of our numerous exigencies [h].

From

[h] Ariſtotle illuſtrates this ſubject by ſhewing how the exchangeable value of a houſe and a bed are compared with each other, by reducing both to the common meaſure of a certain number of minas. The text is corrupt, and the example ſuperfluous; but it is of importance to obſerve how well our author explains the nature of traffic, money, labour, exchangeable value or price, on juſt notions of which all theories of political œconomy ought to be founded. In various parts of his works he makes the important diſtinction between labour conſumed in uſe, and labour employed in production. That of

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In what ſenſe juſtice conſiſts in mediocrity.

From the explanation given of juſtice and injuſtice, it is manifeſt that a juſt action holds the intermediate place between doing and ſuffering an injury. The doer has more, the ſufferer leſs, than he ought; and juſtice is mediocrity, not indeed in the ſame ſenſe with the other virtues, which lie between two contrary and vicious extremes, but becauſe it is productive of equality in our dealings, and gives to each individual that ſhare which truly belongs to him; whereas injuſtice contains in it two oppoſite faults, giving to the one party more than his due, and robbing

of a ſervant or domeſtic ſlave is of the firſt kind; that of a manufacturer or artiſan, of the ſecond. The labour of the artiſan or manufacturer is concentrated and fixed in his work; the labour of a builder in a houſe built, of a weaver in the web. (ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ οἷον ἡ οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ, &c. Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 939.) Having diſtinguiſhed between productive and unproductive labour, he obſerves that every work or production may be employed in two different ways, either in the way of uſe or that of exchange. Thus a pair of ſhoes may either be worn or they may be ſold (οἷον ὑποδήματος, ἥ τε ὑποδέσις, καὶ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ, Politic. l. i. c. ix. p. 305.). Every production or commodity has, therefore, in reference to the wants of human life, two different values, a value in uſe and a value in exchange. Theſe different values ought to be diſtinguiſhed, becauſe things that have the greateſt value in uſe, have often very little value in exchange, and things that have a great value in exchange have often very little value in uſe. The exchangeable value of commodities, according to Ariſtotle, is always relative to the labour requiſite for procuring them; and the quantity of productive labour is exactly meaſured by the work or production in which this labour is fixed and embodied (Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 939.). But commodities or productions are ſo complex in their nature, that they cannot be compared with each other without ſome common meaſure. The metals, in conſequence of their uſefulneſs and beauty, their facility of diviſion without injury, and of tranſportation without much labour, above all, their extreme durability, have been adopted by very general conſent as the fitteſt meaſures of the exchangeable value of all other commodities. But neither the metals in general, nor any one metal in particular, is an exact meaſure. At different times and places, their own values are found to vary; and therefore they cannot be an exact, that is, an invariable meaſure of the value of other things. But though the exchangeable value of the metals varies, Ariſtotle maintains that it is leſs variable than that of any other commodity (πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό, ἡ οὐγὰς αἰεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ἴσως δὲ βούλεται μᾶλλον. De Moribus, l. v. c. viii. p. 65.).

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robbing the other of his right. The virtue of juſtice, then, is that by which a man practiſes by preference and with pleaſure fairneſs in his dealings, not arrogating to himſelf more than his due proportion of good, nor declining to bear his equal ſhare of evil. He treats other men as he would wiſh to be treated by them, aſſigning to each his fair proportion, and following the ſame invariable rule, when his own intereſt is at ſtake, and when he is only adjuſting the differences of others. Injuſtice is directly the reverſe; it leads men in all their tranſactions to give an undue preference to themſelves; and when they are entruſted with ſettling the concerns of others, always to do this unequally, by giving an undue advantage to one of the parties. This much may ſuffice concerning the nature of juſtice and injuſtice.

Chap. 7.

Juſtice applied to actions in a ſenſe different from that in which it is applicable to perſons.

Since the commiſſion of every unjuſt action does not neceſſarily make an unjuſt man, it may be inquired whether, in this reſpect, there be any diſtinction between particular acts of injuſtice, bearing the ſame name, ſuch as theft, adultery, and robbery; or whether the difference of the external acts is altogether immaterial as to conſtituting the vice of injuſtice, even when thoſe acts are performed knowingly; for a man may know that the object of his paſſion is his neighbour's wife; and yet, if he acts merely from the blind impetuoſity of appetite or deſire, without deliberate intention, he is not an adulterer. The ſame holds in all other caſes in which wrong is done; the mere perpetration of the act does not infer the vicious ſtate of mind from which ſuch acts naturally flow. The difference between retaliation and juſtice was formerly mentioned; but, in our inquiries reſpecting the latter, it muſt be remembered, that we have in view chiefly

chiefly that kind of juſtice which may be called political, ſince it is eſtabliſhed for the comfort and all-ſufficiency of ſociety among freemen and equals; whether the government, being democratical, require that each citizen ſhould be dealt by alike; or whether it admit of thoſe diſtinctions of birth, wealth, and abilities, which are allowed their due weight under other forms of government. Where ſuch equality does not prevail, there is not any room for what is ſtrictly called juſtice, but only for that virtue which, on account of its reſemblance, receives the ſame name. Juſtice takes place among thoſe who being capable of injuring each other, are reſtrained by law from mutual encroachments; and thoſe encroachments muſt be made, before injuſtice can be committed; though, as we formerly obſerved, the converſe of the propoſition does not hold, that injuſtice always is committed, when ſuch encroachments are made, becauſe injuſtice implies the deliberate purpoſe of wronging others for the ſake of benefit to ourſelves; a propenſity ſo ſtrong in human nature, that few men are capable of being entruſted with power, without uſing it tyrannically: wherefore law and reaſon ought to bear ſway, and rulers to be the guardians of equal juſtice; contented with thoſe rewards and honours which have been aſſigned to them for upholding the public good by their impartial adminiſtration. Their power is of a different kind from that of fathers and deſpots, in the exerciſe of which there is not any room for the virtue of juſtice ſtrictly ſo called, ſince no one can, in propriety of language, be ſaid to commit injuſtice againſt himſelf, or what entirely belongs to himſelf; becauſe no one ever deliberately propoſed to do real harm to either, and could not poſſibly do

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ſuch harm for the ſake of benefiting himſelf: but ſlaves, who are a kind of property, and alſo children, until they have attained a certain age, are ſo intimately connected with their maſters and parents, that no ſuch relations as thoſe of political juſtice can ſubſiſt between them; for political juſtice implies laws; and laws ſuppoſe an equality, not indeed of ranks and perſons, but of rights and obligations. Wherefore ſomething more nearly reſembling political juſtice takes place between huſbands and wives; but this, which is called œconomical juſtice, is alſo different from the former.

Natural juſtice independent of poſitive inſtitution.

Political juſtice is founded either on nature or on law. The natural, is that which has every where the ſame force and authority; the legal, is that which depends on human inſtitution, rendering actions juſt or unjuſt, which are in themſelves indifferent; as that no more than one mina ſhould be required for the ranſom of a priſoner; that a goat ſhould be ſacrificed rather than two ſheep; regulations reſpecting individuals, as that Braſidas ſhould be honoured with heroic worſhip; and thoſe that come in the ſhape of decrees or reſolutions. Some are of opinion that all juſtice whatever depends on poſitive inſtitution; which they endeavour to prove by obſerving that the laws of nature remain every where unalterably the ſame: fire, for example, which burns and warms in Greece, has preciſely the ſame powers in Perſia; whereas the rules of juſtice are liable to perpetual variations. This, however, is true only in a certain ſenſe; for though among the gods in heaven, what is natural is, perhaps, unalterable, yet, in this lower world, many inſtitutions of nature are capable of being changed and modified by circumſtances. Yet the diſtinction between what is natural and

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and conventional, is not thereby deſtroyed; unleſs we ſhould infer that, becauſe ſome men are capable of uſing both hands with equal dexterity, it is not natural for mankind in general to uſe one hand more dexterouſly than the other[1]. Men's notions of juſtice are often warped by their intereſts; and this great meaſure of human actions varies like the meaſures of wine and corn, which the dealers in thoſe articles have of different ſizes; uſing the larger when they buy, and the ſmaller when they ſell. Great variations reſult alſo from the different forms of government; although, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter, there is one form of government naturally the beſt. Juſtice is a general term; and differs from an act of injuſtice, as an univerſal does from a particular. That is unjuſt which is contrary to nature or to law; and the ſame thing, when done, is an unjuſt action. An unjuſt action is a wrong; and when we rectify a wrong, we are ſaid to do juſtice. But the force of thoſe terms will be afterwards more fully explained.

Chap. 8.

Diſtinction of misfortunes, errors, and crimes.

Injuſtice, as applicable to actions, conſiſts in what we have now ſaid; but it does not belong to perſons, unleſs it be committed voluntarily; for when a man acts without intention, the quality of his action, as good or bad, juſt or unjuſt, is, in reference to the agent, merely an acceſſory, not ſpringing eſſentially from himſelf, and neither entitling him to praiſe, nor ſubjecting him to blame. That, therefore, which is unjuſt, is

[1] He gives the reaſon more generally in Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 167. το γαρ ως επι το πολυ διαμενον, τυτο φυσει δικαιον προφαινες. "That which is invariable and conſtant is manifeſtly natural juſtice." Political juſtice, on the other hand, varies with the arrangements and exigencies of men in ſociety. He therefore concludes βελτιον ων δικαιον το κατα φυσιν, "That natural injuſtice is the better of the two;" a concluſion agreeable to his obſervations in the firſt Philoſophy. See Analyſis, p. 92, & paſſim.

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is not injuſtice in the agent, unleſs it be committed voluntarily; that is, as formerly explained, unleſs the action, with all its circumſtances, depend entirely on our own power, and be performed knowingly, with intention, and without conſtraint. Thus, to make the act of ſtriking parricide, we muſt know the perſon whom we ſtrike, the nature of the inſtrument with which the ſtroke is inflicted, and the motive through which we are impelled to ſuch a horrid crime. The action muſt alſo depend entirely on our own power; for in many natural events, we are both agents and patients knowingly, though not voluntarily; witneſs old age and death [k]. The ſame happens as to juſtice and injuſtice. When a man reſtores a depoſit involuntarily through fear, he cannot be ſaid to act juſtly, ſince the juſtice of the action is not cauſed by himſelf: it is a mere acceſſary or appendage, quite foreign to his deſign or purpoſe. In the ſame manner, he cannot be accuſed of injuſtice, who is conſtrained involuntarily not to reſtore a depoſit. Voluntary actions are performed with, or without election; deliberate actions are performed with election; and thoſe that are without deliberation are without election. In the intercourſe of life, one perſon may hurt another in three ways; either ignorantly, in which caſe the hurt done is called an error; as when we are miſtaken either in the perſon or the inſtrument; or when the action turns out to be of quite a different nature from that which we intended: a man may be hurt by a blow meant merely for rouſing him; a wound may be given caſually; and one perſon may receive a blow which was intended for another. When the harm is not only done unintentionally, but happens altogether unexpectedly, it is called a misfortune; when the conſequences

[k] See Analyſis, p. 109.

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quences of the action might have been foreſeen and expected, the harm done, without any miſchievous purpoſe, is properly termed a fault; for a fault is that evil which originates in ourſelves; and a misfortune, that of which the cauſe is external. Harm done knowingly, but not deliberately, is an injuſtice; as thoſe injuries which proceed from anger and other paſſions, that are either neceſſary, or at leaſt natural. Yet the perſons who have committed ſuch injuries, are not branded with the reproach of injuſtice or wickedneſs; which falls only on wrong proceeding from wilful pravity. The law, therefore, well diſtinguiſhes between premeditated crimes, and thoſe committed through paſſion; for the ſource of the latter may be traced up rather to him who provoked the paſſion, than to him who yielded to its violence. In all ſuch caſes, the queſtion is, not whether the deed was done, but whether it was done juſtly; for anger always proceeds from ſome real or ſuppoſed injury. But in all other diſputes, the queſtion turns on ſome fact, which one party affirms, and the other denies; and as to which, either the one or the other, unleſs his memory deceives him, muſt plainly be guilty; for every deliberate wrong is manifeſt injuſtice, whether it conſiſt, as above explained, in violating the law of equality, or in violating that of proportion. The virtue of juſtice, on the other hand, is exerciſed only in ſuch acts as are done voluntarily and deliberately. Involuntary acts are, or are not, entitled to pardon, according to circumſtances. Thoſe are pardonable, which proceed from complete and habitual ignorance; thoſe are not, which proceed from a temporary ignorance, occaſioned by the blind impetuoſity of paſſion, either extravagantly exceſſive in its degree, or highly improper in its object.

Doubts

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BOOK V. Chap. 9.

Solution of doubts respecting justice.

Doubts may arise, whether the doing and the suffering of injustice, have been defined with sufficient precision. First, shall we hearken to Euripides? One of his characters reasons thus:

> I slew my mother; the defence is plain,
> She *with her* will, or *'gainst my* will, was slain.

Can any person be injured willingly? or must every injury be unwillingly suffered as it is willingly inflicted? A man, it is said, may be injured willingly; since an intemperate man willingly hurts himself. But this argument is not conclusive, for the intemperate man does, what he thinks he ought not to do; his passion makes him act against his deliberate will; for no one can deliberately will what he thinks mischievous to himself. To injure then, is not only to hurt knowingly, but to hurt against the will of the sufferer; for when his will consents, he may indeed be hurt, but is not injured. Glaucus was not injured by his disadvantageous exchange of armour with Diomed, because it was voluntary.

> "Brave Glaucus then, each narrow thought resign'd
> (Jove warm'd his bosom, and enlarg'd his mind),
> For Diomed's brass arms of mean device,
> For which nine oxen paid (a vulgar price)
> He gave his own of gold divinely wrought,
> A hundred beeves the shining purchase bought."
>
> Iliad VI. v. 290. et seq.

Secondly, Whether is the injustice in him who makes an unfair distribution, or in him who receives more than his due? If the former is asserted, those persons distinguished by liberality and equity, who are inclined rather to refuse their full propor-

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tion, than to arrogate more than their juſt ſhare, will ſometimes injure themſelves. It may be anſwered, that theſe perſons, liberal and equitable as they are as to things of a particular nature, will not decline their full ſhare of goods in general; and of ſome kinds, ſuch as praiſe, glory, and whatever is honourable and laudable, will be inclined to arrogate more than fairly belongs to them. But the difficulty is ſolved by the obſervation above made, that no one can be the willing victim of injuſtice; ſo that men cannot injure, although they may hurt, themſelves. Beſides, the injuſtice is plainly in him who makes the unfair diſtribution; for by him the unjuſt action is begun and completed; whereas he who holds more than his due ſhare, may often do it ignorantly and innocently. The word action is taken in different ſenſes. It is applied to inanimate things. The ſword, or any other warlike inſtrument, is ſaid to ſtrike or kill, as well as the hand of one man moved by that of another; or a ſlave, by the command of his maſter. None of thoſe injure, although they are the inſtruments of injuſtice. Unjuſt judgments may proceed merely from ignorance; but that judge only is unjuſt, who paſſes unjuſt decrees, knowingly, from partiality to one party, or ill-will to the other. Between ſuch a judge and one of the parties, the iniquity, as well as its fruits, are ſometimes divided; the latter gets more land than he ought, and the other gets money to which he is not entitled. Injuſtice, however, in judgment, as well as every other ſpecies of injuſtice, always conſiſts in arrogating to ourſelves more than our due proportion of advantage, whether this conſiſts in benefiting our fortune, indulging our partiality, or gratifying our reſentment. Men think, becauſe injuſtice ſeems to be always

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Juſtice, a matter of more difficulty than commonly imagined.

always in their power, that therefore juſtice is eaſy. The thing, however, is far otherwiſe. To commit vicious actions is indeed always in our power, but to acquire either virtuous or vicious habits is the work of time and cuſtom; and the vice is not in the act, but in the frame of mind and habit of the actor. They think alſo, that to diſtinguiſh between juſt and unjuſt tranſactions requires but ſmall diſcernment; becauſe it is eaſy to underſtand the laws promulgated on this ſubject. But the juſtice or injuſtice is not in thoſe tranſactions themſelves, except by way of appendage or acceſſion, when, together with the ſimple performance of the act, certain diſpoſitions and affections, and thoſe uniform and habitual, concur in the agent. To know, therefore, what conſtitutes or contributes to juſtice, is ſtill more difficult than to know what conſtitutes and contributes to health. The medicines of hellebore, honey, and wine, as well as the operations of cutting and burning, are indeed eaſily known; but to underſtand when, how, and to whom, we ought to adminiſter the one and to apply the other, is a thing of no leſs difficulty than to be a ſkilful phyſician. It is alſo a falſe opinion, that a good man is capable of acts of wickedneſs; becauſe, were he inclined to indulge guilty paſſions, he is more likely to do it with impunity than any other. But, as we above obſerved, the vice or wickedneſs is not in the act itſelf, but in the frame or habit of mind of him by whom that act is performed. The art of healing does not conſiſt in performing operations and in adminiſtering medicines; it conſiſts in doing theſe things properly, that is, in the intellectual habit or ſkill of the phyſician. Juſtice takes place only among thoſe who are ſharers in that kind of goods, of which a certain proportion contributes to their

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their happineſs; but of which either the exceſs or the defect has a tendency to deſtroy it. The Gods, perhaps, cannot have too much power and proſperity; and beings incurably wicked, cannot have too little of either; ſince, by them, the means of good will always be converted into ſources of evil. But men are benefited by a due proportion, and by that only.

Chap. 10.

Of the nature of equity in contradiſtinction to juſtice.

We proceed to ſpeak of equity, and to conſider what relation it bears to juſtice. It is not the ſame thing, nor yet is it different in kind; for it is a praiſeworthy quality as well as juſtice, but is ſpoken of as ſomething better than mere juſtice, and really is ſo, for it is the correction of ſtrict, that is, of legal juſtice; which often needs to be modified by equity, becauſe laws being in their nature general, cannot decide rightly in the indefinite variety of particular caſes. The lawgiver is contented with making a rule, which fairly applies to the greater part of caſes; well knowing that it will not include the whole, and the fault is neither in the law nor the lawgiver, but in the nature of things. When an exception to the rule occurs, which the lawgiver did not foreſee, this exception is admitted in equity, which thus ſupplies the defect of law, as the lawgiver himſelf would do, were he preſent in court, and as he would have done by amending his law, had he been aware of the exception. Equity, then, is better than legal juſtice, being its amendment; and ſupplying that defect of laws, which ariſes from their univerſality. The variety of human tranſactions cannot be compriſed within general rules. Occaſional decrees therefore become requiſite; which vary with each variation of circumſtances, for the meaſure of what is indefinite muſt be indefinite itſelf, like the leaden ruler in the Leſbian architecture, which changes its own ſhape according to that of the ſtones to which

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it is applied. It is manifeſt, therefore, that equity is a ſpecies of juſtice, and contraſted with another ſpecies to which it is preferable. A man of equity is he who deliberately and habitually exerciſes this virtue; who prefers it in all his dealings to the rigour of juſtice; and who, even when the law is on his ſide, will not avail himſelf of this advantage to treat others injuriouſly or unhandſomely.

Chap. II.

That a man may hurt, but cannot be guilty of injury towards himſelf.

Whether juſtice be taken in its larger ſenſe, of diſobeying the laws; or in its ſtricter acceptation, of depriving others of their property, it is plain, from the obſervations already made, that no one can be guilty of injuſtice towards himſelf. A man may ſpontaneouſly and knowingly commit an unprovoked injury; he may even deſtroy his own life, in direct oppoſition both to the laws and to right reaſon [k]. He thereby certainly does an injury; but to whom? Not to himſelf, becauſe he ſuffers voluntarily. The injury is therefore done to the ſtate; which, on this account, puniſhes ſelf-murder with infamy. As to the other kind of injuſtice, which does not comprehend wickedneſs in general, but which conſiſts, like cowardice, in one ſpecific vice, we cannot, without a total confuſion of thought, ſuppoſe that a man is guilty of it towards himſelf; for in that caſe, the ſame thing

[k] The Oxford edition very properly ſupplies the word λογον of which ορθον is the ordinary epithet, and of which it muſt here be the adjunct, to render the paſſage intelligible. Suicide is always ſpoken of by Ariſtotle as a baſe and cowardly crime, as a mean dereliction of all perſonal dignity, and a groſs violation of all ſocial duty. Cicero ſometimes (for on this ſubject he is not conſiſtent) ſpeaks otherwiſe. "Atque hæc differentia naturarum tantum habet vim, uti nonnumquam mortem ſibi ipſe conſciſcere alius debeat, alius in eadem cauſſa non debeat." De Officiis, l. i. c. xxxi. Here he ſpeaks of ſuicide as a duty; probably out of deference for his admired Cato. But his language is very different elſewhere. Confer. Tuſc. Diſp. l. i. c. xxx. Somn. Scip. c. iii. Had Ariſtotle's Ethics been equally well known, Cicero's Offices would not have been ſo long regarded as the pureſt and moſt ſolid production of heathen morality.

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thing would be both added to and taken from the ſame perſon, at the ſame time. Injuſtice, therefore, always implies two perſons at leaſt; and if it did not, the diſtinctions formerly made concerning ſpontaneity, deliberation, retaliation, and aggreſſion, would be totally deſtroyed. Retaliation cannot deſerve the epithet of injurious; but could a man injure himſelf, injury would be conſiſtent with the moſt complete retaliation, namely, the doing and ſuffering preciſely the ſame thing, under preciſely the ſame circumſtances; beſides a man might ſuffer injury voluntarily, which was formerly proved to be impoſſible. Still further, the commiſſion of wrong always implies ſome ſpecific act; but by no ſuch act can a man do wrong to himſelf. He cannot commit adultery with his own wife, he cannot be guilty of houſebreaking with regard to his own houſe, he cannot ſteal his own property: univerſally, therefore, he cannot do an injury to himſelf. It is an evil to ſuffer, as well as to do, wrong, but the latter is by far the worſt evil of the two, becauſe it is blameable and baſe. The former, however, may ſometimes, by concurring with other circumſtances not eſſentially connected with it, be attended with far more deplorable conſequences; in the ſame manner as a fall, by ſtumbling, may ſometimes have worſe effects than a pleuriſy, becauſe it may occaſion a man's capture by the enemy, and, in conſequence thereof, his ignominious death. But the ſcience of Ethics, no more than that of Phyſics, pays attention to conſequences not eſſentially inherent in the ſubject, and connected with it merely by way of appendage or acceſſion. It is ſaid metaphorically, not indeed that a man can exerciſe juſtice towards himſelf, but that one part of him may exerciſe juſtice towards another. This juſtice, however, reſembles, not the political juſtice above examined, but the juſ-

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tice of fathers and maſters towards children and ſlaves; whoſe relation to each other bears a near ſimilitude to that of the rational and irrational parts in the human conſtitution. The paſſions often rebel againſt reaſon, as ſlaves do againſt their maſters; and as the latter ſeem guilty of injuſtice, ſo do the former. Let thus much ſuffice concerning juſtice, and the other moral virtues [1].

[1] The doctrine of juſtice is explained on the ſame principles delivered in this Book, Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxxiv.; & Eudem. l. iv.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

BOOK VI.

INTRODUCTION.

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IF philoſophy conſiſt in explaining phænomena, ſeemingly indefinite in number, by a few diſtinct principles of action, this Sixth Book affords one of the fineſt ſpecimens of it ever exhibited. According to Ariſtotle, moral virtue is appetite or affection diſciplined by reaſon and cuſtom; which, enabling us to make a fair eſtimate of excellence, teaches us to prefer and purſue it [a]. To explain, therefore, the different acceptations of the word reaſon; or, in Ariſtotle's language, to deſcribe the different powers of the underſtanding, muſt form an eſſential part of every complete treatiſe of Ethics. By modern philoſophers thoſe powers are not accurately diſtinguiſhed; although, according to our author, the powers of intellection differ as widely from each other as thoſe of ſenſation. Colours, flavours, ſounds, and odours, and other objects about which the ſenſes are converſant, are not more diſtinguiſhable from each other, than the different claſſes of ſpeculative and practical truths, which are perceptible by what our author calls the demonſtrative and deliberative faculties of the underſtanding [b].

Reaſoning

[a] Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxii, p. 161. [b] Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxxv. p. 169.

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Reaſoning on this principle, that powers muſt differ from each other, which exert themſelves in different actions and effectuate different ends, he treats ſeparately of art, ſcience, prudence, intellect, and wiſdom; he explains the nature and functions of each of thoſe habits; examines the difference between what are called natural virtues, and thoſe which are acquired by exerciſe and cuſtom; and proves that none of the acquired virtues can ſubſiſt without that intellectual habit which he calls prudence.

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BOOK VI.

ARGUMENT.

Senſation, intellect, and appetite:—Their different offices.—The five intellectual habits—Science—Art—Prudence—Common ſenſe—Wiſdom.—Quickneſs of apprehenſion.—Juſtneſs of ſentiment.—Importance of the intellectual habits.—Virtue, natural and acquired.—Their difference.

BOOK VI. Chap. 1.

Tranſition to the intellectual virtues.

HAVING formerly ſaid that, in moral matters, mediocrity only ought to be the object of our preference, as being alone conſiſtent with right reaſon, it is proper that this ſubject ſhould be more diſtinctly explained. Whoever exerciſes reaſon has, in all his habitual actions, a certain aim, according to which he regulates his behaviour; moderating his paſſions when too ſtrong, invigorating them when too weak, and always bending them to propriety, as a bow is rendered more or leſs tenſe in order to hit the mark. This obſervation is indeed true, but not ſufficiently explicit to be practically uſeful; for, in all other matters in which ſcience is concerned, we ought certainly to do what right reaſon preſcribes, that is, neither too much nor too little. Thus the phyſician ought to act with regard to his patient; but by knowing that this is his duty, he will not be rendered much the wiſer as to what operations ought to be performed, or what medicines ought to be adminiſtered. It is neceſſary, therefore, to ſpeak more definitely concerning the habits

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bits of the mind, to explain what right reaſon is, and to point out what are the boundaries which it aſſigns to our paſſions and actions. The habits or virtues of the mind were formerly divided into the moral and intellectual; concerning the moral we have already treated; it remains to examine the intellectual, having previouſly ſpoken of the ſoul itſelf. In this, we formerly diſtinguiſhed two parts, the rational and irrational; and the former may alſo be divided into two, namely, that faculty by which we underſtand thoſe ſciences whoſe principles are certain and neceſſary, and which cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe than they are, and that by which we comprehend other branches of knowledge; for if there be any reſemblance or affinity between the truths recogniſed, and the powers which recogniſe them, it is natural to think that things, ſo extremely different as are the neceſſary and contingent, ſhould be perceived and known by different faculties[c]. Knowledge, then, may be divided into that which is demonſtrative and ſcientific, and that which is deliberative and probable; for no one deliberates about things which neceſſarily exiſt after one certain manner, and which cannot poſſibly exiſt after any other. Let us examine, then, what is the beſt habit of each of theſe faculties: the beſt habit of any thing is, in other words, its virtue; and the virtue of each object is aſcertained by its fitneſs for performing its peculiar function.

Chap. 2.

Senſation, intellect, and appetite, their different offices.

There are three principles in man, which, either ſingle or combined, are the ſovereign judges of truth and conduct. Theſe are, ſentation, intellect, and appetite. Of theſe three, mere ſenſation cannot alone be the foundation of any judgment reſpecting conduct, that is, the propriety of action; for wild beaſts have

[c] See alſo Magna Moralia, l. i. c. xxxv. p. 169.

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have perception by ſenſe, but are totally unacquainted with propriety. Affirming and denying are the operations of intellect, deſire and averſion are thoſe of appetite; and ſince moral virtue implies the habit of juſt election, and election or preference reſolves itſelf into deliberation and appetite, every act of virtuous preference requires, that there ſhould be accuracy and truth in the compariſon, as well as correctneſs and propriety in the deſire. Of that intellectual faculty which bears not any relation to life and practice, and which is employed, not in deliberation, but in demonſtration, the ſimplicity of abſtract truth is the proper and only object; but deliberative moral wiſdom bears in all its operations a reference to human happineſs; and terminates, not in the diſcoveries of ſpeculation, but in the exertions of action[d]. This latter faculty, then, only attains its end, when well-ordered appetite harmoniſes with ſound practical reaſon; from the combination of which elements, reſults that moral election or preferenee, peculiar to man; which may be called either impaſſioned intelligence, or reflecting appetite; and which is the ſole fountain of whatever is laudable and graceful in behaviour and manners[e]. This practical reaſon is ſuperior to that converſant about production: for production, as we above obſerved, is imperfect in itſelf, and continually remains ſo, until the work, for the ſake of which it operated, be produced. But the operation of practical reaſon terminates in nothing better than the pleaſure of its own energies. It is not given to us for the gratification of appetite: but appetite itſelf is

[d] In conformity with what is here ſaid, Ariſtotle in his Topics, b. v. c. i. p. 226. diſtinguiſhes ſcience from virtue, by ſaying that the former is in one part of the ſoul, and the latter in more than one.

[e] ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις, κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως. De Animal. Motu. c. vi. p. 706.

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is implanted in us for the ſake of that virtuous moral action, which conſtitutes an eſſential part of human happineſs. Such, then, is man, an intellectual but impaſſioned being, exerciſing his faculties concerning things contingent and future. The paſt cannot be an object of deliberation or preference. No one chooſes, that Troy ſhould not be taken; and Agathon ſays rightly,

> "All things to God are poſſible, ſave one;
> "That to undo, which is already done."

As truth, then, is the object of both our rational faculties, (the ſpeculative and practical,) their excellencies muſt conſiſt in thoſe habits by which truth is moſt clearly diſcerned.

Chap. 3.

The five intellectual habits. Firſt, ſcience.

Let theſe habits be the five following; art, ſcience, prudence, wiſdom, intellect. In matters of opinion we are liable to be deceived; not ſo in matters of ſcience. The former relates to things variable in their nature, of whoſe very exiſtence we may doubt, unleſs when they are actually perceived; the latter is converſant about things unalterable, neceſſary, and eternal, incapable of being generated, exempt from corruption; the knowledge of which admits not of degrees between total ignorance and abſolute certainty. All ſcience may be taught, and all teaching implies principles, namely, thoſe truths which are previouſly known by experience or reaſon. The firſt principles are acquired by induction, that is, by intellect operating on experience[e]. Science, then, may be defined a demonſtrative habit, diſtinguiſhed by thoſe properties which we have aſcribed to it in our Analytics[f]. The principles of ſcience muſt be perceived with the cleareſt evidence; for unleſs they be more evident than the concluſions drawn from them, thoſe concluſions will not form

[e] See Analyſis, p. 57. Comp. p. 161. [f] See Analyſis, p. 77.

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form ſcience ſtrictly ſo called; becauſe their truth does not neceſſarily proceed from the truth of their premiſes; with which they are connected, not eſſentially, but only by way of acceſſion or appendage [a].

Chap. 4. Art.

Things in their nature variable, and which might either have never been, which may ceaſe to exiſt, or whoſe mode of exiſtence is liable to perpetual alterations, are of two kinds; productions or actions. Theſe things are ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from each other even in popular diſcourſe; ſo that a rational habit of action muſt be different from a rational habit of production. Since building, which is a rational habit of production, is an art, and every other ſuch habit is alſo an art, and every art is alſo the habit juſt mentioned, art may be defined the habit of making or producing a certain work agreeably to the rules of right reaſon. All art is employed in examining and contriving how it may beſt form and faſhion thoſe productions or works of which the efficient cauſe is in the maker, not in the materials. Things which exiſt neceſſarily, are not the ſubjects of art; nor thoſe which are produced naturally; for the latter have their efficient cauſe in themſelves [b]. Art, then, is converſant after a certain manner about the ſame things as fortune. Wherefore Agathon ſays,

"In friendly ties are art and fortune bound."

Artleſſneſs is the contrary of art; it is the producing of ſuch works awkwardly; according to erroneous principles of reaſon.

Chap. 5. Prudence.

In explaining the nature of prudence, let us conſider firſt, who they are that deſerve this appellation. It ſeems to be the part of a prudent man to deliberate wiſely about his good or advantage; not in particular points merely, as health or ſtrength, but

[a] See above, p. 65. Conf. p. 115. [b] See above, p. 109.

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but as to the general happineſs of life. This is indicated by our calling thoſe men prudent in their affairs, who take proper means for attaining valuable purpoſes, which are not the proper objects of particular arts. Prudence then implies deliberation; and no one deliberates about things invariable in their nature, and which cannot be otherwiſe than they are; nor about things which are not in their own power. Prudence then is not ſcience, becauſe the objects of ſcience are things invariable; it is not art, becauſe the object of prudence is action, not production. It remains then, that prudence ſhould be a rational and practical habit, bearing a reference to the happineſs and miſery of human life. The end of production conſiſts always in the work produced; but action is often its own end; for happineſs, which is a kind of action, is perfect in itſelf. Pericles, and other great ſtateſmen, are called prudent on account of their ſingular ability in effecting the good of human kind; the great buſineſs of œconomy, both political and domeſtic. The word, in Greek, denoting the moral virtue of temperance, is compounded of two other words, which may be literally tranſlated, "the preſervative of prudence;" for temperance tends to preſerve this intellectual excellence. Pleaſure and pain do not deſtroy every exerciſe of the underſtanding, for inſtance, that which relates to mathematical truth; but that exerciſe only which relates to the practcial concerns of life. For the exceſſive love of pleaſure, or the exceſſive abhorrence of pain, ſubſtitutes new principles of action quite different from thoſe by which wiſe and good men are actuated. Prudence, then, is a rational and practical habit, effective of human happineſs. We ſpeak of excellence in art, but prudence is itſelf excellence. In the arts, voluntary errors are the beſt; but, in matters

matters of prudence, they are the worſt; as in all the moral virtues. Prudence, then, is not an art but a virtue; and the virtue of that faculty of the mind which is converſant about opinion and probability, diſcerning in ſuch things truth from falſehood. As it relates to the practice of life, which, with all men, is a conſtant object of thought, prudence, when once acquired, is not, like other habits of the underſtanding, liable to be forgotten or loſt.

Chap. 6. Intellect.

Since the object of ſcience, as above obſerved, is univerſal and demonſtrable truth, and whatever is demonſtrable muſt be founded on principles, it is manifeſt that there muſt be primary principles[j], which are not ſcience, any more than they are art or prudence. They are not ſcience, becauſe all ſcience is demonſtrable; they are not art or prudence, becauſe theſe have for their ſubject things contingent and variable: neither are they wiſdom, becauſe, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, wiſdom, and the higheſt wiſdom, is converſant about truths ſuſceptible of demonſtration. Since then none of the four habits juſt mentioned; neither ſcience, nor art, nor prudence, nor wiſdom, can afford thoſe primary principles; and ſince all the habits of the underſtanding are reducible to five, it follows that intellect, operating on experience[k], is the only ſource from which thoſe great and primary truths can be ſuppoſed to flow.

Chap. 7. Wiſdom.

Wiſdom is ſometimes taken for ſkill in the arts; and applied, for inſtance, to Phidias, who was a ſkilful ſculptor; or Polycleitus, the ſkilful ſtatuary. But there is a wiſdom of a far ſuperior kind, which does not denote excellence in any of thoſe operations or arts to which Homer alludes in ſpeaking of Margites: "The Gods had not formed him for digging or ploughing,

[j] See Analyſis, p. 92. & ſeq. [k] See Analyſis, p. 57. Comp. p. 161.

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ing, nor made him ſkilful in any other work;" but a wiſdom abſolute and univerſal, ſince it relates to the univerſe and its principles; contemplating, not merely, like other ſciences, the qualities or properties of things, but the things themſelves, or ſubſtances[k]; and, therefore, of all ſciences the moſt accurate as well as the moſt ſublime; comprehending both the higheſt demonſtrations, and the vindication of thoſe primary truths on which all demonſtration is built[l]. To ſay that prudence is more valuable than wiſdom, is to prefer man to all other beings in the univerſe. One thing may be ſalutary and good for human kind; and another for fiſhes: but abſtract qualities remain perpetually the ſame; and in like manner wiſdom is permanent and ſtable, but prudence muſt vary its maxims with each alteration of the ſubject about which it is employed. The buſineſs of prudence conſiſts in providing for the good of thoſe peculiarly recommended to its care; and whoever beſt underſtands how to promote the good of each tribe or of each individual, to him we ſhould be moſt inclined to commit their direction and management. Wherefore ſome of the inferior animals ſeem to be endowed with a kind of prudence, in foreſeeing and providing what is neceſſary for the preſervation of their own lives. The unalterable ſtability of wiſdom clearly diſtinguiſhes it from civil policy, which, if it would attain its end, the public good, muſt be guided by circumſtances; and the different tribes of animals require, in health as well as in diſeaſe, different kinds of management, which are reſpectively moſt conducive to their well-being. It will not avail to ſay, that as man is the nobleſt of animals, therefore the virtue of prudence,

[k] Theſe are God and Intellect—the beſt ſubſtances, ἡ οὐσία μία, ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, &c. Moral. Eudem. l. i. c. viii. p. 201.

[l] See above, Analyſis, p. 86. & ſeq.

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prudence, which is converſant about human happineſs, merits the preference to every other[m]; for that there are many natures more divine than man, is atteſted by thoſe glorious luminaries, and that beautiful arrangement which adorns the univerſe. Wiſdom, then, comprehends both intellect and ſcience, applied to the higheſt purpoſes, the diſcovery of the moſt valuable truths. Wherefore we call Thales, Anaxagoras, and others of their character, wiſe, indeed, but ſurely not prudent, ſince they manifeſtly neglect their private concerns and perſonal advantage, and apply their thoughts to the inveſtigation of ſubjects as lofty and difficult as they are completely uſeleſs for the ordinary purpoſes of human life. But the virtue of prudence is directed ſolely to thoſe purpoſes; and he is juſtly deemed the moſt prudent, whoſe advice is moſt conducive to public proſperity. This great object is not to be attained by abſtract ſpeculations. Prudence muſt be converſant about particulars; for all practice relates to particulars only; wherefore many men, ignorant of theory, are more uſeful than thoſe acquainted with it; for inſtance, empirics, than phyſicians. What avails it to know that light food is ſalutary, unleſs we alſo know, for inſtance,

[m] According to Ariſtotle, prudence is, as it were, wiſdom's ſteward, holding a delegated authority in leſſer concerns, that the maſter may have leiſure for more important purſuits, ἡ φρονησις ὡσπερ επιτροπος τις ἐστι της σοφιας, και παρασκευαζει ταυτῃ σχολην, και το ποιειν της αυτου ἐργον. Magn. Moral. l. i. c. xxxv. p. 172. Theſe more important purſuits conſiſt in ſpeculations concerning God; in meditating on, and worſhipping him: ει τις δη ἡ δι' ενδειαν, ἡ δι' ὑπερβολην κωλυει τον θεον θεραπευειν και θεωρειν, αυτη δε φαυλη. Moral. Eudem. c. xv. p. 291. This employment is the chief end of man; the natural exerciſe of his nobleſt faculties, ὁρος της ψυχης ὁ ὁρος ἀριστος, τα ἡκιστα αισθανεσθαι των αλλων μερων της ψυχης, ἡ τοιουτον. The leſs we are diſturbed by bodily paſſions, or haraſſed by worldly cares, the more likely we are to approach to this ultimate term of mental enjoyment. Idem ibid. Religion cannot be eradicated from the mind, unleſs the underſtanding be deſtroyed: μηδε των θεων φοβεισθαι ὡς ανδρειος, αλλα μαινομενος. Magna Moral. c. v. p. 151.

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BOOK VI.

ſtance, that the fleſh of birds is light? Prudence being a practical virtue, eſſentially includes the knowledge of particulars. Yet even here general and ſuperintending principles are not without their uſe.

Chap. 8.

Policy, general and particular.

Prudence and policy are the ſame habits, but applied to different ſubjects. Policy is general or particular: the general conſiſts in legiſlation; the particular, in deliberations and decrees; for as decrees apply general principles to particular caſes, they immediately precede execution; and therefore thoſe who buſy themſelves about decrees, in propoſing or procuring them, are peculiarly conſidered as workmen in the trade of politics. Prudence chiefly relates to the management of our private affairs, and while directed to this purpoſe preſerves its proper name; but when our prudence extends to the affairs of others, it is called œconomics, legiſlation, politics; which laſt is either deliberative or judicial. Yet politics is ſometimes contraſted with prudence; too much concern about other people's affairs ſeeming unfavourable to our own happineſs. Wherefore Euripides ſays, in the perſon of Philoctetes,

> "How can the name of wife to me belong
> Who might have mingled in the martial throng,
> Unvex'd with buſineſs and exempt from care,
> Taking of ſpoils my honourable ſhare;
> Yet choſe by over-anxious thoughts to move
> The direful hate of all-commanding Jove?"

But a prudential regard to our own intereſt requires, perhaps, that we ſhould not be regardleſs of politics, ſince our own good is involved in that of the Public; and many are extremely ill-fitted to provide even for their own. Young perſons may become good geometers, and render themſelves ſkilful in the arts

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arts depending on the mathematical ſciences. But it is ſcarcely poſſible for a youth to have the virtue of prudence, becauſe this virtue is converſant about particulars, the accurate knowledge of which requires obſervation and experience, which muſt be the work of time. The mathematics are converſant merely about abſtractions formed by ourſelves; the notions of which are clear and preciſe. But the knowledge of nature, and of thoſe cauſes by which nature ſubſiſts, is far more complicated, requiring continually the aſſiſtance of that experience in which it originates. As to practical truths, reſulting from long experience, young men may indeed repeat them, but they ſeldom feel their full force. In applying theory to practice, errors may ariſe from miſtaking either the general or the particular propoſition; for example, that all heavy waters are bad, or that this water is heavy. Prudence is manifeſtly different from ſcience; being the perception of thoſe particular and practical truths which admit not of demonſtration; whereas intellect is employed about thoſe general and primary principles which require not any proof. In the chain of mental faculties, intellect and prudence then form the two extreme links; prudence holding the extreme of individuality, and intellect that of generalization. Prudence then may be called common ſenſe, ſince it is converſant about objects of ſenſe; but in a manner ſpecifically different from that in which the other ſenſes are reſpectively converſant about their particular objects.

Prudence implies deliberation, which word has a leſs extenſive meaning than inveſtigation, becauſe deliberation is that ſpecies of inveſtigation which relates to the practical concerns of life. It is not ſcience, nor opinion, nor conjecture; not ſcience, Chap. 9.

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becauſe no one deliberates about that which admits of demonſtrable proof: not conjecture or gueſſing, becauſe theſe are quick and rapid, but deliberation is a work of time; and it is a common maxim, that we ought to be prompt in execution, but ſlow in deliberation. Deliberation is not preſence of mind, any more than happineſs of conjecture; it is not ſcience, which cannot err; nor opinion, the rectitude of which conſiſts in truth, whereas that of deliberation conſiſts in utility; ſince wrong deliberations are hurtful. Beſides, every opinion is a propoſition either affirmative or negative; whereas deliberation neither affirms nor denies, but inveſtigates and inquires. Good deliberation is rectitude of counſel; but, as rectitude is taken in different ſenſes, it is not every kind of rectitude, particularly it is not that by which an intemperate or bad man may contrive right means for attaining his wicked ends. His right deliberations terminate in much miſchief; whereas good deliberation naturally terminates in advantage. This, however, may ſometimes be attained without good deliberation, ſince a right concluſion is ſometimes inferred from wrong premiſes. Good deliberation alſo muſt be ſeaſonable: its reſult muſt be drawn at a right time, muſt proceed from right premiſes, and muſt terminate in ſome valuable purpoſe, whether that be happineſs in general, or ſomething thereto conducive. *Good counſel*, then, conſiſts in diſcovering proper means for attaining thoſe ends which prudence approves as worthy objects of purſuit.

Chap. 10.

Quickneſs of apprehenſion.

There is a readineſs of apprehenſion in ſome men, which makes them be diſtinguiſhed as intelligent; while others are equally remarkable for their ſlowneſs and ſtupidity. This quickneſs of thought, or acuteneſs in deciſion, is ſomething quite different from ſcience or opinion, ſince all men are capable of learning

learning ſciences and forming opinions; nor does it belong to any ſcience in particular, as phyſic, which is converſant about health, or geometry, which is converſant about magnitude; nor does its proper ſubject conſiſt in things which happen caſually, or in thoſe which are unalterable and eternal; but it is moſt conſpicuous in thoſe things which are matters of deliberation and doubt. It is converſant, then, about the ſame ſubject with prudence, though not preciſely in the ſame manner; for prudence ſpeaks with a voice of authority, commanding one action and prohibiting another; but the intellectual excellence, now under conſideration, is rather critical than commanding; it does not govern and regulate our actions, but enables us to underſtand the regulations which prudence preſcribes; and follows the dictates of this ſovereign virtue, as an intelligent youth goes along with the leſſons of his teacher.

Chap. 11.

Juſtneſs of ſentiment.

That juſtneſs of ſentiment by which ſome men render themſelves ſo commendable, is nothing more than a nice diſcernment of the virtue which we called equity; in proof of which it may be obſerved, that thoſe who are moſt equitable in their tranſactions, are alſo the moſt diſtinguiſhed by their fellow-feeling with others, and the moſt inclinable to excuſe their pardonable errors. Pardon is nothing more than an equitable deciſion; that is, indulgence flowing from right reaſon. The intellectual habits above deſcribed, readineſs of apprehenſion, juſtneſs of ſentiment, prudence, intelligence, or common ſenſe, are all of them converſant about the ſame objects, and all of them conſpire to the ſame great end of making men behave well in the practical concerns of life. Theſe concerns are all of them particular, depending on time and circumſtances; and the habits that have reference to them, muſt therefore be different

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BOOK VI.

from thoſe which are converſant about general and abſtract truth. In practical matters, prudence regulates and commands, ſentiment criticiſes and approves, and intelligence, or common ſenſe, operating on obſervation and experience, furniſhes thoſe firſt principles, which are equally eſſential to the due ſelection of ends, and the proper adjuſtment of means. As theſe firſt principles ſpring up in the mind, without teaching or reaſoning, merely from obſervation and experience, they ſeem to be the gift of nature; and juſtneſs of ſentiment, as well as the other virtues depending on them, ſeem alſo to be natural, and to belong to men at a certain period of life, who ſeem then naturally to attain underſtanding and ſentiment; whereas art, ſcience, or wiſdom, (as above explained,) never ſeem to grow up naturally, but always to be the work of application and ſtudy. Common ſenſe, then, that is, intellect operating on experience, being the ultimate judge of whatever is practically good, we ought to reſpect the opinions of old and prudent men, not leſs than demonſtration itſelf; becauſe they ſee with the eye of experience, which alone can diſcern right principles of conduct. Such, then, is the nature of prudence in contradiſtinction to that of wiſdom; virtues which are converſant about different objects, and which reſpectively belong to different faculties of the ſoul.

Chap. 12.

The value of the intellectual virtues, how to be eſtimated,

Doubts may ariſe in what reſpect theſe intellectual virtues are uſeful; for wiſdom, as above explained, has not any reference to mutable and material things, and therefore ſeems not to have any tendency to promote human happineſs. Prudence, indeed, is converſant about worldly affairs; but wherein conſiſts its utility, ſince it only deliberates concerning honourable, juſt, and other actions conducive to happineſs, which a virtuous man has learned to practiſe? If virtue be a habit, how

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is it to be improved by the reflections of prudence? Perſons poſſeſſed of health or ſtrength would not be more ſtrong or more healthy, though endowed with the ſkill of phyſicians and maſters of exerciſes. But prudence, it will be ſaid, though not neceſſary for the practice, is uſeful to the acquiſition of virtue. Is ſkill in phyſic neceſſary or uſeful to the acquiſition of health? If this were the caſe, we ought, when ſick, to ſtudy phyſic, inſtead of calling a phyſician. Beſides theſe doubts, it is not eaſy to determine the relative value of wiſdom and prudence; and why the latter, which is inferior in dignity, ſhould preſcribe rules for the exerciſe of the former. Having propoſed theſe difficulties, it is our duty, if poſſible, to ſolve them. Firſt of all, wiſdom and prudence, though they terminated not in any diſtinct and ſeparate end, would be things highly deſirable in themſelves, ſince they are reſpectively the virtues of two mental faculties. But they are productive cauſes of human happineſs, not indeed as phyſic is the cauſe of health, but as health itſelf is the cauſe of a healthy habit. The great buſineſs of human life is performed by the co-operation of prudence with moral virtue. The latter makes us purſue right ends; and the former makes us employ fit means for attaining them. To that power of the ſoul, which diſcovers itſelf in the growth and nutrition of the body, no ſuch ſpontaneous function belongs; ſince its operations are carried on altogether independently of our own wills; and it is entirely beſide our power to accelerate or retard them. As to the doubt whether prudence contributes to the practice of juſt and honourable actions, it will be beſt ſolved by tracing thoſe actions to their real ſource. Acts of virtue, in general, may be performed by thoſe who

Their utility in practice.

are

BOOK VI.

are not virtuous men, involuntarily, ignorantly, through fear of the law, or through any other motive which does not imply the habitual love of virtue, and the deliberate preference of it merely for its own ſake. This habit, then, makes our ends right and good; but how to attain thoſe ends, is the work, not of moral virtue, but of another principle. There is a power of the mind, call it cleverneſs, keenneſs, or ſagacity, of which the nature conſiſts in enabling us to accompliſh our purpoſes; and which, when the purpoſes are good, is praiſeworthy; when they are bad, this cleverneſs changes its name, being juſtly reproached as villany. Prudence, though not the ſame thing, (ſince a villain cannot be called prudent,) yet requires for its foundation this natural dexterity, which is determined to the ſide of honour and propriety by habitual acts of virtue. For reaſonings alone cannot ſupply correct principles of conduct. The ends beſt to be purſued, appear ſuch to good men only. Vice diſtorts the judgment; and even in men of naturally keen minds, produces the greateſt practical errors: wherefore it is impoſſible to be prudent without being morally virtuous.

Chap. 13.

Natural virtue different from virtue properly ſo called.

It is neceſſary to ſpeak farther of virtue; for, as natural ſagacity, though ſimilar, is not the ſame with prudence, ſo natural virtue, though ſimilar, is not the ſame with virtue properly ſo called. Our capacities and diſpoſitions are the work of nature; and therefore, in ſome ſort, our morals are ſo likewiſe; men being born with propenſities to juſtice, temperance, and fortitude. But this natural aptitude is not the virtue of which we are in queſt. Strong natural propenſities, and ſtriking differences of manners, appear in children, and even in wild beaſts; and this native vigour being unenlightened by reaſon,

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has a tendency to do much miſchief, like the irregular motions of giants when deprived of their eye-ſight. But when the intellectual eye opens, and affection is diſciplined by reaſon, then that moral virtue diſplays itſelf; which bears the ſame relation to the natural, which prudence bears to that doubtful quality above mentioned, which, though ſomewhat reſembling it, is yet ſpecifically different. As virtue properly ſo called implies prudence, ſome have reſolved all the virtues into modifications of this intellectual excellence. Socrates did this; ſaying, rightly, that none of the virtues could ſubſiſt without prudence; which is nothing elſe than right reaſon, (which all philoſophers now add to the definition of virtue,) applied to the ſubject of morals; but he erred in thinking that the whole of moral rectitude depended ſolely on the underſtanding, and in calling the virtues ſciences. Virtuous men, indeed, muſt act, not only according to right reaſon, but with right reaſon; that is, the right reaſon which regulates their conduct, muſt be a principle in themſelves. The virtues then, though not ſciences, cannot ſubſiſt without that principle of reaſon from which all the ſciences ſpring; in other words, prudence is requiſite for conſtituting the character of the truly good man. The queſtion therefore may be anſwered, whether the virtues can exiſt ſeparately. It ſhould ſeem that they may; becauſe the ſame perſon not being born with equal aptitude to them all, he may poſſeſs ſome of them, though ſtill deficient in others. This indeed is true with regard to the natural virtues; but with regard to thoſe which conſtitute the character of the truly good man, it is impoſſible; for none ſuch can be exerciſed without prudence, and with this ſingle intellectual excellence, all the moral virtues neceſſarily co-exiſt; ſince prudence not only ſhews us how

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how beſt to obtain our ends, but always implies that the ends themſelves are good. Yet prudence, extenſive and dignified as its function is, ought not to be preferred to wiſdom, which is converſant about ſtill higher ſubjects, and is the virtue of a nobler faculty[x]. Phyſic is not better than health; though it preſcribes rules by which health may be attained[y]. To ſet prudence above wiſdom, is the ſame abſurdity as to ſet policy above the Gods; becauſe policy regulates the national religion, as well as all other public concerns[z].

[x] See above, p. 285.

[y] The art of phyſic does not make uſe of health, it only contrives how health may be preſerved or reſtored. It is for the ſake of health, and therefore leſs valuable. See above, p. 149. & ſeq.

[z] The intellectual virtues are treated of more briefly in the laſt chapters of the firſt, and firſt chapters of the ſecond Book of the work intitled Magna Moralia; and in the fifth Book of the Ethics to Eudemus.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

BOOK VII.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK VII.

HAVING examined the virtues and vices, ſtrictly ſo called, the author proceeds to habits which, though often confounded with them, are yet eſſentially different; namely, ſelf-command, and its oppoſite, incontinency; heroic virtue, and its oppoſite, beaſtly depravity; which ſometimes ſhews itſelf in ſavageneſs and ferocity, and ſometimes in unnatural perverſions of the concupiſcible appetites. There is not any ſyſtem of Ethics that accounts ſo fully and ſo clearly for the important diſtinction between weakneſs and wickedneſs, as is done in this Seventh Book.

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BOOK VII.

ARGUMENT.

Vice.—Weakneſs.—Ferocity.—Self-command, and its contrary.—Unnatural depravities, different from vices.—Voluptuouſneſs more deteſtable than iraſcibility—Reaſons of this.—Intemperance and incontinency.—Their difference.

BOOK VII. Chap. 1.

In morals three things to be avoided.

WE now proceed, making a new diviſion, to obſerve, that in morals three things ought to be avoided; vice, weakneſs, and ferocity: the oppoſites to the two firſt are manifeſt, namely, virtue and ſelf-command; and to the third, we may ſet in oppoſition a virtue more than human, ſomething heroic and divine, ſuch as Homer makes Priam aſcribe to Hector;

> "And laſt great Hector, more than man divine,
> For ſure he ſeemed not of terreſtrial line[a]."

Ferocity, and its oppoſites.

So that ſhould we believe what is ſaid of the deification of illuſtrious men, their pre-eminent worth might be properly oppoſed to ſavageneſs and ferocity: for virtue belongs not to gods, any more than vice to beaſts; the excellencies of gods are above virtue, and the depravities of beaſts are ſpecifically different from vice. The Lacedæmonians, when they admire any one exceedingly, ſay, "you are a divine man;" but as ſuch men are ſeldom to be met with, ſo beaſtly depravities are ſeldom to be found in the human race; they occur rarely, and chiefly

[a] Iliad, b. xxiv. v. 223. & ſeq.

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BOOK VII.

chiefly among barbarians. They are ſometimes produced by diſeaſes or wounds; and the exceſſes of human vice are reproached as beaſtly. But concerning ſuch enormous depravities, we ſhall afterwards have occaſion to ſpeak; and we have already conſidered vice properly ſo called. It remains therefore that we now treat of incontinency and ſelf-command; which ſeem not to be entirely the ſame with the habits of vice and virtue, nor yet altogether different from them. We ſhall firſt mention the prevailing opinions on this ſubject, and next ſtate our own doubts: when difficulties are removed, and probabilities eſtabliſhed, the theory will be ſufficiently correct for all practical purpoſes. Firmneſs and ſelf-command appear then to be reſpectable and praiſeworthy habits; and their contraries, weakneſs and yielding ſoftneſs, appear to be, in the ſame proportion, both blameable and contemptible. The man of ſelf-command is ſteady to the deciſions of his reaſon; the weak man is eaſily moved from them. The latter, knowing that his actions are bad, yet commits them through paſſion; the former, knowing that his appetites are bad, yet reſtrains them through reaſon. Some confound ſelf-command with temperance, and the want of it with intemperance; others think that thoſe habits are widely different from each other. Prudence appears to ſome to be totally incompatible with the want of ſelf-command; others think, that men, highly diſtinguiſhed by their prudence and abilities, are often extremely deficient in this particular. A man is ſaid to loſe the command of himſelf, and to be maſtered, not only by pleaſure, but by anger, honour, and gain. Such are the prevailing opinions on this ſubject[b].

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[b] The ſubjects treated in this Book are explained nearly in the ſame words in the ſixth book of the Ethics to Eudemus.

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BOOK VII.

Chap. 2.

Concerning ſelf-command, and its contrary.

It ſeems difficult to explain how a man, who entertains juſt conceptions of things, ſhould voluntarily reſign his independence; and how he who, as Socrates obſerved, has ſcience to direct him, ſhould allow himſelf to be domineered over by inferior principles, and dragged in captivity like a ſlave. Socrates, indeed, maintained, that this could not happen to him who poſſeſſed real ſcience, and that none acted amiſs but through ignorance only. But this opinion is manifeſtly at variance with the phænomena; for if paſſion were cauſed by ignorance, the ignorance ought to precede the paſſion, which is plainly not the caſe; for the man who errs through want of ſelf-command, only does ſo when ſtimulated by paſſion; well knowing, before his paſſion is excited, that the actions to which it moves him are wrong. Some philoſophers maintain that none can err againſt demonſtrative knowledge, but that many daily err againſt that which is only probable; and that the love of pleaſure, though it cannot prevail over ſcience ſtrictly ſo called, may yet be too ſtrong for opinion. But if opinion merely, that is a faint and wavering impreſſion of truth, is the only power that makes reſiſtance to the ſtrength of appetite, it is not wonderful that the latter ſhould obtain the victory; nor ought thoſe to be blamed, in whom the ſtronger principle prevails. But this we find is not true; for men are highly blamed for indulging their corrupt appetites. If neither ſcience nor opinion can take part in this mental conflict, prudence remains as the only antagoniſt. But this is abſurd; for the want of ſelf-command cannot ſubſiſt in the ſame mind with prudence; a prudent man will not voluntarily commit bad actions; and prudence, as we have above ſhewn, is a practical principle, implying the exiſtence of all other virtues[c]. Self-command ſuppoſes

Difficulties concerning this quality.

[c] See p. 303.

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poſes the preſence of ſtrong paſſions, and thoſe blameable either in their nature or in their degree: if they were not blameable, they ought not to be reſiſted; and if they were not ſtrong, there would be little praiſe in reſiſting them. Temperance, as above explained, is inconſiſtent with the preſence of any ſuch paſſions. Temperance and ſelf-command cannot therefore belong to the ſame character. If ſelf-command implied an immoveable adherence to every concluſion of the underſtanding, it would, when this concluſion happened to be falſe, be nothing better than obſtinacy; and if the imperfection oppoſite to ſelf-command conſiſted in eaſily departing from certain opinions or reſolutions, it would ſometimes be a very reſpectable quality; as in the caſe of Neoptolemus, who is repreſented in Sophocles' tragedy as eaſily departing from the reſolution which he had taken, by the advice of Ulyſſes, becauſe he could not bear to tell a lie; and thoſe who having once yielded to the ſeductions of ſophiſtry, continue pertinaciouſly to adhere to them, are ſurely not commendable on that account. Great weakneſs of reſolution, when accompanied with great ſtupidity, might ſometimes be a virtue; becauſe through extreme irreſolution, a man might be tempted to do directly the reverſe of what he fooliſhly intended. Beſides, he who led a life of voluptuouſneſs through deliberate choice, and on conviction of its being the beſt kind of life that he could purſue, would not be in a condition ſo totally hopeleſs, as he who followed the ſame plan through want of ſelf-command, in direct oppoſition to the dictates of his own reaſon. The former having been corrupted by argument, might alſo, by argument, be reformed; but the latter, reſiſting the perſuaſion of his own mind, would be totally incurable; and obnoxious to the proverb,

"Of drinking ſtill, e'en when the water chok'd."

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Beſides, wherein does ſelf-command, and the weakneſs oppoſite to it, properly conſiſt; are the objects about which theſe habits are converſant, limited to a certain claſs? Such are the doubts of which we muſt endeavour to find the probable ſolution.

Chap. 3.

Whether perſons deficient in ſelf-command err knowingly.

We proceed firſt to examine whether a man gives up the command of himſelf knowingly; and, if ſo, how that can happen: we ſhall alſo inquire, whether ſelf-command, and the inability to reſtrain our appetites, have a reference to all pleaſures and pains indiſcriminately, or to certain definite kinds of them; and whether it belongs to the ſame habit of mind to reſiſt pleaſure, and to encounter pain; with ſeveral other queſtions naturally connected with the preſent ſpeculation. Does inability to reſtrain our appetites appear in the improper pleaſures that we purſue, or in the improper manner in which we purſue them, or in both theſe united? Self-command, and its oppoſite, incontinency, when taken in the ſtricteſt acceptation, have a reference to the ſame things about which temperance and intemperance were formerly proved to be converſant [d]; but the kind of relation which they bear to theſe things is exceedingly different. The intemperate man obeys his appetites knowingly and deliberately, thinking that he ought always to follow the impulſe of preſent pleaſure; the man, merely weak and incontinent, alſo obeys his appetites, but without thinking that he is thereby acting the part which becomes him. Whether the perceived impropriety of his conduct be the reſult of certain or only probable knowledge, makes not any material alteration; ſince ſome opinions, as Heraclitus proves, hold as firm poſſeſſion of the mind, as if they were concluſions of ſcience.

[d] See above, p. 218. & ſeq.

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ſcience. But a man is ſaid to underſtand, either when he actually exerciſes this faculty, or when he is barely poſſeſſed of it. It is exceedingly difficult to conceive how he ſhould act againſt his underſtanding in the former caſe, though not at all extraordinary that he ſhould do ſo in the latter. He may underſtand both the general precept, and the particular caſe to which it is applicable; but if he does not actually make the application, his knowledge will not avail him. In practical matters, there are general propoſitions which relate to the agent, and others which relate to the object of his action; and each of theſe have particular propoſitions which naturally fall under them. A man may be poſſeſſed of the knowledge of all the general propoſitions, and alſo of the knowledge of all the particular ones; and yet, if there be any one of the latter, concerning which his underſtanding does not, in the moment of action, exert its operation or energy, it is not wonderful that he ſhould fall into the greateſt practical errors. This operation or energy is manifeſtly ſuſpended in the caſe of perſons aſleep, drunk, or mad; whoſe condition nearly reſembles that of men under the influence of paſſion. Anger and luſt plainly alter the bodily frame, and ſometimes produce madneſs. Such is the ſtate of thoſe unable to reſtrain their appetites. It is no proof of the contrary, that ſuch perſons talk reaſonably; for ſome madmen will repeat the verſes and reaſonings of Empedocles; and boys may be taught to ſtring together demonſtrations, although they know not what they ſay; for to appropriate truth to ourſelves, it muſt be rendered congenial to the mind; which is the work of time. Such perſons no more underſtand the concluſions which they pronounce, than comedians feel the paſſions which they fictitiouſly exhibit. There is alſo a philoſophical

phical cauſe reſulting from the phyſical nature of man, which may explain why he often through paſſion acts contrary to the dictates of his underſtanding. In all practical morality, there is to be conſidered, beſides the general precept or propoſition, alſo the particular one, which reſults from a perception of ſenſe. When theſe two propoſitions coaleſce, there is not merely an aſſent of the mind, but in practical matters, action muſt immediately and neceſſarily enſue. Thus, if the general propoſition be, "ſweet things ought to be taſted;" and the particular, "this before me is ſweet;" it is neceſſary that, unleſs reſtrained by ſome obſtacle or argument, I ſhould immediately taſte what is before me. Although the mind, therefore, may have the knowledge of ſome general propoſition which ought to prevent taſting, yet, if appetite conſpires with the two propoſitions above mentioned, appetite will, in thoſe deſtitute of ſelf-command, be indulged, in oppoſition to right reaſon; and theſe propoſitions will be alleged by them in excuſe for their infirmity. They will appear therefore to act licentiouſly on argument; but, in fact, argument is not in itſelf contrary to right reaſon, but only by way of acceſſion or appendage to appetite, which has the power of moving and changing the whole frame of the body, and thereby diſtorting the intellects. Beaſts, therefore, cannot be blamed for this want of ſelf-command, becauſe they have not any perception of general precepts, their higheſt powers conſiſting in imagination and memory. How men enſlaved by their appetites reſume the exerciſe of their underſtandings, needs not here be explained; this change has nothing in it peculi ar; ſince it entirely reſembles what happens to all mankind when they awake from ſleep, or to drunkards when they recover from a fit of intoxication; ſubjects which belong to the pro-

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vince of the phyſiologiſt. Socrates then ſaid true, that ſcience, properly ſo called, could not be overcome by appetite, which only diſturbs our perception of particular and practical truths.

Whether incontinency be a ſpecific imperfection, denoting, without any addition to it, infirmities of a peculiar kind, comes next to be inquired. It is manifeſtly converſant about pleaſures and pains; and as pleaſures are either neceſſary, namely, ſuch as are eſſential to the health of the body and the preſervation of the ſpecies; or though not neceſſary, yet in themſelves eligible, ſuch as victory, honour, wealth, and ſuch other external advantages, it is to be remarked that we do not call thoſe incontinent who are too eaſily maſtered by the latter pleaſures, and who are inclined to indulge them in a degree not warranted by right reaſon, without adding the particular cauſe or object which overſets them, ſuch as gain, honour, anger. They are incontinent, that is wanting in ſelf-command, not ſimply and abſolutely, but as to gain, honour, anger; and the definition of incontinency in general no more applies to them, than the general definition of a man to an Olympic victor. It is doubtleſs an imperfection in a man's character that he is actuated by too eager a deſire of honour or of wealth; but incontinency, taken abſolutely, is blamed, not merely as an imperfection, but either as general depravity, or at leaſt as a particular vice; which conſiſts in purſuing with too much eagerneſs the pleaſures of the taſte and touch; or in avoiding, ſoftly and weakly, the pains originating in thoſe ſenſes, cold and heat, hunger and thirſt. Continency and incontinency, taken ſimply and ſtrictly, are converſant therefore about preciſely the ſame objects with temperance and intemperance; though the relation which they bear to thoſe objects be extremely different. The intemperate

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man purſues pleaſure willfully and deliberately, thinking it always the proper object of his preference; wherefore his intemperance is more odious in proportion to the debility of his deſires; for what exceſſes might he be expected to commit, were he ſtimulated by the warmth of youthful paſſions? Deſires and pleaſures, as we have already explained, are either natural, (of which ſome are even highly reſpectable and honourable,) or unnatural; or thirdly, they hold an intermediate rank, being natural under certain conditions, and unnatural under others; in which laſt claſs we may place the deſires of gain, glory, or victory. Deſires of the firſt and laſt kind do not ſubject thoſe who gratify them to blame, provided they do not indulge them to exceſs; ſo that thoſe who delight in their own honours and advantage, or in the honour and advantage of their parents or children, and take proper means to promote objects naturally ſo dear to them, are juſtly reſpected on this account; although even here, extremes are dangerous; as was exemplified in the caſe of Niobé, whoſe pride in her children made her contend with the gods; and in that of Satyrus, ſurnamed Philopater, whoſe zeal for the honour of his father proceeded to the extravagance of folly. But ſuch deſires, being highly natural in themſelves, have nothing in them of wickedneſs or turpitude, only their exceſſes being hurtful or uſeleſs, ought to be carefully avoided. In indulging ſuch deſires beyond the limits preſcribed by right reaſon, we are indeed guilty of an error which ought to be ſhunned, but which is not culpable, like that want of ſelf-command, properly called incontinence. Theſe errors bearing ſome analogy to each other, fall under the common denomination of weakneſs; but that word, when applied to the one, does not mean the ſame thing, as when it is applied

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BOOK VII.

to the other, any more than the epithet bad, applied to a player or a phyſician, means the ſame thing, as when it is applied to a man. Self-command then, and its oppoſite weakneſſes, are converſant about the ſame ſubjects with temperance and intemperance. When the words are applied to other ſubjects, they are extended by way of ſimile beyond their ſtrict acceptation, and therefore other words muſt be added to them in order clearly to expreſs our meaning. To ſay ſimply that a man is wanting in ſelf-command, denotes that he is liable to be overcome by the ſeductions of ſenſual pleaſure, but does not immediately ſuggeſt to us that he is liable to be overcome by anger, honour, or gain.

Chap. 5.

Unnatural depravities, their difference from vices.

Some things naturally pleaſe all animals; others are naturally pleaſant only to certain tribes; and a third claſs, though not congenial to any ſpecies of animals in their ſound and natural ſtate, are yet agreeable to ſome individuals of the ſpecies, either through certain bodily defects, through perverſe habits, or through pravity of nature. From this laſt kind reſult the fierce and beaſtly propenſities incident to ſome individuals of the human ſpecies; witneſs that ſavage female who delighted in tearing to pieces women with child, and in devouring their young; and thoſe barbarians around Pontus, who feaſt, ſome of them on raw, others on human fleſh, and who make mutual preſents of their children to eke out their horrid entertainments; witneſs alſo the ſhocking ſtories told of the tyrant Phalaris. Theſe are beaſtly depravities, and others, not leſs abominable, are ſometimes produced through diſeaſes and madneſs, as was exemplified in that wretch who ſacrificed and eat his mother; and in the ſlave who killed his companion that he might devour his liver. Some perſons, through diſeaſe or cuſtom,

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cuſtom, delight in plucking out their hair, biting off their nails, or in eating coals or earth. In nearly the ſame claſs we may place pæderaſty. Such depravities, whether originating in natural corruption, cuſtom, or malady, exceed the limits of vice, and cannot be reproached with epithets characteriſtic of merely human pravity, except by way of metaphor or ſimilitude. Thus he who ſhould fear even the buzzing of a fly, would be degraded by cowardice more than human, and brutiſh. A man was afflicted with a malady which made him tremble at the ſight of a cat; and there are ſome nations of diſtant barbarians who have ſo little uſe of their reaſon, and who are ſo completely guided by their ſenſations, that they are ſcarcely diſtinguiſhable from brutes. Madneſs, epilepſy, and other diſeaſes alſo ſubject thoſe afflicted by them to ſtrange perverſities of deſire; and from the ſame ſource of rational nature vitiated and changed, either by malady or cuſtom, we ſee ſpring thoſe exceſſes of folly, cowardice, intemperance, and ſavageneſs, which tranſcend the boundaries of merely human wickedneſs. We may ſuppoſe a man ſtimulated by brutal appetites, and yet reſtraining them; Phalaris for inſtance, reſtraining his deſire to eat a boy, or to abuſe him as the inſtrument of an abſurd venereal pleaſure; and it may happen on the other hand, that a monſter in a human ſhape may not only feel ſuch propenſities, but want ſelf-command to reſtrain them. In ſpeaking of men, ſuch abominations cannot be called vices ſimply and properly; they are ſomething worſe: depravities originating in diſeaſe or brutiſhneſs, not ſpringing from the improper indulgence of natural appetite. It is manifeſt then, that ſelf-command and weakneſs, continency and incontinency, are converſant about the ſame ſubjects with temperance and intemperance, and that there is another ſpecies of

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Chap. 6.

Reaſons why voluptuouſneſs is more deteſtable than iraſcibility.

of continency, ſo called metaphorically, though converſant about different objects.

Incontinency of anger appears a leſſer deformity than incontinency as to pleaſure. The reaſons of this are, that anger ſeems to liſten to reaſon, though it does not hear it diſtinctly; like officious ſervants, who before they have received their orders fully are in too great a hurry to execute them, and therefore often do it amiſs; and dogs which bark at the leaſt noiſe, before they know whether it proceeds from a friend or an enemy. In the ſame manner anger, without waiting for reaſon's laſt commands, is precipitated through the warmth and quickneſs of its nature, into over-haſty acts of inconſiderate vengeance; concluding, at every real or ſuppoſed inſult, that the author of it is worthy of indignation and puniſhment. The concluſions of anger are indeed often erroneous; but ſenſuality, without ſtopping to draw any concluſions at all, at the firſt proſpect of pleaſure, ruſhes to enjoyment; it is therefore the more degrading imperfection of the two, ſince the ſenſualiſt yields to mere appetite, whereas the angry man is led aſtray by the appearance, at leaſt, of reaſon. Beſides this, it is to be obſerved, that all our faults ſeem to be more or leſs entitled to indulgence and pardon, in proportion as they are more or leſs natural, or more or leſs common. But tranſports of anger are far more natural than exceſſes in criminal pleaſure: the former ſeem to be congenial to ſome races of men; as in the family of him who apologized for beating his father by ſaying, that *he* beat my grandfather, and my grandfather, the father before him; and this little boy, pointing to his ſon, will beat me when he is able; the fault runs in our blood. Another, when dragged by his ſon to the door, deſired him to ſtop there, becauſe he had only

only dragged his own father thither. Anger beſides is open and undeſigning; but the paſſion of voluptuouſneſs is artful, and therefore unjuſt. The ceſtus of Venus is pregnant with wiles.

> "In this was every art and every charm
> To win the wiſeſt and the coldeſt warm;
> Fond love, the gentle vow, the gay deſire,
> The kind deceit, the ſtill reviving fire,
> Perſuaſive ſpeech and more perſuaſive ſighs,
> Silence that ſpoke, and eloquence of eyes*."

The incontinency of voluptuouſneſs is therefore worſe than that of anger; ſince it more nearly approaches to deliberate wickedneſs. It may be obſerved to the ſame purpoſe, that no perſon afflicted with pain is addicted to inſolence; for inſults are committed with pleaſure, but anger is always accompanied with pain; wherefore inſolence, which is of all things the moſt provoking, is incompatible with anger. The different kinds of incontinency have now been ſufficiently explained, the human, the brutiſh, and that originating in diſeaſes; the firſt kind only is converſant about the ſame objects with the vice of intemperance; a thing never aſcribed to brutes, except metaphorically, or comparatively; when any claſs of animals is remarked as peculiarly obnoxious for its luſt, voracity, or miſchief. For brutes, being incapable of deliberation and election, cannot be deformed by vice, ſtrictly ſo called; their ferocity, how formidable ſoever it may be, is a leſs evil than human vice; ſince they are deſtitute of that beſt principle of man, which, by corruption, becomes the worſt; and bad effects flowing from a principle, are thereby rendered more dangerous.

A bad

* Iliad, XIV. v. 247. & ſeq.

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A bad man is capable of doing ten thouſand times more miſchief than a beaſt.

Chap. 7.

With reſpect to the pleaſures and pains of the touch and taſte, which it falls within the province of temperance to regulate, we may be ſo conſtituted as either to conquer thoſe by which the greater part of mankind are ſubdued, or to be conquered by thoſe over which the greater part are victorious. The terms, ſelf-command, or continency, and its oppoſite, incontinency, are moſt properly applied in ſpeaking of pleaſures; the terms, firmneſs and ſoftneſs are reſpectively moſt applicable to thoſe who ſhew more than an ordinary ſtrength of mind in reſiſting pain, or more than an ordinary weakneſs in yielding to this adverſary. The greater proportion of mankind float between the oppoſite extremes of firmneſs and ſoftneſs, continency and incontinency; verging, however, for the moſt part, rather to the imperfections of incontinency and ſoftneſs. Since ſome pleaſures are altogether unneceſſary, and of theſe which are neceſſary, the exceſſes are carefully to be ſhunned, he who purſues unneceſſary or immoderate pleaſures, with deliberate election, and merely for their own ſake, is guilty of intemperance; a vice the more incurable, becauſe thoſe who harbour it are not liable to repentance. The vice oppoſite to intemperance conſiſts in rejecting, through inſenſibility, even neceſſary or commendable pleaſures: the virtue of temperance lies in the middle between theſe blameable extremes. With regard to bodily pains, a man may fly from and avoid, even thoſe which ought to be encountered, either through deliberate election, or through mere weakneſs and infirmity of nature; and as one perſon is led captive by pleaſure, another may be overcome by the painful irritation of deſire.

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deſire. Bad actions are aggravated, when they are committed without impulſe from any violent paſſion. To ſtrike in anger, is an extenuation of the aſſault; and, in like manner, baſe actions, done without temptation, are rendered ſtill baſer; for, in what ſhameful exceſſes would he who commits them be likely to indulge, were he ſtimulated by fierce deſires and headſtrong appetites? Intemperance, then, properly ſo called, is more odious than that weakneſs which we have called incontinency; and continency, which enables us to conquer pleaſures is preferable to that reſiſting firmneſs, which merely prevents us from being ſubdued by pain. Softneſs, or effeminacy, conſiſts in yielding to ſlight pains; and is illuſtrated in him who trails his flowing garments on the ground, rather than ſubmit to the uneaſineſs of tucking them up; thus exhibiting, without neceſſity, a picture of diſeaſe and infirmity, and thinking that there is no miſery in reſembling the miſerable. That a man ſhould be overcome by great pleaſures or great pains, is not a matter of wonder; and his defeat is entitled to pardon, provided his reſiſtance has been vigorous; as is exemplified in the Philoctetes of Theodectes, when bit by the ſnake, and in the character of Cercyon in Cercinus' play of Alopè. The burſts of agoniſing pain are as natural on ſuch occaſions as thoſe of laughter, when long and earneſtly ſuppreſſed; an inſtance of which was ſeen in Zenophantus. But a man is truly contemptible, when he ſoftly yields to ſlight and inconſiderable ſufferings, unleſs this happens through diſeaſe, or through ſome natural infirmity in his race. In the kings of Perſia, effeminacy is hereditary; and manly firmneſs is not expected in women. A playful character is more allied to ſoftneſs than to intemperance; for playfulneſs is the repoſe and relax-

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BOOK VII.

ation of the mind. The want of ſelf-command originates, either in raſhneſs or in debility. Weak men deliberate, but want ſtrength of mind to perſevere in their reſolutions; raſh men are hurried away by paſſion, without deliberating at all. Our own preparations and exertions have great power even over our bodily feelings; a man may accuſtom himſelf to bear tickling without ſuffering the uneaſy ſenſation which it excites; and, in the ſame manner, by calling up pains and pleaſures to the mind, by rendering them objects of perception and examination, and moderating by reaſon the affections which they naturally ſtir up in us, we may acquire the power of reſiſting and conquering thoſe formidable enemies, whenever we are obliged actually to contend with them in real life. Men of quick tempers, and thoſe diſordered by melancholy, are peculiarly deficient in ſelf-command; the former, through their mobility; and the latter, through that vehemence and impetuoſity which renders them ſlaves to their fancies, how wild ſoever they may be.

Chap. 8.

He that is properly intemperate, is not given to repentance; becauſe, acting with deliberate election, he remains firm in his perverſe purpoſes. He, on the other hand, who ſees the right path, but, through weakneſs of character, does not purſue it, is liable to repent of his miſconduct. His faults therefore are curable[f]; and the mental malady under which he labours, reſembles rather the epilepſy, which comes by fits, than the conſumption or dropſy, which are unremitting and continual. His weakneſs, indeed, is ſpecifically different from vice; for the latter can conceal itſelf, and even aſſume the maſk of virtue; but

[f] Ariſtotle ſays, "contrary to what was ſtated in our doubts;" he doubted how a man who knowingly erred, could ever be cured of his errors. See above, p. 311.

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but the former is always undiſguiſed and open. This infirmity of nature is the leſs inexcuſable in proportion to the ſtrength of paſſion, and the total abſence of reflection; and the perſons diſgraced by it reſemble thoſe who are ſpeedily intoxicated and overcome by ſuch a ſmall quantity of wine, as would produce no perceptible effects on ordinary conſtitutions. Yet mere weakneſs of character is attended with as bad conſequences as vice itſelf; and is chargeable with the reproach which Demodocus made to the Mileſians, that though they were not a ſtupid people, yet they acted ſtupidly. In like manner, the weak man acts viciouſly; but does not, like the intemperate man, give a deliberate preference to vice. His mind, therefore, is ſtill open to perſuaſion, and his life capable of reformation, ſince his character is not ſo totally depraved as to make vice his end and aim. In the affairs of life, this end and aim forms a practical principle, which cannot be taught any more than the axioms and poſtulates of geometry; and the perception of which reſults entirely from virtue, either natural or acquired. The temperate man purſues right ends, from which he feels no inclination to deviate; the character of the intemperate man is directly the reverſe. Between theſe two, an intermediate place is held by him, who is hurried into bad actions by the impetuous ſtrength of paſſion; but whoſe mind is not ſo totally vitiated as to make the gratification of ſenſual appetites the deliberate object of his purſuit. Perſons of this deſcription do bad actions; but as the principle of action itſelf, which is the main thing, ſtill remains ſound, their condition is not hopeleſs. They are indeed better than thoſe who are intemperate on principle; but ſtill they are the objects of great diſapprobation; whereas thoſe who, though

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BOOK VII.

liable to be moved by corrupt desires, have yet sufficient strength of mind to restrain and curb them, are held praiseworthy; notwithstanding their characters fall far short of that perfect temperance, with which no improper desire is compatible.

Chap. 9.

Difference between incontinency and intemperance is that between weakness and wickedness.

That firmness of mind called continency, implies a resolute adherence to right opinions in opposition to the seductions of appetite: it is totally different from obstinacy, which often yields to passion, but perversely resists the dictates of reason. Obstinacy bears the same analogy to true firmness, that prodigality bears to liberality; and rashness to courage. It is inseparably connected with self-conceit, ignorance, and clownishness. An obstinate man takes pleasure in resisting conviction; victory, not truth, is his aim; and, as if his opinions were laws, he is mortified and provoked by their rejection or reversal. His character, therefore, so far from implying firmness and self-command, is rather a-kin to incontinency; since he is diverted from propriety of thought and action, by the allurements of false pleasure. A man may want stedfastness in his purposes, without being chargeable with incontinency or weakness. Of this we have an example in the character of Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes. Pleasure made that young hero change his resolution; but an honourable pleasure, the love of truth, after he had been persuaded by Ulysses to consent to be made an accomplice in falsehood; for incontinency and intemperance do not originate in pleasure simply and absolutely, but in that kind of sensual pleasure which is blameable and base. Men, as we have said before, may be diverted from propriety of conduct by being too little, as well as by being too much affected by bodily pleasures. Both extremes are bad; but as the former is observed in few persons,

and

and on few occaſions, it is not diſtinguiſhed by a name; and the praiſeworthy habit of continency is contraſted with that blameable diſpoſition which conſiſts in being too ſtrongly affected with the deſire of ſenſual gratifications. Temperance and ſelf-command are in common diſcourſe often confounded, from the reſemblance which they bear to each other; but the man deſerving the praiſe of true temperance is above ſelf-command, becauſe his character is ſuch, that he could not derive any enjoyment from baſe or blameable pleaſures. The man endowed with continency or ſelf-command, reſiſts, indeed, and overcomes ſuch pleaſures; but ſtill to him they ſeem to be pleaſures, and he occaſionally feels an inclination to enjoy them. In like manner, intemperance and incontinency are often confounded, for both lead to the ſame voluptuous kind of life; but the former prefers pleaſure on principle; the latter purſues it againſt principle.

Chap. 10.

Additional proofs thereof.

Men deficient in ſelf-command may have cleverneſs but cannot have prudence; which latter is a practical principle, implying not only that we know, but that we do, what is right. In reference to the underſtanding, wit or cleverneſs are nearly the ſame with prudence; but in reference to the will they are very different from it, becauſe prudence always implies a rectitude of moral election; it is therefore abſolutely incompatible with the dominion of vicious paſſions. How ſuch paſſions ſhould be indulged knowingly, has been explained by ſhewing that the knowledge of thoſe who indulge in them, is confined to mere ſpeculations which are not applied; that it is knowledge not rouſed to energy, but lying in a ſluggiſh ſtate of mere capacity, like the knowledge of perſons aſleep or intoxicated. The incontinent man is only wicked by halves, becauſe

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becauſe he is not wicked on principle; as he acts without deſign, he is not chargeable with injuſtice. He either does not deliberate at all; or if he deliberates, is like a ſtate which has good laws, but does not obey them; as Anaxandrides reproached the Athenians,

"The ſtate conſults how to make void the law."

The real profligate, on the other hand, obeys laws, and thoſe bad ones. A man is praiſed for ſelf-command, when he excels moſt others in that habit; he is blamed for incontinency, when he yields to temptations, to which moſt men are ſuperior. The incontinency of thoſe who deliberate rightly, but have not firmneſs to perſiſt in their reſolutions, is more curable than that originating in melancholy; which, through its quickneſs and vehemence, impels thoſe affected by it to act without deliberation; and an incontinency depending on cuſtom, is more curable than that which ſprings from nature. For cuſtom is more moveable than nature, ſince the difficulty of changing the former, depends on its reſemblance to the latter.—As the Poet Euenus ſays,

"Habits by long continued care impreſt,
Are ſtrong as nature in the human breaſt."

Let this much ſuffice for a deſcription of the habits of continency and firmneſs on the one hand; of incontinency and ſoftneſs on the other; and on the relations which thoſe habits bear to each other[c].

[c] The four chapters which follow in the original of this work, are mere tranſcripts from the Sixth Book of the Ethics to Eudemus; they treat of pleaſure; a ſubject more fully and more philoſophically explained in the Tenth Book of the Ethics to Nicomachus; of which the reader will find the tranſlation in its proper place.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

BOOK VIII.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOKS VIII. AND IX.

BOOK VIII.

In theſe Books Ariſtotle treats of friendſhip, a ſubject, he obſerves, intimately connected with morals; "ſince friendſhip, if not a particular virtue, at leaſt ſhines moſt conſpicuouſly in the virtuous." He explains the nature of friendſhip, and reſolves the doubts concerning it. He divides it into different kinds, according to the principles in which it originates, and ſhews how the beſt kind of friendſhip may be acquired, maintained, and uninterruptedly enjoyed. Friendſhips differ, not only according to the ſources from which they ſpring, but according to the condition of the perſons by whom they are cultivated. Our author examines the friendſhips between equals, and the friendſhips of inferiors with the great; he explains the relations which friendſhip bears to juſtice, and how both are modified by political inſtitutions. The rules of friendſhip are far leſs preciſe than thoſe of juſtice, becauſe the ſubject to which they apply is far leſs definite; ſcarcely any two caſes being exactly alike. The author explains what is meant by loving our friends as ourſelves, and wherein true ſelf-love conſiſts, in oppoſition to blameable ſelfiſhneſs. He expatiates on the exquiſite

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BOOK VIII.

quiſite delight of virtuous friendſhip, like a man who (as appears from the hiſtory of his life) had warmly felt its charms. The whole treatiſe, indeed, compriſed in the following two Books, is diſtinguiſhed by juſt ſentiment as much as by ſolid argument; it is equally full and perſpicuous, rejecting paradox, diſdaining declamation, and ſhewing, by an illuſtrious example, how an important moral ſubject may be unfolded with ſcientific accuracy, and impreſſed with practical energy.

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BOOK VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Utility and beauty of friendſhip.—Qualities by which it is generated.—Three kinds of friendſhip.—Theſe kinds compared.—Characters moſt ſuſceptible of friendſhip.—Unequal friendſhips.—Their limits.—Friendſhips founded on propinquity.

BOOK VIII.

Chap. 1.

Utility and beauty of friendſhip.

WE proceed next to treat of friendſhip, which is either a particular virtue, or which at leaſt ſhines moſt conſpicuouſly in the virtuous. It is alſo moſt eſſential to the enjoyment of life, for without friends no one would chooſe to live, though poſſeſſed of all other advantages[a]. The rich and powerful ſtand moſt in need of friends, without whom their proſperity could neither be preſerved nor enjoyed; for wherein conſiſts the pre-eminence of power and wealth, but in the pleaſures of beneficence, which is moſt laudably exerciſed towards friends? And how could this precarious pre-eminence be maintained without the ſteady aſſiſtance of friendly adherents? In poverty and other diſtreſſes, friendſhip ſeems our beſt, or rather our ſole, refuge. It is neceſſary in youth as the preſervative againſt irreparable

[a] Si quis in cœlum adſcendiſſet, naturamque mundi, et pulchritudinem ſiderum perſpexiſſet, inſuavem illam admirationem, &c. "To aſcend to heaven, and behold the nature of the univerſe, and the beauty of the ſtars, would afford an admiration barren of delight, unleſs we had ſome one with whom we might talk of thoſe wonders." Cicero de Amicitia, c. 23. Cicero's Treatiſe on Friendſhip abounds with ſparkling paſſages: he has often expanded and embelliſhed Ariſtotle's remarks; but conſidered as a philoſophical work, it neither ſhews that deep inſight into human nature, nor takes that comprehenſive view of the ſubject, which form the principal merit of the Greek original.

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reparable errors; it is neceſſary in old age, as the conſolation amidſt unavoidable infirmities; it is neceſſary in the vigour of manhood, as the beſt auxiliary in the execution of illuſtrious enterpriſes, both ſharpening our thoughts and animating our exertions.

> "By mutual confidence and mutual aid,
> Great deeds are done and great diſcoveries made:
> The wiſe new prudence from the wiſe acquire,
> And one brave hero fans another's fire[b]."

Friendſhip is implanted by nature in parents towards their children, as appears manifeſtly, not only in the human race, but in the various tribes of birds, and in moſt animals; it prevails alſo among thoſe of the ſame claſs or family, but chiefly among men; whence philanthropy is ſo often the juſt ſubject of praiſe. During long and dreary journies, in every man the traveller meets, he beholds the face of a friend; ſuch congenial ſympathy ſubſiſts among the human race! Friendſhip holds mankind together in communities and cities; and lawgivers ſtudy more earneſtly how to promote friendſhip than how to maintain even juſtice itſelf; for concord, which is a-kin to friendſhip, is the perpetual aim of all wiſe legiſlation, which unceaſingly ſtrives to extirpate the ſeeds of diſſenſion and ſedition, as of all things the moſt hoſtile to its views. When concord ripens into friendſhip, the rules of juſtice are ſuperfluous, but juſtice without friendſhip is inſufficient for happineſs; and the moſt perfect and moſt comprehenſive juſtice is that which moſt reſembles friendſhip in its operations and effects. Friendſhip unites beauty with utility, it is not only neceſſary but ornamental; we praiſe it as a virtue; we deſire it as adding luſtre to our characters;

[b] Iliad, X. v. 265. & ſeq.

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characters; and to be a good friend ſeems to many ſynonymous with being a good man. Yet various doubts may be ſtarted concerning the nature of friendſhip. Some think that it reſults from ſimilarity of character and purſuits, and cite the vulgar proverb, "that fowls of a feather flock together." Others maintain that this ſimilarity more naturally begets emulation and hatred; quoting from Heſiod,

Doubts concerning the nature of friendſhip.

"Potters hate potters; bards quarrel with bards."

They ſeek the principles of friendſhip in the high philoſophy of nature, ſaying either with Euripides,

"The parched earth longs for refreſhing ſhowers;
The ſkies, heavy with rain, ſeek to unload
Their weight of waters on the ſolid earth."

or with Heraclitus, "that each nature requires and ſeeks its counterpart:" thus the beſt harmony reſults from differences, and thus all things proceed from contrary elements. Other philoſophers, particularly Empedocles, aſſert directly the reverſe, "that like draws to like." The conſideration of theſe phyſical difficulties we at preſent omit, becauſe they are beſide the purpoſe of this diſcourſe, which is confined to the examination of ſuch queſtions only as have a reference to life and manners; as whether friendſhip can ſubſiſt among all ſorts of perſons, or only among the virtuous; whether there are various kinds of friendſhip ſpecifically different; for thoſe who think there is but one kind, becauſe friendſhip admits of different degrees of warmth and intenſity, truſt to a fallacious proof, ſince other general terms as well as friendſhip comprehend diviſions of things ſpecifically different from each other, and yet partaking more or leſs, in a ſtronger or weaker degree, of the characteriſtic quality

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which the general term denotes. But of this ſubject we have formerly treated [c].

Chap. 2.

The proper objects of friendſhip, or the qualities by which it is produced.

To illuſtrate the nature of friendſhip, we muſt examine what are the qualities by which it is excited or produced. Whatever is an object of our friendſhip, muſt promote either our good, our pleaſure, or our utility; and as utility is deſirable merely as the cauſe of what is either good or pleaſant, the cauſes of friendſhip ultimately reſolve themſelves into goodneſs and pleaſure; conſidered, not abſolutely in themſelves, but in reference to the perſon in whom the friendſhip is generated; whether that perſon has juſt notions of what is good and pleaſant, or takesth oſe for *real* goods, which are only *apparent*. The qualities by which friendſhip is excited are not, when abſtractedly conſidered, able to produce this amiable diſpoſition; for that which is an object of friendſhip is loved on its own account; and it is neceſſary that between friends there ſhould ſubſiſt a reciprocity of affection. Things inanimate therefore cannot be the object of friendſhip. A drunkard indeed loves wine; but it would be ridiculous to ſay that he deſires its good, although he indeed wiſhes for its ſafety, that he himſelf may drink it. Mere good-will may ſubſiſt on one ſide, without meeting a return; and perſons who have not any opportunity of being acquainted, may mutually bear to each other much good-will; but friendſhip not only implies a reciprocity of affection, but requires that this reciprocity ſhould be known to both parties.

Chap. 3.

Three kinds of friendſhip.

Friendſhip may be diſtinguiſhed into three kinds, according to the three qualities by which it is produced; and in each of the three there muſt be a known reciprocity of affection depending on the cauſe in which the friendſhip originates. When this cauſe is utility, men love each other as long as mutual advantage

[c] See Analyſis, p. 65. & ſeq.

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vantage reſults from their friendſhip: a ſimilar obſervation is applicable when their affection is founded on pleaſure. Neither the utility nor the pleaſure which any man affords, conſtitute an eſſential and unalterable part of his character; and when on account of thoſe circumſtances he himſelf becomes an object of friendſhip, he is ſo, merely by way of acceſſion or appendage to qualities not inſeparably connected with him, and which being actually removed, he himſelf ceaſes to be an object of friendſhip. Friendſhips founded on utility prevail moſt among perſons advanced in years; for intereſt, not pleaſure, is their aim. Manhood, and even youth, often imitate too faithfully the ſelfiſh manners of age; chooſing their friends according to views of intereſt. Perſons of this character delight but little in each other's ſociety. Even their convivial hoſpitality has perſonal advantage for its object. Youthful friendſhips however, for the moſt part, are founded on pleaſure; for youth is the age of paſſion, which purſues and prefers preſent and immediate gratification. But as our pleaſures change with our years, youthful friendſhips are as eaſily diſſolved as they were ſpeedily contracted. Beſides, youth is much addicted to love, which is full of mutability, its principal ingredients being pleaſure and paſſion, ſo that it varies many times in a day. Youthful attachments, while they laſt, produce cloſe and habitual intimacy, becauſe ſuch friendſhips have no other foundation than the delight reſulting from mutual intercourſe. The only perfect friendſhip ſubſiſts among thoſe who reſemble each other in virtue, becauſe thoſe who love their friends for their virtue, love them for what is not a temporary appendage, but a permanent eſſential in their characters. The worth of a virtuous friend is not relative to circumſtances, but univerſal and abſolute, comprehending

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ing both pleaſure and utility, and uniting all thoſe qualities which either produce friendſhip or render it unalterable; but his ineſtimable value cannot be fairly appreciated, except by thoſe who are his rivals in moral or intellectual excellence; for men delight chiefly in thoſe qualities which reſemble their own. Such friendſhips are rare, becauſe virtuous men are rare; and even *they* cannot perfectly know each other, until, according to the proverb, they have conſumed many buſhels of ſalt together. Time and familiarity are requiſite for proving mutual affection, and for creating that ſteady confidence which cements friendſhip. Friendly acts produce rather an inclination to friendſhip than the thing itſelf, which muſt be the effect of time and habit operating on excellencies reciprocally exerted, and mutually experienced, in thoſe who are reſpectively conſcious of being the objects of love and affection the one to the other.

Chap. 4.

The different kinds of friendſhip compared with reſpect to their durability.

Friendſhips founded on utility and on pleaſure bear a reſemblance to that founded on virtue; for virtuous men afford both pleaſure and utility to their friends. But friendſhips of the former kind are the more durable in proportion as they originate on both ſides in nearly the ſame principle, that is in nearly the ſame kind of pleaſure or utility. Thus, they naturally laſt long between men recommended to each other by their companionable qualities, their wit and pleaſantry; they are leſs durable among lovers, when, as for the moſt part happens, the love on the one ſide ariſes from an admiration of beauty, and on the other from the attentions beſtowed by the lover. When beauty is impaired by years, the admiration ceaſes, the attentions are withheld, and the friendſhip founded on this kind of love is ſometimes at an end; but many times alſo it laſts, when cemented by congenial manners, ſtrengthened and

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and confirmed by long habits of familiar intercourſe. Friendſhips founded on the love of gain are of all the moſt unſtable; for perſons governed by this principle are not friends to each other, but both to their reſpective intereſts. All perſons promiſcuouſly, the good, the bad, and thoſe of an intermediate character, may feel towards each other that kind of friendſhip which originates in pleaſure or utility; but good men only can be the objects of friendſhip properly ſo called, independent of circumſtances and reſulting from what is moſt eſſential and moſt unalterable in the character itſelf. The friendſhips of the virtuous are not to be deſtroyed by fortune, nor ſhaken by calumny. What accident or event can change or diſturb confirmed habits of virtue? What calumny can prevail againſt known and approved worth? The friendſhip formed from intereſt therefore, like alliances between ſtates, and thoſe formed from pleaſure, like the friendſhips of our boyiſh years, are called friendſhips only by way of ſimilitude or metaphor; and thoſe metaphorical friendſhips reſemble other metaphors in this, that they do not naturally mingle, or eaſily blend and unite; for how ſeldom do we ſee the ſame perſons friends to each other on the combined principles of profit and of pleaſure? Such then are the different kinds of friendſhip. That formed by the virtuous alone deſerves the name, the others are ſo called merely by a figure of ſpeech.

Chap. 5.

The characters moſt ſuſceptible of friendſhip.

Men procure the denomination of friendly as they do that of virtuous, either from their actions or from their habits. Friendly actions can take place only among thoſe who are members of the ſame ſociety; but the habit of friendſhip may ſubſiſt among perſons widely ſeparated from each other, though, when their

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their ſeparation continues long, their friendſhip is apt to be forgotten; whence it is ſaid,

"Long abſence often is the bane of friendſhip."

Old perſons, and thoſe of auſtere characters, are, from this principle, but little diſpoſed to friendſhip; becauſe in them both the love of pleaſure, and the power of communicating it, is commonly ſo much weakened, that they have not any great inducement to keep company with each other; for as pleaſure is the great aim of nature, the ſociety of thoſe who are capable neither of affording nor reliſhing it, cannot poſſibly be deſired; and if they occaſion real and poſitive uneaſineſs, will not long be endured. Thoſe who, without delighting in each other's ſociety, are however reſpectively the objects of mutual approbation, may have great good-will towards each other with very little friendſhip; for nothing is ſo productive of friendſhip as the habitual intercourſe of life. The wretched ſeek ſuccour in ſociety, but the happy ſeek ſociety for itſelf, and can leaſt of all men bear ſolitude; but the love of ſociety itſelf is founded on the pleaſure afforded by thoſe with whom we live; which pleaſure implies that their characters be agreeable, and much of the ſame ſtamp with our own. Friendſhip, therefore, as has been often ſaid, prevails chiefly among the virtuous, to whom only that is good and pleaſant, which is good and pleaſant abſolutely and eſſentially, independently of any circumſtances that may concur, or of any conſequences that may follow; and to whom the mutual enjoyment of their correſpondent excellencies is of all things the moſt delightful.

Chap. 6.

Friendſhip cannot at

Aged perſons and thoſe of auſtere characters are unfit for friendſhip in proportion to their auſterity, and to their averſion

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to ſociety. Young people therefore ſooner form friendſhips than the old and auſtere; who, though they may often bear great good-will to each other, and ſhew much readineſs in mutually conferring the moſt eſſential ſervices, are yet ſlow and cold in ſentimental attachment, becauſe they are averſe to that ſocial intercourſe in which chiefly it originates. Friendſhip in its higheſt perfection cannot extend to many; and for a ſimilar reaſon that it is impoſſible for us to feel the paſſion of love for many perſons at once. There is an intenſity in friendſhip as well as in love, which naturally confines it to one object. Men have different taſtes, each of which has ſomething in it too peculiar to be alike pleaſed with many; and it is right that it ſhould be ſo. Friendſhip, beſides, requires long and intimate knowledge, which is not eaſily obtained of many characters by one perſon, who cannot live in equal and cloſe familiarity with them all. Friendſhips of intereſt or pleaſure are indeed ſpeedily contracted, becauſe their offices may be ſpeedily performed, and many are able to fulfil them. Of the two, thoſe of pleaſure moſt reſemble true friendſhip, eſpecially when the pleaſure is mutual, and reſulting from the ſame objects and purſuits. Such are the friendſhips of youth, which are of a warmer and more liberal kind than thoſe formed among money-getting men on the cold principle of intereſt. Men proſperous in their circumſtances prefer pleaſure to utility; they chooſe the ſociety of agreeable friends, ſince worth itſelf, joined with harſhneſs and auſterity, ſoon becomes offenſive and irkſome; but if they loved and preferred, as right reaſon would direct, agreeable qualities only when ennobled by virtue, they would find in their friends all advantages united. Men inveſted with power have two diſtinct claſſes of friends; the one choſen from taſte, the other

once comprehend many objects.

The great have two diſtinct claſſes of friends.

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other from intereſt. The friends calculated to pleaſe are not qualified to benefit them; for as they ſeek pleaſure diſtinct from virtue, and purſue intereſt diſtinct from honour, merry buffoons are beſt qualified for the firſt purpoſe, and dexterous knaves beſt adapted to the ſecond; the man of virtue alone anſwering the double end of pleaſure and utility. But a virtuous man cannot live in friendſhip with the great unleſs *they* be as much diſpoſed to reſpect his ſuperiority of virtue, as he is diſpoſed to honour their ſuperiority of fortune, becauſe the law of equality, which is the ſoul of friendſhip, would otherwiſe be violated; and as men in power are generally too much intoxicated with their proſperity[e] to make this juſt ſacrifice, they ſeldom enjoy the ineſtimable benefit of virtuous friendſhip. Such then are thoſe kinds of friendſhip in which men interchange either pleaſures or utilities on both ſides, or exchange pleaſure on the one ſide for utility on the other. They reſemble true friendſhip in this, that they are productive of pleaſure or profit; but they differ from it in many other reſpects, and particularly in being eaſily ſhaken by calumny, and eaſily ſubverted by a change in the external circumſtances of thoſe between whom they prevailed.

Chap. 7.

Unequal friendſhips: their limits.

Friendſhip, ſtrictly ſo called, requires, as we obſerved, equality; but there is alſo a ſpecies of friendſhip which ſubſiſts between perſons of extremely unequal conditions; namely, that between fathers (or thoſe who hold the place of fathers) and children; huſbands and wives; rulers and thoſe ſubject to their authority. This ſpecies of friendſhip admits of many ſubdiviſions: the friendſhip of a father towards his ſon, differs from that

[e] Non enim ſolum ipſa fortuna cæca eſt, ſed eos etiam plerumque efficit cæcos, quos complexa eſt. "Fortune is not only herſelf blind, but ſhe, for the moſt part, renders thoſe alſo blind whom ſhe embraces." Cicero de Amicitia, c. xv.

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that of a huſband towards his wife, and that of a king towards his people; it differs alſo from that of a ſon towards his father; for the parties ſtanding in this and other relations, have each of them their reſpective offices and their reſpective duties; the habitual performance of which can alone give ſtability to their friendſhip. When the pre-eminence is greatly on one ſide, whether in the power of beſtowing profit or pleaſure, the friendſhip ought to be greater on the other, in nearly the ſame proportion, that the rules of equal juſtice may thus be maintained. But equality in point of juſtice conſiſts primarily in this, that each man ſhould have his due: tha the ſhares ſhould be nearly equal in quantity, is only a conſequence that ſometimes follows from this rule; for when the perſons are equal in worth, then only their ſhares ſhould be equal in value. But in point of friendſhip, equality in quantity or worth is a primary conſideration; for between perſons extremely unequal as to virtue, power, wealth, and other cauſes productive of diſtinction, friendſhip cannot eaſily ſubſiſt. The gods are the great benefactors of mankind, but they are far too exalted for our friendſhip. Kings do not chooſe their friends among the loweſt claſſes of their people: nor do men eminently diſtinguiſhed by virtue and wiſdom, aſſociate with perſons of no conſideration or merit. It is impoſſible accurately to aſcertain the preciſe limits beyond which the elevation of the one party becomes too great to admit of friendſhip with his inferior. The friendſhip may ſtill ſubſiſt, after many advantages are taken from the one and accumulated on the other. But with the exaltation of the latter to divinity, the relation of friendſhip would unqueſtionably ceaſe[d]; wherefore it is doubted, whether a man can wiſh for the

[d] Does this bear any reference to the friendſhip between Ariſtotle and his pupil Alexander?

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the deification of his friend, ſince this would be to wiſh for the deſtruction of their friendſhip. Perhaps he does not even wiſh for him all human advantages; for a man deſires that every good thing may happen to his friend, provided only what is a good to his friend be not an evil to himſelf; and it would be a great evil to himſelf to loſe a good friend.

Chap. 8.

The ordinary foundations of unequal friendſhips.

Moſt people, through vanity, wiſh rather to be beloved than to love. They are therefore fond of flatterers; who are, or rather pretend to be, a kind of unequal friends, that love more than they are loved. Love is near akin to honour, which moſt men deſire, not indeed for its own ſake, but for the advantages which accrue from it. They delight in marks of diſtinction from the great, which they regard as pledges of future and more ſolid bounties. Thoſe who are ambitious of honour from perſons well acquainted with them, and whoſe characters are eſteemed for equity, wiſh thereby to confirm their good opinion of themſelves. They delight in thinking favourably of their own characters, in conſequence of this impartial verdict in their favour; and the pleaſure which they take in being the objects of love and approbation, is the cauſe for which they deſire external marks of honour and reſpect. To be loved, therefore, is better than to be honoured, and friendſhip is ſtill more than honour ultimately deſirable. The former however conſiſts more in loving than in being loved; in proof of which we may allege the behaviour of mothers who give out their children to nurſe, pleaſed with loving them and knowing that they are well, without expecting or deſiring any return of affection. To love one's friends is a common topic of praiſe; and the *virtue* of friendſhip depends on the ſtrength and propriety of our affection, which can alone render it permanent, levelling all thoſe inequalities, and removing all thoſe obſtacles which

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which might interrupt its duration. Such is the friendſhip of virtuous men, who being ſtable in themſelves, remain ſtable in their relations to each other; neither requiring nor admitting any aſſociation with the worthleſs. Theſe laſt are inconſtant in all their ways, and there can be no ſtability in their relations to each other, ſince none of them acts uniformly or conſiſtently, nor remains long like unto himſelf. Their friendſhip is but a league in villainy, which, for the moſt part, ends when it ceaſes to be profitable: when pleaſure conſpires with profit it is naturally more durable. The friendſhips reſulting from contraries reſolve themſelves into the principle of utility; as thoſe between the poor and rich, the learned and ignorant; for a man is always ready to give ſomething in exchange for that of which he ſtands in need. In the ſame claſs we may place, without much violence, the handſome and the ugly, the lover and the object of his affection. Wherefore ſome lovers juſtly incur ridicule when they expect to meet with a return of love ſimilar to their own. Were their perſons calculated to inſpire a mutual paſſion, their expectation would be reaſonable; but when they are the reverſe, their pretenſions are ridiculous. Perhaps contraries do not primarily affect each other, but both of them are fond of that intermediate condition which is preferable to either. Thus what is dry loves moiſture, only that it may attain an intermediate ſtate; and that which is warm affects cold, only that it may be reduced to a due temperature[e]. But ſuch queſtions may be omitted, as beſide the purpoſe of the preſent diſcourſe.

Chap. 9.

Of the relation which friendſhip bears to juſtice.

Juſtice and friendſhip, as we already obſerved, ſeem to belong to the ſame perſons, and to be converſant about the ſame objects. They are both found in every partnerſhip or community,

[e] See Analyſis, p. 111. & ſeq.

munity, even among thoſe who ſail in the ſame veſſel, and thoſe who fight under the ſame ſtandard; and in proportion to the cloſeneſs of the partnerſhip or community, the more cloſely and intimately is the friendſhip cemented. The proverb ſays rightly, "that all things are common among friends;" for friendſhip reſults from the community of goods, advantages, and pleaſures; it is moſt perfect among brothers and companions; and in the ſame proportion as the ties of the partnerſhip or connexion are looſened, and fewer things are common, the friendſhip becomes leſs intimate, and even the rules of juſtice ſeem leſs binding. It is a more heinous crime to rob our friends than our fellow-citizens, and our fellow-citizens than ſtrangers. Not to ſuccour a brother in diſtreſs is more odious than to refuſe ſimilar aſſiſtance to a ſtranger; and to ſtrike a father is the moſt atrocious of crimes. Friendſhip and juſtice thus march hand in hand, and the vigour of the one is followed by equal intenſity in the other. But all other connexions and partnerſhips are but parts of the great partnerſhip of political ſociety, which utility firſt collected and ſtill holds together. Public utility therefore is that chief and ultimate aim of which wiſe legiſlators never loſe ſight. To promote particular branches of this utility, all inferior aſſociations are formed; fleets ſail, armies march; their aim is wealth or victory; to invade, conquer, and plunder; to ſubdue provinces, and ſtorm cities. Even the peaceful communities of tribes and wards, and thoſe mirthful aſſemblies which meet to feaſt, to drink, and to dance, depend on the ſame principle; for legiſlators have not merely preſent and temporary advantage in view, they look farther, to the permanent comfort and ſure enjoyment of life, and therefore eſtabliſh ſolemnities during which human induſtry may repoſe

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repoſe from paſt labours, and prepare for future exertions, by which the gods are honoured, and the heart of man is gladdened. The ancient ſolemnities of this kind were held towards the end of autumn, the ſeaſon of greateſt leiſure, when men having gathered in the earth's productions, might offer the firſt fruits to the gods. Political ſociety, then, comprehends all other partnerſhips or aſſociations; from the varieties of which the different kinds of friendſhip reſult.

Chap. 10.

Of the different forms of government.

There are three juſt forms of government, each of which is liable to deviate into a corrupt form, which is a counterfeit reſemblance of the former. The juſt forms are royalty, ariſtocracy, and what may be called timocracy, becauſe all men enjoying a certain income are entitled to a ſhare in the government. This laſt, moſt writers diſtinguiſh by the general name of polity, or a republic. It is the worſt of all legal governments, as royalty is the beſt. Tyranny is the corrupt reſemblance of royalty, for both forms are monarchical; but they differ moſt widely, a tyrant conſulting only his own advantage, a king only that of his people; for the latter does not deſerve the name, if he be not in all things pre-eminent, independent, and all-ſufficient in himſelf; ſo that with him perſonal conſiderations being ſuperfluous, he can have no other reaſonable purſuit but that of the public good. If kings are not of this deſcription, they might as well be choſen by lot. Tyrants, on the other hand, purſue only their own intereſt, and their government is the worſt of all, ſince it ſtands in direct oppoſition to royalty, which is of all the beſt. As kings may be corrupted into tyrants, ſo ariſtocracies degenerate into oligarchies, through the corruption of the magiſtrates, who make an unjuſt diſtribution of honours and emoluments, of which they uſurp and retain the greater

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greater part for themſelves, accumulating enormous wealth as the inſtrument of exorbitant power, and continually narrowing, through ſelfiſhneſs, the baſis of the government. Timocracy naturally degenerates into democracy, which is nearly akin to it; ſince whenever men of limited fortunes are entitled to ſhare the government, power will have a natural tendency to fall into the hands of the people. Democracy therefore is a leſs deviation from what is called a republic, than tyranny is from royalty, or oligarchy from ariſtocracy; and in this particular circumſtance, it is leſs depraved and odious than the other two vicious forms of government. Of political revolutions we find the reſemblances, and, as it were, the patterns in what paſſes in families. The paternal authority is the model for that of kings, for children are their fathers' deareſt concern. Whence Homer addreſſes Jupiter by the appellation of father, denoting the near affinity between royal and paternal power. But in Perſia fathers are tyrants, treating their ſons as ſlaves; and ſlaves are treated merely as beſt ſuits the intereſt of their maſters. This may be agreeable to the nature and principles of ſervitude, but the Perſian ſyſtem, in extending theſe principles to children, is vitious in the extreme; for different deſcriptions of perſons require different modes of governance. Domeſtic authority is the beſt model for ariſtocracy, for the authority of a huſband is founded on the ſuperiority of his abilities and his virtues. He exerciſes thoſe functions which this ſuperiority enables him beſt to perform, leaving to female care thoſe offices which women are beſt qualified to fulfil; ſince if he uſurped all management to himſelf, his equitable ariſtocracy would degenerate into an unlawful and rigid oligarchy. When women, being rich heireſſes, acquire thereby more than their due ſhare

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of power, their authority alſo originates in an unjuſt oligarchical principle, ſince, in their prepoſterous pre-eminence, wealth is preferred to worth: the gifts of fortune, to the diſtinctions of nature. Timocracy reſembles the equal commonwealth of brothers, among whom there is no other diſtinction than that made by a ſlight difference of age; for when this difference is very great, brotherly friendſhip cannot eaſily ſubſiſt. Democracy reſembles thoſe families which are without a head; or in which all avail themſelves of the maſter's weakneſs, to aſſert equality, and to defy controul.

Chap. 11.

Of the variations thereby occaſioned in the nature and intenſity of friendſhip.

Friendſhip, as well as juſtice, varies with the different forms of polity; ſince both ultimately depend on the different relations in which men ſtand to each other in ſociety. The relation of a king to his ſubjects, is that of a benefactor to thoſe benefited by his care. He provides for the welfare of his people, as a ſhepherd does for that of his flock: whence Homer calls Agamemnon the ſhepherd of the people. Of a ſimilar kind is the relation of a father to his children, but pre-eminent in the magnitude of benefits, ſince he is the cauſe of their exiſtence itſelf, which ſeems of the utmoſt moment, as well as of their education and nurture. A father is naturally a king in his own family; and the ſame holds with regard to more remote anceſtors and their deſcendants, the former of whom are entitled to honour from the latter, and therefore the friendſhip between them is not that of equals, but is modified by the natural and indelible ſuperiority of the one party to the other. The relation of huſband to wife is ſimilar to that which prevails in ariſtocracies between the magiſtrates and citizens. The honours and advantages belonging to the former, reſult from the ſuperiority of their abilities and virtues. The huſband's honour is

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pre-eminent not abſolute, he has his duties as well as his rights; both parties have their allotted functions, namely, thoſe which are beſt adapted to their reſpective characters. The relation of brothers is that of equal companions, reſulting from the near ſimilitude of their ſtrength and ſtature, their common education, and ſimilar manners. They reſemble a republic, ſtrictly ſo called, in which the citizens are treated juſtly, when they are all treated alike; and as they cannot all rule at once, the government is managed by rotation. Their juſtice conſiſts in equality, and their friendſhip is that of equals. In corrupt governments there is little juſtice, and therefore but little friendſhip. Tyranny, which is the greateſt corruption of all, ſcarcely admits of any friendſhip at all. Since there is nothing common between the ſovereign and ſubject, there is not any room for juſtice, nor therefore for friendſhip. The relation of a tyrant to his ſubjects is that of an artiſt to an inſtrument, of the ſoul to the body, of a maſter to a ſlave. The intereſt and ſafety of all theſe ſubſervient things are conſulted by thoſe who make uſe of them; but there cannot be any friendſhip nor any juſtice between living and inanimate objects, becauſe they cannot enjoy any thing in common. Neither can men have friendſhips with horſes, cattle, or ſlaves, conſidered merely as ſuch; for a ſlave is a living inſtrument, and an inſtrument a lifeleſs ſlave. Yet conſidered as a man, a ſlave may be an object of friendſhip; for certain rights ſeem to belong to all thoſe capable of participating in law and engagement. A ſlave then, conſidered as a man, may be treated juſtly or unjuſtly, and therefore may be a friend or an enemy. There is little friendſhip and little juſtice in tyrannies; but moſt of both in republics, becauſe, among equals there are moſt common rights, and moſt common enjoyments.

Friendſhip,

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Of friendſhips founded on propinquity of blood.

Friendſhip, then, reſults from the community of rights and enjoyments among perſons living in the ſame commonwealth, belonging to the ſame tribe or diſtrict, ſailing in the ſame veſſel; in which, and all ſimilar caſes, the parties ſeem mutually engaged to each other to maintain and uphold their reciprocal advantages. The friendſhip ariſing from hoſpitality is of the ſame nature; but that depending on propinquity in blood, or congeniality of character, may perhaps be referred to a different principle. Friendſhips between relations, though they branch out into many kinds, may be all traced to one ſource, namely, the affection between parents and children. Parents love their children as parts of themſelves, and children love their parents as the ſource from which they ſpring. The love of the former is the ſtrongeſt, becauſe they better know their children for their own, than the children can know them for their parents; becauſe the production more belongs to its author, than the author to his work; and becauſe parents know and love their children for a longer time, that is, immediately from their birth, whereas children cannot begin to love their parents till they become capable of perception and intelligence. The love of parents for their children is merely an expanſion of ſelf-love, for they ſtill regard their children as parts of themſelves; but children have, in their own minds, a ſeparate and independent perſonality, diſtinct from that of their parents, which they are inclined, however, to revere as the fountain of their blood. From the common relationſhip of brothers to the ſame father, they become mutually related to each other; wherefore they are ſaid to come from the ſame blood, which flows in different ſtreams, or from the ſame ſtock, which ſpreads into different branches. Their friendſhip is confirmed by nearneſs of age, ſameneſs of

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education, and ſimilarity of purſuits. They are companions as well as brothers, and therefore warmed with all that affection for each other, which conſort and ſociety is calculated to inſpire. The connexion between other relations originates in the ſame principle, and is more or leſs intimate in proportion to their proximity to the common ſource. Children ſhould love their parents as men do the gods, ſince they are to them the authors of the greateſt benefits; their life, nurture, and education; and the friendſhip between them, from their continual intercourſe of life, contains far more than any other, whatever is ſweeteſt and moſt uſeful. Brothers, we have ſaid, are companions, whoſe fellowſhip will be the more intimate, in proportion to the ſimilarity of their virtuous characters and honourable purſuits, and to the confirmation which the affection of their early years derives from confidence approved by time and experience. The friendſhip between more diſtant kinſmen depends on the ſame circumſtances, according to which it will either invigorate or decay.

Between huſband and wife.

That between huſband and wife is moſt ſtrongly prompted and enforced by nature itſelf; for domeſtic ſociety is more natural than even the political; ſince it is prior and more neceſſary, being eſſential to the preſervation of the ſpecies, and common to all kinds of animals. But with the inferior tribes, this ſociety is limited by the ſole end of reproduction; in man it extends to all the offices of life, which naturally divide themſelves between huſband and wife, each ſupplying what their reſpective qualities beſt enable them to furniſh for the accommodation and comfort of the other. The induſtry and excellencies of each are thus brought into the common ſtock of domeſtic happineſs, which their diſtinctive virtues are calculated wonderfully to augment, ſo that this kind of friendſhip

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friendſhip is recommended and ſtrengthened by every circumſtance of pleaſure as well as of utility. Their children too form a new and powerful tie, being a common good, in which they mutually ſhare; and which has the ſtrongeſt effect in binding them indiſſolubly together. The varieties of friendſhip thus depend on the various kinds of juſtice, which themſelves reſult from the multiplied relations of men in civil ſociety. For very different rights and very different duties have place between friends, ſtrictly ſo called, and thoſe who are partners in the ſame concern, companions in the ſame ſtudies, or who are mere ſtrangers the one to the other.

Chap. 13.

Diſputes between friends, how they ought to be adjuſted.

There are then three kinds of friendſhip, each of which depends on a different principle, and in each of which the friendſhip may ſubſiſt either between equals, or between perſons extremely unequal, not only as to their reſpective worth and dignity, but as to the relative importance of their friendſhip to each other. When the friendſhip ſubſiſts between equals, equal attentions and an equal degree of affection ought, as much as poſſible, to be aimed at; but when the pre-eminence is greatly on one ſide, the affection and attentions of the inferior ought to riſe in the ſame proportion. The friendſhip founded on utility is that which is by far the moſt likely to produce between the parties mutual altercation, and often mutual reproach. When the connecting principle is virtue, friends are eager to benefit each other; the only rivalſhip between them is, who ſhall do to the other moſt good, and he who gains the victory in this amicable conteſt, is ſo far from creating ill-will in his friend, that he only provokes him to new works of kindneſs. Nor are mutual accuſations frequent where the ſole end of the friendſhip is pleaſure. While this purpoſe is attained, the parties keep company.

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pany with each other; and when it is not, a mutual ſeparation is ſo eaſy, that complaint would be ridiculous. But when utility is the principle, refuſals on one ſide muſt be as frequent as exactions on the other, and both parties will think they are ill treated, becauſe each expects more than his due. As law is either written or unwritten, ſo friendſhip founded on utility is either legal or moral; the firſt is where exact returns are ſpecified, as if you give to me that, I will give to you this; or where the agreement is more liberal than merely from hand to hand, and allowing a ſpace of time to be interpoſed before the ſervice performed on the one ſide is requited by an equal ſervice on the other. When friendly confidence is repoſed by one party in the other, an action at law is not granted by ſome nations, for the fulfilling even of conditions, the reality of which admits not of any uncertainty; for to them it ſeems equitable, that he who has imprudently truſted to the good faith of another, ſhould not be entitled to correct by law the error of his own credulity. The moral friendſhip founded on utility takes place, where ſomething is given, or ſome ſervice is rendered, without the ſpecification of any thing, or any ſervice to be given or done in return. Yet by the party who has conferred the benefit, an equal, or even more than equal return is on many occaſions expected; and when this is not made, he complains of ill treatment. His complaint is occaſioned by what occaſions almoſt all other complaints of breach of friendſhip, his unſteadineſs of principle, giving liberally, but craving like a niggard: affecting the praiſe of generoſity in the firſt part of the tranſaction, but ſhewing in the laſt that he is guided merely by intereſt; for moſt men, though they love what is honourable, prefer what is uſeful. It is honourable to do good with-

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out expecting a return; it is useful to have every good action requited with interest. Yet those who have received favours ought to requite them according to their ability, when such requital is desired by their benefactors, for no man's friendship can be obtained against his will; so that when we have met with an act of generous friendship, from one who afterwards appears not to entertain for us any friendly disposition, we ought doubtless, when able, to make a suitable return; when this return is not in our power, even the interested benefactor himself would not be so unreasonable as either to require or expect it. When favours are conferred, we must consider therefore, both the man and his motives, in order to determine whether they ought to be returned, and in what manner the return should be made. It is sometimes a matter of doubt by what standard this return should be measured, whether by the benefactor's good will, or by the advantage therefrom resulting to the person benefited. The latter is often inclined to extenuate his obligations, and to think the favours which he has received both slight in themselves, and such as many others would have been ready to bestow on him. The benefactor on the other hand, represents them as the greatest favours that he could possibly have done, such as none other would have conferred, and enhanced too by being bestowed in a moment of danger, or some other exigency. Since utility is the sole basis of such friendships, and of the actions proceeding from them, ought not the advantage accruing to the person obliged, to be regarded as the just standard of the obligation incurred, and of the return to be made? For *his* exigency required relief; a relief afforded to him in expectation of an equal return; and the assistance bestowed on the one hand is exactly measured by the benefit

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benefit received on the other. His return therefore ought to be equal to this benefit, or greater, which will make his conduct laudable and honourable. In virtuous friendſhips there is not any room for ſuch complaints. In them intentions, not conſequences, form the ſtandard of obligation; for, as we have often obſerved, the deliberate election of the will is the principle by which all queſtions concerning virtue and morals muſt be determined.

Chap. 14.

The ſame ſubject continued.

Unequal friendſhips are extremely productive of altercations and differences, each party deſiring to have more than his due, which has a tendency to diſturb, and finally diſſolve concord. He who is pre-eminent in virtue and ability, claims a proportional ſhare of regard and affection; thinking that men ſhould always be conſidered ſuitably to their characters. In the ſame manner, he who is moſt uſeful, expects to be loved and regarded in proportion to his utility; ſaying, that friendſhip would be a burden if it were not returned on the one ſide proportionally to the benefits conferred on the other. They think that the ſame rule is applicable to friendſhip which holds in a partnerſhip in trade, where he who employs moſt ſtock alſo receives moſt profit. The needy man holds a very different language, ſaying, that it is the duty of a friend to aſſiſt his friend in diſtreſs; and aſking what benefit could otherwiſe reſult from the ſo much envied friendſhip of the good and great. Both parties are partly in the right, ſince both ought to have the advantage; the good and great in point of honour, the inferior and indigent in point of gain; for honour is the meed of beneficent virtue, and gain is the cure of diſtreſſing poverty. This rule obtains in ſtates. Thoſe who benefit the public, are honoured by the public, for honour is a public reward; but to expect

expect from the public, both great honours and great gains is highly unreaſonable; ſince the public would thereby ſubmit to an inferiority of advantage in both points at once; a diſgraceful inferiority which every individual would ſpurn. For reciprocal and proportional favours equaliſe and preſerve friendſhip, the good and great benefiting their friends as to their characters or their fortunes, the needy inferior giving in return the only thing he can give, honour, and even of this not always a full proportion; ſince it is impoſſible ſufficiently to honour the gods and our parents: but thoſe are commended who do it to the beſt of their power; for the returns of friendſhip muſt be limited by poſſibility. Wherefore it is not allowable for a ſon to renounce his father, though the latter may renounce the former. For the ſon has to pay obligations, which are too great for him ever to diſcharge; he muſt always therefore remain a debtor. But the father, on the other hand, to whom the debt is due, may diſcard and abandon a worthleſs ſon, though he will ſeldom do it, but for exceſs of wickedneſs; ſince both paternal affection and natural humanity ſtrongly oppoſe ſo cruel a meaſure [e].

[e] The ſubject of this and the following Book is leſs fully treated in the ſeven laſt chapters of the ſecond book of the Magna Moralia; and in the thirteen firſt chapters of the ſeventh book of the Ethics to Eudemus.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

BOOK IX.

ARGUMENT.

Friendſhip does not admit of preciſe rules.—Diſſolution of friendſhip when juſtifiable.—Analogy between our duties to ourſelves, and thoſe to our friends.—Happineſs of virtue.—Wretchedneſs of vice.—Good-will.—Concord.—Exquiſite delight of virtuous friendſhip.

BOOK IX. Chap. 1.

According to what rules the returns of friendſhip may be beſt eſtimated.

WHERE friends poſſeſs qualities totally diſſimilar, and extremely different in value, their friendſhip, as we have ſaid, muſt be equaliſed and maintained by a due obſervance of thoſe rules of proportion which obtain in the commercial intercourſe of ſociety; where the ſhoemaker and weaver, and other artizans, exchange the productions of their ſeveral manufactures according to their reſpective values. That this might be done conveniently, the uſe of money was eſtabliſhed, which ſerved as a common meaſure, with which all other things were compared, and by which their relative worth was eſtimated. Lovers often accuſe the objects of their affection, that they do not meet their warmth of love with equal ardour, when perhaps there is nothing in themſelves that is at all lovely. The perſons beloved, on the other hand, often accuſe their admirers,

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that they once made to them the moſt magnificent promiſes, but now totally deceive them. The origin of theſe complaints is, that the friendſhip of the one party is founded on pleaſure; that of the other on utility: on delight which the one has no longer the power to excite, and benefit which the other has no longer the means to confer; ſo that as the cauſes of ſuch friendſhips are variable and inconſtant, the friendſhips themſelves muſt be deſtitute of ſtability; which is the caſe with all others, except thoſe ſubſiſting between virtuous men in conſequence of their congeniality of characters. Thoſe who are friends through intereſt, not only are likely to diſagree, when either of them ceaſes to meet with a return, but when the return is not ſuch as he either wiſhed or expected; for an improper return is conſidered as none at all. We have an example of this in him who promiſed a muſician that he ſhould be paid according to his performance, and being aſked next day for the reward which he had promiſed, ſaid that it had already been beſtowed, ſince he had given one pleaſure in return for another. But profit, not pleaſure, was the return which the muſician expected; for in order to obtain what they want, men willingly part with that which is either ſuperfluous, or which they can moſt eaſily ſpare; which is the baſis of all commercial intercourſe. It is aſked, who ought to aſcertain the meaſure of the return, he who has performed the ſervice, or he who has received it? The former ſeems to commit his intereſt to the diſcretion of the latter: as Protagoras is ſaid to have done, for he deſired his diſciples to eſtimate the value of what they had learned, and to pay him accordingly. In ſuch caſes, ſome approve the rule, "clear bargains make ſure friends." Thoſe who receive payment in advance, and then perform nothing worthy

worthy of the magnificence of their promiſes, are liable to the reproach of injuſtice; a reproach which perhaps the ſophiſts neceſſarily incur, ſince unleſs they received their payment in advance, nobody would think their labours worthy of any pecuniary remuneration. In virtuous friendſhips, there is not any room for complaint, becauſe each party deſires only the heart and affections of his friend; and the only contention between them is, which ſhall be productive of moſt good to the other. Such is the friendſhip that ought to ſubſiſt between thoſe who teach and thoſe who ſtudy philoſophy, the value of which cannot be appreciated in money; and to the teachers of which no adequate honours can be aſſigned. Their ſcholars muſt honour them as they do their parents and the gods; not ſufficiently, for that is impoſſible; but in proportion to the extent of their ability; ſhewing to them all the reſpect they can, ſince they never can ſhew to them enough. In thoſe friendſhips where certain and full returns are expected, it is deſirable that they ſhould prove ſatisfactory to both parties; but when this cannot take place, it ſeems juſt as well as neceſſary, that he who has received the favour ſhould determine the return moſt proper to be made; becauſe he is the beſt judge of the value of the advantage which he has received, and of the value of the pleaſure which he has enjoyed. It is thus in thoſe bargains where confidence is repoſed by the one party in the other; for the fulfilment of which, the party diſappointed is not entitled in ſome countries to any legal redreſs; his cauſe muſt ſtand or fall according to the good faith or diſhoneſty of him in whom he voluntarily confided. This rule is founded on the principle, that he who has received a favour is better qualified to aſcertain its value, than he who conferred it: for men eſtimate too highly the

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the favours which they beſtow, as they are apt to do all good things which proceed from themſelves. The perſon firſt benefited decides therefore what return he ſhould make, becauſe he beſt knows the value of the benefit which he has received; but this benefit is perhaps more juſtly eſtimated by the value which he ſet on it, while it was ſtill an object of his deſire, than by that which he continues to ſet on it after it has been put into his poſſeſſion.

Chap. 2.

That it is impoſſible to aſſign preciſe rules for the proper exerciſe of friendſhip.

A doubt may be ſtarted as to filial friendſhip, whether fathers ought in all things to be obeyed? In matters reſpecting health, ought a ſon to follow the advice of his father or his phyſician? In electing a general, ought he to prefer to him a perſon ſkilled in war? In the ſame manner it may be doubted, whether favours are beſt beſtowed on friends, or on men of merit; and whether we ought to be grateful to our benefactors or liberal to our friends, when we have not the means of exerciſing both gratitude and liberality. All theſe queſtions are too indefinite to admit of ſuch general ſolutions as may be practically uſeful; becauſe there is not any one caſe exactly ſimilar to another, but each is marked by circumſtances peculiar to itſelf, and diſtinguiſhable in their degrees of magnitude, as well as of propriety or neceſſity. It is manifeſt in general, that all advantages ought not to be accumulated on any one individual, and that before we are liberal to our friends, our debts of gratitude ought to be diſcharged towards our benefactors. Yet this rule will not always hold, as in the caſe of a man ranſomed from robbers, and whoſe ranſomer, perhaps a perſon of no value, ſhould afterwards ſtand in need of the ſame favour, or, at leaſt, ſhould demand back his money. In both caſes, the man ranſomed, if his own father happens alſo to be in captivity, will prefer ranſoming

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ſoming his father, if his fortune does not enable him to acquit both obligations at once. Though it is ſaid in general, therefore, that every kindneſs ought to meet with its due return, yet caſes may be propoſed in which generoſity is, in point of propriety or neceſſity, a paramount duty even to gratitude itſelf. Sometimes the ſame favours, done by different perſons, are of very different values; and the benefactor therefore has not always a right to expect a preciſely ſimilar return. When a bad man obliges a good one, or a knave lends money to a man of property and probity, the perſons obliged may, with propriety, decline to return exactly ſimilar favours; ſince thoſe favours are, in different circumſtances, of very different values. The knave by lending runs no riſk of loſing his money, but the honeſt man would run this riſk by lending to a knave; nay, ſhould he only ſuſpect him of being either a knave or a ſpendthrift, he will not act abſurdly in refuſing to return his favour in kind. It is evident therefore, as we have often obſerved, that all rules concerning the paſſions and actions of men are preciſe, only in proportion as the ſubjects to which they relate are definite. We ought not (to anſwer the queſtion firſt ſtarted) to have deference, in all particulars, even to our fathers, ſince all kinds of ſacrifices are not offered to Jupiter. Our parents, brethren, companions, and benefactors, are ſeverally entitled to their reſpective marks of kindneſs and regard. This is ſufficiently indicated by general practice; for relations, principally, are invited to aſſiſt at marriages and funerals, as things eſſentially intereſting to the whole family, and all its branches. To provide for the ſubſiſtence of our parents, who are the cauſes of our being, is a duty as indiſpenſable, and ſtill more honourable, than even that of providing for our own. We ought to honour

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honour them too as we honour the gods; but each parent is entitled to diſtinctive marks of our reſpect, a reſpect different in kind from that beſtowed on perſons unrelated to us, but eminently conſpicuous for their abilities or virtues. Our ſeniors, in proportion to their years, ought to be treated with more or leſs deference. With companions, familiarity and full freedom of ſpeech is allowable; with kinſmen, neighbours, fellow-citizens, in a word, with every deſcription of perſons with whom we are connected, it is incumbent on us to behave ſuitably to the relations of affinity or utility in which thoſe perſons ſtand to ourſelves, as well as to their own perſonal merit and inherent virtues. When the relations between others and ourſelves are ſtrong and intimate, the rules of our behaviour towards them are more eaſily defined; the ſtrict limits of our duty are with more difficulty aſcertained towards perſons remotely and faintly connected with us. Yet we muſt not be deterred by this difficulty from inveſtigating thoſe rules of conduct which will enable us to behave towards all men with propriety.

Chap. 3.

Juſtifiable grounds for the diſſolution of friendſhips.

Doubts are ſtarted concerning the diſſolution of friendſhip between perſons whoſe characters no longer remain the ſame, or at leaſt no longer continue to bear the ſame relation to each other. Where friendſhips are contracted for the ſake of pleaſure or utility, it is not wonderful that when neither utility accrues to the one party, nor pleaſure to the other, ſuch friendſhips ſhould of courſe be ſubverted; for the foundations are deſtroyed on which only they ſtood. But a man may juſtly complain of bad faith in him who affected to cheriſh his character and his virtues, while intereſt or pleaſure were at bottom the ſole grounds of his regard; for differences between friends chiefly proceed from this, that they think their friendſhip founded

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founded on one principle, when it is really founded on another. When therefore a man is deceived, and thinks without reaſon that he is loved for his character and his virtues, he has himſelf only to complain of; but he may complain of the duplicity of his pretended friend, when the hypocriſy of the latter is the ſource of his own miſtake; and he may complain of him more juſtly than men do of coiners and clippers, ſince he is defrauded by him in an object more valuable than money. But when our friend changes his manners, and contracts by evil communication a depravity of character, ought we ſtill to regard him with affection? Or, is it impoſſible to love that which ceaſes to be amiable? "Like," we have ſaid, "draws to like;" and a good man neither can nor ought to love a bad one. Are we then inſtantly to renounce and forſake him? Not unleſs he has unalterably renounced and forſaken his character; for while he is not totally incorrigible, it is our duty to endeavour to reform his morals, a thing incomparably more important than alleviating his pecuniary diſtreſs, and alſo more peculiarly the work of friendſhip. To detach ourſelves entirely from a friend who becomes worthleſs, has nothing in it unreaſonable; ſince he is not in fact the ſame man with whom we contracted the friendſhip; and when we find that there is not any hope of his ever again becoming ſuch, we naturally wiſh to have done with him. But what ſhall we ſay when one of the friends remains what he was, and the other changes for the better. Can their friendſhip continue to ſubſiſt? Or is this alſo impoſſible? The queſtion will be beſt anſwered by propoſing a caſe where the difference is great in the extreme. Of two perſons who are friends in their early years, the one may remain a child in underſtanding through life, and the other may become a man of the moſt

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diſtinguiſhed abilities. What friendſhip can ſubſiſt between ſuch different characters, who can neither take any pleaſure in each other's ſociety, nor have any occupations and purſuits in common? As all congeniality of mind is at end between them, their friendſhip, it ſhould ſeem, muſt ceaſe. Yet will the ſuperior, if he is a man of humanity, treat the friend of his youth very differently from what he would do an abſolute ſtranger. The remembrance of his early affection will ſtill cling to his heart; and he will never entirely abandon an ancient attachment, unleſs on account of extreme worthleſſneſs in him who was its object.

Chap. 4.

The analogy between the duties which we owe to ourſelves, and thoſe which we owe to our friends.

The duties which we owe to our friends, ſeem analogous to thoſe which each individual willingly pays to himſelf. We ought, it is ſaid, to wiſh their good, or what appears to us to be ſuch, and to promote it to our beſt ability, merely on their own account. With this kind of diſintereſted affection, mothers are animated towards their children, and thoſe friends towards each other, between whom ſome diſguſt has ariſen which, though it interrupts their intercourſe, does not deſtroy their mutual kindneſs. Others ſay that friends muſt ſpend much of their time together, have the ſame inclinations and purſuits, and ſympathiſe with each other in their joy as well as in their ſorrow. On whichever or how many ſoever of thoſe conditions friendſhip principally depends, we ſhall find that all of them belong to the affections by which a good man is animated towards himſelf; and by which all men are animated in proportion as they either approximate, or only think they approximate, to an honourable and praiſeworthy character; which, in queſtions concerning human nature, is juſtly conſidered as the ſole unerring ſtandard. The virtuous man only is at peace within himſelf,

The happineſs of virtue.

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himſelf, ſince all the powers of his mind are actuated by the ſame motives, and conſpire to the ſame end: always aiming at good, real and intrinſic, the good of his intellectual part. To him exiſtence is a benefit, which he earneſtly wiſhes may be preſerved, eſpecially the exiſtence of the thinking principle within him, which is peculiarly himſelf; for every individual ſtrives after its own good, real or apparent; which in the virtuous man only coincide: but could an individual love its change into ſomething quite different from itſelf, the good of the latter would be to the former a matter of ſlight concern. In Deity all goods are accumulated, becauſe he is ever and invariably that which he is; and in man the thinking principle is the part that is properly and permanently himſelf. He who purſues the good of his mind, is pleaſed in his own company, being delighted with the recollection of the paſt, as well as animated with the proſpect of the future; and having ever at command innumerable ſpeculations, in which he exerciſes himſelf with the moſt exquiſite pleaſure. Both his joys and his ſorrows are reſpectively conſiſtent with themſelves, ſince they invariably proceed from fixed and regular cauſes; for he does not delight at one time in what will excite his repentance at another; and thus harmonized within his own breaſt, he is ſimilarly affected towards his friend, whom he conſiders as a ſecond ſelf; and his ſympathy for whom, when it reaches the higheſt perfection, reſembles that internal concord which is experienced in his own mind, when the various principles of his nature coaleſce into one movement, and flow in the ſame homogeneous ſtream of virtuous energy. Yet many men of very irregular lives ſeem to be highly ſatisfied with themſelves. Is this becauſe they miſtake their own characters? It ſhould ſeem ſo, ſince

The wretchedneſs of vice.

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the complete villa in is always viſibly at variance with himſelf; and all others are ſimilarly affected in proportion to their progreſs in wickedneſs; willing one thing, yet deſiring, and preferring another; as thoſe who allow themſelves to be ſubdued by vicious pleaſure, and who may be ſaid, with their eyes open, to ruſh into voluntary deſtruction. In the ſame manner others, through lazineſs or cowardice, avoid that conduct which they know moſt likely to promote their happineſs. When men proceed to the laſt ſtage of depravity, they become as odious to themſelves as they are deteſtable to others, and therefore often deſtroy their own lives; and even before they arrive at this deplorable condition, they fly from, and avoid themſelves; preferring any kind of ſociety to that of their own reflections; the paſt crimes which haunt their memory, and the meditated guilt which is continually occurring to their fancy. As they have nothing in them that is amiable, they cannot be the objects of their own love. Neither their joys nor their ſorrows are conſiſtent. Their whole ſoul is in ſedition, diſtracted between contending principles, the pleaſure of one giving pain to another; and when the worſt principle prevails, a foundation is laid for the bittereſt remorſe. If ſuch be the wretchedneſs of wickedneſs, how ſtrenuouſly ought we to exert ourſelves to become good men, that we may live in friendſhip with ourſelves, and be worthy of the friendſhip of others.

Chap. 5.

Of good-will.

Good-will reſembles friendſhip, but is not the ſame thing. Good-will we may entertain for thoſe not perſonally known to us, and without being ourſelves conſcious of it. This cannot happen with regard to friendſhip, as we formerly obſerved. Beſides every act of friendſhip implies an affection and expanſion of the ſoul, it is alſo much connected with cuſtom;

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whereas mere good-will ariſes ſuddenly, as towards the combatants in the public games, to one or other of whom we immediately wiſh well, though we would not make any great exertion in order to promote his victory. Good-will, then, is but a ſudden and ſuperficial emotion; and at beſt but an element of friendſhip, as the firſt element or beginning of love is the pleaſure received by the eye; without which, though the paſſion of love cannot commence, yet that pleaſure does not by any means conſtitute this paſſion, to which it is neceſſary that we ſhould not only delight in the object when preſent, but exceedingly long for it when abſent. Speaking metaphorically, we may call good-will an incipient and indolent friendſhip; which, through time and cuſtom, naturally improves into friendſhip ſtrictly ſo called; not that founded on pleaſure or utility, which have but little to do with good-will, ſince he who has received a favour ought in juſtice to return it; and he who does a kindneſs in expectation of meeting with a greater, has good-will only to himſelf. Good-will, in one word, is always excited by ſome laudable quality, ſuch as generoſity, or courage: witneſs the manner in which we are affected by the prize-fighters, abovementioned.

Chap. 6.

Of that kind of concord which friendſhip implies.

Friendſhip implies concord, which is not merely agreement in opinion. This latter may prevail among perſons totally unknown to each other; and what connection has friendſhip with fameneſs of opinion concerning the heavenly motions, and other ſuch ſubjects? Concord prevails among cities and commonwealths, when they conceive the ſame deſigns to be conducive to the common intereſt, and agree in the ſame meaſures for promoting them. It relates therefore to practical ſubjects only, and thoſe of a certain magnitude in themſelves, and bearing

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ing an important relation to the parties concerned; for example, that the magiſtracies ſhould be elective; that an alliance ſhould be made with the Lacedæmonians; that Pittacus ſhould be archon, when he himſelf is willing to diſcharge that honourable office[s]. When each party wiſhes the ſame thing for himſelf, then diſſenſion enſues, becauſe the factions in the ſtate, though they agree in the object, yet differ as to the perſon. But genuine concord requires that each party and each individual ſhould obtain his wiſh; as when both the people and the better ſort agree in chooſing virtuous men for their magiſtrates. This concord is, as we have ſaid, the baſis of political friendſhip. It is converſant about matters eſſentially uſeful to the comfortable ſubſiſtence of men in ſociety; and can only be found among men of virtue, who being firm in their purpoſes, and not variable like the Euripus, are alone qualified to maintain the relations of concord and amity with themſelves and others. As juſtice and utility have long regulated their private behaviour, they carry the ſame principles along with them into their public adminiſtration. But neither concord nor friendſhip can durably ſubſiſt among diſhoneſt men, who will be continually ſtriving to engroſs every advantage, and to ſhift off every burden; and who muſt ſoon fall into ſedition by their endeavours to compel others to comply with thoſe rules of juſtice which they themſelves diſdain to practice.

Chap. 7.

Why there is more love in thoſe who confer bene-

How comes it that men love thoſe to whom they have done good, better than theſe love their benefactors? Moſt are of opinion that this happens becauſe debtors are more concerned about the ſafety of their creditors, than the creditors are about theirs,

[s] Diogenes Laertius, l. i. ſeq. 75. tells us, that Pittacus laid down the archonſhip after he had held it ten years; to which tranſaction Ariſtotle ſeems here to allude.

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theirs, and that merely from motives of intereſt; which Epicharmus[b], perhaps, would ſay, is judging of mankind by the worſt examples among them. The accuſation, however, is certainly too juſt, for with regard to the ſervices which they have received, the greater part are of weak memories, and more willing to receive benefits than inclined either to confer or to return them. Yet the queſtion juſt ſtarted muſt be ſolved on deeper principles than thoſe of debtor and creditor, which imply nothing of love or friendſhip, but depend entirely on dull conſiderations of intereſt. Thoſe to whom we have done good, are objects of our love and affection, though they neither return, nor ſhould ever be expected to return, the obligation: for we are naturally diſpoſed towards them as artiſts are towards their works; and particularly poets towards their poems; which they love as parents do their children; that is, much more than their productions, were they endowed with life and perception, would love them. For each individual loves every excellence proceeding from himſelf in proportion as he deſires and loves his own exiſtence, the energies of which are concentrated and preſerved in his works. Beſides, our own good actions are more pleaſing ſubjects of reflection, than any paſt benefits that we may have received: for the firſt are honourable, and the ſecond only uſeful; and utility, however delightful in proſpect, is often forgotten with the occaſion which required it; whereas honour is permanent and unalterable; and every praiſe-worthy deed is not only pleaſing in proſpect, but delightful on remembrance, above all moſt tranſporting when actually exerciſed; giving

fits than in thoſe who receive them.

[b] A diſciple of Pythagoras, who ſeems to have had better principles of morality, than he is ſaid to have entertained of religion. Vid. Cicer. de Natur. Deorum, l. i. and Menag. ad Diogen. Laert. l. iii. ſect. 9. & ſeq.

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giving to us a conſciouſneſs of that kind of exiſtence which is moſt peculiarly agreeable to our nature, the happineſs of which reſults not from paſſive ſenſations, but from active exertions. Beſides, whatever is obtained with much labour, is naturally regarded with much affection. Thoſe who have acquired their fortunes, delight in them far more than thoſe who ſucceed to hereditary wealth; and for a ſimilar reaſon, maternal tenderneſs often riſes to the higheſt pitch. On ſuch principles we may explain why the affection of thoſe who confer benefits, which is commonly a work of ſome exertion, ſhould be ſtronger than that of thoſe who receive them, which requires no exertion at all.

Chap. 8.

Of the different ſenſes in which a man is ſaid to love himſelf.

It is doubted which we ought to love moſt, ourſelves or our friends. Selfiſhneſs is branded as a vice of the blackeſt die, and thought to ſink deeper into each individual, in exact proportion to the worthleſſneſs of his character. A bad man has nothing but himſelf in view; while a good one loſes ſight of himſelf, and aims chiefly at friendly or honourable actions; and this the more in proportion to his progreſs in virtue. Yet theſe obſervations ill accord with what is commonly ſaid, that a friend wiſhes to promote our good for our own ſakes, and though we ſhould ever remain ignorant of his good offices; which is ſurely the diſpoſition of each individual towards himſelf, and comformable to this diſpoſition are all the other circumſtances, and all the proverbial expreſſions by which friendſhip is indicated and aſcertained; as that friends have but one ſoul, that all things are common between them, that friendſhip is equality, and that the knee is nearer than the foot. But a man ſtands in all thoſe relations to himſelf, and being moſt his own friend, ought moſt to love himſelf. Theſe contradictions cannot

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cannot be reconciled but by diſtinguiſhing the different ſenſes in which a man is ſaid to love himſelf. Thoſe who reproach ſelf-love as a vice, conſider it only as it appears in worldlings and voluptuaries, who arrogate to themſelves more than their due ſhare of wealth, power, or pleaſure. Such things are to the multitude, the objects of earneſt concern and eager contention, becauſe the multitude regards them as prizes of the higheſt value; and in endeavouring to attain them, ſtrives to gratify its paſſion at the expence of its reaſon. This kind of ſelf-love, which belongs to the contemptible multitude, is doubtleſs obnoxious to blame; and in this acceptation, the word is uſually taken. But ſhould a man aſſume a pre-eminence in exerciſing juſtice, temperance, and other virtues, though ſuch a man has really more true ſelf-love than the multitude, yet nobody would impute this affection to him for a crime. Yet he takes to himſelf the faireſt and greateſt of all goods, and thoſe the moſt acceptable to the ruling principle in his nature, which is properly himſelf, in the ſame manner as the ſovereignty in every community is that which moſt properly conſtitutes the ſtate. He is ſaid, alſo, to have, or not to have, the command of himſelf, juſt as this principle bears ſway, or as it is ſubject to control; and thoſe acts are conſidered as moſt voluntary which proceed from this legiſlative and ſovereign power. Whoever cheriſhes and gratifies this ruling part of his nature, is ſtrictly and peculiarly a lover of himſelf, but in a quite different ſenſe from that in which ſelf-love is regarded as a matter of reproach; for all men approve and praiſe an affection calculated to produce the greateſt private and the greateſt public happineſs; whereas they diſapprove and blame the vulgar kind of ſelf-love as often hurtful to others, and always ruinous to thoſe who indulge it. A

Self-love, well underſtood, wherein it conſiſts.

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bad man, we have ſaid, is really at variance with himſelf; purſuing a conduct directly oppoſite to what his own duty and his own intereſt moſt powerfully recommend. But the man of morals obeys and follows the dictates of his intellect; and every intellect, when free and uncircumſcribed, neceſſarily prefers and purſues its own individual good. The virtuous man indeed ſtrenuouſly exerts himſelf in the cauſe of his friends and his country; and readily lays down his life for their ſake. He willingly reſigns honours and emoluments; but firmly defends the firſt ſhare of generoſity and probity. The tranſports of one glorious day, he would not exchange for a whole life of liſtleſs inſignificance; one year ſpent in honourable exertion, he prefers to ages vulgarly and caſually conſumed; nay, a ſingle effort of ſplendid virtue is more valuable in his eyes than an indefinite ſeries of ſmall and ordinary actions; and, on ſuch principles, he is ready to lay down his life in the cauſe of his friends or country. He is ready alſo to employ his fortune in their ſervice; ſo that, while they are enriched at his expence, he may acquire an unrivalled ſhare of well-merited applauſe. As to offices and honours he is ſimilarly affected, eaſily relinquiſhing them all; nay, even the fame of illuſtrious actions, when it appears to him more praiſe-worthy, to give an opportunity to others of performing them, than to effect them by his own agency. Thus, amidſt all his liberalities, he is ſtill moſt ſelfiſh, ſince he ſtill claims for himſelf what is incomparably moſt valuable, that internal delight ariſing from the conſciouſneſs of merit.

Chap. 9.

Whether friendſhip be the greateſt good in proſperity or in adverſity.

It is diſputed whether or not happy men need friends. Happineſs ſeems all-ſufficient in itſelf without ſuch auxiliaries; whence they ſay,

"When Fortune's goods abound, what boots a friend?"

Yet

Yet on the other hand, it appears abſurd, if happineſs includes all good things, to deprive it of friendſhip, which of external goods is the greateſt. Beſides, if friendſhip, as we above proved, conſiſts rather in conferring favours, than in receiving them, and it is honourable to do good to thoſe who are peculiarly recommended to our love in preference to all others, proſperous and happy men muſt ſtand in need of fit objects, towards whom they may exerciſe their beneficence. It is diſputed, therefore, in which of the two ſtates men require friends the moſt, the ſtate of proſperity, or that of adverſity; the former needing favourites as much as the latter does benefactors. It is alſo abſurd to think that happineſs can be enjoyed in ſolitude; man being a ſocial and political animal by the conſtitution of his nature itſelf; without conforming to which, human happineſs cannot be attained; nor ſo completely attained in caſual or indifferent ſociety, as in that of amiable and virtuous friends. What is the meaning then of the obſervation firſt made, or by what arguments can it be juſtified? The people regard only thoſe as their friends who promote their utility, and friends of this kind a proſperous man does not need; nor does he ſeem greatly to need thoſe who may adminiſter to his pleaſure, ſince his life being delightful in itſelf, he has not much occaſion for adventitious enjoyment. Thoſe two claſſes of friends being excluded as unneceſſary, it is too haſtily inferred that he needs not any friends at all. For we ſaid in the beginning, that happineſs is energy, that is, a thing conſiſting in our own exertions, not reſulting from our acquirements or poſſeſſions; and the life of a good man conſiſts in a ſeries of virtuous and delightful energies, which will be far more unbroken and uninterrupted, if he contemplates them not only in

The exquiſite pleaſure of virtuous friendſhip.

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himself, but in those who are around him, whose behaviour he is able to view more attentively and more steadily than he can possibly do his own[i]. Friends of this description, therefore, he requires, that he may sympathize with their sentiments, and participate in their actions; for a good man is charmed with good actions more than a skilful musician with the finest melody; and as the latter is provoked by dissonance, so is the former grieved by depravity. Besides, as Theognis[k] says, virtuous friends exercise, improve, and perfect each other. But if we examine the matter more deeply, we shall find that one good man is naturally an object ultimately desirable to another; for a good man delights in what is naturally delightful, and values what is really and absolutely valuable; and as the life of animals consists barely in sensation, but that of man both in sensation and intellection, and that not merely in the capacities but principally in the exercise of those powers, for the sake of which the capacities are given to us, it is plain that the more widely we extend the sphere of our energies, our happiness will be the more complete; provided those energies be, like every thing that is good, definite in their nature, not variable and undetermined, like the lives of bad men, which appear under innumerable forms of wretchedness. But neither such lives, nor those overwhelmed by an accumulation of pains and sorrows, (of which we shall speak hereafter,) are calculated to make us rightly

[i] ωσπερ γε οταν θελωμεν αυτοι αυτων τον προσωπον ιδειν, εις τον κατοπτρον εμβλεψαντες ιδωμεν, ομοιως και οταν αυτοι αυτες θελησωμεν γνωναι εις τον φιλον ιδοντες γνωρισαιμεν αν, &c. "As when we wish to see our own countenances, we must view it in a looking-glass; in the same manner, when we wish to know our own characters and virtues, we must contemplate those of our friend; for a friend, as we say, is another self." Magn. Moral. l. ii. c. xv. p. 194.

[k] The gnomic poet of Megara, some of whose sententious verses are still preserved.

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rightly appreciate the value of exiſtence, which to wiſe and good men is an object ſo truly deſirable. For when we ſee or hear, we are conſcious of thoſe perceptions; and when we think and theorize, we are conſcious of thoſe intellections; and the higher and nobler our thoughts are, the more pleaſure we derive from the conſciouſneſs of entertaining them. This conſciouſneſs makes us feel the pleaſure of exiſtence; for the energy of life itſelf, which is of all things moſt delightful, conſiſts in nothing elſe but perceiving and thinking. But a good man, being affected towards his friend nearly as towards himſelf, derives therefore the higheſt gratification from communicating his thoughts and reflections with others like himſelf, and living with them in a perpetual participation of intellectual and moral enjoyments; ſince he thereby attains nearly as clear a perception of their pleaſurable exiſtence as he has of his own. This indeed is human ſociety properly ſo called, in contradiſtinction to that of cattle, which conſiſts in feeding at the ſame ſtall. Since then his own life is, to a good man, a thing naturally ſweet and ultimately deſirable, for a ſimilar reaſon is the life of his friend agreeable to him, and delightful merely on its own account, and without reference to any object beyond it; and to live without friends is to be deſtitute of a good, unconditional, abſolute, and ultimately deſirable; and therefore to be deprived of one of the moſt ſolid and moſt ſubſtantial of all human enjoyments.

Chap. 10.

Different kinds of friendſhip require different limitations as to number.

Ought this reaſoning to make us deſirous of multiplying the number of our friends? Or ought we to adopt as to friendſhip what ſeems to be well ſaid with regard to hoſpitality,

"For many gueſts are often worſe than none."

In

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In the ſame manner ought the number of our friends to be limited? Of friends choſen from motives of utility or convevience, it undoubtedly ought; for more than ſerve our purpoſe, are only obſtacles and hindrances; and it is impoſſible for us to return the ſervices or civilities of too numerous a liſt. Neither need thoſe choſen from motives of pleaſure to be many; for too much ſeaſoning is pernicious in diet. But as to friendſhips ſtrictly ſo called, originating in ſympathy of minds and congeniality of characters, ought there to be defined limits, beyond which that number ought not to extend; any more than the populouſneſs of a city, which, for the ſupply of mutual wants, requires more than ten, but, for the ſake of wiſe regulation and good morals, ought not perhaps to exceed ten myriads of inhabitants? The number of friends, even virtuous friends, muſt be limited by the extent of human activity, which is incapable of cultivating beyond a certain proportion, who muſt all likewiſe be friends to each other, on the ſuppoſition, which is neceſſary, that they ſhould ſpend their time together in amicable concord. This cannot eaſily happen to a great multitude, eſpecially ſince ſuch is the inſtability of human affairs, that we cannot cordially ſympathize with many perſons at once, for if we ought to rejoice with one, it will too often happen that we ought to grieve with another. Many friends, therefore, are neither to be deſired nor expected, and their number will be the ſmaller in proportion to the cloſeneſs of the intimacy; for intimate friendſhip is almoſt as excluſive as love, which admits but one only object. Experience juſtifies this obſervation, for the friendſhips moſt celebrated have ſubſiſted between two only. In political life we ſee popular men, who ſeem to have innu-

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innumerable friends. They are often flatterers of the multitude. But a public character without flattery may, by his real worth, recommend himſelf to the gratitude of many who are his friends politically. But friends, ſtrictly ſo called, cannot be numerous. Happy is the man who finds only a few ſuch!

Chap. 11.

Whether the company of our friends is moſt deſirable in our proſperity or in our adverſity.

Whether are friends moſt deſirable in proſperity or in adverſity? Both conditions of life peculiarly require them; the proſperous, that they may have objects towards whom to exerciſe their beneficence; the unfortunate, that they may have ſources from which they may derive relief. The neceſſity for friends is greateſt in the latter, who therefore ſeek perſons who may be uſeful to them; but the luſtre of friendſhip ſhines moſt conſpicuous in the former, who ſeek perſons with whom they may ſpend their time agreeably, and whom it is a real pleaſure to benefit. The company of friends is delightful both in proſperity and adverſity. In the latter, our grief is alleviated by their ſympathy; whether it be that they diſburden us of part of our ſufferings, or that their ſympathy is itſelf delightful. Both cauſes ſeem to concur, for in misfortune the preſence of a friend affords a mixed pleaſure. The very ſight of him cheers our minds; and if he has any dexterity, he knows how to adminiſter to us that kind of comfort of which our tempers and characters are moſt ſuſceptible. Beſides, we ourſelves, in his preſence, endeavour to moderate our ſorrow, that we may not be the cauſe of ſuffering to our friend; and perſons of firm minds are careful how they impart their ſecret misfortunes, and reject all exceſs of commiſeration as unſuitable to the dignity of their characters; whereas women, and womaniſh men, delight in echoing groans and ſympathetic lamentations. In all things the beſt

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beſt characters are the fit models for imitation; and as amidſt proſperity the beſt men delight in the preſence and congratulation of their friends, which is agreeable to the benevolence of their nature, we ought therefore to be forward in calling thoſe who love us to participate in our joy, but very backward in calling them to participate in our ſorrow; remembering

"Their own misfortunes are enough to bear."

Above all, we muſt ſummon their preſence when, without giving much trouble to ourſelves, we may greatly benefit *them*. But, on the other hand, to act with laudable propriety, we muſt go readily and uninvited to the houſe of mourning; for it is as honourable as delightful to aſſiſt our friends in diſtreſs, eſpecially without any ſolicitation on their part, which might leſſen them in our eſteem. It is our duty ſtrenuouſly to co-operate with fortune in promoting the proſperity of our friend; but to be ſlow and modeſt in craving his aſſiſtance; yet without too faſtidiouſly rejecting his beneficence; which has ſometimes made a breach in very ſolid friendſhips.

Chap. 12. Conclusion.

As love enters firſt by the eye, ſo friendſhip is produced by the habitual intercourſe of life; and as the ſenſe of ſight is that which lovers would be moſt unwilling to loſe, ſo habitual intercourſe is the advantage which friends would be moſt unwilling to reſign. Friendſhip is a community of enjoyments; and as a man delights in the energies of his own exiſtence, ſo he alſo does in thoſe of his friend; wherefore, in whatever thoſe energies principally conſiſt, their chief enjoyment reſults from exerting them in company; ſome drinking and playing dice together, while others make parties of hunting, practiſe their exerciſes, or cultivate philoſophy. The friendſhip of bad men

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is as corrupt and unſtable as themſelves; and is ſo far from being advantageous to either party, that it tends only to plunge them both ſtill deeper in depravity and wretchedneſs: whereas virtuous friendſhips grow continually more firm and more intimate, the example and admonitions of good men mutually improving and perfecting each other[1]. Thus much concerning friendſhip. It remains that we ſhould next treat of pleaſure.

[1] Ariſtotle quotes a few words from Theognis which have this meaning.

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ARISTOTLE's ETHICS.

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INTRODUCTION.

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THIS Book treats of pleaſure and happineſs. It is too conciſe to admit of abridgment, and ſufficiently perſpicuous not to require elucidation. In the concluding chapter, Ariſtotle ſhews the inſeparable connection between Ethics and Politics; and prepares the reader for an eaſy tranſition from the former to the latter. By way of concluſion to theſe ſhort introductions, I ſhall obſerve, that Ariſtotle's Moral Philoſophy is, perhaps, of all others the leaſt liable to the following objection, which has been often made by thinking men to the too faſhionable philoſophy of the times: "A profeſſed ſceptic can be guided by nothing but his preſent paſſions; and to be maſters of his philoſophy, we need not his books or advice, for every child is capable of the ſame thing without any ſtudy at all."—GRAY.

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BOOK X.

ARGUMENT.

Pleaſure—Its ambiguous nature—Defined.—Happineſs—Intellectual—Moral—Compared.—Education.—Laws.—Tranſition to the ſubject of Politics.

BOOK X. Chap. 1. The love of pleaſure.

WE proceed to treat of pleaſure, a thing moſt congenial to our nature; and by which, therefore, and its oppoſite, pain, the motions of the minds of children are guided as by a rudder. In morals the main point is attained, when our love and hatred, our grief and joy, are reſpectively excited by natural and worthy cauſes; ſince theſe affections are as extenſive as the multiplied affairs of life itſelf, and their proper regulation is of the utmoſt importance to virtue and happineſs. For we are all prompted by nature to purſue pleaſure, and to avoid pain; the conſideration of which ought not to be omitted in a treatiſe of this kind, eſpecially as the opinions concerning them are perplexed by much contradiction; ſome regarding pleaſure as the higheſt good, others calling it a thing contemptible in the extreme, whether from the real conviction of their minds, (which perhaps may be the caſe with ſome,) or becauſe they think it beſt to ſpeak of pleaſure in terms of reproach, ſince moſt men are tempted to diſgrace themſelves by indulging in it immoderately. Severe moraliſts, therefore, think that they cannot too much ſtigmatiſe pleaſure, that thoſe whom they wiſh to benefit

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Not to be too ſeverely condemned.

benefit by their diſcourſes may be deterred from exceſs, and confined within the bounds of propriety. They ſhould take care however, leſt this proceeding be not attended with effects contrary to their expectation; for in practical matters, men pay leſs attention to what is ſaid than to what is done; and when opinions, juſt and reaſonable within certain limits, are carried to a length manifeſtly inconſiſtent with experience, they are rejected diſdainfully and completely; even the truth which they contain being overwhelmed and loſt in the ſurrounding falſehood. Thus thoſe detractors of pleaſure, when they are obſerved on any occaſion to purſue it with much eagerneſs, appear to the bulk of mankind no better than hypocritical voluptuaries; for the people at large are not capable of making diſtinctions; they conſider things in the groſs, and therefore continually confound them. The truth, therefore, beſt ſerves not only to enlighten our underſtandings, but to improve our morals. For when our doctrines are true, our lives will more naturally be conformable to them; and our precepts being confirmed by examples, will produce conviction, and excite emulation of our virtues, in thoſe with whom we live. But enough on this ſubject: we proceed to enumerate the opinions held concerning pleaſure.

Chap. 2.

Different opinions concerning it.

Eudoxus[a] thought pleaſure the chief good, becauſe he perceived it to be univerſally deſired by all animals, rational and irrational; that every thing is good in the ſame proportion as it is deſirable: that animals find out, each tribe, what is beſt for themſelves, as they do their proper food; and that therefore the

[a] Eudoxus of Cnidus τουτον αντι Ευδοξου Ενδοξον ικαλων δια την λαμπροτητα της φημης. See his life in Laertius, B. viii. ſect. 86, &c. By a pun on his name, he was called "Illuſtrious."

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the ſupreme good muſt conſiſt in that which is univerſally and moſt eagerly deſired by them all. The regularity of his life added great weight to his arguments, for he was a man of ſingular temperance; ſo that his commendation of pleaſure did not appear to proceed from any prejudice in its favour, but rather to be extorted from him by the force of truth. His argument he confirmed by conſidering pain; which, being the contrary to pleaſure, all animals endeavoured to ſhun and eſcape. That is chiefly deſirable, he remarked, which is deſirable ultimately and on its own account. This deſcription peculiarly applies to pleaſure, which no one deſires for the ſake of any thing beyond itſelf, nor finds the neceſſity of aſſigning any reaſon why he ſhould enjoy it; pleaſure always carrying its own recommendation along with it, and rendering every object, however valuable, to which it is joined, ſtill more deſirable, not excepting virtue itſelf. As pleaſure improves every other good with which it is combined, it is manifeſtly a good in itſelf; a good not inferior to that which it heightens. Yet Plato employed a ſimilar argument to prove that pleaſure was not the ſupreme good; ſince pleaſure, joined with virtue, is better than alone and ſeparate; which cannot happen to the ſupreme good, a thing incapable of augmentation, and diſdaining admixture. But what is that good or happineſs which mankind, by the conſtitution of their nature, are beſt qualified for enjoying? This only is the queſtion with which we are concerned in the preſent treatiſe. Thoſe who deny that which all deſire, to be a part of this happineſs, ſhould take care leſt they fall into an abſurdity. For *that* we ſay is truth, which to all appears ſuch; and he who is diſſatisfied with this kind of proof will not eaſily meet with a better. If only creatures

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void of underſtanding purſued pleaſure, much might be plauſibly urged againſt it: but what ſhall we ſay, when we find it an object of deſire with the beſt and wiſeſt of the human race? Nay even irrational animals may afford perhaps a ſtrong argument in favour of it, ſince in purſuit of what is beſt for their nature, they are actuated by a wiſdom far ſuperior to their own[b]. The argument drawn from pain, which is the oppoſite to pleaſure, ſeems not liable to the objection made to it. The objectors ſay, that though pain be an evil, this is not any proof that pleaſure, its contrary, is a good; becauſe both contraries are often bad, and the good is often ſomething intermediate between them. But this obſervation, though true in many caſes, is not applicable to the preſent. For if both were evils, both would be objects of averſion; but the one, we ſee, is univerſally purſued as a good, and the other univerſally ſhunned as an evil.

Chap. 3.

The ambiguous nature of pleaſure.

It forms not any objection to pleaſure, that it is not one of thoſe indelible qualities by which things are characteriſed and diſtinguiſhed; for neither to the claſs of qualities can the energies and operations of virtue itſelf, which are ſo highly and ſo juſtly praiſed, in ſtrict philoſophical language, be aſcribed: no, nor happineſs itſelf, which is of all things moſt valuable. It is farther objected, that pleaſure is of a vague indefinite nature, admitting of various degrees of intenſity; whereas whatever is truly good, ought to be uniformly perceived, and accurately defined[c]. But juſtice, fortitude, and the other virtues admit of various degrees, when conſidered as attributes of the perſons in whom thoſe habits exiſt; the ſame is true of health; yet the health of the mind, as well as that of the body, conſidered abſtractedly

[b] See Analyſis, p. 114. and Conf. p. 134. & ſeq.

[c] See Analyſis, p. 112.

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abſtractedly in themſelves, are things ſufficiently definite, though they do not, in each individual, reach that ſtate of perfection which properly conſtitutes their nature [b]. The ſame thing may poſſibly hold with regard to pleaſure. It is further objected, that pleaſure is motion; and that all motions are imperfect, ſince they are only tendencies to certain ends [c]; whereas whatever is abſolutely good, ought to be complete and perfect in itſelf, independently of any ſeparate purpoſe for which it may ſerve. But, that pleaſure is motion, is not likely to be true; for all motion admits of ſlowneſs and celerity; ſince the motion of the univerſe itſelf, though it cannot be called ſwift or ſlow, abſtractedly conſidered, yet deſerves the former of thoſe epithets when compared with the peculiar motions which belong reſpectively to its parts [d]. But pleaſure is not characteriſed by either of theſe qualities. We may indeed be ſpeedily pleaſed, as we are ſpeedily made angry; and as walking, growing, or any other motion, is performed with celerity, in the ſame manner, we may rapidly change from a ſtate of indifference or pain, to a ſtate of pleaſure; but to the energy of pleaſure itſelf, that is, to pleaſure actually enjoyed, the epithets of ſwift or ſlow do not apply. This energy is complete in itſelf in every inſtant; and is not perfected by the accompliſhment of any diſtinct and ſeparate end, in which it terminates. It is therefore a thing totally different from generation or production, or motion of any kind; ſince all of theſe are mere changes of material ſubſtances, paſſing from one place, or one ſtate, to another; not indeed at random, but according to certain and fixed laws of motion and reſt, generation and corruption; ſo that from the ſame

[b] See Analyſis, p. 117. [c] Ibid. p. 119. [d] Ibid. p. 120. & ſeq.

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BOOK X.

ſame materials out of which any compound is generated, into the ſame, that compound is, by corruption, diſſolved[e]. If pleaſure then be generation, pain muſt be corruption; and that which is generated by pleaſure, muſt by pain be diſſolved into the ſame materials from which it was produced. But to ſpeak thus of pleaſure and pain, is to talk unintelligibly; and to confound immaterial with material things. It is ſaid alſo, that pain conſiſts in natural deficiencies or wants, and that pleaſure is nothing elſe but the ſupplying of theſe wants. But deficiency and fulneſs are plainly affections of body; and if pleaſure is the ſupply of corporeal deficiencies, that which receives the ſupply ought to feel the pleaſure, which therefore reſides in the body; a concluſion reſulting from the premiſes, but highly unreaſonable. Pleaſure, therefore, is not the ſupply of bodily wants, though it accompanies this ſupply; as pain, on the contrary, accompanies the laceration or maiming of the body. The opinion ſeems to have ariſen from conſidering the pain of hunger, and the pleaſure of feeding; the latter of which muſt always be preceded by the former. But all pleaſures are not preceded by pain; thoſe, for inſtance, of the intellectual kind; and even thoſe of the ſenſes of ſmelling, hearing, and ſeeing; beſides innumerable enjoyments, reſulting from pleaſing recollections, as well as from agreeable and animating hopes. Of what deficiencies can ſuch pleaſures be the ſupply, ſince previouſly to their exiſtence in us, there was not any thing defective? With regard to groſs and reproachable pleaſures, which our adverſaries may cite in proof of their erroneous theory, the very name of pleaſures may, with propriety, be denied to them; ſince they are acknowledged as ſuch only by men of corrupt minds

[e] Analyſis, p. 107. & ſeq.

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minds and perverſe ſentiments. Perſons diſeaſed are not fit judges of the reliſh of wholeſome food; nor is that white, which appears ſuch to thoſe afflicted with an ophthalmy. It may be obſerved alſo, that pleaſure is not deſirable, unleſs it proceed from an honourable, at leaſt an innocent ſource; any more than wealth is a good, when too dearly purchaſed by diſhoneſty. Different pleaſures are adapted to different characters. Juſt men only know the pleaſure of juſtice; as thoſe only who have an ear for muſic, enjoy the pleaſure of melody; the ſame differences are obſervable in other particulars. The very diſſimilar gratifications which we derive from friends and flatterers ſhow, that either pleaſure is not in itſelf deſirable, or that there muſt be pleaſures ſpecifically different from each other. A friend aims at promoting our good, a flatterer aims only at giving us pleaſure; and the behaviour of the one is as univerſally and as juſtly praiſed, as that of the other is univerſally and juſtly condemned. None worthy of the name of a man, would chooſe to have the underſtanding of a child, that he might ſpend his life happily in childiſh amuſements; nor would he ſubmit to do baſe actions, whatever pleaſure he might derive from them, and though aſſured that they ſhould never afterwards be followed by pain or puniſhment. But, on the other hand, he would deſire moſt earneſtly to have the uſe of his eye-ſight, of his memory, and of his underſtanding, as well as to be endowed and adorned with virtuous habits, although no pleaſure whatever reſulted from the exerciſe of thoſe capacities or powers. That this exerciſe is neceſſarily accompanied with pleaſure makes not any difference, ſince it is an object of deſire on its own account, and independently of the delight which neceſſarily attends it. It ſeems plain, therefore, that

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pleaſure is not the ſupreme good, nor that all kinds of pleaſures are deſirable; and that whether or no pleaſures are deſirable ultimately, and on their own account, depends on the ſource from whence they ſpring. Such are the opinions held concerning pleaſure and pain.

Chap. 4.

Pleaſure conſiſts in exerciſing the proper energies of our nature, which it improves and perfects.

But what pleaſure is in reality, and under what claſs of things it ought to be arranged, will more fully appear from the following induction. The act of ſeeing is perfect in every inſtant of time, needing nothing to give to it the ſpecific completion and fulneſs of which its nature is ſuſceptible. Such alſo is pleaſure, a whole, perfect in each inſtant, and not more perfect than at the firſt inſtant, how long ſoever it may be enjoyed. Pleaſure therefore is not motion, becauſe all motion co-exiſts with a certain portion of time; and tends to a certain end, in which it terminates, being, from its very nature, imperfect; becauſe, as ſoon as the end is effected, the motion by which it was attained ceaſes to exiſt[f]. Thus of the art of building, the end is a houſe; and until the houſe is made, the building is imperfect; but when the houſe is built, the action or motion by which it was produced ceaſes to exiſt: and the parts of that action or motion are, until the whole is finiſhed, each different from another, and each imperfect in itſelf; as rearing the walls, chamfering the pillars, building the dome; all of which, as well as laying the foundation and adding the ornaments, are but parts of one action, which, taken together, conſtitute a whole, when the work is completed. The ſame holds, with regard to that kind of motion which conſiſts in change of place, and its various modes, namely, walking, jumping, flying, and others of that ſort; each of which conſiſts of imperfect parts, ſpecifically

[f] Analyſis, p. 117. & ſeq.

ſically different from each other, and from the whole collectively. Thus, in the Olympic race, a different part of the ſtadium is run over in each particle of time, till the goal is attained; and as each part is different from another, ſo muſt the motions performed in them be all different; nay, though the ſame part be run over, yet if the racer proceed, in the one caſe, from the ſtarting-poſt to the goal, and in the other, from the goal to the ſtarting-poſt, a difference in the motions muſt ariſe from the difference in their directions. But concerning motion, we have treated accurately in another work[a]. Pleaſure is manifeſtly a thing quite different; ſince it is complete in each *indiviſible now*, that is, in each inſtant; not requiring for its perfection any the ſmalleſt portion of time: but motion, as we have elſewhere proved, cannot exiſt without time or ſucceſſion. In the ſame manner, the act of viſion, a point, and an unit, are things which have not any connection with generation, nor any kind of motion; every modification of which muſt belong to things not eſſentially wholes, but partible; and to them only. Of this kind is pleaſure, eſſentially a whole, ſince eſſentially perfect; accompanying the operation of each percipient with regard to the perceptible object, when both the perceiving power is properly conſtituted, and the perceptible object the faireſt and the beſt on which that ſpecific act of perception can poſſibly be exerciſed[b]. To ſay that the perceiving power exerciſes its energies, or the ſubſtance in which that power reſides, makes not any difference as to the preſent ſubject. Pleaſure accompanies every act of perception by ſenſe in a higher or lower degree, in proportion to the prevalence of the conditions above ſtated; and alſo every act of reaſoning or intelligence.

But

[a] Analyſis, p. 119 & ſeq. [b] Ibid. p. 51, & ſeq.

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BOOK X.

But as the phyſician and the medicines which he preſcribes, are in different ſenſes the cauſes of health, ſo our percipient powers are enlivened and perfected in a different manner by the proper objects of thoſe powers, and by the pleaſure attending our perception of them. Each ſenſe has its appropriate pleaſure: the eye is delighted by ſights; the ear by ſounds; and in proportion to the ſoundneſs and vigour of the ſenſe itſelf, as well as the beauty and excellence of the object on which it is exerciſed, the pleaſure will be the greater; but pleaſure there always muſt be, wherever the agent and the object are naturally adapted to each other. Pleaſure does not perfect our energiſing powers as a pre-acquired habit, but rather as a ſupervenient end; in the ſame manner as beauty accompanies the flower of youth. The powers of man are not capable of unceaſing activity, and therefore our pleaſures cannot be continuous, for they are inſeparably connected with our energies. Things which delight when new, often ceaſe to give pleaſure, and that becauſe our attention is no longer rouſed by their preſence, nor the energies of our mind called forth in contemplating them. They are diſregarded as an old and familiar ſhow; and in proportion to the weakneſs of our exertions, our pleaſure is blunted. It may be ſuſpected that all love pleaſure, becauſe all are fond of life, which conſiſts in exerciſing the energies of our nature. Life then is energy, which each individual exerciſes on thoſe ſubjects in which he moſt delights; the muſician, on melodies; the mathematician, on theorems; and others, on other ſubjects. Pleaſure therefore is naturally deſirable, becauſe it perfects our energies, that is our life, in the continuance of which all delight. But whether life is deſired for the ſake of pleaſure, or pleaſure for the ſake of life, needs not at preſent be examined; ſince

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since these two seem so intimately combined as not to admit of separation. Pleasure, then, cannot exist without energy; and our energies are strengthened and perfected by the pleasures accompanying them. BOOK X.

It seems to follow from these observations, that as energies or actions widely differ from each other, so must also the pleasures by which they are perfected. This holds in the several operations both of nature and of art, the different kinds of which respectively terminate in different and appropriate ends; namely, animals, plants, pictures, statues, houses, and furniture. The action of the senses, or what is called perception by sense, manifestly differs from the action of the understanding; and the pleasures respectively accompanying those operations, bear a near affinity to the operations which they respectively accompany; for each operation or energy is encreased, improved, and perfected by a pleasure that is a-kin to it. Thus the exertions of the geometer, the musician, and the architect, are enlivened and invigorated by the delight which they take in their respective pursuits; and the cultivators of those sciences thereby improve themselves gradually, until they attain the most consummate skill, and most decided pre-eminence. But pleasures, on the other hand, which are not a-kin to the operations which they accompany, are so far from improving and perfecting them, that, on the contrary, they weaken and obstruct them. Thus, those who are agreeably employed in reading or study, cannot, if they are lovers of music, persevere in applying to their books and meditations, should they happen to hear at a distance an agreeable melody; for the two pleasures not being a-kin, the stronger overpowers the weaker. Wherefore, when we are much delighted with one thing, we cannot attend to any Chap. 5.

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any other. At a well acted play the mind is fixed in delightful tranſport, but when the ſtage players are bad, many ſpectators amuſe themſelves with ſweetmeats[1]. Pleaſures not a-kin to the operations which they accompany, have the ſame effect (though they produce it differently) with congenial pains; for theſe alſo have a tendency to weaken and deſtroy our energies. Thus, thoſe to whom it is painful to write or to reaſon, have little inclination to do either, and commonly do them incorrectly. Of operations and the pleaſures accompanying them, ſome are laudable and reſpectable; others are blameable and contemptible. The former are to be purſued, and the latter to be avoided. Pleaſures are more a-kin to energies, than even the deſires which precede them; for theſe deſires are eaſily diſtinguiſhable from the energies which they prompt, both in their own nature and in point of time; whereas pleaſures and energies are ſo difficultly ſeparated even in thought, that many ſuppoſe them to be one and the ſame thing. They are indeed intimately connected; but as energies both of ſenſe and intellect are often not only unpleaſant but painful, it is abſurd to think that pleaſure and energy are the ſame, though the former cannot ſubſiſt without the latter. But it is of more importance to obſerve that the nature and qualities of our pleaſures depend entirely on the nature and qualities of our energies. In this manner the pleaſures of the ſight differ in purity from thoſe of the touch; and the pleaſures of the ear from thoſe of the palate; while the intellect affords pleaſures totally diſſimilar to any reſulting from the ſenſes. As each animal is endowed with peculiar energies, each having his appropriate work to effect, and his aſſigned taſk to perform, ſo each ſpecies is deſtined for the enjoyment of congenial and kindred pleaſures; thoſe of a man

[1] Ariſtotle ſays, "they do ſo moſt when the players are bad."

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man differing ſpecifically from the pleaſures of the horſe or the dog, the animals with which he is moſt familiar. As Heraclitus ſays, an aſs would prefer ſtraw to gold, loving food more than money. But among individuals of the ſame ſpecies it might be expected that the ſame effects ſhould follow from the ſame cauſes; and that there ſhould be a complete community of pleaſures as well as of pains. Yet in the human race we find the thing far otherwiſe; one loving what another moſt deteſts, and that giving pain to one, which affords the moſt exquiſite pleaſure to another. This however need not appear extraordinary, if we conſider that the ſame food has a very different reliſh to a man in health, and to another in diſeaſe; and that the warmth agreeable to perſons of weak conſtitutions, is unpleaſant to thoſe of a firmer temperament. Innumerable other examples to the ſame purpoſe will occur; with regard to all which, we affirm *that* only to be right, which appears ſo to perſons rightly formed and properly conſtituted. Virtue therefore, and the man of virtue as ſuch, is the only natural and correct ſtandard; and thoſe only are true enjoyments, with which he is delighted. That the purſuits which *he* rejects and ſpurns, ſhould to others afford gratification, is not to be wondered at, ſince human nature is liable to corruptions and depravities of many kinds; and each corrupt individual will delight in pleaſures akin to the ſpecific depravity under which he labours[1]; which are pleaſures indeed to him, but to none beſides. But the queſtion is, what are the pleaſures of a man in his natural and moſt perfect ſtate? That they are inſeparably connected with his energies, we have above proved; ſo that if

[1] —— Mala mentis
Gaudia. VIRG. vi. 78.

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if there be peculiar works to be performed by a man, and peculiar taſks aſſigned to him, his proper and natural pleaſures muſt conſiſt in the operations by which his work is done, and his taſk accompliſhed. Other pleaſures are only ſecondary, and ſeparated by a wide interval.

Chap. 6.

Of happineſs;

Having examined the nature of virtue, friendſhip, and pleaſure, it remains to ſpeak of happineſs, the end, as we obſerved, of all human purſuits. Our diſcourſe will be rendered more conciſe by reſuming ſome concluſions already ſtated. Happineſs, we ſaid, conſiſts, not in mere capacity unrouſed, or in mere habit unexerciſed; for were that the caſe, it might belong to a man who ſhould remain for ever aſleep, living the life of a plant, or involved in the greateſt calamities; ſince a man thus circumſtanced might be endowed with the nobleſt capacities, and moſt excellent and moſt honourable habits. Happineſs, then, muſt be claſſed with operations or energies, ſome of which, as we already remarked, are neceſſary for the attainment of farther and diſtinct ends, and others are deſirable merely on their own account; with which laſt, happineſs is, manifeſtly, to be numbered. Energies terminating in themſelves, and deſirable merely on their own account, include all the amiable and laudable actions which proceed from confirmed habits of virtue; they appear alſo to include thoſe innocent amuſements which are ſought ſo entirely for their own ſake, that men often purſue them to the prejudice of their health or fortune. In ſuch amuſements it is common for the wealthy and powerful to place the principal enjoyment of life, and perſons moſt dexterous in promoting them are not unfrequently the higheſt in eſteem with princes; ſince they are the beſt qualified for ſupplying them with thoſe gratifications, of which they have the ſtrongeſt reliſh.

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reliſh. In ſuch amuſements the vulgar, too, are apt to place happineſs, becauſe they ſee them purſued as ſuch by thoſe who, in the gifts of fortune, are greatly their ſuperiors. But neither the vulgar nor the great ought to ſerve for models. Virtue, intellect, ardent feelings of the heart, and exalted energies of the mind, are not appendages of greatneſs; and though men inveſted with power, but incapable of taſting genuine and liberal pleaſure, often ſeek delight in groſs gratifications of ſenſe, this affords not any proof that ſuch deluſive purſuits are entitled to a juſt preference. Children think all things inferior in value to their own childiſh amuſements; and as different objects pleaſe men and children, ſo good and bad men might be expected to have very different delights; but, as we have often ſaid, thoſe things only are truly valuable and truly delightful, which are recognized as ſuch by men of virtuous habits; for, as our habits are, ſuch will be our pleaſures and our purſuits. Happineſs, then, cannot conſiſt in mere recreative paſtime; for it is abſurd to think that all our ſerious exertions and ſtrenuous labours ſhould terminate in ſo frivolous an end [k]. We do not labour that we may be idle; but, as Anacharſis juſtly ſaid, we are idle that we may labour with more effect; that is, we have recourſe to ſports and amuſements as refreſhing cordials after contentious exertions, that having repoſed in ſuch diverſions for a while, we may recommence our labours with encreaſed vigour [l]. The weakneſs of human nature requires frequent remiſſions of energy; but theſe reſts and pauſes are only the better to prepare us for enjoying the pleaſures of activity. The amuſements of life

[k] Neque enim ita generati à natura ſumus, ut ad ludum et jocum facti eſſe videamur. Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. 29.

[l] Ludo autem et joco, uti illo quidem licet; ſed ſicut ſomno et quietibus cæteris. Ibid.

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life therefore are but preludes to its buſineſs, the place of which they cannot poſſibly ſupply; and its happineſs, becauſe its buſineſs, conſiſts in the exerciſe of thoſe virtuous energies, which conſtitute the worth and dignity of our nature. Inferior pleaſures may be enjoyed by the fool and the ſlave, as completely as by the hero or the ſage. But who will aſcribe the happineſs of a man to him, who, by his character and condition, is diſqualified for manly purſuits?

Chap. 7.

intellectual;

'If happineſs conſiſts in virtuous energies, the greateſt human happineſs muſt conſiſt in the exerciſe of the greateſt virtue in man; which muſt be the virtue or perfection of his beſt part, whether this be intellect, or whatever principle it be, that is deſtined to command and bear ſway; having knowledge of things beautiful and divine, as being either divine itſelf, or at leaſt that principle in us which moſt approximates to divinity. The greateſt human happineſs, then, is theoretic and intellectual; which well accords with the properties which we formerly found, by inveſtigation, to be eſſentially inherent in that moſt coveted object. The intellect is the beſt principle in man; its energies are the ſtrongeſt, and the objects about which it is converſant are far the moſt ſublime. The energies of intellect are alſo the longeſt and moſt continuous, ſince we can perſevere in theoriſing and thinking much longer than in performing any action whatever. Pleaſure, it was obſerved, muſt be an ingredient in happineſs; but contemplative wiſdom offers pleaſures the moſt admirable in purity and ſtability, and the pleaſures of knowledge continually encreaſe in proportion to our improvement in it; certainty concerning the ſublimeſt truths affording ſtill higher delight in proportion to the intenſe efforts of intellect by which they were diſcovered. That all-ſufficiency, which we remarked as a property of happineſs, belongs to intellectual energies

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energies more than to any other; for though the ſage, as well as the moraliſt or the patriot, ſtands in need of bodily accommodations, yet in exerting his higheſt excellencies, he is not like them dependant on fortune, both for his objects and his inſtruments; for objects towards whom he may exerciſe his virtues, and inſtruments which may enable him to effectuate his ends. Even unaſſiſted and alone, though perhaps better with aſſiſtants, he can ſtill think and theorize; poſſeſſing in the energies of his own mind, the pureſt and moſt independant enjoyments. Theſe enjoyments are valuable peculiarly on their own account, ſince they terminate completely in themſelves; whereas all practical virtue has, beſide the practice itſelf, ſome diſtinct and ſeparate end in view. The tranquillity of leiſure is naturally more agreeable than the buſtle of buſineſs; we toil for the ſake of quiet, and make war for the ſake of peace. But the practical virtues are moſt conſpicuouſly exerciſed in political and military functions, the latter of which none but the moſt ſavage and ſanguinary minds would ſubmit to from choice, converting friends into enemies for the mere pleaſure of fighting with them. Politics, too, forms an operoſe and troubleſome occupation, which would not be undertaken from the ſole love of exerciſing political functions, independently of diſtinct and ſeparate ends; power, wealth, and honour; in one word, proſperity to ourſelves, friends, or fellow-citizens. But intellectual energies are complete and perfect in themſelves, ſupplying an exhauſtleſs ſtream of pure and perennial pleaſure, which in its turn invigorates and enlivens the energies, and thus encreaſes and refines the ſource from which it unceaſingly ſprings; all-ſufficient, peaceful, and permanent, as far as is compatible with the condition of humanity. Were unalterable permanency

added

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added to such a life, its happiness would be more than human; but even within a limited term, its inestimable delights may be enjoyed by those who attain the perfection of their age and faculties; living not merely as partners with a frail and compound nature, but according to the simple and divine principle within them, whose energies and virtues as far transcend all others, as the intellectual substance in which they reside excels all other substances of which our frame is composed [m]. We ought not, therefore, according to the vulgar exhortation, though mortal, to regard only mortal things; but as far as possible, to put on immortality, exerting ourselves to taste the joys of the intellectual life. This is living according to the best part of what we call ourselves, which, though seemingly small in bulk, is incomparably greater in power and in value than all things besides [n]. The intellect indeed is the best and sovereign part of our constitution, and therefore strictly and properly ourselves. It is absurd therefore to prefer any other life to our own. What was above observed will apply here. The pleasure and good of each individual must consist in that which is most congenial to his nature [o]. The intellectual life, therefore, must be the best and happiest for man; since the intellect is that which is peculiarly himself.

Chap. 8. and moral.

The moral life follows next, both in fitness and in dignity; for the practice of justice, fortitude, and other virtues, are highly

[m] Analysis, p. 50. & seq. [n] Ibid.

[o] In the third chapter of the third book of the Topics, p. 209, there is an excellent practical rule for distinguishing real goods from those merely of opinion, και ει το μεν δι' εαυτο, το δι, δια την δοξαν αιρετον· οιον υγιεια καλλος, ορος δε του, προς δοξαν, το, μηδενος συνειδοτος, μη αν σπουδασαι υπαρχειν. Things desirable in themselves are to be preferred to those which are desired merely on account of the opinion entertained of them, as health to beauty; but we may know what those things are that are good merely in opinion, by the following test, "they are those about which we would not give ourselves much trouble, if no person were to know that we possessed them."

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highly ſuitable to the nature of man, and eſſentially requiſite in ſocial intercourſe, that mutual wants may be ſupplied, and mutual duties may be performed; that individual paſſions may be regulated with propriety, and rendered as ornamental to thoſe affected by them, as beneficial to the public. Moral virtue, then, is intimately connected with the paſſions and affections, many of which have their origin in the body; and, on the other hand, it is equally connected with the intellectual virtue of prudence; ſince the firſt principles of this practical wiſdom originate in good moral habits; and thoſe habits only are good which prudence juſtifies and approves. The moral virtues, therefore, are eſſential to the well-being of our compound nature; but the virtues and happineſs of the intellect are, like the intellect itſelf, ſeparate and independent: thus much only I ſhall ſay concerning it, for to treat more accurately of our intellectual part, belongs not to the ſubject of the preſent diſcourſe. The happineſs reſulting from its energies, requires but few external advantages; fewer by far than are requiſite for the exerciſe of political or moral virtues. The ſage indeed, as well as the patriot, muſt be furniſhed with the neceſſaries of life; and although the labours of the latter have more connection with the body and its wants, yet this circumſtance need not make any great difference in their perſonal accommodations; but it will make a difference of the greateſt magnitude as to the exerciſe of their reſpective energies. For the man of liberality muſt be furniſhed with the means of beneficence; and the man of probity or equity, with the means of making, for received favours, fair and reaſonable returns; mere intentions are obſcure and doubtful; and being often pretended, can only be clearly aſcertained when carried into effect. In the ſame

Pre-eminence of the former proved.

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manner, fortitude ſhines moſt conſpicuouſly when armed with power to repel dangers; and temperance diſplays its brighteſt charms, amidſt temptations to voluptuouſneſs. The vulgar controverſy, whether virtue conſiſts principally in action or intention, proves that both are requiſite to its completion. But actions are dependent on external circumſtances; and the greater and more illuſtrious they are, they require, for their performance, the greater number of inſtruments and auxiliaries. Speculation, on the other hand, is far leſs operoſe; it would be rather obſtructed than benefited by a cumberſome apparatus of externals; which, how uſeful ſoever they may be for the diſplay of practical virtue, are not at all eſſential to the exerciſe of intellectual energy. That the latter compoſes the beſt and firmeſt portion of human felicity may appear alſo from this, that it is difficult to conceive in what operation or energy beſides, the felicity of the gods, whom univerſal conſent acknowledges moſt happy, can poſſibly conſiſt. In the exerciſe of juſtice? It would be ridiculous to ſuppoſe thoſe celeſtial beings employed in making bargains, reſtoring depoſits, or in performing any other actions about which the virtue of juſtice is converſant. There is, if poſſible, ſtill leſs room among them for courage. Can it redound to their glory, that they encounter dangers manfully? Liberality cannot be aſcribed to them, unleſs we ſuppoſe, abſurdly, that they make uſe of money, or ſomething equivalent. The praiſe of temperance is beneath thoſe who have not any unruly appetites to reſtrain. Were we to go through the whole catalogue of the moral virtues, we ſhould find that they are converſant about actions totally unworthy of the grandeur and ſublimity of the gods. Yet we all believe thoſe glorious beings to live exerciſing the

The exerciſe of intellectual energy the beſt and firmeſt portion of human happineſs.

energies

energies of their nature, not ſleeping like Endymion. After what manner, then, can they be employed? Not in practical virtue, far leſs in productive induſtry. It remains therefore that they live an intellectual life; which, as eſſentially belonging to the gods, muſt be pre-eminent in happineſs; a happineſs pure and permanent, to which the life of man, in proportion as it is intellectual, will more nearly approximate; and of which inferior animals, as they are deſtitute of the divine principle of intellect, can never in any degree partake. Happineſs is not an acceſſory to the energy of thought. It is connected with it ſubſtantially and indiviſibly; a rich ſtream, unalterably flowing from an inexhauſtible ſpring. The ſage indeed requires bodily health and bodily accommodations; but the meaſure of his external advantages needs not be large; for ſuperfluity will neither aſſiſt his own exertions, nor ſharpen his judgment concerning the performances of others. To diſplay the beauty and gracefulneſs even of moral virtue, it is not neceſſary for him to be maſter of the ſea and of the land. A mediocrity of circumſtances is ſufficient for the exhibition of moral excellencies; which is evident from this, that they appear more frequently in private perſons than in thoſe inveſted with power. This mediocrity, therefore, as it contributes moſt to virtue, is moſt conducive to happineſs. Solon well delineated the condition of thoſe whoſe happineſs he admired, ſaying, "that they had enjoyed a moderate proportion of the goods of fortune, performed moſt illuſtrious actions, and lived correctly and ſoberly[o]." Anaxagoras ſeems not to have thought happineſs an attribute of wealth or power, when he ſaid[p], that it would not ſurpriſe him,

[o] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. i. c. vii. p. 305 and 306.

[p] In the Ethics to Eudemus, l. i. c. iv. p. 197. the circumſtance here alluded to is more

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him, ſhould he be deemed a very abſurd perſonage by the multitude; who judge, and who are capable of judging, only by externals. The opinions of wiſe men are likely to be conformable to reaſon; but in practical matters, experience alone can afford conviction; and thoſe opinions only are to be approved, which the lives of thoſe who hold them, confirm. There is ſtill a farther reaſon why thoſe who moſt cultivate their intellectual powers ſhould alſo be moſt happy; for ſuch perſons not only attain the beſt temper of mind, and the higheſt perfection of their own nature, but they are alſo the moſt pleaſing in the ſight of the Divinity. If the gods (as they appear to do) concern themſelves about human affairs, it is reaſonable to conclude that they ſhould moſt delight in the energies of intellect, which are the beſt, and higheſt, and moſt congenial to their own; and that they ſhould remunerate and reward thoſe who love and honour thoſe exereiſes and occupations which they themſelves hold dear; and who, in preferring and adorning the intellectual part, act rightly and honourably [q].

Having

more fully explained. "Anaxagoras of Clazomené, being aſked who moſt deſerved the epithet of happy? anſwered, not ſuch men as you would imagine, but, on the contrary, ſuch perſons as to you would appear egregious fools. He probably anſwered thus, becauſe he perceived him with whom he was converſing incapable of appreciating happineſs by any other ſtandard than that of mere externals, power, wealth, beauty, &c. whereas he himſelf thought *that* man the happieſt who lived exempt from pain or perturbation, practiſing juſtice, and cultivating his underſtanding."

[q] The higheſt energy of intellect conſiſts in contemplating the Divinity; and when any inferior principle in man, through its rebellion and irregularity, reſtrains him from thus meditating on and worſhipping God, that principle is deſtructive of human happineſs. Eudem. l. vii. c. ult.

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Having thus delineated virtue, friendſhip, and pleaſure, ought we to conſider our undertaking as now finiſhed? Or ought we rather to conſider, as has been already ſaid, that in practical matters, practice, and not theory, is the main object; and that, independently of good actions, the mere ſpeculative knowledge of virtue is not of any avail. The important queſtion then is, how men may be rendered virtuous? If moral diſcourſes ſufficed for this purpoſe, they could not be purchaſed, as Theognis ſays, at too high a price. But the influence of ſuch leſſons extends only over the liberal minds of ingenuous and well-diſciplined youths, who may thereby be retained within the paths of honour and duty: they are too feeble to controul the multitude, whoſe wickedneſs is to be reſtrained, not through the dread of ſhame, but through the fear of puniſhment; ſince the many, being enſlaved by their appetites, make it the buſineſs of their lives to purſue ſenſual pleaſures, and to avoid bodily pains; having no taſte nor perception of refined and laudable enjoyments. What eloquence can perſuade, what words can transform men thus brutified? It is impoſſible, at leaſt hardly poſſible, for reaſoning to extract the evils which cuſtom has riveted; and when all favourable circumſtances concur, the felicity of thoſe is ſtill worthy of envy, who, through the combined energy of conſpiring cauſes, are retained and confirmed in the practice of virtue. This ineſtimable poſſeſſion, ſome aſcribe to the bounty of nature; others think that that they have acquired it by cuſtom; and a third claſs acknowledge themſelves indebted for it to inſtruction. The virtue beſtowed by nature evidently depends not on our own exertions; it is given by a certain divine diſpoſal, to thoſe

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whoſe lot is ſurely beyond that of all other men moſt fortunate. Inſtruction and reaſoning will not ſucceed, unleſs the mind is previouſly wrought on by cuſtom, as a field is ploughed and prepared for receiving and nouriſhing the good ſeed: for thoſe who are not habituated to love what is amiable, and to deteſt what is odious, would neither liſten to, nor underſtand, exhortations to virtue; becauſe their affections lead them not beyond the purſuit of courſe animal gratifications, the unreſtrained appetite for which is of too ſtubborn a nature to yield to mere reaſon; and which, when no contrary paſſion intervenes, can be checked only by force. Before virtue therefore can be acquired, affections congenial to it muſt be implanted; the love of beauty and excellence, the hatred of baſeneſs and deformity; which preparatory diſcipline cannot take place, except in thoſe ſtates which

Of laws.

are governed by good laws; for a life of ſoberneſs and ſelf-command is irkſome to the multitude, and peculiarly unpleaſing to the headſtrong impetuoſity of youthful paſſions, which muſt therefore be bridled by the authority of law; that what is painful by nature, may become pleaſant through cuſtom. The ſuperintending aid of diſcipline ought not to be confined to children, but muſt extend to adoleſcence and manhood; the greater proportion of human kind remaining through life rather ſlaves to neceſſity, than ſubjects of reaſon; and more ſuſceptible of the fear of puniſhment, than ſenſible to the charms of moral excellence. Legiſlators, therefore, it is ſaid, ought to employ admonitions and chaſtiſements, as well as puniſhments that are final; admonitions, for thoſe whoſe character and morals render them open to conviction; chaſtiſements, for thoſe whoſe immoderate and beaſtly paſſion for ſelfiſh

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ſelfiſh pleaſures muſt be ſubdued and corrected by coarſe bodily pains; (the pains inflicted on them ſtanding as nearly as poſſible in direct oppoſition to the pleaſures which they unlawfully purſued;) and total extermination, or perpetual baniſhment, for the extreme evils of incurable profligacy and incorrigible villany. Since then the condition of the greater proportion of mankind is ſuch, that to be kept within the bounds of propriety and virtue, they require not only the benefits of early inſtitution, but the watchfulneſs of perpetual diſcipline through life, good laws become eſſentially neceſſary for upholding this diſcipline by their coercive authority. The influence of fathers over their children is too feeble for that purpoſe; or indeed the influence of any individuals not inveſted with public authority. Law has a compulſive and neceſſary force, ſince it is acknowledged as the commanding voice of prudence and reaſon; and its power is not invidious, like that of men, who are apt to offend us, when they oppoſe, even moſt juſtly, our favourite propenſities. In Lacedæmon, the legiſlator, with the aſſiſtance of a few friends, eſtabliſhed a regular plan of public education and moral diſcipline; things neglected in the greater part of ſtates, where men, in theſe particulars, live like the Cyclops:

> By whom no ſtatutes and no rights are known,
> No council held, no monarch fills the throne;
> Each rules his race, his neighbour not his care,
> Heedleſs of others, to his own ſevere.
>
> Iliad ix. v. 127, & ſeq.

A public education, when good, is doubtleſs preferable to a private one; but what is omitted by the public, individuals ought, as far as poſſible, to ſupply; inſtructing and benefiting their

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their children and friends; which taſk they will be the better qualified to perform, if they are acquainted with thoſe principles of legiſlation from which public happineſs flows; for the ſame principles that operate conſpicuouſly on nations, will alſo have their due weight within a narrow domeſtic ſphere, eſpecially ſince the ties of blood, and the remembrance of benefits, will recommend paternal examples, and enforce paternal admonitions. Private education enjoys this peculiar advantage, that it may be adapted to the diſpoſition and character of each individual. Beſides this, phyſicians who have few patients, and maſters of exerciſes who have few ſcholars, are moſt likely to be attentive to thoſe intruſted to their care. But their power of being uſeful to them depends on their ſkill in their reſpective profeſſions; and although ſome, from experience merely, without ſcience, may learn to be good phyſicians to themſelves, while they are incapable of curing any beſides, yet it is always moſt deſirable, whether it be our buſineſs to benefit one or many, to inſtruct one or many, that we ſhould underſtand thoſe general theorems from which the particular rules of practice flow. A teacher of morality therefore ought to be acquainted with the ſcience of legiſlation, that he may apply to the improvement of individuals the ſame maxims which have been found beneficial to communities. But how is this ſcience to be acquired? It ſeems to be a branch of politics, and ought therefore to be learned from ſtateſmen. Yet do not ſtateſmen differ from phyſicians, painters, and all thoſe employed in other liberal arts, or other learned profeſſions, in this important particular, that all the reſt not only exerciſe but teach their reſpective vocations? whereas ſtateſmen are never

The ſcience of legiſlation, how to be acquired.

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never the teachers of politics, nor are the teachers of politics often employed in affairs of ſtate. The ſophiſts who profeſs politics, take not any ſhare in the public adminiſtration; and the ſtateſmen, who adminiſter public affairs, do not profeſs politics; they neither give lectures on the ſubject, nor write treatiſes concerning it; although this employment would be more uſeful and more dignified than that of poliſhing their pleadings and embelliſhing their ſpeeches. Neither do they tranſmit their political knowledge to their children and friends, which they certainly would, if they were able, ſince they could not bequeath to them a nobler preſent, nor one more beneficial to their country. It is plain, therefore, that the knowledge of ſtateſmen is a matter, not of ſcience, (which always may be taught,) but of experience merely; and this experience, which is ſufficient to form politicians, muſt be eſſentially neceſſary to thoſe who would underſtand politics as a ſcience. The ſophiſts who pretend to teach this ſcience, deviate widely from the mark. They neither know what is the nature of politics, nor what are its objects; otherwiſe they could not regard it as a ſubordinate branch of rhetoric, nor think it an eaſy matter to copy good laws from one ſtate, that may be ſafely adopted by another[r]; as if it were not a work of the utmoſt delicacy, and requiring much reach of thought, and much experience, to adapt laws and inſtitutions to occaſions and exigencies, and to change and vary them according to each variation of circumſtance. In muſic and painting, the vulgar of mankind are contented with perceiving the effect, which is the only thing of which

[r] How ſtrongly applicable is this remark to the ſophiſts of the preſent day!

they

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they are judges; but perſons ſkilled in thoſe elegant arts muſt underſtand how this effect is produced, what colours kindly blend, and what ſounds ſweetly harmonize. Laws are productions or works of political art; an art which, being practical, cannot, any more than the art of phyſic, be learned merely from books; for though medical books not only contain recipes or preſcriptions, but accurately diſtinguiſhing different habits and different maladies, diſtinctly point out how each ſeparately is to be treated and cured, yet all theſe obſervations cannot be of the ſmalleſt uſe to men totally deſtitute of experience in the healing art. The ſame holds with regard to treatiſes on the ſubject of politics, which cannot be of much value to thoſe who have not learned by their own obſervation to appreciate and apply them. An aptitude and readineſs for acquiring knowledge, books, doubtleſs, may communicate and augment; but real practical knowledge cannot poſſibly be acquired without the aid of experience. As our predeceſſors, therefore, have left the ſcience of legiſlation unfiniſhed, it may be proper here to examine it, as well as to treat the ſubject of politics in general, that the philoſophy which bears a reference to the affairs of human life may be perfected to the beſt of our ability. We ſhall firſt collect what appears to us judiciouſly written by others on particular branches of the ſubject. We ſhall, then, from a wide ſurvey of commonwealths and governments, endeavour to explain the means through which thoſe political edifices in general, and the different kinds of them in particular, are preſerved or ſubverted; as well as to unfold the cauſes which render ſome conſtitutions worthy of applauſe, and others liable to cenſure. The reſult of our ſpeculations will enable us to determine which

Tranſition to the treatiſe on "Politics."

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is the beſt form of government; and what are the different regulations reſpectively beſt adapted to each particular conſtitution [a].

[a] The method here laid down by Ariſtotle agrees not preciſely, either with that followed by the editors of his Politics in Greek, or with the arrangement which, for the ſake of perſpicuity, I thought fit to give to my tranſlation.

In the act of finiſhing this firſt volume, I was much pleaſed to read the following paſſage in an excellent diſcourſe lately delivered before the Univerſity of Cambridge: "Ariſtotle's Nicomachean Ethics afford not only the moſt perfect ſpecimen of ſcientific morality, but exhibit alſo the powers of the moſt compact and beſt conſtructed ſyſtem which the human intellect ever produced upon any ſubject; enlivening occaſionally great ſeverity of method, and ſtrict preciſion of terms, by the ſublimeſt, though ſobereſt, ſplendour of diction. If moral philoſophy, I mean ſpecifically and properly ſo called, is to be ſtudied as a ſcience, in ſuch ſources it is to be ſought. Thence will be formed a manly intellectual vigour, an ingenuous modeſty and dignity of habit, an energy of thought and diction, and a reach of comprehenſive knowledge, which diſtinguiſhes the true Engliſh ſcholar. On the contrary, it is to be feared that the feeble ſpeculation which almoſt all modern ſyſtems of morality encourage, and the ſuperficial information they afford, ſuperſeding the neceſſity of all active and real employment of the faculties, have operated more fatally upon the mental habits of the riſing generation than total ignorance could poſſibly have done." See "Benevolence excluſively an Evangelical Virtue," p. 19, & ſeq. by Thomas Rennell, D. D. late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge.

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